Palabrica v. Field Investigation Office II

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 241498. April 3, 2019.]

NESTOR C. PALABRICA (SALARY GRADE 24), FORMER CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER, PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, petitioner, vs.FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE II, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, REPRESENTED BY DAVID A. LUCERO, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated03 April 2019which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 241498 — NESTOR C. PALABRICA (Salary Grade 24), Former Chief Administrative Officer, Presidential Commission on Good Government, petitioner, versus FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE II, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, represented by DAVID A. LUCERO, respondent.

This is a petition for certiorari 1 (Petition) under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Nestor C. Palabrica (petitioner) against herein respondent Field Investigation Office II (FIO), Office of the Ombudsman (OMB), represented by OMB Investigator David A. Lucero, assailing the: (1) OMB Resolution2 dated November 21, 2017 and (2) Order3 dated June 5, 2018.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

On April 1, 1976, petitioner was hired by the Development Academy of the Philippines (DAP) as Clerk Typist. He was later appointed to the position of Project Officer IV, 4 and, in June 17, 1981, as Project Officer II. 5 In 1986, he was appointed as Budget Officer III in the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). In all the Personal Data Sheets (PDS) that petitioner submitted in the course of his employment with these government agencies, he consistently indicated that he graduated from the University of the East (UE) with a course of Bachelor of Science in Business Administration (BSBA), Major in Accounting, 6viz.:

 

Document	Year Accomplished	Course/CY Graduated	School Graduated	Agency
Personal History Sheet	1976	BSBA 1975	University of the East	DAP
Personal Data Sheet	1988	BSBA 1975	University of the East	PCGG
Personal Data Sheet	1999	BSBA 1975	University of the East	PCGG
Personal Data Sheet	2005	BSBA 1975	University of the East	PCGG 7

 

It was later discovered, however, that contrary to what was indicated in his PDSs (i.e., having "graduated in 1975"), it was only in the second semester of the year 1994-1995 that petitioner had actually completed the academic and non-academic requirements for a BSBA, Major in Accounting, 8 as certified by UE. 9

These discrepancies led the FIO-OMB, as nominal complainant, to file a Complaint10 against petitioner charging the latter with three (3) counts of violation of Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), with each count representing the declarations in his PDSs dated April 12, 1988 (1988 PDS), February 9, 1999 (1999 PDS) and May 3, 2005 (2005 PDS); and one (1) count for violation of Article 171 in relation to Article 172 of the RPC in relation to his 1976 PDS, since according to the FIO-OMB, at the time he prepared said PDS, there was no "taking advantage of official position" just yet. 11

The FIO-OMB avers in the Complaint that all the elements of Falsification of Public Documents were present when petitioner prepared and submitted his PDSs, considering that: first, a PDS is a public document; second, petitioner was legally obliged to disclose the truth as to the completion or non-completion of his academic requirements, which information was vital to the determination of his qualification for the position; third, indicating that he graduated with a BSBA degree is clearly false considering that at the time he asserted his claim of having graduated with a BSBA degree, he was yet to complete his course and to actually graduate from the university; and finally, with the exception of his 1976 PDS, that he had taken advantage of his official position since the preparation and submission of a PDS is part of his duties as a public officer. 12

Responding to the FIO-OMB's allegations in his Counter-Affidavit, 13 petitioner did not deny that he indicated in his PDSs that he graduated from UE in 1975 (despite the Certification 14 from UE indicating that he graduated in 1995), arguing only that he acted in good faith considering that he had in fact finished his academic subjects and that he was only advised that he had deficiencies in two (2) physical education (PE) subjects, Arnis and Volleyball, which were, he argues, "non-academic subjects." 15 Petitioner claims that he did, in fact, enroll in two (2) PE subjects in the second semester of School Year (SY) 1974-1975, 16 just before he joined the DAP in 1976.

However, petitioner claims that it was only in 1993 that he was prompted to revisit his academic records since he "had only been assuming in good faith" the completion of his degree. 17 It was only then that he allegedly discovered that he passed his volleyball class but that his name was not listed in the Arnis class. Attempting to cure the deficiency in his requirements, he then re-enrolled and passed Arnis in UE, but that was only in the second semester of SY 1994-1995. 18

In light of these incidents, petitioner claims that he initially wanted to inform his then employer, the PCGG, of the discovery, but decided against it as it "may possibly affect official documents that [he] previously signed in [his] various capacities." 19 In any event, petitioner claims that he firmly believed in good faith that his employers, DAP and later PCGG, would have verified his educational background before appointing him to his various positions in said offices. 20

The OMB Ruling

In the assailed OMB Resolution 21 dated November 21, 2017, the OMB found probable cause against petitioner for Falsification of Public Documents under Article 171 (4) of the RPC, viz.:

WHEREFORE, finding probable cause against respondent NESTOR CANUTO PALABRICA, let an Information for Falsification of Public Documents under Article 171 (4) for his 2005 PDS be filed against him in the proper court.

SO ORDERED.22

The OMB ruled that the crimes that may have been committed for the 1976, 1988, and 1999 PDS had already prescribed. 23 The OMB further observed that having re-enrolled in UE in SY 1994-1995, petitioner was deemed to have been duly informed of the deficiency in his academic records and that in any case, petitioner had admitted in his Counter-Affidavit that he was aware of the deficiency and its subsequent completion only in 1995. Thus, notwithstanding the prescription of the crimes that may have been committed in 1976, 1988 and 1999, it remains that in his 2005 PDS, petitioner continued to make untruthful statements in his PDS. 24

In the assailed Order 25 dated June 5, 2018, the OMB denied petitioner's Motion for Partial Reconsideration26 dated April 30, 2018 for lack of merit.

Hence, this Petition.

Issue

The Court resolves the sole issue of whether the Ombudsman, in issuing the assailed Resolution dated November 21, 2017 and Order dated June 5, 2018, acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Ruling

The Court rules in the negative. Accordingly, the Petition must be dismissed.

To begin with, flowing from the principle that public office is a public trust, 27 Section 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution 28 and Republic Act No. (RA) 6770, 29 otherwise known as the OmbudsmanAct of 1989, vest in the OMB a wide latitude in the exercise of its investigatory and prosecutorial powers to pass upon criminal complaints involving public officials and employees. 30 Accordingly, the Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exist reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the appropriate courts. 31

Thus, in deference to this constitutionally-recognized independence of the OMB, 32 the Court generally does not interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of its investigatory and prosecutorial powers, 33 except to review the Ombudsman's rulings by certiorari, but only when it is shown that in arriving at its rulings, the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

While the Ombudsman's discretion in the determination of the existence of probable cause is not absolute, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that such discretion was gravely abused in order to warrant the Court's reversal of the Ombudsman's ruling. 34 No such grave abuse of discretion has been shown by petitioner in the present case.

Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, exists when the facts are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof. 35 In determining whether there is a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, the elements of the crime charged — falsification of public documents in this case — should, in all reasonable likelihood, be present. 36 This is based on the principle that every crime is defined by its elements, without which, there should be no criminal offense. 37

Article 171, paragraph 4 of the RPC provides:

Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastical minister. — The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:

xxx xxx xxx

4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts[.]

Reduced to its elements, a violation of the above provision requires that: (1) the offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (2) he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; (3) the facts narrated by him are absolutely false; 38 and (4) he took advantage of his official position in making the falsification either because he has the duty to make or prepare the document which he falsifies or has custody of the documents which he falsifies. 39

The Court is unfortunately not convinced by petitioner's claim that there is no probable cause for the filing of an Information against him for Falsification of Public Documents. To be clear, probable cause does not require clear and convincing evidence of guilt, or evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt — it implies probability of guilt and requires more than bare suspicion but less than evidence which would justify conviction. 40

Here, the Court notes that petitioner himself in his Counter-Affidavit does not dispute that he made representations in his PDSs to the effect that he graduated in 1976, when in fact, based on the Certification from UE, he "completed [his] academic and non-academic requirements leading to the Degree of Bachelor of Science in Business Administration (BSBA) major in Accounting as of 2nd Semester, SY 1994-1995." 41 The PDS being a public document 42 which petitioner had the legal obligation to accomplish truthfully, and petitioner having made — and in fact continued to make — false declarations therein until 2005, the Court agrees with the Ombudsman that probable cause exists to charge petitioner with a violation of Article 171 (4) of the RPC.

A final note. In Fullero v. People, 43 therein petitioner Ernesto Fullero accomplished and signed his PDS in 1988 stating that he passed the Civil Engineering Board Examination in 1985, when in fact, he never passed the board examination for civil engineering and his name does not appear in the Professional Regulation Commission's book of registration for civil engineers. 44 In Sevilla v. People, 45 in answer to the question in his PDS on whether he had a pending criminal case against him, therein petitioner Venancio Sevilla marked the box which stated "no," despite the pendency of a criminal case against him for assault upon a person in authority. 46 In both these cases, the Court affirmed the Ombudsman's finding that petitioners committed falsification of public documents under Article 171 (4) of the RPC for making untruthful statements in their PDSs.

Inasmuch as the Court empathizes with petitioner's plight considering that he had served the government for thirty-eight (38) years, 47 the Court, after a judicious review of the records, finds, and is thus constrained to rule, that insofar as the finding of probable cause for Falsification of Public Documents is concerned, there is no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Ombudsman. After all, what is punished in falsification of public documents is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as solemnly proclaimed in those public documents. 48

WHEREFORE, there being no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Office of the Ombudsman in the latter's Resolution dated November 21, 2017 and (2) Order dated June 5, 2018, finding probable cause against petitioner for Falsification of Public Documents under Article 171 (4) for his 2005 PDS, the Court resolves to DISMISS the instant Petition.

The Resolution dated November 21, 2017 and Order dated June 25, 2018 of the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-C-16-0427 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. (REYES, J., JR., J., on wellness leave)"

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) MARIA LOURDES C. PERFECTODivision Clerk of Court

By:

TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 3-19.

2.Id. at 20-26. Through Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II Alteza A. Añoso and reviewed by Acting Director Maricel M. Marcial-Oquendo; recommended for approval by Assistant Ombudsman Aleu A. Amante and approved by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Melchor Arthur H. Carandang.

3.Id. at 34-38.

4. On September 1, 1976; see rollo, p. 28.

5.Rollo, p. 28.

6. See id. at 20-21.

7.Id. at 21.

8.Id.

9.Id. at 76.

10.Id. at 41-44.

11.Id. at 43-44.

12.Id. at 43, citing Fullero v. People, 559 Phil. 524 (2007).

13.Id. at 66-69.

14.Id. at 76.

15.Id. at 67.

16.Id.

17.Id. at 68.

18.Id.

19.Id. Emphasis and underscoring omitted.

20.Id. at 67.

21.Id. at 20-26.

22.Id. at 25-26.

23.Id. at 25.

24.Id. at 24-25.

25. Id. at 34-38.

26. Id. at 27-33.

27. 1987 CONSTITUTION, Art. XI, Sec. 1; RA 6770, Sec. 2.

28. SECTION 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:

   (1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.

29. AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE FUNCTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES (November 17, 1989).

30. Garcia, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman, 747 Phil. 445, 457 (2014).

31. Soriano v. Marcelo, 610 Phil. 72, 78 (2009), citing Esquivel v. Ombudsman, 437 Phil. 702, 711 (2002).

32. 1997 CONSTITUTION, Art. XI, Sec. 5 provides:

   SECTION 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military establishment may likewise be appointed.

33. Esquivel v. Ombudsman, supra note 31, at 711.

34. Office of the Ombudsman v. Heirs of Margarita Vda. de Ventura, 620 Phil. 1, 10 (2009).

35. Garcia, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman, supra note 30, at 459.

36. Id.

37. Id., citing Alberto v. Court of Appeals, 711 Phil. 530, 553-554 (2013).

38. People v. Sandiganbayan (2nd Division), 765 Phil. 845, 860 (2015).

39. Fullero v. People, supra note 12, at 539, citing Adaza v. Sandiganbayan, 502 Phil. 702, 720 (2005) and Luis B. Reyes, THE REVISED PENAL CODE, CRIMINAL LAW (Fourteenth Edition, Revised 1998), Book Two, Arts. 114-367, p. 216, further citing People v. Uy, 101 Phil. 159, 163 (1957) and United Statesv. Inosanto, 20 Phil. 376, 378 (1911).

40. Ramiscal, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 530 Phil. 773, 794 (2006), citing Drilon v. Court of Appeals, 327 Phil. 922, 923 (1996), further citing Webb v. De Leon, 317 Phil. 758, 789 (1995).

41. Rollo, p. 76.

42. Sevilla v. People, 741 Phil. 198 (2014); see also Fullero v. People, supra note 12.

43. Supra note 12.

44. Id. at 529-530.

45. Supra note 42.

46. Id. at 201.

47. Rollo, p. 66.

48. People v. Sandiganbayan (2nd Division), supra note 38, at 861.