EN BANC
[G.R. No. 238875. August 7, 2018.]
SENATORS FRANCIS PANGILINAN, FRANKLIN DRILON, PAOLO BENIGNO AQUINO, LEILA DE LIMA, RISA HONTIVEROS, AND ANTONIO TRILLANES, petitioners,vs. ALAN PETER CAYETANO, SALVADOR MEDIALDEA, TEODORO LOCSIN, JR., AND SALVADOR PANELO, respondents.
[G.R. No. 239483. August 7, 2018.]
PHILIPPINE COALITION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (PCICC), LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, DR. AURORA CORAZON A. PARONG, EVELYN BALAIS-SERRANO, JOSE NOEL D. OLANO, REBECCA DESIREE E. LOZADA, EDELIZA P. HERNANDEZ, ANALIZA T. UGAY, NIZA CONCEPCION ARAZAS, GLORIA ESTER CATIBAYAN-GUARIN, RAY PAOLO "ARPEE" J. SANTIAGO, GILBERT TERUEL ANDRES, AND AXLE P. SIMEON, petitioners,vs. OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, REPRESENTED BY HON. SALVADOR MEDIALDEA, THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, REPRESENTED BY HON. ALAN PETER CAYETANO, AND THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE UNITED NATIONS, REPRESENTED BY HON. TEODORO LOCSIN, JR., respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court en banc issued a Resolution datedAugust 7, 2018, which reads as follows: HTcADC
"G.R. No. 238875 — Senators Francis Pangilinan, Franklin Drilon, Paolo Benigno Aquino, Leila De Lima, Risa Hontiveros, and Antonio Trillanes, petitioners, vs. Alan Peter Cayetano, Salvador Medialdea, Teodoro Locsin, Jr., and Salvador Panelo, respondents.
G.R. No. 239483 — Philippine Coalition for the International Criminal Court (PCICC), Loretta Ann P. Rosales, Dr. Aurora Corazon A. Parong, Evelyn Balais-Serrano, Jose Noel D. Olano, Rebecca Desiree E. Lozada, Edeliza P. Hernandez, Analiza T. Ugay, Niza Concepcion Arazas, Gloria Ester Catibayan-Guarin, Ray Paolo "Arpee" J. Santiago, Gilbert Teruel Andres, and Axle P. Simeon, petitioners, vs. Office of the Executive Secretary, Represented by Hon. Salvador Medialdea, the Department of Foreign Affairs, Represented by Hon. Alan Peter Cayetano, and the Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Philippines to the United Nations, Represented by Hon. Teodoro Locsin, Jr., respondents. —
This Court resolves to deny the Motion filed by petitioner Senator Leila M. De Lima (Senator De Lima) asking that she be allowed "to personally appear and represent herself" 1 during the oral arguments set by this Court in these consolidated petitions.
In a Manifestation with Motion dated June 25, 2018, Senator De Lima sought clearance from this Court for her appearance in oral arguments. There, she noted that on May 18, 2018, she, along with Senators Francis Pangilinan (Senator Pangilinan), Franklin Drilon (Senator Drilon), Paolo Benigno Aquino, Risa Hontiveros, and Antonio Trillanes filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus assailing the constitutionality of the Philippines' withdrawal from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court "solely decided upon by the Executive Department." 2
She conceded that she is barred by Article VI, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution 3 from appearing as counsel before any court. However, relying on Rule 138, Section 34 4 of the Rules of Court, she emphasized that she intended to appear, not as counsel, but in her personal capacity as petitioner. She invited this Court to take judicial notice of how, in the past, legislators have been permitted to appear before this Court in their personal capacities as litigants. As an example, she cited Representative Edcel Lagman's (Representative Lagman) having argued before this Court as petitioner in Lagman v. Medialdea. 5
The Office of the Solicitor General addressed Senator De Lima's Manifestation with Motion in an Opposition dated July 9, 2018. It pointed out that Senator De Lima is a prisoner under detention, charged with the non-bailable offense of violating Section 26 (b) of Republic Act No. 9165. 67 It asserted that Senator De Lima's interests as petitioner can be adequately represented by her fellow petitioners. 8 It also maintained that Senator De Lima's Motion is a disguised Petition for Bail that should have been filed before the Regional Trial Courts where her criminal cases are pending. 9
Article VI, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution prevents "Senator[s] or Member[s] of the House of Representatives [from] personally appear[ing] as counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies."
Senator De Lima is correct in noting that this prohibition pertains specifically to appearance as counsel for or in representation of another. 10 Thus, a Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may appear for himself or herself. This is inconsistent with Rule 138, Section 34 of the Rules of Court, which enables "a party [to] conduct his [or her] litigation" personally: HEITAD
Section 34. By whom litigation conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar. (Emphasis supplied)
A party who appears for himself or herself, even if he or she is a lawyer, does not act in representation of another or as counsel. He or she is not engaged in the practice of law:
The Rules recognize the right of an individual to represent himself in any case in which he is a party. The Rules state that a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and that his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the Bar. The individual litigant may personally do everything in the progress of the action from commencement to the termination of the litigation. A party's representation on his own behalf is not considered to be a practice of law as "one does not practice law by acting for himself, any more than he practices medicine by rendering first aid to himself."11 (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, in Maderada v. Mediodea: 12
This provision means that in a litigation, parties may personally do everything during its progress — from its commencement to its termination. When they, however, act as their own attorneys, they are restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure as those qualified to practice law; otherwise, ignorance would be unjustifiably rewarded. Individuals have long been permitted to manage, prosecute and defend their own actions; and when they do so, they are not considered to be in the practice of law. "One does not practice law by acting for himself any more than he practices medicine by rendering first aid to himself." 13
Cases resolved by this Court demonstrate how the appearance of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives for themselves is permissible.
Puyat v. De Guzman14 concerned the issue of "whether or not in intervening in the [Securities and Exchange Commission] Case, Assemblyman [Estanislao A.] Fernandez [was], in effect, appearing as counsel, albeit indirectly, before an administrative body in contravention of the Constitution provision." 15This Court conceded that Assemblyman Fernandez's appearance in a personal capacity as intervenor"[o]rdinarily . . . cannot be said to be appearing as counsel."16 This Court, however, noted "certain salient circumstances [which] militate against the intervention," 17 and which reveal an intent to enable "indirect 'appearance as counsel,'" 18 and how "[t]he 'intervention' was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity": 19
Ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of another, although he is not joining the cause of private respondents. His appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his ownership of ten (10) shares of IPI in respect of the matter in litigation and not for the protection of the petitioners nor respondents who have their respective capable and respected counsel.
However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the [Securities and Exchange Commission] Case. He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in [International Pipe Industries Corporation], representing ten shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares. He acquired them "after the fact," that is, on May 30, 1979, after the contested election of Directors on May 14, 1979, after the quo warranto suit had been filed on May 25, 1979 before [the Securities and Exchange Commission] and one day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the [Securities and Exchange Commission] on May 31, 1979. And what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for respondent Eustaquio T. C. Acero, but which was objected to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to "intervene" on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation. And it may be noted that in the case filed before the Rizal Court of First Instance (L-51928), he appeared as counsel for defendant Excelsior, co-defendant of respondent Acero therein.
Under those facts and circumstances, we are constrained to find that there has been an indirect "appearance as counsel before . . . any administrative body" and, in our opinion, that is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. The "intervention" was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity. To believe the avowed purpose, that is, to enable him eventually to vote and to be elected as Director in the event of an unfavorable outcome of the [Securities and Exchange Commission] Case would be pure naiveté. He would still appear as counsel indirectly.
A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the constitutional provision ineffective. All an Assemblyman need do, if he wants to influence an administrative body is to acquire a minimal participation in the "interest" of the client and then "intervene" in the proceedings. That which the Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by indirection or by a general legislative act which is intended to accomplish the objects specifically or impliedly prohibited. ATICcS
In brief, we hold that the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in [the Securities and Exchange Commission Case] No. 1747 falls within the ambit of the prohibition contained in Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution. 20 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
In Lagman v. Medialdea, 21 Representative Lagman, along with Representatives Tomasito S. Villarin, Gary C. Alejano, Emmanuel A. Billones, and Teddy Brawner Baguilat, Jr. filed a Petition under the Third Paragraph of Section 18 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, 22 assailing President Rodrigo Duterte's placing all of Mindanao under martial law. Representative Lagman was permitted to appear and argue in his capacity as petitioner. 23
Puyat demonstrated that the right to personally appear is not always availing. Exercising the same discretion as it did in Puyat, this Court finds no compelling reason to have Senator De Lima personally appear during the conduct of oral arguments.
Senator De Lima's capacity to appear for herself must yield to the fundamental restrictions on her liberty borne by her current detention. In any case, it does not appear that her and her co-petitioners' cause shall be prejudiced by the appearance before this Court of a person other than her.
The Office of the Solicitor General concedes Representative Lagman's prior appearance before this Court. It also rightly points out, however, that Senator De Lima is not similarly situated with Representative Lagman. As it emphasizes, unlike Representative Lagman, "she is detained for a non-bailable offense, that is, violation of Section 26 (b) of [Republic Act] No. 9165": 24
17. Nevertheless, De Lima cites Lagman v. Medialdea, where the Court permitted Representative Edcel Lagman to argue the case. She alleges that being a member of Congress like Lagman, she is similarly situated and should therefore not be treated any differently.
18. She cannot ask for the same treatment. While it is true that she and Lagman are both members of Congress, De Lima seems to have omitted one crucial fact — she is detained for a non-bailable offense, that is, violation of Section 26 (b) of R.A. No. 9165. There is a restraint on her liberty. In contrast, Lagman was not under detention when he argued before the Court. 25
People v. Jalosjos26 explained the nature and consequences of imprisonment. It emphasized that imprisonment entails "the curtailment and elimination of certain rights": 27
Imprisonment is the restraint of a man's personal liberty; coercion exercised upon a person to prevent the free exercise of his power of locomotion.
More explicitly, "imprisonment" in its general sense, is the restraint of one's liberty. As a punishment, it is restraint by judgment of a court or lawful tribunal, and is personal to the accused. The term refers to the restraint on the personal liberty of another; any prevention of his movements from place to place, or of his free action according to his own pleasure and will. Imprisonment is the detention of another against his will depriving him of his power of locomotion and it "[is] something more than mere loss of freedom. It includes the notion of restraint within limits defined by wall or any exterior barrier."
It can be seen from the foregoing that incarceration, by its nature, changes an individual's status in society. Prison officials have the difficult and often thankless job of preserving the security in a potentially explosive setting, as well as of attempting to provide rehabilitation that prepares inmates for re-entry into the social mainstream. Necessarily, both these demands require the curtailment and elimination of certain rights. 28
Individuals under preventive detention continue to be presumed innocent. They are yet to be found guilty by final judgment. As such, they "do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon confinement." 29 Nevertheless, "the fact of their detention makes their rights more limited than those of the public." 30Trillanes IV v. Pimentel, Sr.31 underscored that in the event of detention, "the presumption of innocence does not carry with it the full enjoyment of civil and political rights." 32
People v. Hon. Maceda33 was specific about the restraints on the exercise of a profession, engagement in a business or occupation, and/or holding of office arising from imprisonment whether because of preventive detention or in the course of serving a sentence upon conviction:
As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under the custody of the law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to answer for the commission of the offense. He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized by the court to be released on bail or on recognizance. Let it be stressed that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence can not practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention. 34 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted) TIADCc
In Maceda, this Court noted that "private respondent [Avelino T.] Javellana[, a lawyer,] is not allowed to practice his profession as a necessary consequence of his status as a detention prisoner." 35 This Court, however, was quick to qualify that this did not apply to cases where he "would appear in court to defend himself." 36 Indeed, a detained person retains the right to appear for himself or herself. Otherwise, he or she shall have none, not even himself or herself, as his or her own advocate. The right to due process shall then be impaired.
Consistent with Maceda, Senator De Lima suffers restrictions from appearing in court, although she remains capacitated to appear for herself. Consistent with Puyat, however, her right to appear for herself is not an unbridled prerogative. She cannot be totally denied the option to appear for herself as this may ultimately be a matter of necessity and due process, but she cannot insist upon such appearance in total disregard of the lawful restraints impelled upon her by her status.
No less than this Court sustained the issuance of a warrant of arrest against Senator De Lima. 37 The matter was vigorously argued, with dissenting views being registered by members of this Court. Regardless, the matter of her arrest has been settled and this Court has affirmed, as a consequence, the propriety of her detention. With this affirmation comes the confirmation of all lawful incidents of this detention. This Court's divided, but final, decision on her arrest and detention, and its attendant affirmations are truths with which Senator De Lima must come to terms.
This Court finds no compelling reason for lifting the restraint of detention on Senator De Lima. She will not be denied representation before this Court plainly on account of her non-participation in oral arguments. Her right to due process will not be violated.
While indeed a party to these consolidated petitions, Senator De Lima did not come to this Court by her lonesome. She is joined in the Petition subject of G.R. No. 238875 by five (5) other senators who do not stand differently from her. Senator De Lima's and her co-petitioners' principal invocation on the matter of standing is that they are seeking relief as senators in view of "the impairment of the Senate's constitutional function to concur in the Philippine government's decision to withdraw from the Rome 38 They additionally invoke standing "as citizens because this case involves a 'public right and [its] object . . . is to procure the enforcement of a public duty." 39
At no point in the Petition subject of G.R. No. 238875 or in her own Manifestation with Motion did Senator De Lima plead circumstances or competencies exclusive to her which make her appearance, to the exclusion of her co-petitioners, imperative and indispensable. It is true that not all of her co-petitioners are lawyers who are equipped with technical competence to argue before courts. Still, it does not appear clearly to this Court why Senator De Lima — and no one else — must argue for their Petition.
Absent a specific allegation on Senator De Lima's exclusive competence on the subject of their Petition, it is reasonable to assume that the other senator-lawyers joining her as petitioners are equally capable of skillfully and zealously arguing before this Court. Certainly, this Court cannot overlook the legal competence, nay, brilliance of Senators Drilon and Pangilinan.
Senator Drilon's biography 40 and resume 41 at the Senate's official website note that he has served as managing partner of a law firm, has become bar examiner twice, and has taken on multiple cabinet positions, notably, as Secretary of Justice on two (2) occasions. He was elected to the Senate four (4) times and there served as, among others, Minority Leader and Majority Leader. He was Senate President on four (4) separate occasions.
Senator Pangilinan is currently on his third term as Senator. As Senator, he has concurrently served as, among others, Majority Leader, Chairperson of the Committee on Justice and Human Rights, and Senate Representative to the Judicial and Bar Council. His biography 42 and resume 43 at the Senate's official website note that he has been the author and/or sponsor of laws of particular relevance to legal practice: Republic Act No. 9227 or the Judiciary Compensation and Modernization Act; Republic Act No. 9285 or the Alternative Dispute Resolution Law; Republic Act No. 9344 or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act; and Republic Act No. 9279, Strengthening and Rationalizing the National Prosecution Service.
It is not lost on this Court that Senator De Lima's co-petitioners in G.R. No. 238875 have not manifested anything inconsistent with Senator De Lima's Motion. It is possible, therefore, that they have conceded to her exclusive appearance for all six (6) of them. Without detracting from Senator De Lima's intended appearance as ultimately being for herself and not as counsel, it is also reasonable to say that any concession made by her co-petitioners to her appearing to their exclusion places her in a situation where she will act in representation of others. Were she to actually do so, she will act in a manner not actually as, but nevertheless akin to, a counsel. It is well to remind her co-petitioners then that even as litigants are free to be represented by counsels of their choosing, any such choice must contend with contingencies that may impair the capacity of their selected counsel. Thus, a litigant cannot insist on representation by a lawyer who has been suspended from the practice of law, has been disbarred, or, as in Senator De Lima's case, is incarcerated. AIDSTE
To be clear, this Resolution should not be taken as a cavalier cue and authority for denying parties the right to personally appear and litigate their cases. Rule 138, Section 34 of the Rules of Court remains controlling. This Court's pronouncements in Santos v. Judge Lacurom, 44Maderada v. Mediodea, 45 and like cases, which were made by way of decisions or resolutions disposing of cases with finality, 46 remain binding.
This Court will not impose upon litigants its own wisdom in their choice of counsel. Still, it will not hurt to hearken to an admonition long ago uttered: "I hesitate not to pronounce, that every man who is his own lawyer, has a fool for a client." 47 This admonition was echoed by this Court in In re: Borromeo: 48 "[H]e who acts as his own lawyer has a fool for a client. There would seem to be more than a grain of truth in th[is] aphorism." It was also echoed by the United States Supreme Court when it affirmed that "the adage that 'a lawyer who represents himself has a fool for a client' is the product of years of experience by seasoned litigator." 49
The difficulty of acting as counsel for one's self is illustrated in this Court's recent decision in Alpajora v. Calayan. 50 There, respondent Atty. Ronaldo V. Calayan was noted to have resorted to "harassing tactics against opposing counsel[s]" 51 and to have attributed "unsupported ill-motives . . . to a judge" 52 in the course of litigating his own cases. He "apologized for not being more circumspect with his remedies and choice of words[, and] admitted losing objectivity and becoming emotional while pursuing the cases involving him." 53 His apologies failed to impress this Court. He was found guilty of violating the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, was suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years, and sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar offenses shall be dealt with more severely. 54
This Court is not bound by the authority of American precedents. But worth noting is the recent American experience in the Matter of Zappin. 55 This Court cites this not as a matter of jurisprudential authority but as an exhortation to good sense and learning from basic human frailty. In that case, Anthony Zappin (Zappin), a lawyer, opted to represent himself in his case for divorce and custody against his wife. During the proceedings, he committed multiple acts of misconduct both inside and outside the courtroom, including verbally insulting the judges and his wife's lawyer during trial. This led to disciplinary proceedings against Zappin, eventually culminating in his disbarment. Indeed, one directly involved with the outcome of a case or having an interest in it can often be clouded with sentiment and personal dispositions, depriving him or her of the detachment, rationality, and objectivity that are necessary to effective legal advocacy.
By no means does this Court intend to belittle Senator De Lima's demonstrated expertise. Her record speaks for itself. 56 The reference to a centuries-old adage comes purely by way of a faithful quotation of words previously uttered and repeated in jurisprudence here and abroad. What interests this Court, more than the severe choice of words of previous speakers, are the erudition that underlies their statements and a solicitous admonition to self-restraint and prudence.
It does not escape this Court's attention that the subject of the consolidated petitions are intensely, politically charged matters. Thus, this Court takes the opportunity to exhort all parties to heed the wisdom of tact and sobriety, to refrain from any posturing that may detract from a dispassionate, level-headed resolution.
After a careful consideration, this Court elects to deny Senator De Lima's Motion. The resolution of her plea is made with the hope that the parties and this Court can henceforth proceed to a composed resolution of the ultimate issues.
WHEREFORE, petitioner Senator Leila M. De Lima's Motion asking that she be allowed to personally appear and represent herself during the oral arguments set by this Court in these consolidated petitions is DENIED. Caguioa, J., on official leave. (adv38)
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETAClerk of Court
Separate Opinions
CARPIO, J., dissenting:
I dissent. The Court should allow Senator Leila M. De Lima to personally appear and represent herself during the Oral Arguments in these consolidated petitions which involve a constitutional issue of paramount national importance. AaCTcI
As one of the petitioners in G.R. No. 238875, Senator De Lima has undeniably the right to argue during the Oral Arguments in accordance with Section 34 1 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which allows a party to conduct his or her litigation personally. More importantly, as a former Chairperson of the Commission on Human Rights and former Secretary of Justice, Senator De Lima has the background and competence to argue the constitutionality of the withdrawal of the Philippines from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
This Court and the Sandiganbayan have, in many instances, granted the requests of Senators and others similarly charged with non-bailable offenses, temporary furlough or provisional leave from detention for various reasons:
1. In Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, 2 then Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, who was charged with plunder, was granted provisional liberty by this Court because of his advanced age and fragile health which required special medical attention.
2. Recently, the Sandiganbayan granted temporary furlough to detained former Senator Ramon "Bong" Revilla, Jr., who is charged with plunder, to undergo dental check-up, oral prophylaxis, and implant cleaning on 19 June 2018 for two hours. 3 Previously, he was also granted temporary liberty to visit his son, Jolo Revilla in March 2015 at the Asian Hospital. 4 From 2015 to 2017, the Sandiganbayan also granted furlough to Senator Revilla, Jr. on several occasions to visit his ailing father, former Senator Ramon Revilla, Sr. 5 Senator Revilla, Jr. was also allowed to spend Christmas Eve with his family at his residence in Cavite on 24 December 2017 from 11 a.m. to 9 p.m. 6
3. Former Senator Jose "Jinggoy" Ejercito Estrada, who was also charged with plunder, was granted furlough by the Sandiganbayan to: (a) undergo therapy for shoulder pains; 7 (b) undergo medical examinations; 8 (c) attend the 80th birthday of his father, former President and now Manila Mayor Joseph Estrada; 9 (d) attend the graduation of his son, Julian Estrada; 10 and (e) visit his ailing mother-in-law, Estelita Vitug. 11
4. Former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (now Speaker of the House of Representatives), while on hospital arrest for a plunder case, was granted a Christmas furlough from 23 to 26 December 2014 by the Sandiganbayan. 12 On 8 December 2015, this Court issued a Resolution granting former President Arroyo Christmas and New Year furloughs for the periods 23 to 26 December 2015 and 30 December 2015 to 2 January 2016, to be spent exclusively at her residence in Quezon City. 13 In a Resolution dated 15 March 2016, this Court granted her a three-day birthday furlough from 4 to 6 April 2016. 14
Considering that this Court and the Sandiganbayan have, on numerous instances and for varied reasons, granted temporary furlough to senators and others charged with non-bailable offenses, then all the more reason exists to grant the request of Senator De Lima to personally appear and represent herself during the Oral Arguments in these consolidated petitions. Senator De Lima's right to argue her own case on a grave constitutional issue, accompanied by PNP personnel, is surely a more justifiable reason for a grant of appearance before this Court than to attend birthday celebrations or school graduations, or enjoy Christmas and New Year furloughs.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to allow petitioner Senator Leila M. De Lima to personally appear and represent herself during the Oral Arguments in these consolidated petitions.
Footnotes
* As corrected.
1. Senator De Lima's Manifestation with Motion, p. 3.
2. Senator De Lima's Manifestation with Motion, p. 1.
3. CONST., art. VI, sec. 14 provides:
Section 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.
4. RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, sec. 34 provides:
Section 34. By whom litigation conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
5. Senator De Lima's Manifestation with Motion, p. 2. See Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771, and 231774, July 4, 2017 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2017/july2017/231658.pdf> [Per J. Del Castillo, En Banc].
6. Office of the Solicitor General's Opposition, pp. 5-8.
Rep. Act No. 9165, sec. 26 (b) reads:
Section 26. Attempt or Conspiracy. — Any attempt or conspiracy to commit the following unlawful acts shall be penalized by the same penalty prescribed for the commission of the same as provided under this Act:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and transportation of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical . . .
7. Office of the Solicitor General's Opposition, pp. 2-4.
8.Id. at 4-5.
9.Id. at 8-10.
10. Senator De Lima's Manifestation with Motion, p. 2.
11.Santos v. Judge Lacurom, 531 Phil. 239, 249 (2006) [Per J. Carpio, Third Division], citing RULES OF COURT, Section 34, Rule 138; Cortes v. Agcaoili, 355 Phil. 848 (1998) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc]; and Maderada v. Mediodea, 459 Phil. 701 (2003) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
12. 459 Phil. 701 (2003) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
13.Id. at 716-717 citing RUBEN AGPALO, LEGAL ETHICS 40 (4th ed., 1989); Lombardi v. Citizens National Trust & Savings Bank, 289 P2d 823, November 22, 1955; Nelson v. Smith, 157 ALR 512, December 18, 1944; and In re Opinion of the Justices, 194 NE 313, January 30, 1935.
14.Puyat v. De Guzman, 198 Phil. 420 (1982) [Per J. Melencio-Herrera, En Banc].
15.Id. at 425.
16.Id.
17.Id. at 426.
18.Id.
19.Id.
20.Id. at 425-427.
21.Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771, and 231774, July 4, 2017 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2017/july2017/231658.pdf> [Per J. Del Castillo, En Banc].
22.Id. at 10.
23.Id. at 67. This Court's Decision specifically notes that "During the oral argument, petitioner Lagman admitted that 'the assertion of facts [in the Proclamation and Report] is the call of the President.'" See also Arianne Merez, Mindanao martial law extension 'unconstitutional,' petitioners tell SC, ABS-CBN NEWS, available at <http://news.abs-cbn.com/news/01/16/18/mindanao-martial-lawextension-unconstitutional-petitioners-tell-sc> as cited in Senator De Lima's Manifestation with Motion, p. 2.
24. Office of the Solicitor General's Opposition, p. 6.
25. Id.
26. 381 Phil. 690 (2000) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, En Banc].
27. Id. at 708 citing Sheldon, Krantz, 1988 Supplement. The Law of Correction and Prisoners' Rights, 3rd ed., p. 121.
28. Id. citing Black's Law Dictionary, Special Deluxe 5th Ed., p. 681; Words and Phrases, Permanent Ed., p. 466; Sheldon, Krantz, 1988 Supplement. The Law of Correction and Prisoners' Rights, 3rd ed., p. 121.
29. Alejano v. Cabuay, 505 Phil. 298, 311 (2005) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].
30. Trillanes IV v. Pimentel, Sr., 578 Phil. 1002, 1014 (2008) [Per J. Carpio-Morales, En Banc].
31. 578 Phil. 1002 (2008) [Per J. Carpio-Morales, En Banc].
32. Id. at 1015.
33. 380 Phil. 1 (2000) [Per J. Pardo, First Division].
34. Id. at 5.
35. Id. at 4-5.
36. Id. at 5.
37. See De Lima v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 229781, October 10, 2017 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2017/october2017/229781.pdf> [Per J. Velasco, En Banc].
38. Petition in G.R. No. 238875, p. 4.
39. Id., citation omitted.
40. Biography, Honorable Senator Franklin M. Drilon, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES 17TH CONGRESS, <https://www.senate.gov.ph/senators/sen_bio/drilon_bio.asp> (last visited August 6, 2018).
41. Resume, Honorable Senator Franklin M. Drilon, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES 17TH CONGRESS, <https://www.senate.gov.ph/senators/sen_bio/drilon_resume.asp> (last visited August 6, 2018).
42. Biography, Honorable Senator Kiko Pangilinan, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES 17TH CONGRESS, <https://www.senate.gov.ph/senators/sen_bio/pangilinan_bio.asp> (last visited August 6, 2018).
43. Resume, Honorable Senator Kiko Pangilinan, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES 17TH CONGRESS, <https://www.senate.gov.ph/senators/sen_bio/Pangilinan_resume.asp> (last visited August 6, 2018).
44. 531 Phil. 239 (2006) [Per J. Carpio, Third Division].
45. 459 Phil. 701 (2003) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
46 N.b., CIVIL CODE, art. 8, states that "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines."
47. See REV. HENRY KETT, THE FLOWERS OF WIT, OR, A CHOICE COLLECTION OF BON MOTS (1814).
48. 311 Phil. 441 (1995) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
49. Id. at 454.
50. Alpajora v. Calayan, A.C. No. 8208, January 10, 2018 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2018/january20618/8208.pdf> [Per J. Gesmundo, En Banc].
51. Id. at 9.
52. Id. at 10.
53. Id. at 14.
54. Id.
55. 2018 NY Slip Op 01564, decided on March 8, 2018.
56. Prior to her election as Senator, Senator De Lima served as Secretary of Justice, Chairperson of the Commission on Human Rights. She spent many years in private practice, having been partner in several law firms. She was also a law professor. She placed eighth in the 1985 Bar Examinations, was a law clerk for the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and was part of the staff of Supreme Court Associate Justice Isagani Cruz. See Senator De Lima's biography at the Senate's official website <https://www.senate.gov.ph/senators/sen_bio/delima_bio.asp>.
CARPIO, J., dissenting:
1. This provision reads: "Section 34. By whom litigation conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar." (Emphasis supplied)
2. 767 Phil. 147 (2015).
3. http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/nation/656882/sandiganbayan-oks-bong-revilla-furlough-for-dental-check-up/story/ (visited 8 August 2018).
4. http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/676482/sandiganbayan-allows-bong-revilla-to-visit-son-jolo (visited 8 August 2018).
5. Sandiganbayan granted a five-hour furlough to Senator Revilla, Jr. to visit his father at the hospital on 14 July 2015. (https://www.rappler.com/nation/99278-sandiganbayan-oks-bong-revilla-furlough-visit-revilla-sr [visited 8 August 2018]); Sandiganbayan allowed Senator Revilla, Jr. to visit his sick father on 16 December 2016. (https://www.rappler.com/nation/155787-bong-revilla-visit-sick-dad [visited 8 August 2018]); Sandiganbayan allowed Senator Revilla, Jr. a total of 18 hours to spend time with his father in the hospital on 29 and 31 December 2016 and 1 January 2017. (https://www.rappler.com/nation/156911-sandiganbayan-bong-revilla-visit-sick-dad [visited 8 August 2018]); Sandiganbayan allowed Senator Revilla, Jr. to visit his father at the St. Luke's Medical Center on 8 and 9 February 2017. (https://www.rappler.com/nation/160685-bong-revilla-sandiganbayan-visit-father-hospital-plunder [visited 8 August 2018]); Sandiganbayan allowed Senator Revilla, Jr. to visit his father who was scheduled to undergo surgery on 18 March 2017. (https://www.rappler.com/nation/164462-bong-revilla-hospital-furlough-sandiganbayan [visited 8 August 2018]).
6. http://www.manilastandard.net/news/top-stories/254590/sandiganbayan-oks-revilla-plea-for-christmas-furlough.html (visited 8 August 2018).
7. http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/652817/sandiganbayan-oks-estrada-therapy-in-san-juan (visited 8 August 2018).
8. https://www.rappler.com/nation/88611-court-jinggoy-estrada-hospital-shoulder (visited 8 August 2018); https://www.rappler.com/nation/157779-sandiganbayan-allows-jinggoy-estrada-medical-tests (visited 8 August 2018); https://www.rappler.com/nation/170134-sandiganbayan-furlough-checkup-jinggoy-estrada-right-shoulder (visited 8 August 2018); https://www.philstar.com/metro/2017/05/17/1700977/jinggoy-granted-medical-furlough-aching-shoulder (visited 8 August 2018); http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/nation/619548/sandiganbayan-grants-jinggoy-s-3-day-medical-furlough/story/ (visited 8 August 2018).
9. https://www.manilatimes.net/court-grants-jinggoys-petition-furlough/322633/ (visited 8 August 2018).
10. http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/679121/sandigan-allows-jinggoy-estrada-to-attend-sons-graduation (visited 8 August 2018).
11. http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/nation/526586/sandiganbayan-oks-jinggoy-furlough-to-visit-mother-in-law/story/ (visited 8 August 2018).
12. https://www.rappler.com/nation/78651-sandiganbayan-grants-arroyo-christmas-furlough (visited 9 August 2018).
13. http://manilastandard.net/news/top-stories/193933/christmas-new-year-furloughs-given-arroyo.html (visited 9 August 2018). The Resolution dated 8 December 2015 states:
G.R. No. 220598 — GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, Petitioner v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE SANDIGANBAYAN [FIRST DIVISION], Respondents.
Before acting on the petitioner's Urgent Motion for House Arrest Pending Resolution of the Petition; and Submission in Support of Petitioner's "Urgent Motion for House Arrest Pending Resolution of the Petition," The Court RESOLVES TO REQUIRE the Office of the Solicitor General to comment thereon within 20 days from notice.
Pending the resolution of the aforementioned incident, the Court hereby GRANTS to the petitioner Christmas and New Year furloughs for the inclusive periods of 8:00 o'clock in the morning of December 23, 2015 to 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of December 26, 2015, and of 8:00 o'clock in the morning of December 30, 2015 to 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of January 2, 2016, to be spent exclusively at her residence at No. 14 Badjao Street, La Vista Subdivision, Quezon City. It is understood that notwithstanding the furloughs the petitioner shall remain under preventive custody of the law.
xxx xxx xxx
14. http://cnnphilippines.com/news/2016/03/15/supreme-court-former-president-lubao-representative-gloria-macapagal-arroyo-birthday-furlough.html (visited 9 August 2018). The Resolution dated 15 March 2016 reads:
G.R. No. 220598(Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo vs. People of the Philippines and Sandiganbayan [First Division]) and G.R. No. 220953(Benigno B. Aguas vs. Sandiganbayan [First Division]). — Acting on the Motion for 5-day Birthday Furlough dated March 11, 2016 filed by counsel for petitioner Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, the Court Resolved to GRANT petitioner a three-day birthday furlough, not five (5) days as prayed for, beginning at 8 o'clock in the morning of April 4, 2016 up to 5 o'clock in the afternoon of April 6, 2016.