FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 236176. November 18, 2021.]
ARLYN PSYCHE CARASI PANCHO, petitioner,vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and JONATHAN MEMIS PANCHO, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated November 18, 2021 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 236176 (Arlyn Psyche Carasi Pancho, petitioner, v. Republic of the Philippines and Jonathan Memis Pancho, respondents).
This is an appeal from the December 6, 2017 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 105923, reversing the February 16, 2015 Decision and July 8, 2015 Resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, Branch 72 (RTC), in Special Proceedings No. 3627-N, where petitioner Arlyn Psyche Carasi Pancho (Arlyn) sought the judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent Jonathan Memis Pancho (Jonathan) on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Antecedents
Arlyn and Jonathan met at work. Jonathan was described as being meek, quiet, and kind. He courted Arlyn, and they eventually became sweethearts and later started living together. Arlyn became pregnant and the couple got married on December 10, 2001. Arlyn gave birth to their son in July of 2002. Afterwards, with Jonathan's consent, Arlyn found work in Saudi Arabia. Jonathan continued to work at the Manila City Jail. They entrusted their son's care to Arlyn's parents in Ilocos Sur. 2
After a month, Jonathan admitted to Arlyn that he was having an affair. He assured her that he would end the affair, but soon he stopped answering Arlyn's calls. She suspected that he had continued his affair. When she asked him to leave the other woman, he answered that he could not, which caused Arlyn great pain. When Arlyn first came back from working abroad, Jonathan told her that he had left the other woman; however, he also told Arlyn that he had caught a sexually transmitted disease, possibly from a prostitute. 3
Before leaving again for Saudi Arabia, Arlyn asked Jonathan if he could request to be transferred to Ilocos Sur, to be closer to their son but Jonathan wanted their son to move to Manila instead. When asked whether his reason for not wanting to transfer was another woman, Jonathan kept quiet. 4
Jonathan decided to take up nursing, to keep himself busy. While Arlyn was in Saudi Arabia, she received news of Jonathan having a girlfriend in school. Jonathan denied the allegation and complained instead that Arlyn was always late in sending money. He threatened to stop studying if she failed to send him money. She later learned that Jonathan would spend some of the money she sent on fun and womanizing. 5
During her next vacation, Arlyn stayed in Manila with Jonathan. Jonathan was sweet and kind to her, and she was happy. Arlyn was hopeful that things would get better, but after she returned abroad to work, she again received word that Jonathan was with another woman. She also learned that Jonathan was telling people that he was supporting his own studies and that she was not helping him. Nonetheless, on her next return to the country, she allowed Jonathan to stay with them in Ilocos Sur. 6
On her fourth trip back home, Arlyn found Jonathan living with another woman. He confessed his fault but said that Arlyn should be grateful as other men would not do the same. Again, he promised to stop womanizing. At one point, Jonathan called Arlyn for money for his expenses due to an accident which required an operation. However, Arlyn was informed that Jonathan was with another woman at the time of the accident. Jonathan denied that he was with another woman. Someone later confirmed that the woman was pregnant. This angered Arlyn, who told him not to expect any money from her. 7
Arlyn then filed the petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage before the RTC. 8 Jonathan failed to file an answer to the petition. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance as counsel for the Republic of the Philippines. During the trial, Arlyn presented herself, her mother, and clinical counseling psychologist Dr. Julian Ramos Montano (Dr. Montano), as witnesses. 9
The RTC granted the petition, finding both Arlyn and Jonathan psychologically incapacitated in accordance with Article 36 of the Family Code. The OSG moved for reconsideration, which was denied. 10
Ruling of the CA
On appeal, the CA reversed the ruling of the RTC, finding that the evidence was insufficient to establish psychological incapacity. 11
First, Dr. Montano's report, which found Jonathan to be suffering from antisocial and dependent-type personality disorder, utterly lacked factual basis. His psychological condition was described with sweeping generalizations wanting in specific and material details. There was never even any conclusion whatsoever that Jonathan's personality disorder was rooted from childhood. Moreover, in Dr. Montano's psychological evaluation report, it was initially claimed that Jonathan opted not to go through the psychological evaluation. However, later in the report, Dr. Montano stated his observations on Jonathan's behavior, allegedly based on his interview and testing the subject. The CA deemed suspect Dr. Montano's claim that he personally interviewed Jonathan, and thus, ruled that his report on Jonathan was based on hearsay; therefore, it should have been disregarded for being unscientific and unreliable. 12
Second, even an evaluation of Arlyn's psychological issues would not be sufficient to nullify the marriage. Dr. Montano's opinion that Arlyn demonstrated behavioral patterns representative of dependent and obsessive compulsive personality disorders relied only on the information fed by Arlyn, and hence, wholly one-sided. Further, the evidence demonstrated Arlyn's high tolerance for Jonathan's infidelity and lack of financial support, which ends up in her frustration, irritability, and controlling behavior. However, the CA opined that this failed to show that Arlyn was incapacitated in her marital commitment. On the contrary, it is extant in the records that Arlyn strived hard to keep her relationship with Jonathan. She overlooked his many faults and even worked abroad to support her husband and child. The CA found no adverse integral element in Arlyn's personality structure that effectively incapacitates her from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. 13
Third, the CA held that the evidence failed to sufficiently show that both parties' alleged psychological incapacity had juridical antecedence and were incurable. 14
Issues
Dissatisfied, Arlyn filed the instant appeal, with the following assignment of errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT IMPEACHED THE TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESS ON APPEAL IN VIOLATION OF THE PROVISION SECTION 13, RULE 132 OF THE RULES OF COURT AND THE EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE[;]
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED DECISION CONSIDERING THAT THE TOTALITY OF EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PETITIONER IN THE COURT A QUO SUCCESSFULLY ESTABLISHED THAT BOTH THE PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT JONATHAN MEMIS PANCHO ARE PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THEIR MARITAL OBLIGATIONS. 15
Petitioner alleges that the CA should not have disregarded the testimony of Dr. Montano on the basis of allegedly conflicting testimony, as the latter was not confronted with said conflicting statements and was not allowed to explain the inconsistencies during trial, citing People v. De Guzman. 16 As such, any inconsistent testimony cannot be taken against him and should not affect his credibility. 17 aScITE
Petitioner likewise maintains that the ruling of the RTC was founded on facts and evidence presented during trial, and consistent with existing jurisprudence regarding psychological incapacity. Both parties were shown to be psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage. The root cause of the incapacity was medically or clinically identified through the expert testimony of Dr. Montano. The same testimony established its gravity, incurability, as well as its existence at the time of the celebration of the marriage. 18
In its Comment, 19 the OSG argues that the CA correctly held that petitioner failed to sufficiently prove the existence of psychological incapacity, particularly the juridical antecedence of Arlyn and Jonathan's respective personality disorders. Dr. Montano's report contained general statements and lacked specificity to show how the parties' childhood experiences contributed to their incapacity. Further, assuming that the parties indeed have psychoses of some sort, the evidence fails to show how such conditions would cause the parties to fail to comply with their essential marital obligations. 20
Petitioner filed her reply, which essentially repleads the arguments raised in her petition.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is without merit.
Psychological incapacity refers to an incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. It is confined to the most serious cases demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. 21 In the recent case of Tan-Andal v. Tan, 22 We refined the characterization thus:
x x x Psychological incapacity is neither a mental incapacity nor a personality disorder that must be proven through expert opinion. There must be proof, however, of the durable or enduring aspects of a person's personality, called "personality structure," which manifests itself through clear acts of dysfunctionality that undermines the family. The spouse's personality structure must make it impossible for him or her to understand and, more important, to comply with his or her essential marital obligations.
To justify the declaration of the nullity of a marriage, the totality of the evidence must sufficiently prove that either or both of the spouses' psychological incapacity was grave, incurable, and existing prior to the time of the marriage. 23 The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable. 24 The incurability contemplated here is not medical, but in a legal sense, where: "the incapacity is so enduring and persistent with respect to a specific partner, and contemplates a situation where the couple's respective personality structures are so incompatible and antagonistic that the only result of the union would be the inevitable and irreparable breakdown of the marriage." 25
In an action for declaration of nullity based on psychological incapacity, the burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. 26 In order to overcome this presumption, the plaintiff must establish his or her case with clear and convincing evidence. 27
Petitioner's argument regarding the application of Section 13, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court is grossly misplaced. The rule refers to the impeachment of a witness based on statements that he or she made at different times and applies to the introduction of evidence for such purpose. Here, the CA did not introduce new evidence. It found that Dr. Montano's psychological evaluation report in and of itself to be inconsistent regarding how he was able to diagnose Jonathan. In said report, Dr. Montano narrated that his observations of Jonathan were made during interview and testing. However, earlier in the report, it was noted that Jonathan opted not to go through psychological evaluation. Clearly, both statements cannot be concurrently true.
These inconsistent statements were not made on separate occasions — which might have justified the call for the application of Sec. 13, Rule 132 — but appeared within the same report. Further, Dr. Montano's report formed an integral part of his testimony, which was offered by the petitioner herself into evidence. Therefore, she cannot now challenge the admissibility of such evidence and question whether or not such evidence may be considered in determining the weight to be given to Dr. Montano's testimony. The CA cannot be faulted in finding that the report, as it pertained to Jonathan, lacked factual basis. DETACa
The report of Dr. Montano should be viewed having been based solely on the information provided by the petitioner, whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted. While this circumstance alone does not disqualify the psychologist for reasons of bias, his report, testimony, and conclusions deserve the application of a more rigid and stringent set of standards. 28
We find that the CA did not commit any reversible error in holding that the evidence failed to establish that either of the parties were psychologically incapacitated so as to warrant a judicial declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code.
With regard to Jonathan, aside from the lack of sufficient factual basis behind Dr. Montano's findings, the CA also observed that petitioner failed to show that his psychological incapacity had juridical antecedence and was incurable. To show its existence prior to the marriage and its incurability, petitioner points to Dr. Montano's report stating:
A: It is the respondent's personality inborn traits that has predisposed him to the development of his personality disorder. His childhood and adolescent experiences had then reinforced these traits to be self-centered and deceitful. His father was a womanizer and growing up he was very angry with him for being so.
Respondent's personality disorder, as all other personality disorders, is incurable. A personality disorder is a personality trait which is intrinsic and permanent. x x x. Lastly, the psychological patterns involved are of such long duration that major psychotherapeutic endeavors would not effect significant, lasting and permanent changes. 29
We remain unconvinced. The report merely states that Jonathan was "predisposed" to the development of his disorder, and vaguely cites "childhood and adolescent experiences." Lacking any more concrete or specific circumstances and past events, We find this insufficient to prove that the incapacity was already existing at the time of the marriage. Likewise, the statement that all personality disorders are incurable is far too general and sweeping to be given much credence.
It bears emphasis that psychological incapacity should no longer be equated with a medical illness that has to be medically or clinically identified, and that expert medical opinion is no longer absolutely required to prove the same. Nonetheless, considering that the bulk of petitioner's evidence consists of Dr. Montano's findings, We maintain that the totality of evidence falls short of the quantum required in nullity cases.
On the other hand, according to Dr. Montano, Arlyn suffered from dependent personality disorder, and obsessive compulsive personality disorder. 30 In essence, he described her disorder as resulting in her perpetuating Jonathan's abusive and irresponsible behavior. While such behavior contributed to the breakdown of the marriage, it is not indicative of any incapacity on Arlyn's part in carrying out her marital obligations. Indeed, the CA astutely observed that Arlyn tried her best to make the marriage work, financially providing for both husband and child, and repeatedly giving Jonathan a chance to reform.
Additionally, juridical antecedence of her alleged incapacity was not sufficiently established. To prove that her condition existed at the time of the marriage, Dr. Montano stated:
A: The behavioral patterns of [Arlyn's] personality disorder developed from her personality traits and were reinforced by her childhood and adolescent family experiences. Arlyn grew up as an obedient child and would make her parents proud with her consistent performances in the different activities they would get her involved in. She completed her nursing degree without repeating any subject and passed her board exams in her first try. 31
Such narration of Arlyn's past appears commonplace and entirely unremarkable. Even if proven as fact, the Court fails to see how such prior experiences affected Arlyn's behavior towards Jonathan and their marriage.
While the marriage between the parties appears to have failed, absent sufficient evidence of psychological incapacity as contemplated by Art. 36, We are compelled to uphold the validity of the marriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The December 6, 2017 Decision of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 105923, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED."Lopez, M., J.,no part;Zalameda, J., designated additional Member per Raffle dated October 27, 2021.
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 42-52; penned by Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando (now a Member of the Court), with Acting Presiding Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Associate Justice Mario V. Lopez (now a Member of the Court).
2.Id. at 43.
3.Id.
4.Id.
5.Id. at 44.
6.Id.
7.Id. at 44-45.
8.Id. at 45.
9.Id.
10.Id. at 45-46.
11.Id. at 46.
12.Id. at 48-50.
13.Id. at 50.
14.Id.
15.Id. at 12.
16.351 Phil. 587 (1998).
17.Rollo, pp. 13-16.
18.Id. at 16-17.
19.Id. at 62-73.
20.Id. at 67.
21.Santos v. Court of Appeals, 310 Phil. 21, 40 (1995).
22.G.R. No. 196359, May 11, 2021.
23.Mendoza v. Republic, 698 Phil. 241, 243 (2012).
24.See Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra at 39.
25.Tan-Andal v. Tan, supra note 22.
26.Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 664, 676 (1997).
27.Tan-Andal v. Tan, supra note 22.
28.Rumbaua v. Rumbaua, 612 Phil. 1061, 1084 (2009).
29.Rollo, p. 31.
30.Id. at 21.
31.Id. at 25.