Pangasinan Five Star Bus Co., Inc. v. Commonwealth Insurance Co.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 210298. August 9, 2017.]

PANGASINAN FIVE STAR BUS COMPANY, INC. AND ERWIN ANTAO, petitioners,vs. COMMONWEALTH INSURANCE COMPANY, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated August 9, 2017, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 210298 (Pangasinan Five Star Bus Company, Inc. and Erwin Antao, Petitioners vs. Commonwealth Insurance Company, Respondent). — Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 are the Decision 2 dated February 15, 2013 and Resolution 3 dated December 3, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 95263, reversing and setting aside the Orders dated September 22, 2009 4 and February 8, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 58.

The Facts

On December 22, 2005, at around 9:00 p.m., a vehicular accident occurred along the North Luzon Expressway, Canumay Extension, Valenzuela City. The vehicles involved include, among others, a passenger bus, Nissan Truck Bus, operated by petitioner Pangasinan Five Star Bus Company (bus company) and was driven by petitioner Erwin Antao (Antao), and an Isuzu Crosswind Wagon, owned and registered under the name of Lourdes Mercado and driven by Ireneo Lacandola. Respondent Commonwealth Insurance Company is the insurer of the Isuzu Crosswind. 5

As a result of the collision, the Isuzu Crosswind was heavily damaged. Respondent paid its share in the cost of the repair thereof in the amount of Php400,000. 6 HTcADC

Respondent then, by way of subrogation, demanded for the reimbursement of the said amount from the petitioners through a demand letter. As the same remained unheeded, on October 3, 2006, respondent filed a Complaint 7 for Sum of Money and Damages before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 58 against the petitioners. 8

During trial, the respondent presented two witnesses, to wit: Romeo Diolata and Lucita Pantig, who testified on the validity of the insurance claim. Respondent also formally offered the following documentary evidence, to wit: (1) claim slip; (2) release claim and subrogation receipt; (3) check voucher; (4) insurance policy; (5) photos of the vehicle of the insured; (6) the insured car's deed of sale; (7) demand letters; and (8) a copy of the traffic investigation report or police report. 9

Petitioners timely objected to the admissibility of the traffic investigation report or police report as the same was not the original copy and was merely a copy from a certain law office. 10

After the respondent rested its case, petitioners filed a Demurrer to Evidence, 11 invoking the best evidence rule and hearsay evidence rule. 12

Ruling of the RTC

In an Order 13 dated September 22, 2009, the RTC granted petitioners' demurrer to evidence. Notably, the RTC in the said order recognized that the questioned traffic investigation report or police report was merely a photocopy or a copy from a certain law office. It, however, stated in its order that it "excuses the non-submission of the original since it is undisputed that the original copy thereof was submitted in the case filed in Valenzuela." Despite admission of the said document, still, the RTC found that the respondent failed to prove its case by preponderance of evidence. According to the said court, while the respondent was able to establish the fact of the accident, the identity, of the owner of the Isuzu Crosswind, and the owner's recovery of the insurance claim from the respondent, still Antao's negligence in driving the bus and the bus company's negligence in the selection and supervision of its employees were not proven. The pictures presented by the respondent and admitted in evidence may have shown the damage to the insured vehicle but there was no evidence that it was the fault or negligence of the petitioners which caused such damage. 14 Thus:

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the complaint is hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence.

SO ORDERED. 15

Respondent move for reconsideration but the same was denied by the RTC in its Order dated February 8, 2010. 16

This prompted the respondent to file an appeal before the CA.

Ruling of the CA

On appeal, the CA upheld the admissibility of the questioned traffic investigation report or police report as the RTC categorically excused the submission of the original thereof for the reason that the original copy was submitted in a case filed in Valenzuela. The CA also noted that the petitioners made a general denial of the allegations in paragraph 4 of the Complaint, as they merely stated that "except for the date and place of the accident" they "specifically deny each and every material allegation made" in the said paragraph. Thus, according to the CA, the fact that the insured vehicle was hit by the passenger bus, as well as the surrounding circumstances thereof remain uncontroverted. 17

Considering the foregoing, the appellate court applied the doctrine of resipsaloquitur in ruling that petitioners are liable for damage caused to the insured vehicle. According to the CA, the traffic accident report manifests that Antao appears to have caused the collision as he was speeding; the apparent tremendous damage caused to the insured vehicle and the death of one of the passengers demonstrate the impact caused by the fast-approaching bus. As Antao was the one in control of the bus which caused the mishap, he is clearly negligent. The CA also noted that there was no contributory negligence on the part of the driver of the insured vehicle. Hence, the elements of the said doctrine are existent in this case. 18 aScITE

Having established Antao's liability, the CA applied Article 2176, 19 in relation to Article 2180 20 of the Civil Code, which essentially makes employers solidarily liable for the damages caused by their employees. The CA noted that the bus company did not present evidence to prove that it exercised due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection or supervision of its employees as instead, it filed a demurrer to evidence.

The CA disposed, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Appeal is GRANTED. The assailed Orders of Branch 58, [RTC] of Makati City dated 22 September 2009 and dated 08 February 2010 are hereby REVERSEDANDSETASIDE.

Accordingly, [petitioners] are jointly and severally ordered to pay [respondent] the following:

1.)  the amount of Four Hundred Thousand (P400,000.00) Pesos with legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) perannum computed from the time extrajudicial demand was made or on 11 May 2006 until fully paid;

2.)  attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total amount adjudged the [respondent]; and

3.)  cost of suit.

SOORDERED. 21

Hence, this petition.

Issue

Was there sufficient evidence to prove petitioners' liability in the vehicular accident in the case at bar?

Our Ruling

We deny the petition.

We uphold the CA's conclusion that petitioners are liable for the damage caused by the vehicular accident.

Preliminarily, We note that respondent's subrogation is not an issue in this petition. Hence, We uphold respondent's right to pursue this case.

We now resolve.

The CA correctly observed that petitioners' Answer to the Complaint contains a general denial. Section 10, 22 Rule 8 of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires a defendant to specify each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit and, whenever practicable, to set forth the substance of the matters upon which he relies to support his denial. 23 Section 11 24 of the same Rule provides that allegations of the complaint not specifically denied are deemed admitted. 25 Thus, the answer should be so definite and certain in its allegations that the pleader's adversary should not be left in doubt as to what is admitted, what is denied, and what is covered by denials of knowledge as sufficient to form a belief. 26 The purpose of requiring the defendant to make a specific denial is to make him disclose the matters alleged in the complaint which he succinctly intends to disprove at the trial, together with the matter which he relied upon to support the denial. 27 The parties are compelled to lay their cards on the table. 28

Moreover, a denial is not made specific simply because it is so qualified by the defendant. A general denial does not become specific by the use of the word "specifically." 29

In the case at bar, the CA correctly pointed out that petitioners are deemed to have admitted, not only the fact of the accident, but also that Antao was negligent in driving the bus, when they failed to specifically deny such allegation in the complaint. As can be gleaned from the complaint, the fact of the accident, the circumstances surrounding the same, as well as the negligence of Antao were all clearly and specifically, alleged. Petitioners' Answer, on the other hand, merely stated that they "specifically deny each and every material allegation" as regards the matter. The Answer was bereft of any allegation as to what actually transpired from the petitioners' viewpoint. In fine, thus, petitioners are deemed to have admitted the circumstances surrounding the vehicular accident.

As the circumstances of the vehicular accident are deemed to be admitted, respondents cannot evade liability by virtue of the doctrine of resipsaloquitur.

In D.M.Consunji,Inc. v. CA, 30 We clearly elucidated the concept of the said doctrine, thus:

While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and while the mere happening of an accident or injury will not generally give rise to an inference or presumption that it was due to negligence on defendants part, under the doctrine of resipsaloquitur, which means, literally, the thing or transaction speaks for itself, or in one jurisdiction, that the thing or instrumentality speaks for itself, the facts or circumstances accompanying an injury may be such as to raise a presumption, or at least permit an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant, or some other person who is charged with negligence.

x x x where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which caused the injury complained of was under the control or management of the defendant, and that the occurrence resulting in the injury was such as in the ordinary course of things would not happen if those who had its control or management used proper care, there is sufficient evidence, or, as sometimes stated, reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the injury arose from or was caused by the defendant's want of care. 31

Here, We reiterate that the circumstances of the accident are deemed admitted. Thus, We sustain the court aquo's findings that the bus driven recklessly by Antao hit the rear end of the insured vehicle with great impact which caused serious damage to it. As such, it can be readily seen that the requisites for the application of the rule on resipsaloquitur are present in this case, to wit: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. 32 Verily, the bus would not have hit the rear end of the insured vehicle with such great impact unless someone is negligent. The said bus was admittedly under the exclusive control of Antao. Lastly, no contributory negligence was attributed to the driver of the insured vehicle. As all the requisites of the doctrine of resipsaloquitur are present, a reasonable presumption of negligence on the part of the petitioners is, thus, created. HEITAD

Unfortunately for the petitioners, they were not able to rebut such presumption or inference as they opted to file a demurrer to evidence instead of presenting their own evidence.

Antao's negligence having been established, the CA correctly applied Article 2176, in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, as basis for the bus company's liability. Paragraph 5 of Article 2180 substantially provides that when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in the supervision over him after selection, or both. 33 Again, petitioners failed to rebut such disputable presumption.

One final note. We take exception to the admission in evidence by the RTC and the CA of a mere copy of the traffic investigation report. The RTC seriously erred in "excusing" the presentation of the original copy of the said document merely because the same was filed in another court. It must be noted that what was submitted before the trial court was a mere photocopy or a copy certified by a certain law firm. Worse, no competent person was presented in court to identify and verify the said document and the contents thereof.

The Court is not unaware that traffic investigation reports or police reports are admissible in evidence and their contents are primafacie evidence of the fact stated therein as they form part of official records. 34 In this case, however, as only an unidentified copy of the said document was presented, there is no way to ascertain the authenticity thereof. We cannot simply assume that the copy of the traffic accident report presented before the trial court is what it purports to be. For a traffic accident report to be admissible as primafacie evidence of the facts therein stated, the following requisites must be present:

(a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so;

(b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and

(c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official information. 35

Regrettably in this case, the aforecited requisites were not established as the RTC merely settled with the copy of the questioned document.

Nevertheless, as above-discussed, with the doctrine of resipsaloquitur and general denial, petitioners' negligence was established. We, therefore, find no reversible error on the part of the appellate court in adjudging liability against the petitioners.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision dated February 15, 2013 and Resolution dated December 3, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95263 are hereby AFFIRMED. (Reyes,Jr.,J., no part for having concurred in the assailed Court of Appeals decision and resolution; Caguioa, J., designated additional Member per Raffle dated August 7, 2017.)

SOORDERED."

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 15-48.

2. Penned by Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda, concurred in by Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. (now a Member of the Court) and Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato; id. at 99-113.

3.Id. at 121-124.

4. Penned by Presiding Judge Eugene C. Paras; id. at 79-81.

5.Id. at 16 and 100.

6.Id.

7.Id. at 52-55.

8.Id. at 16.

9.Id. at 80.

10.Id. at 17.

11.Id. at 72-78.

12.Id. at 19.

13.Id. at 79-81.

14.Id. at 80-81.

15.Id. at 81.

16.Id. at 103.

17.Id. at 100-102.

18.Id. at 109.

19. Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

20. Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

xxx xxx xxx

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

xxx xxx xxx.

21.Rollo, pp. 112-113.

22. The provision reads in full:

SEC. 10.Specificdenial. — A defendant must specify each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit and, whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters upon which he relies to support his denial. Where a defendant desires to deny only a part of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and material and shall deny only the remainder. Where a defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment made to the complaint, he shall so state, and this shall have the effect of a denial.

23.Aquintey v. Spouses Tibong, 540 Phil. 422, 440 (2006).

24. SEC. 11.Allegations not specifically denied deemed admitted. — Material averment in the complaint, other than those as to the amount of unliquidated damages, shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied. Allegations of usury in a complaint to recover usurious interest are deemed admitted if not denied under oath.

25.Aquintey v. Spouses Tibong, supra note 23.

26.Id. at 441.

27.Id.

28.Id.

29.Id.

30. 409 Phil. 275 (2001).

31.Id. at 290.

32.Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. v. Alberto, et al., 680 Phil. 813, 825-826 (2012).

33.Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 249 Phil. 363, 378 (1988).

34.Lao v. Standard Insurance Co., Inc., 456 Phil. 227, 234 (2003).

35.DST Movers Corporation v. People's General Insurance Corporation, G.R. No. 198627, January 13, 2016, 780 SCRA 498, 513.