THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 255420. June 28, 2021.]
MARILOU MANALANG PARAISO, petitioner, vs.CSV MATERNITY AND LYING-IN CLINIC AND CRISTINA SANTOS VELASQUEZ [OWNER], respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated June 28, 2021, which reads as follows: HTcADC
"G.R. No. 255420 (Marilou Manalang Paraiso v. CSV Maternity and Lying-in Clinic and Cristina Santos Velasquez [owner]). — This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the Decision 2 dated January 16, 2020 and Resolution 3 dated December 22, 2020 rendered by the Court of Appeals.
On December 11, 2000, petitioner Marilou Manalang Paraiso (petitioner) started working as a nursing assistant/senior staff nurse for respondent CSV Maternity and Lying-in Clinic, which is a single proprietorship owned by Cristina Santos Velasquez (respondent). At that time, she was receiving P5,500.00 for her monthly salary. Considering that the clinic was new, it was orally agreed that petitioner would receive a portion of the payment received from the patients that she referred to the clinic, in addition to her monthly salary. 4
Dispute arose on March 1, 2017, when respondents stopped paying petitioner referral fees and later prevented her from entering the clinic. 5 Aggrieved, petitioner filed a labor complaint 6 for illegal dismissal and payment of wages and monetary benefits against the respondents.
Petitioner claimed that she was illegally dismissed. Further, respondents should be cited for violating the prohibition against elimination or diminution of benefits when they refused to give her the patient-referral shares, which she had been receiving for almost 17 years. 7
In here, respondent admitted that she employed petitioner as a nursing assistant/senior staff nurse to oversee its operations, process the billing statements, and accept payments of the clinic's patients. 8 On three separate occasions in 2016, respondent received complaints from its patients alleging that petitioner overcharged the rate for normal birth delivery procedure. Upon investigation, it was discovered that petitioner gave to the said patients its old billing statement, where the amounts charged therein were more than its fixed rate. In the clinic's records, petitioner used another set of billing statements and indicated therein the correct amount to be charged. 9 Petitioner would submit to the clinic the correct billing statement and payments, and afterwards would issue a spurious billing statement to the patients with a higher amount, and pocket the difference. 10
Aside from the fraudulent overcharging, petitioner failed to report for work for several days starting on February 27, 2017. 11 Consequently, respondents ordered petitioner on several instances to explain in writing why she should not be disciplined for the fraudulent overcharging and for taking unauthorized leaves of absences. 12 Petitioner, however, failed to submit her written explanation and appear in the scheduled meetings despite notice. 13 Thus, respondents gave petitioner written notices on April 5 and 6, 2017 informing her that she was terminated from employment on the grounds of continued unauthorized absences and fraudulent overcharging of clinic fees. 14
Labor Arbiter's Ruling
In its Decision 15 dated August 14, 2017, the Labor Arbiter ruled that petitioner was dismissed for a just cause because respondents were able to present substantial evidence to prove that petitioner committed a serious misconduct, which warranted her termination from employment. As such, petitioner was not entitled to reinstatement and to the award of full backwages, moral and exemplary damages, and payment of attorney's fees. Likewise, the Labor Arbiter denied petitioner's prayer for the payment of her salary differential, overtime pay, holiday pay, and night shift differential pay due to insufficiency of evidence. The Labor Arbiter, however, found that respondents should be ordered to pay petitioner her service incentive leave pay, thirteenth month pay, and ECOLA, as there was no showing that petitioner received these amounts. Thus, the Labor Arbiter disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the dismissal of complainant legal. However, respondents are ordered to pay jointly and severally complainant as follows:
|
1. Service incentive leave |
P12,573.63 |
|
2. 13th month pay |
P65,382.85 |
|
3. ECOLA |
P22,958.00 |
|
4. Salary differential |
P71,794.20 |
|
|
–––––––––– |
|
Total Awards |
P172,708.68 |
SO ORDERED.
NLRC's Ruling
The NLRC affirmed the dismissal of the labor complaint in its Decision 16 dated April 23, 2018 and held that there was just cause for dismissing petitioner. Petitioner, however, was not accorded procedural due process, as respondents failed to comply with the mandatory twin-notice rule. Thus, the NLRC held that petitioner was entitled to an award of nominal damages.
As regards petitioner's claim that she was entitled to the payment of her patient-referral shares, the NLRC denied the same because petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence to substantiate such an arrangement between her and respondents. Similarly, the NLRC denied petitioner's prayer for the award of exemplary and moral damages and attorney's fees for lack of factual basis. Thus, the NLRC disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, in light of these considerations, complainant Marilou Manalang Paraiso's instant appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED, and the assailed Decision rendered on 14 August 2017 by Labor Arbiter Pablo A. Gajardo, Jr. is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION in that complainant is hereby awarded nominal damages amounting to Ten Thousand Pesos (Php10,000.00).
All other claims are hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
The rest of the Decision STANDS.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the CA.
CA Ruling
In a Decision 17 dated January 16, 2020, the CA dismissed the petition filed by petitioner. It sustained the findings of both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that there was just cause for the dismissal of petitioner. The CA concurred with the NLRC that petitioner was not accorded with procedural due process. Thus, the CA found that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in affirming the valid dismissal of petitioner and in awarding her nominal damages. Accordingly, the CA disposed as follows:
FOR THESE REASONS, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Hence this appeal.
Issue
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR WHICH AMOUNTED TO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT DISMISSED BOTH THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF PETITIONER AND DECLARED THAT SHE WAS VALIDLY DISMISSED BY RESPONDENTS AND HER MONETARY CLAIMS HAVE NO BASIS.
First and foremost, it should be noted that petitioner elevated her case before this Court via a petition for review for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Section 6, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court has been interpreted to mean that petitions for review on certiorari will only be entertained if the questions raised therein are of significant consequence and value. Accordingly, this Court may exercise its exclusive discretion to deny outright such an appeal if "there is no novel legal question involved, or when a case presents no doctrinal or pedagogical value that warrants this Court's review and expound on, rectify, modify and/or clarify existing legal policy, or lay out novel principles and delve into unexplored areas of law." Also, such an appeal may not be entertained if there is no manifest or demonstrable departure from legal provisions and/or jurisprudence or deviation from settled procedural norms. 18
Here, petitioner insists that she was illegally dismissed. She claims that respondents falsely incriminated her to justify her dismissal and ultimately stop paying her patient-referral fee. Her illegal dismissal then justifies her entitlement to her monetary claims. 19
It is evident from a mere perusal of the petition filed before this Court that petitioner's appeal should be denied outright. The Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and the Court of Appeals were unanimous in ruling that respondents were able to substantially prove that on several instances, petitioner overcharged respondent's patients and then pocketed the difference. Such infraction amounted to a serious misconduct, which is one of the just causes for dismissing a regular employee. 20 Petitioner's allegations that the pieces of evidence presented by respondents were fabricated lacks credence.
Furthermore, it has been held that the Non-Diminution Rule under Article 100 of the Labor Code can only be invoked upon proof that the benefit being claimed is based on an express policy, a written contract, or practice. That is, the giving of such benefit has been done consistently and deliberately by the employer over a long period of time. 21 Petitioner, however, miserably failed to substantiate her claim that respondents agreed to pay her a fee for every patient that she was able to refer to them.
Thus, the present petition should be denied outright as it lacks merit and failed to raise questions of substance. We, however, find the need to modify the amount of nominal damages to P30,000.00 awarded in favor of petitioner, consistent with this Court's pronouncement in Agabon v. NLRC. 22
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court RESOLVES to DENY the instant petition for failure of petitioner to show substantial reasons to warrant review by this Court and for lack of merit. The Decision dated January 16, 2020 rendered by the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION in that the award of nominal damages is increased to P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 11-30.
2. Penned by Associate Justice Danton Q. Bueser with Associate Justices Ronaldo Roberto B. Martin and Walter S. Ong concurring, id. at 32-41.
3.Id. at 43-45.
4.Id. at 104-105.
5.Id. at 106.
6.Id. at 101-102.
7.Id. at 115-116.
8.Id. at 155.
9.Id.
10.Id.
11.Id. at 184.
12.Id. at 156.
13.Id. at 156-157.
14.Id. at 157.
15. Penned by Labor Arbiter Pablo A. Gajardo, Jr., id. at 87-100.
16. Penned by Commissioner Mary Ann F. Plata-Daytia with Commissioners Grace M. Venus and Leonard Vinz O. Ignacio, concurring, id. at 63-81.
17.Supra note 2.
18.Kumar vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 247661, June 15, 2020.
19.Rollo, pp. 14-15.
20. LABOR CODE, Art. 296 (formerly Art. 282) (a). See Stanfilco — a Division of DOLE Philippines, Inc. v. Tequillo, G.R. No. 209735, July 17, 2019.
21.Wesleyan University-Philippines v. Wesleyan University Faculty and Staff Association, 729 Phil. 240, 249 (2014), citing Central Azucarera De Tarlac v. Central Azucarera De Tarlac Labor Union-NLU, 639 Phil. 633, 641 (2010).
22. 485 Phil. 248 (2004).