Paraguya y Aniñon v. People

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 246543. September 29, 2021.]

DIEGO PARAGUYA y ANIÑON, petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedSeptember 29, 2021which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 246543 — DIEGO PARAGUYA y ANIÑON v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Proceedings before the Trial Court

The Charge

In Criminal Case No. 2013-1191, petitioner Diego Paraguya y Aniñon was indicted for violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (RA 9165) viz.:

That on or about September 27, 2013 at more or less 11:20 o'clock in the evening at Isla Bugnaw, Consolacion, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by law to sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drugs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, criminally and knowingly sell and/or offer for sale, deliver and give away to a confidential agent acting as poseur buyer one (1) heat-sealed transparent sachet containing white crystalline substance believed to be shabu, a dangerous drug, weighing a total of .7476 gram, which after a confirmatory laboratory test, the same was found positive for the presence of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, locally known as shabu, in consideration of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) consisting of one (1) genuine P1,000 bill with Serial No. VBO78775, which was previously marked and recorded for the purpose of the buy-bust operation, accused knowing the same to be dangerous drug.

Contrary to Section 5, Paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. 1

The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC)-Branch 40, Cagayan de Oro City. On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. 2

The prosecution presented the following version.

In the evening of September 27, 2013, Police Officer 2 Ian Quitoriano (PO2 Quitoriano) and his fellow police officers received a briefing from their station commander Police Senior Inspector Parnes (P/SI Parnes) about a buy bust operation against a certain Dodong in Barangay 35, Cagayan de Oro City. Senior Police Officer 1 Marvin Bolanio (SPO1 Bolanio), was the one who received the information through a cellphone call from a confidential informant, who later showed up in the police station. 3

The confidential informant confirmed that he already agreed to buy from Dodong shabu worth P1,000.00. The sale was going to take place in Barangay Consolacion, Cagayan de Oro City. 4 SPO1 Bolanio was designated as team leader while PO2 Quitoriano was tasked to accompany the confidential informant. SPO1 Bolanio coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA). The other team members were P/SI Parnes and Police Officer 3 Gaabucaya. 5

Around eleven o'clock in the evening, the team made their way to Barangay Consolacion. PO2 Quitoriano rode his motorcycle together with the confidential informant while SPO1 Bolanio rode another motorcycle. The rest of the team boarded the mobile patrol. PO2 Quitoriano parked his motorcycle along the pathway leading to Isla Bugnaw. 6

After fifteen (15) minutes, a man, identified by the confidential informant as Dodong, arrived. Dodong casually approached PO2 Quitoriano and the confidential informant, who, in turn, asked Dodong if he brought the item. Dodong confirmed so the confidential informant handed to Dodong the P1,000.00-bill, buy bust money. After receiving the money, Dodong took out from his right pocket a piece of cardboard wrapped in packaging tape. With the aid of the light from PO2 Quitoriano's cellphone, Dodong tore apart the item, took out a rectangular sachet and handed the same to the confidential informant. PO2 Quitoriano secretly got the sachet from the confidential informant and slid it in his own pocket. Thereupon, PO2 Quitoriano introduced himself as a police officer, arrested Dodong and held the latter — holding the suspect was the pre-arranged signal. PO2 Quitoriano informed Dodong of his rights and frisked him. Recovered from Dodong were the buy-bust money, a rectangular pouch, and a piece of paper. PO2 Quitoriano was assisted by SPO1 Bolanio in restraining Dodong. 7

Dodong, who was later identified as petitioner, was brought to the barangay hall of Barangay Consolacion. There, an inventory was conducted in the presence of Barangay Captain Dante Roa (Barangay Captain Roa) and media representative Ferced Blanca (media representative Blanca). PO2 Quitoriano marked the sachet with "DPA" and affixed his signature thereto while SPO1 Bolanio took photographs of the seized items. 8Barangay Captain Roa testified that when he arrived at the barangay hall, he saw a person in handcuffs and marked items laid down on a table by the police. He also confirmed that he signed the inventory sheet. 9 The parties stipulated that media representative Blanca witnessed the inventory and signed the inventory sheet. 10

Petitioner was taken to the police station and the incident was recorded in the blotter. The police officers also prepared the letter-request for laboratory examination for the seized specimen. Petitioner and the specimen were then brought to the crime laboratory. 11

The parties stipulated on the following: 1) the existence of Letter-Request dated September 27, 2013 from Police Station No. 5, Macabalan, Cagayan de Oro City and the existence of the specimen, marked with DPA 9/27/2013 with the signature of PO2 Quitoriano; 2) Police Chief Inspector Emma Salvacion-Sampaga (P/CI Salvacion-Sampaga) is a member of the Philippine National Police and assigned at the Regional Crime Laboratory Region X, she is an expert in forensic chemistry, particularly in testing substances for dangerous drugs, she received the Letter-Request dated September 28, 2013 and the specimen subject thereof from PO2 Quitoriano, she conducted the laboratory examination on the specimen, she reported her findings through Chemistry Report No. D-367-2013 dated September 28, 2013, she turned over the specimen to the evidence custodian and retrieved it only on the day of the hearing, and she personally brought the specimen to the trial court. 12

As for the defense, it waived the right to present testimonial and documentary evidence. 13

The Ruling of the Trial Court

By Judgment 14 dated April 27, 2018, the trial court convicted petitioner of illegal sale of dangerous drugs. It ruled that the prosecution was able to prove all the elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs and the chain of custody was duly preserved. Thus:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered, the court hereby finds accused Diego A. Paraguya GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of having committed the offense charged in the information (violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165). He is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine in the amount of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00), without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The period of his preventive detention shall be credited in his favor.

SO ORDERED. 15

The Proceedings Before the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals directed petitioner to file his appellant's brief within thirty (30) days from notice or until October 12, 2018. On October 11, 2018, petitioner filed a motion for extension of thirty (30) days or until November 11, 2018 within which to file his brief, explaining that his counsel was saddled with drafting and filing of other equally important briefs and petitions. On November 9, 2018, petitioner filed a second motion for extension, this time, asking for additional fifteen (15) days or until November 26, 2018 within which to submit his brief. Subsequently, petitioner was able to submit his brief on November 14, 2018. 16

By Resolution dated November 22, 2018, the Court of Appeals granted the first motion for extension with warning against further extension. Petitioner received the resolution on December 18, 2018 and promptly filed a motion for reconsideration within the same day. On December 19, 2018, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a motion for extension of ninety (90) days within which to file the appellee's brief. 17

On January 31, 2019, petitioner received the Court of Appeals' Resolution dated December 14, 2018 denying his second motion for extension and dismissing his appeal for failure to file the appellant's brief on time. 18

On January 22, 2019, petitioner moved for reconsideration. Petitioner pointed out that his brief was filed on November 14, 2018 while the Court of Appeals issued the warning against further extensions only on November 22, 2018. Besides, the delay was only three (3) days beyond the first extension granted by the Court of Appeals. Also, jurisprudence invariably directs the appellate court to refrain from outrightly dismissing appeals in cases where a party is represented by a counsel de officio. Lastly, it would be the height of injustice to simply dismiss an appeal on the basis of a procedural technicality when what is involved is the guilt or innocence of an accused. 19

By Resolution dated January 15, 2019, the Court of Appeals noted without action petitioner's motion for reconsideration. 20

Eventually, by its assailed Resolution dated March 13, 2019, the Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal of petitioner's appeal and denied the OSG's motion for extension of time, viz.:

The Motion for Extension of Time filed by the OSG is NOTED WITHOUT ACTION.

The appeal was dismissed due to appellant's failure to file the required Appellant's Brief in spite of the extension already granted. Hence, the Motion for Reconsideration is denied.

The accused-appellant's counsel was negligent in failing to file the required brief not only within 45 days from receipt of the notice, but also within the total extended period of forty-five (45) days granted by the Court. She, however, explains that she could not comply with the Court's directive because she had to attend to other cases that she considered equally as important and urgent. Regrettably, such excuse is unacceptable. She is bound to protect her client's interest to the best of her ability and with utmost diligence. Failure to file brief certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence, more so if the delay results in the dismissal of the appeal. Every member of the Bar should always bear in mind that every case that a lawyer accepts deserves his/her full attention, diligence, skill, and competence, regardless of its importance, whether he/she accepts it for a fee or free. Unfortunately, the accused-appellant is bound by the negligence of his counsel.

WHEREFORE, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED. 21

The Present Petition

Petitioner now seeks affirmative relief from the Court via Rule 45. He essentially argues that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt because the trial court did not admit in evidence the Inventory of Seized Items, no representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ) was present during the marking and inventory, the stipulation on P/CI Salvacion-Sampaga's testimony did not adequately explain the source of the specimen she supposedly tested, the omission of the prosecution to present the testimony of the evidence custodian constituted a break in the chain of custody, and, there was no explanation as to why the marking was not immediately done in the place of arrest. Additionally, he reiterates that his appeal before the Court of Appeals should be reinstated on ground of substantial justice. 22

In its Comment 23 dated March 22, 2021, the OSG, through Assistant Solicitor General Gilbert U. Medrano and Associate Solicitor Rigel C. Bajande, asserts that procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantive rights. Also, the prosecution duly proved the existence of the elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs and that there was no gap in the chain of custody.

Issues

1) Did the Court of Appeals correctly dismiss petitioner's appeal for the alleged failure of his counsel to timely file the appellant's brief?

2) Was there full compliance with the chain of custody rule?

Our Ruling

Petitioner's counsel was

Simple negligence is defined as the failure to give proper attention to a required task or to discharge a duty due to carelessness or indifference. On the other hand, gross negligence is characterized by want of even the slightest care, or by acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to the consequences, or by flagrant and palpable breach of duty. It denotes a flagrant and culpable refusal or unwillingness of a person to perform a duty. 24

Here, petitioner's counsel, the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) was not negligent at all. In fact, it demonstrated zealousness and care in pursuing petitioner's appeal before the Court of Appeals. The following timelines are relevant:

1. September 12, 2018 — PAO received the notice to file appellant's brief within thirty (30) days or until October 12, 2018. 25

2. October 11, 2018 — PAO filed its first Motion for Extension of Time to File Appellant's Brief for additional thirty (30) days or until November 11, 2018. 26

3. November 9, 2018 — PAO filed a second motion for extension of fifteen (15) days or until November 26, 2018 to file appellant's brief. 27

4. November 14, 2018 — PAO filed the appellant's brief. 28

5. November 22, 2018 — under Resolution of even date, the Court of Appeals granted PAO's first motion for extension of time to file brief with warning against further extension. 29

6. December 14, 2018 — under Resolution of even date, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's second motion for extension and dismissed petitioner's appeal. 30

7. December 18, 2018 — PAO received the Court of Appeals' Resolution dated November 22, 2018. On the same day, PAO filed a motion for reconsideration, expressing profuse apologies and explaining it was humanly impossible to file the brief before November 11, 2018 considering their workload. 31

8. December 19, 2018 — the OSG filed a motion for extension of ninety (90) days within which to file appellee's brief. 32

9. January 8, 2019 — PAO received Resolution dated December 14, 2018, denying PAO's second motion for extension of time to file appellant's brief and dismissing petitioner's appeal. 33

10. January 15, 2019 — under Resolution of even date, the Court of Appeals noted without action PAO's motion for reconsideration of Resolution dated November 22, 2018 (grant of first extension with warning). 34

11. January 22, 2019 — PAO sought reconsideration of Resolution dated December 14, 2018. PAO begged for the kind indulgence of the Court of Appeals and pointed out that it had already filed the appellant's brief on November 14, 2018, or three (3) days after the lapse of the first extended period, and before its receipt of Resolution dated November 22, 2018. It cited jurisprudence recognizing that when an accused is represented by a counsel de officio, such as the PAO, failure to timely file the appellant's brief should not instantaneously cause the dismissal of the appeal. Ultimately, the higher ends of justice should prevail over technicality. 35

12. January 31, 2019 — PAO received the aforesaid Resolution dated January 15, 2019. 36

13. March 13, 2019 — under Resolution of even date, the Court of Appeals denied PAO's motion for reconsideration of Resolution dated December 14, 2018 and affirmed the dismissal of the appeal.

14. April 3, 2019 — PAO received the aforesaid Resolution dated March 13, 2019. 37

The timelines speak for themselves. PAO had already sought a second motion for extension of fifteen (15) days or until November 26, 2018, long before it even received the first resolution containing a warning against any further extension. Too, the appellant's brief already formed part of the records when the Court of Appeals denied the second motion for extension and petitioner's motion for reconsideration, and dismissed petitioner's appeal for alleged belated filing of the appellant's brief.

Wherever we look at it, we do not find any badge of negligence committed by petitioner's counsel here. What we see are overly strict actions of the Court of Appeals based on the record of its timelines only. It did not consider that PAO could not have possibly complied with its warning against a second extension for the simple reason that it received the notice post facto or after it had already sought a second extension and after it had already filed the appellant's brief itself. PAO could not have undone what had already been done.

In any event, since the appellant's brief already formed part of the records, the appellate court should have admitted it instead of dismissing the appeal on the ground that it was not filed within the first extension sought by PAO. To be sure, procedural rules cannot prevail over substantial justice, more so in the present case where what is at stake is no less than the life and liberty of petitioner who has been languishing in jail ever since 2013 38 or for about eight (8) years already. Besides, the Court has time and again, accorded leniency and consideration to counsel de officio such as PAO. 39

The next question — should we remand the case to the Court of Appeals for a resolution on the merits? Our short answer — since both petitioner and People have already presented here their respective arguments on the merits, we will no longer remand the case to the Court of Appeals for yet another round of proceedings lest it breed another round of delay in the already delayed disposition of the case. To repeat, petitioner has been languishing in jail for the past eight (8) years already. This case, therefore, should now be resolved right here.

We acquit.

The chain of custody

In drug related cases, the State bears the burden not only of proving the elements of the offense but also the corpus delicti itself. 40 The dangerous drug seized from an accused constitutes such corpus delicti. It is thus imperative for the prosecution to establish that the identity and integrity of the dangerous drug were duly preserved in order to sustain a verdict of conviction. 41 It must prove that the dangerous drug seized from the accused is indeed the substance offered in court, with the same unshakeable accuracy as that required to sustain a finding of guilt.

On September 27, 2013, petitioner was charged with violation of Section 5, RA 9165. The governing law, therefore, is the original version of RA 9165 and its implementing rules, prior to the effectivity of the amendatory Republic Act No. 10640 42 on August 7, 2014.

Section 21 of RA 9165 reads:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; x x x

The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 further mandates:

xxx xxx xxx

Section 21. (a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: x x x Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements underjustifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items; (Emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

Generally, there are four (4) links in the chain of custody of the seized illegal drug: (i) its seizure and marking, if practicable, from the accused, by the apprehending officer; (ii) its turnover by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; (iii) its turnover by the investigating officer to the forensic chemist for examination; and, (iv) its turnover by the forensic chemist to the court. 43

The first link refers to the seizure and marking which must be done immediately at the place of the arrest. Too, it includes the physical inventory and taking of photograph of the seized items which should be done in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, as well as certain required witnesses, namely, "a representative from the media and the DOJ, and any elected public official."44

Here, the first link of the chain of custody had already been breached early on.

At the outset, the marking was not done immediately after arrest and seizure of the specimen. In People v. Castillo, 45 the Court explained the importance of immediately marking the corpus delicti after seizure:

In People v. Saunar, this Court discussed the purpose of marking and emphasized that it is a separate requirement from inventorying and photographing:

Although the requirement of "marking" is not found in Republic Act No. 9165, its significance lies in ensuring the authenticity of the corpus delicti. In People v. Dahil:

in proving the chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or other related items immediately after they have been seized from the accused. "Marking" means the placing by the apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature on the items seized. Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link; hence, it is vital that the seized contraband be immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the markings as reference. The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of the criminal proceedings, thus, preventing switching, planting or contamination of evidence. (Emphasis supplied) (Citations omitted)

Here, the prosecution never offered any explanation why the marking was not immediately done at the place of arrest — at Isla Bugnaw, Barangay Consolacion, Cagayan de Oro City. After arresting petitioner, the police officers went straight to the barangay hall and did the marking there. This breach is fatal because the prosecution did not even attempt to justify such deviation from the mandatory procedure. Indeed, police officers are "compelled not only to state reasons for their non-compliance, but must in fact, also convince the Court that they exerted earnest efforts to comply with the mandated procedure, and that under the given circumstance, their actions were reasonable."46 Meantime, the alleged corpus delicti remained unmarked and there is no testimony or evidence on how PO2 Quitoriano, who slid the sachet in one of his pockets, continued to ensure the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti before the actual marking, inventory, and photographing were finally done.

In People v. Zanoria, 47 the Court said that "[e]ven if the transfer from the place of arrest to the police station may be justified, this is by no means a blanket authorization to be lackadaisical in the process. The risk of alteration, tampering, contamination, and substitution persists until the presentation of evidence in court. At every step of the way, police officers are expected to zealously adhere to precautions on chain of custody."

In sum, PO2 Quitoriano's failure to mark the sachet immediately after seizure already tainted the chain of custody. As a consequence, no amount of subsequent safety measures can cure this germinal defect.

Another breach. The inventory was done in the presence of petitioner and only two (2) insulating witnesses, namely, Barangay Captain Roa and media representative Blanca. The prosecution did not even acknowledge that the representative from the DOJ was noticeably absent. To repeat, the insulating witnesses must be an elected public official and a representative of the DOJ and the media. In People v. Serojales, 48 the Court held that the presence of only an elected official (barangay councilor) and a media representative, without the DOJ representative, does not amount to substantial compliance with the chain of custody rule absent any showing that earnest efforts were made to secure the presence of all three (3) insulating witnesses, viz.:

It is undisputed that the inventory and marking of evidence were conducted only in the presence of Barangay Councilor Lyn K. Denham and Sheila Joy Labrador as the representative from the media. However, the prosecution did not bother to explain the absence of a representative from the DOJ during the physical inventory and the taking of photographs of the seized drugs nor was there any evidence offered to prove that the police officers exerted any effort to seek their presence. The buy-bust operation, by its nature, was arranged and scheduled in advance — the police officers formed an apprehending team, coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, prepared the buy-bust money, and held a briefing. Simply put, the buy-bust team had enough time and opportunity to bring with them said witnesses. Yet, the prosecution failed to ensure that a representative from the DOJ would be present during the physical inventory and the taking of photographs of the seized drugs. Thus, for failure of the prosecution to provide justifiable grounds or to show that it exerted genuine efforts in securing the witnesses required under Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the Court is constrained to rule that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized drugs have been compromised. (Emphasis supplied)

The Court has repeatedly stressed that the presence of the required insulating witnesses at the time of the inventory is mandatory. Under the law, the presence of the insulating witnesses is a high prerogative requirement, the non-fulfillment of which casts serious doubts upon the integrity of the corpus delicti itself — the very prohibited substance itself — and for that reason imperils the prosecution's case. 49 Here, the Court takes note of the prosecution's failure to explain as to why no representative from DOJ was present. In other words, there is no earnest effort to speak of in securing the presence of the DOJ representative during the inventory.

Going now to the second link, none of the prosecution witnesses testified on how the corpus delicti was handled when it was transported from the barangay hall of Barangay Consolacion back to Police Station No. 5, Macabalan, Cagayan de Oro City. It was not shown how the police officers continued to ensure the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti after the actual marking, inventory, and photographing. No one testified on how the police officers handled the corpus delicti while it was being processed at the police station. There is no testimony if it was even turned over to a police investigator and how long it took the police officers to prepare the paper work. Lastly, PO2 Quitoriano did not testify on how he handled the corpus delicti while he was transporting it to the crime laboratory. Clearly, the prosecution's failure to address this gap in the chain of custody is disconcerting and, in effect, casts more doubt on the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti.

True, the saving clause under Section 21 (a), Article II, RA 9165 IRR ordains that non-compliance with the prescribed requirement shall not invalidate the seizure and custody of the items provided such non-compliance is justified and the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officers. 50

As shown, the saving clause here is not triggered for the prosecution failed to prove that the police officers' non-compliance with the prescribed procedure was justified and it is very clear that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items have already been tainted.

Verily, we find that the prosecution utterly failed to 1) prove the corpus delicti of the crime especially since the amount involved in this case is minuscule, the likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with respect to an exhibit is greatest when the exhibit is small and is one that has physical characteristics fungible in nature and similar in form to substances familiar to people in their daily lives; 51 (2) establish an unbroken chain of custody of the seized drugs; and (3) offer any explanation why the Chain of Custody Rule was not complied with. Accordingly, the Court is constrained to acquit appellant based on reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court RESOLVES to:

1) REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Resolution dated December 14, 2018 and Resolution dated March 13, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02036-MIN and REINSTATE the appeal of DIEGO PARAGUYA y ANIÑON; and

2) REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Judgment dated April 27, 2018 of the Regional Trial Court-Branch 40, Cagayan de Oro City in Criminal Case No. 2013-1191. DIEGO PARAGUYA y ANIÑON is ACQUITTED.

The Director General of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to: a) immediately release DIEGO PARAGUYA y ANIÑON from custody unless he is being held for some other lawful cause or causes; and b) submit a report on the action taken within five (5) days from notice.

Let entry of judgment be issued immediately.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

By:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, p. 58.

2.Id.

3.Id. at 60.

4.Id.

5.Id. at 60-61.

6.Id. at 61.

7.Id.

8.Id.

9.Id. at 64.

10.Id.

11.Id. at 61.

12.Id. at 59-60.

13.Id. at 65.

14.Id. at 58-66.

15.Id. at 66.

16.Id. at 9.

17.Id. at 9-10.

18.Id. at 10-11.

19.Id. at 11.

20.Id.

21.Id. at 95.

22.Id. at 4-35.

23.Id. at 132-151.

24.Trinidad, Jr. v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 227440, December 02, 2020.

25.Rollo, p. 9.

26.Id.

27.Id.

28.Id.

29.Id.

30.Id. at 10.

31.Id. at 9-10.

32.Id. at 10.

33.Id.

34.Id. at 11.

35.Id.

36.Id.

37.Id.

38.Id. at 58.

39.People v. Ramos, 791 Phil. 162, 170 (2016).

40.People v. Calates, 829 Phil. 262, 269 (2018).

41.Calahi v. People, 820 Phil. 886, 894 (2017), citing People v. Casacop, 778 Phil. 369, 376 (2016) and Zafra v. People, 686 Phil. 1095, 1105-1106 (2012).

42. AN ACT TO FURTHER STRENGTHEN THE ANTI-DRUG CAMPAIGN OF THE GOVERNMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTION 21 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002."

43.People v. De Leon, G.R. No. 227867, June 26, 2019.

44.People v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 239000, November 05, 2018, 884 SCRA 318, 327.

45. G.R. No. 238339, August 07, 2019.

46.People v. Labsan, G.R. No. 227184, February 06, 2019.

47. G.R. No. 226396, December 02, 2019.

48. G.R. No. 243985, September 03, 2020.

49.People v. Manansala, G.R. No. 229509, July 03, 2019.

50.People v. Frias, G.R. No. 234686, June 10, 2019.

51.People v. Pagsigan, G.R. No. 232487, September 03, 2018, 878 SCRA 545, 562.