Parc Chateau Condominium Unit Owners Association, Inc. v. De Mesa

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 158567. September 16, 2015.]

PARC CHATEAU CONDOMINIUM UNIT OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., and DANNY G. TUMANG, petitioners, vs. ANTONIO M. DE MESA, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedSeptember 16, 2015 which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 158567 — PARC CHATEAU CONDOMINIUM UNIT OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., and DANNY G. TUMANG, Petitioners, v. ANTONIO M. DE MESA, Respondent.

The respondent leased Unit 1901 of the Parc Chateau Condominium in Pasig City. 1 He desired to renovate the unit, and secured permits from the petitioner Parc Chateau Condominium Unit Owners Association, Inc. (Parc Chateau Condominium), through petitioner Danny G. Tumang, the building administrator. A total of 12 permits were issued during the period from June 16, 1998 to September 9, 1998. 2 While the renovation was being done, the petitioners discovered during an ocular inspection of the unit 12 electrical floor outlets and 12 telephone outlets for 12 distinct telephone lines installed within a single room; a storage room constructed near the area intended for the living room; and the partition wall made of clear glass of the intended bedroom. They insisted to the respondent that such installations were not in the plans submitted to the petitioners; and that the unit — albeit located in the 19th floor of the condominium — would be used for commercial purposes, a use the Master Deed prohibited for units higher than the second floor, to wit:

Section 3. Use of Units: The condominium units at the Ground Floor and Second Floor shall be for commercial use and all the condominium units on the upper floors for residential use as indicated and shall not be converted into any other use. 3 . . .

Tumang wrote to ask the respondent to explain the deviations from the plans in order to allay the suspicion that the unit would be converted into an office space. In response, the respondent gave verbal and written assurances that the renovation would not disrupt the normal operations of the condominium. Finding the assurances inadequate, the petitioners required the respondent to execute a notarized undertaking to the effect that he would not convert the unit to commercial use. 4 Claiming that he was being singled out, the respondent refused to execute the undertaking unless the petitioners showed him similar undertakings from other tenants. Tumang informed him, however, that the work permits would not be renewed pending the submission of the undertaking. Nonetheless, the respondent reiterated his assurances, and indicated that he planned to conduct his business in another unit located on the first floor of the building that he intended to lease, and that the storage area of Unit 1901 would only be temporary pending negotiations for such lease.

With the petitioners considering his reiteration of assurances still unsatisfactory, the respondent instituted this action for damages against the petitioners in the Regional Trial Court in Pasig City (RTC). 5

Although the respondent was eventually able to lease Unit 102 for his business activities on September 22, 1998, the petitioners remained adamant in their stance, and refused to renew the work permits of the respondent. 6

On October 5, 1998, the RTC issued the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction requiring the petitioners to issue the work permits to the respondent, and to allow him to resume the renovation of Unit 1901.

On June 19, 2000, the RTC, opining that it was premature and purely speculative on the part of the petitioners to insist that Unit 1901 would be used for commercial purposes because the renovation was still going on, and that the petitioners were not able to establish that other tenants similarly situated like the respondent had been similarly treated, rendered its decision in favor of the respondent, 7 decreeing:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Antonio M. De Mesa ordering defendants Parc Chateau Condominium Unit Owner's [sic] Association, Inc. and Danny G. Tumang to jointly and severally pay the plaintiff the following sums, to wit:

1. P72,000.00 as and for actual damages;

2. P500,000.00 as and for moral damages;

3. P500,000.00 as and for exemplary damages;

4. P80,000.00 plus P4,000.00 per appearance, as and for attorney's fees; and

5. The costs of this suit. TIADCc

Further, the Preliminary Mandatory Injunction issued on October 5, 1998 is hereby made PERMANENT.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC. 8

Issues

Hence, the petitioners have appealed to the Court, contending that the CA overlooked certain circumstances that, if properly appreciated, would show that the respondent violated the Master Deed; and that there was no basis to justify the awards of damages in favor of the respondent.

Ruling of the Court

The appeal is partly meritorious.

First of all, the non-mention by the CA of the extraordinary number of electrical floor outlets and telephone lines, the storage room, and the use of the glass partition in Unit 1901 that would have indicated that the unit would be used for conducting a business, and of the fact that at the time the respondent was already leasing Unit 1405 for his residential use did not necessarily mean that the CA did not consider such circumstances at all. 9 For one, we are sure that the CA was well aware of the allegation on the extraordinary number of electrical and telephone outlets installed in the unit because the assailed judgment adverted to the allegation. Moreover, the records show that the CA did not contradict but fully affirmed the RTC's findings of facts, which included the installation of the outlets and the construction of the storage room. 10 As such, the CA is deemed to have adopted such findings as its own. Also, the petitioners' insistence that the presence of the glass partition was an indication that Unit 1901 would not be used as a bedroom was at best speculative. Neither did the fact that the respondent also leased Unit 1405 for residential purposes strengthen the petitioners' suspicion that Unit 1901 would not be similarly used for residential purposes. For sure, they could not reasonably expect the respondent to live in Unit 1901 while the unit was undergoing renovation.

Secondly, the Master Deed 11 acknowledged the rights of the unit owners or tenants in their condominium units, and concurrently placed restrictions on the exercise of such rights, to wit:

[E]ach unit owner or purchaser shall have the exclusive right, at his own expense, to paint, repaint, tile, wax, paper, or otherwise refinish and decorate the inner surfaces of: (1) the walls, (2) ceilings (3) floors, (4) windows and (5) doors bounding his own unit. . . . cSEDTC

Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions, the owner, purchaser, tenant or occupant of a unit may not undertake any structural repair or alteration, or any other work which would jeopardize the safety of the building or any unit, or impair any easement, without the prior written approval of the Condominium Corporation and of the owners of the unit or purchasers affected by such work. 12

By virtue of the lease, the owner of Unit 1901 authorized the respondent to exercise the right to renovate the unit. 13 Such right came with the concomitant obligation to first obtain the approval of Parc Chateau Condominium before doing any renovation. On its part, Parc Chateau Condominium should not deny his application for the permits without a valid reason.

The reasons of the petitioners for refusing to renew the work permits in favor of the respondent were found to be insufficient by the RTC and the CA. We agree with the lower courts. To start with, there was yet no showing of a violation of the Master Deed on the part of the respondent. Also, the respondent gave assurances to the effect that the renovation would not disrupt normal condominium operations. In addition, he rented a different unit from which to conduct his business. And, lastly, the petitioners did not entirely disavow or disprove his contention of being discriminated against because other similarly situated tenants were not required to submit written undertakings. Indeed, contrary to their stance that he was side-stepping the issue by raising discrimination, it was they who were side-stepping the issue of discrimination, for they did not even contend that the written undertaking they desired him to submit could be required under the Master Deed, or the Articles of Incorporation, or the By-Laws, or any of the Rules and Regulations of the Owners' Association.

In their reply dated December 19, 2003, 14 the petitioners averred that they were vindicated because the respondent began using Unit 1901 for his business. They attached copies of the security records of the premises showing that at least 10 people had visited Unit 1901 daily, and that there were 15 commercial telephone lines in Unit 1901 registered in the name of Metro TV Shopping Center, Inc. However, such documents had no bearing on whether or not the petitioners were justified in refusing to issue the permits at the time, which was the main issue the RTC considered and determined. The supposed subsequent violation of the Master Deed, if such subsequent use of the unit could be so characterized, should constitute a distinct cause of action for the petitioners, who then should have brought a separate complaint instead of interjecting it in this appeal. In addition, the matter of such subsequent use, being factual in nature, cannot be considered now, firstly, because this Court is not a trier of facts, and, secondly, because evidence not presented at the trial cannot be considered at all. 15

Finally, the Court finds the objection of the petitioners to the P500,000.00 allowed for each of the moral and exemplary damages to be warranted.

We first note that the RTC justified the grant of such damages in the following manner:

. . . Failing to do so, coupled with the harassment suffered by the workers and visitors of plaintiff, defendants only bolstered the plaintiff's claim that he is being discriminated against willfuly (sic) by the defendants. Again for willfully humiliating the plaintiff, a respected businessman widely known in the business community, defendants are liable for moral damages suffered by plaintiff pursuant to Article 2219 of the New Civil Code.

By way of example or correction for the public good, pursuant to Article 2219 of the New Civil Code, as the Court is fully convinced that plaintiff was discriminated against in the manner the Master Deed, Manual of House and Rules and Regulations, Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws of Parc Chateau Condominium Unit Owner's Association, Inc. is being applied by defendants, the latter are liable for exemplary damages and for defying the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction issued.

To protect his rights, plaintiff incurred expenses in engaging the services of counsel which he is allowed to recover from the defendants pursuant to Article 2208 of the New Civil Code. 16 AIDSTE

In affirming the grant of the damages by the RTC, the CA discoursed:

Appellants likewise question the award of moral and exemplary damages in the amount of P500,000.00 each. The basis of such award is Article 2219 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code. The assessment of the amount of damages that may be awarded is left to the discretion of the court according to the circumstances of the case (Radio Communications of the Phils., Inc. vs. Rodriguez, 182 SCRA 899). This Court can only modify or change the amount awarded when they are palpably or scandalously excessive so as to indicate that it was the result of passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial court. We do not find this circumstance attending in the case at bar. It cannot be disputed that the plaintiff, in undertaking the renovation of Unit 1901, had already spent the amount of P3,000,000.00 in order to make the unit habitable. The unit would be rendered totally useless if the improvements were discontinued.

In refusing to issue the permit asked for by the plaintiff, the court found that the appellants deliberately discriminated against the plaintiff. This is sufficient to prove bad faith on the part of the defendants entitling the plaintiff to an award of exemplary damages, in addition to the award of actual and moral damages, consonant with the provisions of Article 2234 of the Civil Code. 17

The objection of the petitioners to the awarding of moral damages is well-founded but not necessarily on the basis that the amounts of the damages exceeded the complaint's prayer for "at least P200,000.00." The RTC anchored the award on the arbitrariness of the refusal to issue the permits "coupled with the harassment suffered by the workers and visitors of plaintiff" that "only bolstered the plaintiff's claim that he is being discriminated against willfuly (sic) by the defendants," and on the petitioner having thereby "willfully humiliate[ed] the plaintiff, a respected businessman widely known in the business community." In our view, the established circumstances of the case, albeit warranting moral damages for the respondent, did not substantiate the excessive amount of P500,000.00. Moral damages are not intended to enrich the plaintiff at the expense of the defendant, but are granted only to enable the plaintiff who is injured to obtain the means, diversion, or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral sufferings he has undergone by reason of the defendant's culpable action; towards that end, the amounts allowed should be proportionate to the sufferings inflicted. 18 The discretion to fix the amounts for moral damages pertains to the courts which should exercise such discretion with the awareness that moral damages are granted to the plaintiff who suffered "physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury." 19 How the respondent could have been humiliated by the acts of the petitioners is not clear. Instead, the records show that the petitioners were only trying to insist on the enforcement of the rules on renovation that bound all users of the premises, whether owners or tenants, and in so doing they were by no means actuated by malice, or ill will towards the respondent. That such action caused inconvenience to the respondent was an incident of the contract of lease between him and his lessor (the latter being the owner of the unit). It is also difficult to see how such action could have besmirched his reputation as a "respected businessman widely known in the business community" without a showing that the petitioners acted with ill will towards him. Moreover, it was apparent even to the RTC itself that the harassment was not personally experienced by him but by his "workers and visitors." Worthy of note is that the right to recover moral damages is personal to the party who experiences the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury.

Nonetheless, we agree that the failure of the petitioners to produce proof of the undertakings by the other tenants similarly situated like him caused to the respondent the unnecessary feeling of being discriminated against. That feeling entitled him to moral damages, for discrimination inflicted a definite moral or spiritual injury on him.

The granting of moral damages is left mainly to the discretion of the trial court, but the Court undoubtedly retains the authority as the ultimate reviewing tribunal to increase, or reduce or remove the award of moral damages as the established circumstances warrant. Having found the award of P500,000.00 unwarranted, unfounded, and excessive, the Court concludes that the respondent should not be allowed moral damages higher than P50,000.00.

The Court deletes the exemplary damages. Under Article 2229 of the Civil Code, exemplary or corrective damages may be imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. Indeed, such damages are not a matter of right, for the court will decide whether or not they should be adjudicated. 20 Having declared that the petitioners, in refusing to issue the permits to resume the renovation, did not proceed against the respondent in a wanton or oppressive manner but out of the impression that he was about to infringe the Master Deed by introducing improvements to render Unit 1901 conducive for conducting business (in violation of the prohibition against such use of any floor higher than the second), to adjudge them liable to him for exemplary damages would be inequitable. Given that the petitioners' patent objective was the enforcement of the Master Deed, which was their undeniable responsibility to do in the first place, exemplary damages would be inappropriate. There is no question that in contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary damages only if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner. 21

That the respondent did not pray for actual damages in his complaint removed the fundamental basis for the grant of actual damages as relief. Hence, such grant should also be deleted.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the judgment promulgated on December 20, 2002 subject to the MODIFICATIONS that: (a) the moral damages are REDUCED to P50,000.00; and (b) the exemplary and actual damages are DELETED.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED."

Very truly yours,

 

(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETADivision Clerk of Court

Footnotes

1. Rollo, pp. 54-55.

2. Id. at 43-44.

3. Id. at 58.

4. Id. at 44.

5. Id. at 203.

6. Id. at 128.

7. Id. at 242-249.

8. Id. at 43-52; penned by Associate Justice Elvi John Asuncion, and concurred in by Associate Justice Conrado Vasquez, Jr. (later Presiding Justice/retired/deceased) and Associate Justice Sergio Pestaño (retired/deceased).

9. The Episcopal Diocese of Northern Philippines v. The District Engineer, Mountain Province Engineering District, Department of Public Works and Highways (MPED-DPWH), G.R. No. 178606, December 15, 2009, 608 SCRA 238, 244.

10. Rollo, pp. 127-128; 130.

11. Id. at 57-76.

12. Id. at 68.

13. Id. at 54.

14. Id. at 286-288.

15. Becton Dickinson Phils., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. Nos. 159969 & 160116, November 15, 2005, 475 SCRA 123, 144.

16. Rollo, p. 131.

17. Id. at 51.

18. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Wong, G.R. No. 120859, June 26, 2001, 359 SCRA 608, 619.

19. Article 2217 of the Civil Code states:

Article 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission.

20. Article 2233 of the Civil Code.

21. Article 2232 of the Civil Code.