THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 192335. July 9, 2014.]
JHOANA IBON PASION AND FLORAMELLA Q. IBON, REP. BY ROGER PASION, petitioners, vs. CONCEPCION V. LORENZO, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated July 9, 2014, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 192335 (Jhoana Ibon Pasion and Floramella Q. Ibon, rep. by Roger Pasion v. Concepcion V. Lorenzo). — Before the Court is a Petition for Review assailing the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated December 18, 2009, and its Resolution 2 dated May 4, 2010 in CA-G.R. SP No. 102113. The CA affirmed the Order 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 16, dated November 28, 2007, in Civil Case No. 14029-16, which expunged petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of proper notice of hearing.
The case at bar sprung from an action for partition which petitioners Jhoana Ibon Pasion and Floramella Ibon filed against respondent Concepcion Lorenzo before the Laoag Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC). On April 23, 2007, the MTCC rendered a Decision 4 ordering the partition of the covered lots. The decretal portion reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the partition of Lot No. 11111-B, Psd-1-00768- being a portion of Lot 11111, Laoag Cadastre, covered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18393 of the Registry of Deeds of Laoag City. The plaintiffs and the defendant are hereby directed to execute the deed of partition such as necessary to be registered with the Registry of Deeds.
There being no evidence adduced to prove damages, none is here awarded.
SO ORDERED. 5
Upon appeal, the RTC of Laoag City set aside the MTCC Decision and ruled 6 on October 15, 2007 as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court a quo, dated April 23, 2007, is set aside and Judgment is hereby rendered:
l. Declaring Lot No. 11111 as the conjugal property of spouses Nicolas Velasco and Emeteria dela Cruz;
2. Declaring defendant Conception Velasco-Lorenzo as the exclusive owner of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 11111 or the one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 11111-B.
3. Declaring the other one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 11111-B as the subject of partition: one-half (1/2) for the defendant Concepcion Velasco-Lorenzo and one-half (l/2) for the plaintiffs;
4. Ordering the parties to execute the appropriate Deed of Partition.
SO ORDERED. 7
Petitioners thus filed a motion for reconsideration on November 6, 2007. However, on November 28, 2007, the RTC, upon Lorenzo's motion, ordered the expunction 8 of said motion for reconsideration. It held that, for failure to specify the time and date of hearing, petitioners' motion for reconsideration is pro forma and a mere scrap of paper which the court has no authority to act upon. This prompted petitioners to file a Petition for Certiorari before the CA. They alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in expunging their motion for reconsideration from the records when they presented issues questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court itself.
On December 18, 2009, the CA dismissed petitioners' petition for certiorari and upheld the RTC's order of expunction. Hence, they filed the instant petition before the Court.
The crucial issue in this case is whether the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting Lorenzo's motion to expunge petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of a specific time and date in the notice of hearing.
The petition lacks merit. ACIESH
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court on Motions provides:
Sec. 4. Hearing of motion. —
Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant.
Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereon shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice. (Emphasis supplied)
Sec. 5. Notice of hearing.
The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion.
The Court has consistently held in the past that a motion which does not meet the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 is defective. It is considered a worthless scrap of paper, which the clerk of court has no right to receive and the trial court has no authority to act upon. Service of a copy of a motion containing a notice of the time and the place of hearing of that motion is a mandatory requirement, and the failure of movants to comply with these requirements renders their motions fatally defective. This rule, however, admits of certain exceptions and liberal construction is thus allowed where: (1) a rigid application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice; (2) the interest of substantial justice will be served; (3) the resolution of the motion is addressed solely to the sound and judicious discretion of the court; and (4) the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate to the degree of the movant's thoughtlessness in not complying with the rules." 9 However, the petitioners miserably failed to demonstrate that their case falls under any of these exceptions.
Petitioners cite the cases of Vette Industrial Sales Co., Inc. v. Sui Soan S. Cheng10 and Jehan Shipping Corporation v. National Food Authority11 to support their demand for a more liberal application of the Rules. But it appears that the circumstances in the foregoing cases are not attendant in this case. In Vette, the trial court did not immediately resolve the motion. Instead, it allowed the petitioners to file their comment and also leave to file a rejoinder if Sui files a reply. These circumstances justify a departure from the literal application of the rule because the petitioners were given the opportunity to study and answer the arguments in the motion. In Jehan, on the other hand, the trial court gave the petitioner ten (10) days within which to comment on the respondent's motion for reconsideration. In the petitioner's l4-page Opposition to the motion, it not only pointed out that the motion was defective for not containing a notice of hearing, it also ventilated its substantial arguments against the merits of the Motion and of the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. Here, the Laoag RTC never required Lorenzo to file a comment or opposition so as to give her ample time to carefully review petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
Further, it is clear that the omission of the details prescribed by the Rules was intentional and not merely an oversight. The petitioners argue that the reason why the notice of hearing did not include a date and time was that their counsel then supposedly waived further oral arguments, 12 despite the clear mandate of the law that every written motion shall be set for hearing. 13 It must also be emphasized that the requirements on hearing of motions under the Rules are not intended for the benefit of the movant or its counsel. It is to avoid surprises that may be tossed upon the adverse party, who must be given time to study and meet the arguments in the motion before the court issues a resolution. 14
In sum, the requirements that the notice shall be directed to the parties concerned and that it shall state the time and place for the hearing of the motion are mandatory. 15 If not complied with, a motion is considered pro forma and the court has no authority to act upon it. It likewise does not toll the running of the prescriptive period for an appeal or the filing of the requisite pleading. 16 Thus, the Laoag RTC did not err, much less act with grave abuse of discretion, in allowing the expunction of the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. Grave abuse of discretion implies a whimsical exercise of judgment that amounts to an evasion of a positive duty, or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. 17 In contrast, the RTC in the case at bar merely acted in accordance with the dictates of law and within the boundaries of its bounden duty.
Therefore, while litigation is not a game of technicalities and the rules of procedure should not be strictly enforced at the cost of substantial justice, still, that does not mean that the Rules of Court may be ignored at will and at random, to the prejudice of the orderly presentation, assessment, and just resolution of the issues. 18 Verily, for refusing to observe basic rules of procedure which are mandatory, 19 petitioners must corollarily bear the unfortunate consequences of their action. HIEASa
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated December 18, 2009 and Resolution dated May 4, 2010 are hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Mario V. Lopez, with Associate Justices Rebecca De Guia-Salvador and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr.; concurring; rollo, pp. 40-49.
2. Id. at 51-54.
3. Id. at 70-71.
4. Id. at 59-63.
5. Id. at 63.
6. Id. at 66-69.
7. Id. at 69.
8. Id. at 70-71.
9. Vlason Enterprises Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 369 Phil. 269 (1999).
10. 539 Phil. 37 (2006).
11. 514 Phil. 166 (2005).
12. Rollo p. 20.
13. Rules of Court, Rule 15, Section 4.
14. Preysler, Jr. v. Manila Southcoast Development Corporation, G.R. No. 171872, June 28, 2010, 621 SCRA 636, 643.
15. De la Peña v. De la Peña, 327 Phil. 936, 942-943 (1996).
16. Preysler v. Manila Southcoast Development Corporation, supra note 14, at 639.
17. De Vera v. De Vera, 602 Phil. 877, 886 (2009).
18. Lanzaderas v. Amethyst Security and General Services, Inc., 452 Phil. 621, 632 (2003).
19. Tan v. Court of Appeals, 356 Phil. 1058, 1072 (1998).