FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 198557. October 1, 2018.]
MAY PANO, MANUEL ABELLERA, AND DOLORES ABELLERA, petitioners, vs.FATIMA O. DE GUZMAN-FUERTE, MARRIED TO GEORGE MAURICE FUERTE, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedOctober 1, 2018which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 198557 (May Pano, Manuel Abellera, and Dolores Abellera v. Fatima O. De Guzman-Fuerte, married to George Maurice Fuerte). — This is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision 2 dated June 15, 2011 and Resolution 3 dated September 9, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 116443. The CA reversed the Decision 4 dated March 3, 2010 and Order 5 dated September 17, 2010 of Branch 123 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Caloocan City in Civil Case No. C-22422 which affirmed the Decision 6 dated September 30, 2009 of Branch 51 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Caloocan City in Civil Case No. 06-28695. The MeTC dismissed the complaint for unlawful detainer and damages on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the case.
On June 21, 2006, Dr. Fatima O. De Guzman-Fuerte (Fuerte) filed a complaint for unlawful detainer and damages, 7 docketed as Civil Case No. 06-28695, against May Pano, Conchita Añ(h)over (Añover), Adolfo Ibarreta (Adolfo), Noli Abellera, Luzviminda Abellera, Manuel Abellera (Manuel), Dolores Abellera, and Edwin Abellera (Pano, et al.) before the MeTC, Caloocan City. She sought to evict Pano, et al. from a parcel of land located at Block 17, Lot 20, Parkland Street, Maligaya Subdivision, Barangay 177, Caloocan City, with an area of 722 square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. C-374786. 8 Fuerte alleged that she was the absolute owner of the subject property which Pano, et al. were illegally occupying. On March 31, 2005, Manuel and Adolfo among others, offered through a letter 9 to purchase through the Community Mortgage Program of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation a portion of the property at P2,000.00 per square meter. On October 9, 2005, Fuerte entered into a Kasunduan10 with Pano, et al., except Añover, regarding the purchase of the property for a consideration of P2,000,000.00, payable in installments. However, Pano, et al. failed to comply with their undertaking. Thus, Fuerte made demands for them to vacate the premises and pay rentals for its use and occupation in the amount of P2,000.00 for each occupant from October 9, 2005 until they fully vacate the premises. 11 The demands were ignored; hence, the complaint. 12
In a Decision 13 dated September 30, 2009, the MeTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The MeTC ruled that the allegations in the complaint failed to constitute a case for either unlawful detainer or forcible entry. It could not be a case for unlawful detainer as Fuerte did not have any contract with Pano, et al.; thus, there could be no expiration or termination of Pano, et al.'s right of possession over the property, and consequently, no unlawful withholding of possession thereof from Fuerte. Neither was it a case for forcible entry. Fuerte did not allege that she was in prior physical possession of the property and that she was deprived of possession through force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. 14
Fuerte appealed the Decision to the RTC, which affirmed the MeTC in its Decision 15 dated March 3, 2010. Her motion for reconsideration was denied in the Order 16 dated September 17, 2010 for lack of notice of hearing. CAIHTE
On June 15, 2011, the CA granted Fuerte's petition for review 17 under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. At the outset, the CA allowed a liberal construction of the rules on notice of hearing in order to give way to the resolution of the case on the merits in the interest of substantial justice. 18 On the merits, the CA ruled that to resolve the issue of jurisdiction, the court must interpret and apply the law on jurisdiction vis-à-vis the averments of the complaint. 19 Contrary to the findings of the MeTC and RTC, the CA found that the complaint had sufficiently averred the jurisdictional requirements of a complaint for unlawful detainer. It further held that the fact that the complaint failed to state that Fuerte was in prior physical possession of the property before it was unlawfully withheld by Pano, et al. was of no moment as it was not an indispensable requirement. 20
The CA found that Pano, et al.'s occupation of the property was by Fuerte's tolerance. While a Kasunduan was entered into between Fuerte and Pano, et al. (except Añover), the same was not shown to have materialized. Thus, Pano, et al. remained to be possessors by tolerance who were bound by an implied promise that they would vacate the premises upon demand. Having ignored Fuerte's demands, the CA held that an action for ejectment was properly instituted as they had become deforciants unlawfully withholding the property. 21
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision dated March 3, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 123, Caloocan City (RTC), in Civil Case No. C-22422 is REVERSEDandSET ASIDE and a new one is entered ordering the respondents to surrender and vacate the subject premises and to pay rentals for the use and occupation thereof in the amount of P2,000.00 per month for each respondent from April 21, 2006 until they fully vacate the same. Respondents are further ordered to solidarily pay the petitioner the amount of P20,000.00 as and for attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.22
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, 23 which the CA denied. 24
Hence, this petition for review which raises the following arguments:
(1) the CA erred when it relaxed the rules on notice of hearing; 25
(2) the CA erred when it held that the jurisdictional requirements for a complaint for unlawful detainer were present;
(3) the complaint failed to state a cause of action for unlawful detainer; and
(4) the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the complaint. 26
The petition has no merit.
We hold that the CA did not err when it relaxed the rules on notice of hearing.
We have held that under Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, mandatory is the notice requirement in a motion, which is rendered defective by failure to comply with the requirement. As a rule, a motion without a notice of hearing is considered pro forma and does not affect the reglementary period for the appeal or the filing of the requisite pleading. 27 However, there are exceptions to the strict application of this rule, to wit: DETACa
Liberal construction of this rule has been allowed by this Court in cases (1) where a rigid application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice; especially if a party successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final and executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from the recitals contained therein; (2) where the interest of substantial justice will be served; (3) where the resolution of the motion is addressed solely to the sound and judicious discretion of the court; and (4) where the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate [to] the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed. 28 (Citations omitted.)
This case falls under the first and second exceptions. In this case, to allow the RTC Decision dated March 3, 2010 to attain finality based on a mere technicality would inevitably result to a manifest failure of justice. Substantial justice dictates that the case be resolved on the merits in order to correct the erroneous decision of the RTC. Certainly, procedural rules are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application should be relaxed when they hinder, rather than promote, substantial justice. Public policy dictates that court cases should, as much as possible, be resolved on the merits, not on mere technicalities. Substantive justice trumps procedural rules. 29
On the merits, we find that the CA correctly ruled in favor of Fuerte.
In Zacarias v. Anacay, 30 we explained the rule in determining the nature of an action and the court which has jurisdiction over the case:
The invariable rule is that what determines the nature of the action, as well as the court which has jurisdiction over the case, are the allegations in the complaint. In ejectment cases, the complaint should embody such statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which Section 1 of Rule 70 provides a summary remedy, and must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence. Such remedy is either forcible entry or unlawful detainer. In forcible entry, the plaintiff is deprived of physical possession of his land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In illegal detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right thereto under any contract, express, or implied. 31 (Citations omitted.)
An ejectment case, based on the allegation of possession by tolerance, falls under the category of unlawful detainer. 32 An action for unlawful detainer, as in this case, refers to a situation where the current occupant of the property initially obtained possession lawfully. This possession only became unlawful due to the expiration of the right to possess, which may be a contract, express or implied, or by mere tolerance. 33
A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it establishes the following key jurisdictional facts:
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter's right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complain for ejectment. 34 (Citation omitted.)
A simple allegation that defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from plaintiff is sufficient. The phrase "unlawful withholding" has been held to imply possession on the part of defendant, which was legal in the beginning, having no other source than a contract, express or implied, and which later expired as a right and is being withheld by defendant. 35 More, where the plaintiff allows the defendant to use his property by tolerance without any contract, the defendant is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate on demand, failing which, an action for unlawful detainer will lie. 36
Meanwhile, a court's jurisdiction is provided by law. 37 Section 33 (2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 12938 provides that metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts, and municipal circuit trial courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer. ATICcS
Here, the complaint alleged the following:
3) Plaintiff is the absolute owner in fee simple of the subject premises at x x x which is being illegally and unjustly occupied by the defendants, as evidenced by the title in her name, under Transfer Certificate of Title No. C-37486 of the Registry of Deeds for Kaloocan City, x x x.
4) Defendants are among the occupants of the abovesaid property of the plaintiff when on March 31, 2005, in a letter of the said date, some offered to plaintiff to purchase the said parcel of land with an area of Seven Hundred Twenty Two (722) Square Meters, at the rate of Pesos: Two Thousand (PhP2,000.00), Philippine Currency per square meter, x x x.
5) On 09 October, 2005, a written agreement for the purchase of the abovesaid parcel of land, entitled "Kasunduan" was entered into with all the occupants, including the herein defendants, except defendant Conchita Anover, x x x.
6) The defendants who signed and executed the above Kasunduan however, utterly failed to comply with their undertaking while defendant Anover did not sign the same, thereby rendering their occupation and possession over the subject premises unlawful.
7) Thus, on various and several occasions, plaintiff demanded the defendants to vacate the subject premises and forthwith, to pay her compensation for their use and occupation over the same at the rate of PhP2,000.00 per month, per defendant, or the total amount of PhP16,000.00 per month, counted from 09 October 2005 until they finally vacate the same but despite thereof, they utterly and unjustly failed and/or refused to comply thereto to the undue and irreparable damage and prejudice of the herein plaintiff.
8) In view thereof, plaintiff, through counsel, formally made the foregoing demands upon the defendants but in spite of the foregoing, still the defendants contumaciously and stubbornly failed and/or refused to comply thereto, without just, valid or lawful ground, resulting to further undue and irreparable damage and prejudice of the herein plaintiff, x x x. 39 (Emphasis in the original.)
These allegations in the complaint made out a case of unlawful detainer, vesting the MeTC with exclusive original jurisdiction over the complaint. As alleged, Fuerte owned the subject property as evidenced by a transfer certificate of title in her name. Pano, et al. possessed and occupied Fuerte's property. With the intent to purchase the property from Fuerte, Pano, et al. entered into a Kasunduan where they agreed to buy the property in installments. Fuerte merely tolerated Pano, et al.'s possession by allowing them to continue occupying the property while they pay the purchase price in installments. However, Pano, et al. failed to comply with their obligation; hence, Fuerte demanded that they vacate the premises and pay rentals. When Pano, et al. still failed to meet Fuerte's demands, she instituted the complaint for unlawful detainer. The complaint was filed on June 21, 2006, or within one year from the date of last demand on April 21, 2006. 40 Taken together, these circumstances present a clear case of unlawful detainer based on mere tolerance.
We now determine whether Fuerte was entitled to the reliefs she prayed for in her complaint. In civil cases, including unlawful detainer, the party having the burden of proof must establish the case by a preponderance of evidence. Preponderance of evidence simply means evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it. 41 TIADCc
We agree with the CA's conclusion that Fuerte was entitled to the physical possession of the lot. She was able to prove by preponderance of evidence, through the TCT registered in her name, that she was entitled to possession of the property as the owner thereof. Petitioner's argument that the TCT in the name of Fuerte was null and void cannot be given weight. Settled is the rule that the validity of a certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked in an action for ejectment. 42
We also affirm the award of rentals and attorney's fees in favor of Fuerte. Section 17 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 17. Judgment. — If after trial the court finds that the allegations of the complaint are true, it shall render judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the restitution of the premises, the sum justly due as arrears of rent or as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises, attorney's fees and costs. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
The rightful possessor in an unlawful detainer case is entitled to recover damages, which refer to "rents" or "the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises," or "fair rental value of the property," 43 and attorney's fees and costs. The payment of attorney's fees is likewise justified. Fuerte was compelled to file the case for unlawful detainer in order to protect her rights and interests as a result of Pano, et al.'s unwarranted refusal to vacate and surrender possession of the property. In unlawful detainer cases, where attorney's fees are awarded, the same shall not exceed P20,000.00. 44 Thus, we affirm the awards of monthly rent of P2,000.00 which Pano, et al. must each pay and attorney's fees of P20,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated June 15, 2011 and Resolution dated September 9, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 116443 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The amount of P2,000.00 monthly rental to be paid each by Pano, et al. from April 21, 2006 until the property is fully vacated is subject to interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of last demand on April 21, 2006 until June 30, 2013, and 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until fully paid. AIDSTE
SO ORDERED." Bersamin, J., on official travel.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 9-32.
2.Id. at 149-156. Penned by Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe (now a Member of this Court), with Associate Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes and Elihu A. Ybañez concurring.
3.Id. at 166. Penned by Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, with Associate Justices Marlene Gonzales-Sison and Elihu A. Ybañez concurring.
4.Id. at 84-87. Penned by Judge Oscar P. Barrientos.
5. Records, p. 233.
6.Rollo, pp. 74-78. Penned by Presiding Judge Alma Crispina B. Collado-Lacorte.
7.Id. at 33-38.
8.Id. at 41.
9.Id. at 42.
10.Id. at 43.
11.Id. at 44-45.
12.Id. at 150.
13.Supra note 6.
14.Rollo, pp. 76-77.
15.Supra note 4.
16.Supra note 5.
17.Rollo, pp. 88-114.
18.Id. at 152-153.
19.Id. at 153.
20.Id. at 154.
21.Id. at155.
22. Id. at 155-156.
23. Id. at 157-160.
24. Supra note 3.
25. Rollo, pp. 17-19.
26. Id. at 19-22.
27. City of Dagupan v. Maramba, G.R. No. 174411, July 2, 2014, 728 SCRA 520, 535-536, citing Jehan Shipping Corporation v. National Food Authority, G.R. No. 159750, December 14, 2005, 477 SCRA 781, 788-789.
28. Vlason Enterprises Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 121662-64, July 6, 1999, 310 SCRA 26, 53-54, citing Tan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130314, September 22, 1998, 295 SCRA 755, 767.
29. Aneco Realty and Development Corporation v. Landex Development Corporation, G.R. No. 165952, July 28, 2008, 560 SCRA 182, 193.
30. G.R. No. 202354, September 24, 2014, 736 SCRA 508.
31. Id. at 514-515.
32. Republic v. Luriz, G.R. No. 158992, January 26, 2007, 513 SCRA 140, 152.
33. Province of Camarines Sur v. Bodega Glassware, G.R. No. 194199, March 22, 2017, 821 SCRA 295, 305-306.
34. Suarez v. Emboy, Jr., G.R. No. 187944, March 12, 2014, 718 SCRA 677, 692.
35. Barba v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126638, February 6, 2002, 376 SCRA 210, 216-217.
36. Republic v. Luriz, supra at 153.
37. Gayoso v. Twenty-Two Realty Development Corporation, G.R. No. 147874, July 17, 2006, 495 SCRA 295, 298.
38. The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.
39. Rollo, pp. 34-35.
40. Id. at 44-45.
41. Booc v. Five Star Marketing Co., Inc., G.R. No. 157806, November 22, 2007, 538 SCRA 42, 52.
42. Delos Reyes v. Odones, G.R. No. 178096, March 23, 2011, 646 SCRA 328, 336.
43. Herrera v. Bollos, G.R. No. 138258, January 18, 2002, 374 SCRA 107, 112. Citation omitted.
44. Uy v. Estate of Vipa Fernandez, G.R. No. 200612, April 5, 2017, 822 SCRA 382, 400.