SECOND DIVISION
[A.M. No. P-17-3631. July 10, 2019.]
ROLEN C. PAULINO, complainant, vs.CLERK OF COURT ALEXANDER C. RIMANDO, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES, OLONGAPO CITY, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated10 July 2019which reads as follows:
"A.M. No. P-17-3631 (Rolen C. Paulino vs. Clerk of Court Alexander C. Rimando, Office of the Clerk of Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Olongapo City)
Complainant Rolen C. Paulino, then Vice-Mayor of Olongapo City, charges respondent Alex Rimando, Clerk of Court, Office of the Clerk of Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Olongapo City with Grave Abuse of Authority and Usurpation. Complainant essentially alleges:
On August 2, 2005, a demolition team headed by respondent Sheriff Alex Rimando arrived at Sitio Maliwakat, new Cabalan to implement the Special Order of Demolition issued by Judge Ramon S. Caguioa, Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, Olongapo City. In his capacity as then Vice-Mayor of Olongapo City, he went to the area because one of the affected families asked him to talk to the demolition team to allow the affected families to do the demolition themselves so they could salvage some materials which may still be of use to them.
He asked respondent to heed the request of the affected residents, but respondent plainly ignored him. In a high-handed manner respondent ordered his men: "Putang Ina, Tuloy ang Trabaho!" He was constrained to introduce himself to respondent as the Vice-Mayor of Olongapo City. But respondent sharply retorted "Walang Vice-Mayor, Vice-Mayor, utos ito ni Davide." Then using a sledge hammer, respondent crashed the structures which used to serve as dwellings of the affected families.
He subsequently discovered that respondent was not deputized to implement the order of demolition since at that time he was assigned as City Sheriff for the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Olongapo City. 1
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) directed respondent to file his comment on the complaint. Respondent requested three (3) extensions of time within which to file the required comment. His requests were all granted, albeit in the end, respondent still failed to submit his comment.
By Resolution dated August 1, 2007, the Court directed respondent to show cause why he should not be administratively dealt with for refusing to submit his comment despite several directives from the OCA, and to submit said comment within five (5) days from notice. But as he was wont to do, respondent never complied.
On August 27, 2008, the Court considered respondent to have waived his right to file comment on the complaint and referred the same to OCA for evaluation, report, and recommendation. 2
Memorandum of the Office of the3
The OCA found respondent Alexander C. Rimando guilty of discourtesy and insubordination, viz.:
Under the Civil Service Rules, discourtesy in the course of official business is a less grave offense punishable with suspension from one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months. Considering that this is the first time that respondent Rimando is being found guilty of discourtesy in the course of official duties, the penalty of one (1) month and one (1) day is proper.
Refusal to comply with the Court's directives constitutes insubordination, which is a defiance of authority. It is also a less grave offense punishable by suspension of one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months. And considering that this is likewise the first time that respondent Rimando is being held liable for insubordination, suspension of one (1) month and one (1) day would be in order.
All told, we find respondent Rimando guilty of discourtesy in the course of official duties and insubordination which are considered less grave offenses and penalized with suspension for the same period. Based on the records, however, respondent Rimando can no longer serve the penalty of suspension, it appearing that he has been dismissed from the service pursuant to the En Banc, Resolution dated 26 October 2009 in A.M. No. P-07-2385 entitled "Judge Jacinto C. Gonzales vs. Clerk of Court Alexander C. Rimando" for Grave Misconduct, Usurpation of Authority and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. Respondent Rimando may be ordered to pay a fine in lieu of suspension.
According to the OCA, respondent's offensive remarks which he publicly uttered against then Vice-Mayor Paulino were disrespectful. More so because they were directed against a person in authority. The OCA found respondent liable for discourtesy in the performance of his official duties. Too, respondent was found guilty of insubordination due to his repeated failure to comply with the directives of the OCA and the Court itself to submit his comment on the complaint. Thus, the OCA recommended: 4
1. The instant matter be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter against respondent Alexander C. Rimando, former Clerk of Court IV, Office of the Clerk of Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Olongapo City; and
2. Respondent Rimando be found GUILTY of discourtesy in the course of official duties and insubordination and be imposed the penalty of FINE in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) in lieu of suspension from office, it appearing that he has been ordered dismissed from the service in the Decision dated 26 October 2009 in A.M. No. P-07-2385.
Ruling
The Court partly adopts the Memorandum of the OCA.
We agree with the OCA that respondent committed discourtesy in the performance of his official duty. Respondent committed discourtesy in the course of implementing the Special Order of Demolition. He spat out a slew of offensive remarks i.e., "Putang Ina, Tuloy ang Trabaho!," "Walang Vice-Mayor, Vice-Mayor, utos ito ni Davide." Simultaneously, he grabbed a sledge hammer and used it to crash the dwellings of the affected families, whose request to salvage materials they could still use was brought to the attention of respondent who simply ignored it.
Canon IV, Section 2 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel provides that court personnel shall carry out their responsibilities as public servants in as courteous a manner as possible. 5 Discourtesy is punishable under Rule 10, Section 46, paragraph (D) of the 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in Civil Service:
Classification of Offenses. — x x x
xxx xxx xxx
(D) The following less grave offenses are punishable by suspension of one (1) month and one (1) day suspension to six (6) months for the first offense; and dismissal from the service for the following offenses:
xxx xxx xxx
1. Discourtesy in the course of official duties;
2. x x x
Court employees are expected to conduct themselves with propriety and decorum at all times. They must refrain from the use of abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing or otherwise improper language. They are expected to accord due respect, not only to their superiors, but also to all others. Their every act and word should be characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy and dignity. 6 The Court has in several cases penalized discourteous conduct of court employees.
In Apaga vs. Ponce, 7 the Court admonished a court employee when he answered back an old lawyer who was also an officer of the court.
In Judge Marbas-Vizcarra vs. Soriano, 8 the Court found respondent liable for gross discourtesy for hurling invectives against Judge Marbas-Vizcarra. He was suspended for six (6) months without pay.
In Baniqued v. Rojas, 9 the Court pronounced that shouting in the workplace during office hours is discourtesy and disrespect not only toward co-workers but toward the court as well.
In Sasing vs. Gebolingo, 10 the Court held that Sheriff Gelbolingo's failure to properly respond to the communication of Sasing equated to discourtesy. A simple note informing the parties as to where he temporarily stored their personal effects could have assured them that their belongings were not confiscated and would be properly turned over to them. The Court is fully aware that a Sheriff's schedule can be hectic, but the Sheriff could have easily relayed the information to the other court staff to address Sasing's concerns. This simple gesture could have avoided the controversy. The Court also reiterated instances where it found respondents' government employees liable for discourtesy:
Under Rule XIV, Sec. 23 of the Civil Service Law and Rules, a first offense of discourtesy, which is a light penalty, in the course of one's official duties shall be meted the penalty of reprimand. In Peñalosa v. Viscaya, Jr., 11 respondent deputy sheriff was reprimanded for gross discourtesy in connection with his actuations towards the complainant (therein private complainant in a criminal case) when the latter requested for an explanation for his failure to serve a warrant of arrest upon the accused. In Paras v. Lofranco, 12 the respondent, Clerk III of a lower court, was charged with discourtesy and conduct unbecoming a court employee for her acts and utterances directed against the complainant, the counsel for the accused in a pending case before the said court. This Court found the arrogant gesture and discourteous utterances of the respondent in treating the complainant to be improper. Accordingly, it imposed on respondent the penalty of reprimand. In Reyes v. Patiag, 13 respondent clerk of court was censured for discourtesy for two acts, when, in a very rude manner, she denied complainant's request to see the records of a civil case and treated her as if she was not an interested party by telling complainant that she seemed to be more knowledgeable than the court because complainant asked why a "preliminary investigation," actually a preliminary examination, was necessary. Considering that this is the first offense of the respondent, we find the penalty of reprimand to be appropriate in this case.
In Concerned Citizen vs. Nonita v. Catena, 14 the Court held therein that respondent's silence on the complaint despite the ample opportunity accorded him to comment signifies an implied admission thereof. Too, silence means respondent has nothing to say in his own defense.
So must it be.
In another vein, respondent's defiance of the directives of the OCA and the Court to submit his comment on the complaint amounts to gross insubordination; not just simple insubordination as found by the OCA.
To recall, the OCA required respondent to submit his comment through 1st Indorsement dated August 30, 2005. But instead of complying, respondent asked for three (3) extension of time within which to submit his comment. The OCA granted the requests, but in the end, respondent still failed to submit the required comment. On August 1, 2007, the Court directed respondent to show cause why he should not be administratively dealt with for refusing to submit his comment on the complaint despite several directives from the OCA, and to submit his comment within five (5) days from notice. Respondent never complied.
Respondent's repeated failure to comply with the directives of the OCA and the Court constitutes a clear disrespect of this Court's lawful orders. As it was, the Court through the OCA exercises supervision over all lower courts and personnel. Hence, willful refusal to comply with the directives of the OCA constitutes a defiance of the lawful orders of the Court itself. But the worst part is this: Respondent continued to show defiance, disrespect, or indifference directly against the Court's Resolution to Show Cause dated August 1, 2007.
On several occasions the Court has emphasized that when it requires comment on administrative complaints against officials or employees of the judiciary, it is not to be construed as a mere request. Nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively. Respondents in administrative complaints should comment on all accusations or allegations against them in these administrative complaints. For it is their duty to preserve the integrity of the judiciary. The Court should not and will not tolerate respondents' indifference to the administrative complaints and to the resolutions requiring comment thereon. 15
In Paquing vs. Judge Gobarde, 16 the Court declared that the prolonged and repeated refusal to comply with the directives of the OCA to comment on the complaint constitutes a clear and willful disrespect for the lawful orders. Such defiance is gross insubordination.
In Judge Fe Gallon-Gayanilo vs. Caldito, 17 the Court reiterated that a court employee who deliberately and continuously fails and refuses to comply with its directive is guilty of gross misconduct.
In Office of the Court Administrator vs. Hon. Cader P. Indar, et al., 18 the Court held that a judge who deliberately and continuously fails or refuses to comply with its resolution is guilty of gross misconduct and insubordination.
Finally, in Judge Gonzales vs. Clerk of Court and City Sheriff Alexander C. Rimando, 19 which also involves herein respondent Alexander C. Rimado, the Court ruled that he is liable for gross insubordination for failure to comply with the OCA directives, viz.:
Rimando also committed another count of Gross Insubordination for his refusal to file his comment on the present complaint despite the directive of the OCA in its 1st Indorsement of August 23, 2006 and in its 1st Tracer, dated March 5, 2007. It was only after the Court issued a SHOW CAUSE Order on October 3, 2007 that he was constrained to file a Comment on December 17, 200727 in the course of the investigation conducted by Judge Farrales or more than one year from his receipt of the 1st Indorsement.
x x x [Respondent's] prolonged and repeated refusal to comply constitutes a clear and willful disrespect for lawful orders of the OCA . . . through [which] the Supreme Court exercises supervision over all lower courts and personnel thereof. x x x28
A first offense of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service is punishable under Rule IV, Section 52 (A) (20) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service with suspension from six months and one day to one year.
A first offense of Gross Insubordination is penalized with suspension from six months and one day to one year, while a second offense of Gross Insubordination is penalized with dismissal.29
By the foregoing standards, therefore respondent's continued and repeated defiance of the OCA directives and even the Court's own directive here makes him liable for gross insubordination.
Under Rule 10, Section 46, paragraph (B) of the 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in Civil Service, gross insubordination is a grave offense which carries the penalty of suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense and dismissal for the second offense.
Penalty
Respondent committed two (2) offenses: a) discourtesy in the course of official duties; and b) gross insubordination.
Under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, discourtesy in the course of official duties is a less grave offense punishable by suspension for one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first violation. 20 As for gross insubordination, the imposable penalty is suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense and dismissal for the second offense. 21
Rule IV, Section 52 22 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides that the penalty to be imposed on the employee who is guilty of two (2) or more offenses is that corresponding to the most serious offense. The rest of the offenses shall be considered as aggravating circumstances only. 23
Here, the Court finds respondent liable for two (2) offenses: discourtesy in the course of official duties and gross insubordination. It appears that respondent was already found guilty of two (2) counts of insubordination in A.M. No. P-07-2385, 24 for which he was already dismissed from the service under Decision dated October 26, 2009. For this reason, therefore, the Court can no longer impose another decree of dismissal on respondent.
Following Garingan-Ferreras vs. Umblas, 25 a fine of P40,000.00 to be imposed on respondent in this particular case is in order, viz.:
x x x Thus, considering his earlier dismissal from service and its accessory penalties, the penalty applicable in this case, which is also dismissal, is no longer relevant or feasible. In lieu thereof, we find it proper to impose a fine of P40,000.00 to be deducted from his accrued leave credits.
ACCORDINGLY, Alexander C. Rimando is found guilty of discourtesy in the course of official duties and gross insubordination. He is FINED Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) to be deducted from his accrued leave credits. In case his leave credits be found insufficient, he is directed to pay the balance within ten (10) days from notice of this Resolution.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
MARIA LOURDES C. PERFECTODivision Clerk of Court
By:
(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 4-5.
2.Id. at 32.
3.Id. at 31-34.
4. OCA Recommendation, p. 34, October 6, 2016.
5.Ramos v. Teves, 689 Phil. 289, 293 (2012).
6.Escaño v. Manaois, 799 Phil. 622, 637-638 (2016).
7. 245 SCRA 233 (1995). See also Punzalan-Santos v. Arquiza, 244 SCRA 527 (1995); Abenojar v. Lopez, 203 Phil. 385 (1982); Peñalosa v. Viscaya, Jr., 84 SCRA 298 (1978), cited in Paras v. Lofranco, 407 Phil. 329, 340 (2001).
8. 448 Phil. 19, 20-22 (2003).
9. 396 Phil. 145, 148-149 (2000), see also Apaga v. Ponce, 315 Phil. 226 (1995), cited in Judge Marbas-Vizcarra vs. Soriano, 448 Phil. 19, 28 (2003).
10. 704 Phil. 251, 258 (2013), citing Perez v. Cunting, 436 Phil. 618, 626-627 (2002).
11. 173 Phil. 487 (1978) [as cited].
12. 407 Phil. 329 (2001) [as cited].
13. 423 Phil. 1 (2001) [as cited].
14. 714 Phil. 114, 122-123 (2013).
15.Salvador vs. Judge Limsiaco, Jr., 519 Phil. 683, 688-689 (2006), citing Martinez vs. Judge Zoleta, 374 Phil. 35 (1999).
16. 550 Phil. 58, 62 (2007).
17. 794 Phil. 32, 37-38 (2016).
18. 725 Phil. 164, 177 (2014).
19. 619 Phil. 392, 397-398 (2009).
20. Rule 10, Section 46, paragraph (D) of the 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in Civil Service.
21. Rule 10, Section 46, paragraph (B) of the 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in Civil Service.
22. "If the respondent is found guilty of two or more different offenses, the penalty to be imposed should be to that corresponding to the most serious offense and the rest shall be considered as aggravating circumstances. In case the respondent is found guilty of two or more counts of the same offense, the penalty shall be imposed in the maximum regardless of the presence of any mitigating circumstance."
23. 710 Phil. 10, 18 (2013).
24.Supra note 19.
25. 803 Phil. 25, 35 (2017).