FIRST DIVISION
[A.C. No. 13462. January 17, 2023.][Formerly CBD Case No. 15-4572]
REYNALDO PANEM AND CESARIA PANEM, complainants, vs.ATTY. MA. CARMINA M. ALEJANDRO-ABBAS AND ATTY. JOSEPH ANTHONY M. ALEJANDRO, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedJanuary 17, 2023which reads as follows: HTcADC
"A.C. No. 13462 [formerly CBD Case No. 15-4572] (Reynaldo Panem and Cesaria Panem v. Atty. Ma. Carmina M. Alejandro-Abbas and Atty. Joseph Anthony M. Alejandro). — The Notice of Resolution No. CBD-XXV-2021-08-19 1 dated August 28, 2021 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines' Board of Governors (IBP-BOG); and the Extended Resolution 2 dated August 28, 2021 of the IBP-BOG, both transmitted by Letter 3 dated March 7, 2022 of Atty. Avelino B. Sales, Jr., Director for Bar Discipline, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, together with the records and flash drive file, are both NOTED.
After a careful review of the records of the case, the Court reverses Resolution No. CBD-XXV-2021-08-19 of the IBP-BOG dismissing the Complaint. The Court adopts the recommendation 4 of the Investigating Commissioner with modification such that the penalty of suspension from the practice of law to be imposed on respondent Atty. Ma. Carmina M. Alejandro-Abbas (Atty. Abbas), who alone participated in the administrative proceedings, be increased to two years. Meanwhile, the case is dismissed without prejudice against respondent Atty. Joseph Anthony M. Alejandro (Atty. Alejandro).
At the onset, it bears pointing out that the IBP-BOG, in reversing the Investigating Commissioner, assessed the charges against Atty. Abbas and Atty. Alejandro (collectively, respondents) with the wrong evidentiary threshold, that is, preponderance of evidence. The Court has clarified in Reyes v. Atty. Nieva5 that the quantum of proof in administrative proceedings against lawyers is substantial evidence, which is in keeping with the primordial purpose of and essential considerations with these types of cases, thus:
As case law elucidates, "[d]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor." 6
Accordingly, substantial evidence, which is more than a mere scintilla but is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, would suffice to hold one administratively liable. 7
With the application of the proper evidentiary threshold, the Court finds that the present charges against Atty. Abbas have been proven by this standard. Based on the evidence on record, the Court agrees with the observation of the Investigating Commissioner that the allegations that respondents forcibly entered the subject property and demolished the structures thereon, intimidated and shouted invectives at Reynaldo Panem and Cesaria Panem (complainants) remain undisputed.
Complainants' claims of destruction and physical damage were supported by evidence on record. While the contents of the barangay and police blotters alone may not have been sufficient to prove misconduct, these pieces of evidence attain significance when buttressed by Atty. Abbas' evasiveness in addressing complainants' allegations. Charged with such disparaging conduct, it is highly peculiar that instead of squarely denying these accusations, Atty. Abbas in her Answer 8 merely claimed that it was a pure harassment suit and that a pending case with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudicatory Board (DARAB) posed a prejudicial question. 9 Similarly, in Atty. Abbas' Verified Position Paper, 10 she merely argued that complainants' claims were unsubstantiated and emphasized that there was no proof that any investigation was even undertaken by the police and barangay officials with respect to the copies of the blotters submitted by complainants. Moreover, it has not escaped Our attention that the same allegations of intimidation, destruction and acts of dispossession were made by complainants before the DARAB in their Complaint for Maintenance of Peaceful Possession with Prayer for TRO and/or Injunction 11 against respondents. 12 Curiously, respondents in their Answer with Counterclaim 13 before the DARAB only made a general denial of these allegations and reiterated the invalidity of complainants' Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA).
To the mind of the Court, Atty. Abbas could have expressly and in no uncertain terms denied the allegations against her if they were untrue. In Domingo-Agaton v. Atty. Cruz, 14 We held:
The natural instinct of [a person] impels him or her to resist an unfounded claim or imputation and defend himself or herself. It is totally against our human nature to just remain reticent and say nothing in the face of false accusations. Hence, silence in such cases is almost always construed as implied admission of the truth thereof. 15
Under the Rules of Court, material averments shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied. 16 Considering that complainants have established their burden of proof, the burden of evidence shifted to Atty. Abbas to establish her defense, which she failed to do.
Time and again, the Court has ruled that any misconduct or wrongdoing of a lawyer, indicating unfitness for the profession justifies disciplinary action because good character is an essential and continuing qualification for the practice of law. 17 The Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) is emphatic in its provisions with regard to the high moral standards required in the legal profession. The following provisions of the CPR are relevant:
CANON 1 — A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 1 clearly mandates the obedience of every lawyer to laws and legal processes. To the best of their ability, lawyers are expected to respect and abide by the law, and thus, avoid any act or omission that is contrary thereto. 18 As aptly explained by the Court in Fermin v. Bedol: 19
A lawyer's personal deference to the law not only speaks of his or her character but it also inspires respect and obedience to the law, on the part of the public. As servants of the law and officers of the court, lawyers are required to be at the forefront of observing and maintaining the rule of law. They are expected to make themselves exemplars worthy of emulation. This, in fact, is what a lawyer's obligation to promote respect for law and legal processes entails. 20
Similarly, the lawyer's oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the land but also to refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court. 21
For the Court, Atty. Abbas' conduct falls short of the standard expected from the members of the legal profession. Assuming arguendo that several irregularities attended the issuance of the CLOA, the fact remains that she cannot forcibly eject complainants who were in prior and actual physical possession of the subject property. As an officer of the Court, it was incumbent upon her to observe the proper legal process to secure the return of her purported property, and not take the law into her own hands.
Similarly, We find no merit in Atty. Abbas' defense that assuming the acts imputed against her and Atty. Alejandro were true, these were committed in their private capacities. Part of Atty. Abbas' duty as a lawyer is to maintain the dignity owing to the profession. For this reason, a lawyer may be disciplined for acts committed even in his or her private capacity for acts which tend to bring reproach on the legal profession or to injure it in the favorable opinion of the public. 22 Thus, there is no distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in a lawyer's private life or in his or her professional capacity, for a lawyer may not divide his or her personality as an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. 23 Rather than Rule 10.03 of the CPR, the Court finds that Atty. Abbas is guilty of violating Rule 7.03 which provides:
CANON 7 — A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
We also take this opportunity to reiterate that administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own, distinct from and may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. There is no prejudicial question nor prescription that will prevent it from proceeding. 24 Thus, Atty. Abbas' repeated assertions regarding the invalidity of the CLOA will not hinder this Court from conducting an investigation and holding her administratively liable for her conduct.
All told, the Court finds that complainants' version is more credible, with the caveat that the Court is not accepting hook, line, and sinker every allegation of complainants. However, under the attendant circumstances, there is sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that Atty. Abbas forcibly wrested possession of the subject property from complainants and destroyed their belongings. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or even preponderant. 25
Due Process Violation
While the charges against Atty. Abbas have been established by the required quantum of proof, the Court cannot subscribe to the Investigating Commissioner's determination that Atty. Alejandro could also be sanctioned despite lack of notice of the disciplinary proceedings against him.
It is explicit from Rule 138, Section 30 of the Rules of Court (Rules) that no attorney shall be removed or suspended from the practice of law until he or she has reasonable notice of the charges against him or her.
Section 30. Attorney to be heard before removal or suspension. — No attorney shall be removed or suspended from the practice of his profession, until he has had full opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against him, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself or counsel. But if upon reasonable notice he fails to appear and answer the accusation, the court may proceed to determine the matter ex parte.
Correspondingly, Rule 139-B, Sec. 8 of the Rules governing proceedings to disbar and discipline lawyers, also provides that lawyers shall be given full opportunity to defend themselves and present witnesses on their behalf:
Section 8. Investigation. — Upon joinder of issues or upon failure of the respondent to answer, the Investigator shall, with deliberate speed, proceed with the investigation of the case. He shall have the power to issue subpoenas and administer oaths. The respondent shall be given full opportunity to defend himself, to present witnesses on his behalf, and be heard by himself and counsel. However, if upon reasonable notice, the respondent fails to appear, the investigation shall proceed ex parte.
The most basic tenet of due process is the right to be heard. In administrative proceedings against lawyers, there is a denial of due process when there is an absolute lack of opportunity to be heard. 26 Here, Atty. Alejandro was denied a reasonable opportunity to present his defense, either orally or through pleadings because based on the evidence on record, copies of the Complaint and Notice of the Mandatory Conference were not served on him either at his office or purported residence address. 27 The copy sent to his office address was returned with the notation "unknown" while the copy sent to his residence address contained the notation "RTS Moved 7-24-15." 28 Likewise, the return of the copy of the Order 29 dated August 28, 2015 terminating the mandatory conference and directing the parties to submit their respective position papers sent to Atty. Alejandro's purported residence included the notation "RTS Moved 9-10-15." 30
Service through registered mail is deemed complete only upon the addressee's actual receipt. 31 Furthermore, service to a wrong address determined without proper basis cannot be considered sufficient notice to comply with the indispensable requisite of due process. In the instant case, the records are silent as to how Atty. Alejandro's residence and office addresses were determined, but it is evident that these were never received. Moreover, the Court disagrees with the Investigating Commissioner's conclusion that Atty. Abbas was Atty. Alejandro's counsel for the simple fact that Atty. Abbas' Answer and Verified Position Paper used the term "respondents." 32
A lawyer can only be deprived of the privilege and right to practice law for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has afforded him or her. 33 The fact that Atty. Alejandro and Atty. Abbas are siblings does not dispense with separate notices to be sent to each of them. As it stands, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline failed to notify Atty. Alejandro of the disciplinary proceedings against him and thus, the instant Complaint should be dismissed against Atty. Alejandro, without prejudice.
As to the Proper Penalty
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. In addition, the failure to live up to the provisions of the CPR is, likewise, a ground for disciplinary action. 34
In Bautista v. Ferrer, 35 the Court sanctioned an errant lawyer with suspension from the practice of law for one year after it was found that she shouted invectives and used underhanded tactics to intimidate her debtor, thus:
In Canlapan v. Atty. Balayo, Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court, Atty. Torres v. Atty. Javier, and Re: Complaints of Mrs. Milagros Lee and Samantha Lee against Atty. Gil Luisito R. Capito, the Court suspended erring lawyers for periods ranging from one (1) month to three (3) months for their insulting, offensive, and improper language. In the present case, however, Ferrer not only exclaimed foul words and expletives directed at Bautista, she practically took matters into her own hands in detaining and confronting Bautista in the police station as well as in depriving her of her belongings without due process of law. This vindictive behavior must be met with suspension from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year in line with Spouses Saburnido v. Madroño, Gonzalez v. Atty. Alcaraz, and Co v. Atty. Bernardino. 36 (Citations omitted)
Similar to the above, Atty. Abbas not only hurled abusive language and threats, but ignored legal remedies available at her disposal. Even on the assumption that Atty. Abbas is the owner of the subject property and is consequently entitled to its possession, she still cannot forcibly eject complainants who were in prior physical possession of the land. It is well-settled that, notwithstanding the actual condition of the title to a property, a person in possession cannot be ejected by force, violence or terror — not even by the owners. 37
The appropriate penalty for an erring lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts. 38 In determining the proper penalty, the Court typically considers the finding of previous administrative liability as an aggravating circumstance. In Hipolito v. Alejandro-Abbas, 39(Hipolito) respondents were suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months for violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the CPR. Respondents threatened and forcibly removed complainant therein and his family from occupying a parcel of land. Conspicuously, the dispute in Hipolito occurred around the same time and the land therein involved was situated in the same place as the present administrative case. While the IBP-BOG acknowledged the similarity and close proximity of these incidents, it was nonetheless silent as to the reason why these two cases were not consolidated.
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. As keepers of the public faith, lawyers are burdened with a high degree of social responsibility and, hence, must handle their personal affairs with greater caution. 40 While the Court will not hesitate to remove an erring lawyer where the evidence calls for it, it will also not disbar him or her where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end. 41 In the present case, the Court finds suspension to be a sufficient sanction. Suspension, We may add, is not primarily intended as a punishment, but as a means to protect the public and the legal profession. 42 Accordingly, the Court deems it proper to modify the penalty recommended by the Investigating Commissioner such that the period of suspension be increased from one (1) to two (2) years.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ma. Carmina M. Alejandro-Abbas is found GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1, and Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, she is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, with a STERN WARNING that a commission of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. Meanwhile, the case is DISMISSED with respect to respondent Atty. Joseph Anthony M. Alejandro for lack of notice, without prejudice.
Atty. Abbas is DIRECTED to immediately file a Manifestation to the Court that her suspension has started, copy furnished all courts and quasi-judicial bodies where she has entered her appearance as counsel.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters; the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts in the country; and the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be attached to her personal record as a lawyer.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 155-157.
2. Id. at 168-171.
3. Id. at 154.
4. Id. at 167.
5. 794 Phil. 360 (2016).
6. Id. at 379-380.
7. Id. at 380.
8. Id. at 54-57.
9. Id. at 57.
10. Id. at 117-123.
11. Id. at 59-62.
12. Id. at 54-57.
13. Id. at 66-75.
14. Domingo-Agaton v. Atty. Cruz, A.C. No. 11023, May 4, 2021.
15. Id., citing Grefaldeo v. Judge Lacson, 335 Phil. 266, 271 (1998).
16. RULES OF COURT, Section 8.
Sec. 8. Allegations not specifically denied. — Material averment in the complaint, other than those as to the amount of damage, shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied.
17. Philippine Investment One (SPV-AMC), Inc. v. Lomeda, 912 Phil. 586, 593 (2019).
18. Fermin v. Bedol, 919 Phil. 401, 407 (2019).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Philippine Investment One (SPV-AMC), Inc. v. Lomeda, supra.
22. Valin v. Ruiz, 820 Phil. 390, 405 (2017).
23. Id.
24. AA Total Learning Center for Young Achievers, Inc. v. Caronan, A.C. No. 12418, March 10, 2020.
25. Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Company, Inc. v. Atty. Consunji, A.C. No. 11439, January 4, 2022.
26. Ylaya v. Gacott, 702 Phil. 390, 403 (2013).
27. Rollo, p. 153.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 110.
30. Id. (dorsal).
31. RULES OF COURT, Rule 13, Section 10.
32. Rollo, p. 162.
33. Valin v. Ruiz, supra note 19, at 398.
34. Bautista v. Ferrer, A.C. No. 9057, July 3, 2019.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Heirs of Laurora v. Sterling Technopark III, 449 Phil. 181, 187 (2003).
38. Quitazol v. Capela, A.C. No. 12072, December 9, 2020.
39. 927 Phil. 379, 389 (2019).
40. Reyes v. Atty. Nieva, supra note 2, at 377.
41. In Re: Miñas, A.C. No. 12536, November 17, 2020.
42. Mr. and Mrs. Saburnido v. Madroño, 418 Phil. 241, 248 (2001).