FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 188616. December 11, 2013.]
JAILEN M. PAUL, accused-petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated December 11, 2013 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 188616 (Jailen M. Paul v. People of the Philippines). — We resolve the appeal, filed by accused-petitioner Jailen M. Paul (Paul), from the Decision dated 21 August 2008 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA), Mindanao Station, in CA-G.R. CR No. 27989. 1 The CA Decision affirmed the conviction of Paul for the crime of libel under Article 353, in relation to Articles 355 and 360 of the Revised Penal Code, in Criminal Case No. 39473-97.
The RTC Ruling
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City, Branch 13, convicted petitioner of the crime of libel in a Decision dated 31 July 2003. 2 Paul was the treasurer of the Parents Teachers Association (PTA) of the University of Southern Philippines (USP) Laboratory High School for school year 1996-1997, while private complainant Eva Antipuesto (Antipuesto) was the president. 3 When the amount of P4,036.70 collected from students as PTA fees were not remitted and accounted for by Freddie Rollon (Rollon), the PTA vice-president, the PTA board acted immediately and set up a meeting with him. Consequently, he admitted liability for the missing PTA funds and promised restitution. 4 However, Paul accused Antipuesto of being responsible for the irregularity and of not taking any action against Rollon Paul circulated letters to that effect to PTA officers and to university officials, even after Rollon had admitted being solely responsible for the missing PTA funds and had promised to return them. 5 In fact, Paul was a witness to the Promissory Note that Rollon executed in favor of the PTA. 6 In his letters, Paul called Antipuesto a "child of the devil" and a liar. 7 The RTC found that his act constituted the crime of libel, since the elements of the crime were present. Firstly, the RTC found that the statements he had made were defamatory. Secondly, it found that there was publication of these statements. Thirdly, Antipuesto was identified as the person defamed. Fourthly, malice was presumed present as provided by law (malice in law), although the RTC went even further and found that the communication was made with malice in fact. 8
Petitioner was sentenced to suffer imprisonment ranging from four months of arresto mayor to four years and two months of prision correccional. He was also sentenced to pay P30,000 as moral damages and P20,000 as attorney's fees. 9CIAacS
The CA Ruling
The CA affirmed the RTC in toto. 10Moreover, the appellate court found no merit in the appeal of Paul, who argued that he was merely acting in the performance of his moral and social duty, and that his act was protected as a privileged communication. The CA further clarified that the defense of privileged communication does not protect the accused from prosecution; it merely removes the presumption of malice in law. It explained that even if the defense is properly set up, the accused can still be found liable if the latter is shown to have acted with malice in fact. 11 In the present case, since the RTC did find that there was malice in fact — a finding that the CA affirmed 12 — Paul was properly found guilty of the crime of libel. Hence, we now rule on the final review of the case.
Our Ruling
We deny the appeal. After a careful review of the records of the case, we see no reason to reverse the findings of the trial court and the CA. We emphasize the established doctrine that factual findings of the trial court are accorded great respect and even finality, especially when affirmed by the CA. 13
To be liable for libel, the following elements must be present: (a) allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication of the charge; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice which is presumed in defamatory acts. 14 In the instant case, there is no doubt as to the existence of the first three elements as found by the RTC and affirmed by the CA. In fact, in this petition, petitioner no longer disputes their presence; instead he makes the defense that his letters were privileged, because their circulation was done in the performance of a moral and social duty under paragraph 1 of Article 354. 15 He is therefore merely questioning the presumed presence of malice — the fourth element — in his case; such presumption is removed when a communication is privileged.
We emphasize that a defendant who sets up a defense of privileged communication has the burden of proving the affirmative allegation. 16 As the CA correctly stated, petitioner had the onus of showing the following: (a) he had a legal, moral or social duty to make the communication or, at least, had an interest to protect, which may be either his own or of the one to whom it is made; (b) the communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or a superior, who has some interest or duty in the matter, and who has the power to furnish the protection sought; and (c) the statements in the communication are made in good faith and without malice in fact. 17 All the above requisites must concur. 18IaDSEA
Based on the records, Paul utterly failed to discharge his burden of proving his duty — whether legal, moral or social — to make the subject communication to university officials. As the trial court found, the matter had been swiftly acted upon by the PTA board. As a member of the board, he was bound to abide by the legitimate collegial actions it took and in which petitioner participated actively. In fact, he was a witness to the Promissory Note that Rollon executed in favor of the PTA. Paul's active participation proves that he found the meetings to be the proper and effective forum for addressing the matter. Notably, in U.S. v. Cañete, 19the Court explained that the purpose of privileging certain communications is to facilitate the investigation of persons charged with wrongdoing. In this case, that purpose was absent, because Rollon had owned up to the wrongdoing and the PTA board had already acted with dispatch on the matter. In fact, Rollon had promised restitution.
Secondly, petitioner also had the burden of showing that Antipuesto, as president of the PTA, was under the supervision of university officials, and that they could have done something about the financial mess or could have disciplined her. This organizational set-up he failed to show. Other than his unsupported claims that the PTA was under the dean of the College of Education and the university president, there was no other evidence in the records, documentary or otherwise, to prove his claims.
Finally, the trial court below found that the communication was not made in good faith and that, on the contrary, there was malice in fact. Thus, we agree with the CA that even granting that petitioner successfully discharged his burden of proving that the first two requirements of a privileged communication were present, the protection afforded by that communication is not availing because of the presence of malice in fact. In determining whether malice in fact attended the making of a qualifiedly privileged communication, we explained in US v. Bustos 20 that the defendants must have had probable cause to believe in the truthfulness of the imputation they were making against the other party. Here, petitioner had no probable cause to believe in the truthfulness of his allegations against Antipuesto, because Rollon had owned up to the wrongdoing and promised restitution after the board acted on the matter speedily. Indeed, persons who feel it their duty to tell a superior about a wrongdoing must do so in good faith and must make the erroneous imputation innocently or honestly. 21
In addition, the spiteful language Paul used in the letters disproves his claim of good faith. Clearly, as the trial court and the CA have found, the letters, with their reference to Antipuesto being a "child of the devil" and a liar, were designed to put her up for ridicule. In Buatis v. People, 22we noted that crafting a letter "in an injurious way than what is necessary" negates good faith and shows malice.
Hence, the claim of Paul that his defamatory statements were privileged communication is unmeritorious, and the presumption of malice on his part has not been rebutted. 23 Consequently, we find that the RTC and the CA rightfully convicted accused-appellant of the crime of libel.
Modification of Penalty from Imprisonment to Fine
Nonetheless, following precedents, 24 the Court modifies the penalty from imprisonment to a fine of P6,000 in the judicious exercise of its discretion. In Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 08-2008, 25 we noted with approval the "emergent rule of preference for the imposition of fine only rather than imprisonment in libel cases under the circumstances therein specified."
In the instant case, we find that "the imposition of a fine alone would best serve the interests of justice;" and that there is no danger that "forbearing to impose imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperative of justice." We note that the records do not show that petitioner has previously violated any provision of the penal laws whether on libel or any other offense. We also note that the libelous statements were made in the context of his performance of his responsibilities as a PTA officer, even though he so clearly went overboard that his actions became criminal. DHSCTI
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 21 August 2008, in CA-G.R. CR No. 27989 is hereby AFFIRMED. Accused-appellant Jailen M. Paul is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of libel. However, in lieu of imprisonment, he is sentenced to pay a fine of P6,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. In addition, he is ordered to pay Eva Antipuesto P30,000 as moral damages and P20,000 as attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Penned by CA Associate Justice Edgardo T. Lloren, and concurred in by Associate Justices Edgardo A. Camello and Jane Aurora C. Lantion; rollo, pp. 13-26.
2.Rollo, pp. 832-840; Annex AA of Petition; RTC Decision dated 31 July 2001, pp. 1-9.
3.Id. at 834; Annex AA of Petition; RTC Decision dated 31 July 2003, p. 3.
4.Id. at 836; Annex AA of Petition; RTC Decision dated 31 July 2003, p. 5.
5.Id. at 838-839; Annex AA of Petition; RTC Decision dated 31 July 2003, pp. 7-8.
6.Id. at 836; Annex AA of Petition; RTC Decision dated 31 July 2003, p. 5.
7.Id. at 838; Annex AA of Petition; RTC Decision dated 31 July 2003, p. 7.
8.Id. at 838-839; Annex AA of Petition; RTC Decision dated 31 July 2003, pp. 7-8.
9.Id. at 840; Annex AA of Petition; RTC Decision dated 31 July 2003, p. 9.
10.Id. at 84; Annex A of Petition; CA Decision 21 August 2008, p. 14.
11.Id. at 81; Annex A of Petition; CA Decision, 21 August 2008, p. 11.
12.Id. at 81-83; Annex A of Petition; CA Decision, 21 August 2008, pp. 11-13.
13.Sanchez v. People, G.R. No. 179090, 5 June 2009, 588 SCRA 747.
14.Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, 373 Phil. 238, 248 (1999); Vicario v. Court of Appeals, 367 Phil. 292, 297 (1999).
15.Rollo, p. 54; Petition, p. 16.
16.Dizon v. Eduardo, 242 Phil. 200, 211 (1988); People of the Philippines v. Gaspar, 86 Phil. 413, 421 (1950).
17.Binay v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 170643. 8 September 2006.
18.Lagaya v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 176251, 25 July 2012, 677 SCRA 478, 492.
19. 38 Phil. 253, 263-264 (1918).
20. 37 Phil. 731 (1918).
21. 38 Phil. 253, 263-264 (1918).
22. 520 Phil. 149, 163 (2006).
23.Id. at 164.
24.Lagaya v. People of the Philippines, supra note 13; Fermin v. People, G.R. No. 157643, 28 March 2008, 550 SCRA 132; Buatis, Jr. v. People, supra note 15; Brillante v. Court of Appeals, 483 Phil. 568 (2004); Mari v. Court of Appeals, 388 Phil. 269 (2000); Sazon v. Court of Appeals, 325 Phil. 1053 (1996).
25. GUIDELINES IN THE OBSERVANCE OF A RULE OF PREFERENCE IN THE IMPOSITION OF PENALTIES IN LIBEL CASES.