THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 226387. September 6, 2017.]
ROSS EDWARD DAVID PALMER, petitioner,vs. BRENDAN P. PARAISO, BRYCE P. PARAISO, AND TOMMY CUNA, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedSeptember 6, 2017, which reads as follows: SDHTEC
"G.R. No. 226387 (Ross Edward David Palmer vs. Brendan P. Paraiso, Bryce P. Paraiso, and Tommy Cuna). — For the consideration of the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari dated October 4, 2016 1 filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision dated April 27, 2016 2 and Resolution dated August 8, 2016. 3 The CA affirmed with modification the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 90, in its Order dated January 9, 2012, 4 which found probable cause against petitioner.
The facts are as follows:
In a Joint Affidavit-Complaint dated June 8, 2011, 5 Brendan P. Paraiso, Bryce P. Paraiso, Bianca P. Paraiso and Tommy Cuna charged petitioner Ross E. D. Palmer with Grave Threats in relation to Republic Act No. (RA) 7610 or the Special Protection of Children against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act. They alleged that, on April 14, 2011, they were at the playground of their village when petitioner started screaming at them and threatening them, saying that he had a shotgun.
Palmer answered the allegations in a Counter-Affidavit dated July 12, 2011 6 where he alleged that respondents were at the vacant lot across his house and that one of them had a machete and was hacking at the banana trees that he and his neighbors had planted on the lot. Thus, he started shouting at them to try to save the trees because of which respondents allegedly scampered.
After proceedings before the public prosecutor, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City issued a Resolution dated September 28, 2011, 7 recommending the filing of an information against Palmer for violation of Section 10 (a) of RA 7610 but only with respect to respondents Brendan and Bryce Paraiso and Tommy Cuna. It was discovered that Bianca Paraiso was no longer a minor at the time of the alleged commission of the offense. Subsequently, an Information dated September 28, 2011 8 was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa against petitioner.
Afterwards, petitioner filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause dated October 17, 2011 9 praying for, among others, the declaration of the non-existence of probable cause and the dismissal of the case against him.
In an Order dated January 9, 2012, the trial court ruled on petitioner's Motion as follows:
After a careful and personal evaluation of the Information filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor, Muntinlupa City, and the supporting documents thereto attached, and relying further on the Certification made by the Investigating Prosecutor, this Court filed that there is reasonable ground to engender a well-founded belief that an offense had been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. The documents attached to the motion, and the reply, are matters of evidence which could be presented during the trial on the merits of the case.
WHEREFORE, let a warrant be issued for the arrest of accused Ross Palmer. Bail is set at Eighty Thousand Pesos (P80,000.00).
SO ORDERED. 10
Petitioner moved for but was denied reconsideration in an Order dated April 19, 2012. 11
Thus, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals in a Petition dated May 8, 2012 12 through a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. However, the CA dismissed the petition in the assailed Decision dated April 27, 2016. The CA found that petitioner failed to adduce sufficient evidence to support his claim that the trial court did not personally determine the existence of probable cause. Thus, the CA ruled that the trial court did not act with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the warrant of arrest against petitioner.
From such Decision petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration that was denied in the assailed Resolution dated August 8, 2016.
Hence, the instant petition, anchored on the following grounds:
The action of the trial court — in denying herein petitioner's motion for an [sic] judicial determination of probable cause in a manner contrary to established and pertinent jurisprudence — can, and should, be a proper subject of review by the honorable Supreme Court in accordance with its ruling in Macapagal-Arroyo v. People of the Philippines (G.R. No. 220598, 19 July 2016). AScHCD
The Court of Appeals gravely erred in upholding the ruling of the trial court — denying herein petitioner's motion for an [sic] judicial determination of probable cause — as said ruling relied solely on the prosecution's report and totally disregarded the affidavit/affidavits and the documentary evidence of the parties, the Counter-Affidavit of the accused and his witnesses in a manner contrary to doctrine enunciated in Ho v. People, et al. (G.R. No. 106632, 09 October 1997) and in Okabe v. Hon. Gutierrez (G.R. No. 150185, 27 May 2004). 13
The petition is bereft of merit.
The question posed before this Court is whether the CA correctly ruled that the trial court did not act with grave abuse of discretion in finding that probable cause against petitioner exists.
As explained by the Court in Hao v. People:
As in Montoya, we need to scrutinize the CA decision in the same context that the petition for certiorari it ruled upon was presented to it. Thus, we need to examine the CA decision from the prism of whether it correctly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court and not on the basis of whether the trial court's denial of petitioners' motions was strictly legally correct. In question form, the question to ask is: did the CA correctly determine whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners' motions to defer arraignment and lift warrant of arrest? 14 (Emphasis supplied)
Grave abuse of discretion has been defined as:
This Court has defined grave abuse of discretion as such "capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or [an] exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or an exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act in a manner not at all in contemplation of law."
Here, petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion against the trial court for allegedly ruling against his Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause solely on the basis of the report of the investigating prosecutor without examining the supporting documents, that is, the affidavits and evidences submitted by the parties during the preliminary investigation. In support of such contention, petitioner points out the errors of the trial court and the CA:
1. First of all, the record will show that the trial court judge did not consider nor appreciate material inconsistencies in the allegations of the Private Respondents in their Joint Complaint-Affidavit vis-à-vis the counter-affidavits and counter-evidence of herein Petitioner. 15
2. Furthermore, the trial court judge, in denying herein Petitioner's Motion for a Judicial Determination of Probable Cause did not consider nor appreciate the significance or materiality of the material lapse in time between 14 April 2011 — when the alleged act of which he is charged supposedly happened — and July 2011 when Private Respondents filed a complaint with the Muntinlupa Prosecutor's Office as ground for reasonable doubt of the truth of the charge against herein Petitioner. 16
3. Finally, the Court of Appeals — in affirming the action of the trial court in denying Petitioner's Motion for a Judicial Determination of Probable Cause did not consider nor appreciate the significance or materiality of the dismissal of the complaint of Grave Threats by Bianca Paraiso in of I.S. No. XV-08-INV-12A-00098 (Annex "R-1" hereof) — that the Court of Appeals was apprised in Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration — as basis for a lack of probable cause to charge the Petitioner for Grave Threats in I.S. No. XV-08-INV-11F-01064. 17
Such contention is erroneous.
Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the issuance of a warrant of arrest in criminal cases:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. (Emphasis supplied)
In light thereof, Section 6, paragraph (a) of Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states the requirements before a warrant of arrest may be issued:
Section 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. — (a) By the Regional Trial Court. — Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to Section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint of information. (Emphasis supplied) AcICHD
In the RTC Order, the trial court judge categorically stated that she personally evaluated the information, its supporting documents, as well as the certification of the investigating prosecutor. This would necessarily include the affidavits of the parties and their evidences that were submitted to the investigating prosecutor. Such statement evinces her compliance with the Constitutional requirement of personal evaluation of whether probable cause exists based on the prosecutor's report and supporting documents and evidence.
The fact that the points raised by Petitioner were not discussed in the assailed RTC Order does not mean that the trial court judge did not examine the supporting documents of the prosecutor's report in her determination of the existence of probable cause.
Such conclusion simply does not follow.
There is a disputable presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties by court officials and personnel. 18 Such disputable presumption may only be rebutted by affirmative evidence. 19 Petitioner's argument that because the trial court judge did not consider the arguments that he presented in his Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause does not mean that his affidavits and evidences were not considered. Petitioner has failed to present sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption of regularity. Mere conjecture will not serve to overthrow the presumption.
In fact, the Court has already ruled that a judicial determination of probable cause need not be an exhaustive discussion of the points raised by parties. It is sufficient that the judge examine the prosecutor's report and the supporting documents to arrive at a determination of whether probable cause exists to issue a warrant of arrest.
In Ho v. People, citing Lim, Sr. v. Felix, 20 the Court explained the extent of a judge's personal evaluation, thus:
The extent of the Judge's personal examination of the report and its annexes depends on the circumstances of each case. We cannot determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the Judge's examination should be. The Judge has to exercise sound discretion for, after all, the personal determination is vested in the Judge by the Constitution. It can be as brief or as detailed as the circumstances of each case require. To be sure, the Judge must go beyond the Prosecutor's certification and investigation report whenever necessary. He should call for [the] complainant and [the] witnesses themselves to answer the court's probing questions when the circumstances of the case so require. 21 (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, in Ho vs. People, the Court stated:
x x x Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. Hence, the judge, before issuing a warrant of arrest, must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted there is sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested is probably guilty thereof. At this stage of the criminal proceeding, the judge is not yet tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary investigation. It is sufficient that he personally evaluates such evidence in determining probable cause. In Webb vs. De Leon, we stressed that the judge merely determines the probability, not the certainty, of guilt of the accused and, in doing so, he need not conduct a de novo hearing. He simply personally reviews the prosecutors' initial determination finding probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence.22 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, absent any affirmative evidence to prove that the trial court judge did not, in fact, personally make such determination based on the prosecutor's report and supporting documents, the CA was correct in finding that the judge did not act with grave abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the assailed April 27, 2016 Decision and August 8, 2016 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Court resolves to DENY the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari dated October 4, 2016 and, thus, AFFIRM said Decision and Resolution.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court
By:
(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 19-41.
2.Id. at 43-52. Penned by Associate Justice Myra V. Garcia-Fernandez and concurred in by Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang and Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr.
3.Id. at 54-55.
4.Id. at 132.
5.Id. at 56-57.
6.Id. at 62-66.
7.Id. at 92-96.
8.Id. at 97-98.
9.Id. at 99-115.
10.Id. at 132.
11.Id. at 157.
12.Id. at 158-181.
13.Id. at 27-28.
14. G.R. No. 183345, September 17, 2014, 735 SCRA 312, 321.
15.Rollo, p. 31.
16.Id. at 32.
17.Id. at 33.
18. RULES OF COURT, Rule 131, Section 3 (m).
19.Genato Investments, Inc. v. Barrientos, G.R. No. 207443, July 23, 2014, 731 SCRA 32.
20. G.R. Nos. 94054-57, February 19, 1991, 194 SCRA 292, 306.
21. G.R. No. 106632, October 9, 1997, 280 SCRA 365, 376.
22.Id. at 377.