FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 209638. October 13, 2021.]
AGAPITA PAJARILLO, AS SUBSTITUTED BY HER LEGAL HEIRS, NAMELY: BEBIAN P. LO, ZENAIDA LO TANG, ELENA P. LO, PEPITO P. LO, MELITA LO, JOSEPH PAJARILLO, ALEXANDER PAJARILLO AND IMELDA P. MADERA, petitioners, vs.THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE DEMETRIO VICTA, REPRESENTED BY MOISES VALERO VICTA, SR., AS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedOctober 13, 2021which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 209638 (Agapita Pajarillo, as substituted by her legal heirs, namely: Bebian P. Lo, Zenaida Lo Tang, Elena P. Lo, Pepito P. Lo, Melita Lo, Joseph Pajarillo, Alexander Pajarillo and Imelda P. Madera v. The Intestate Estate of the late Demetrio Victa, represented by Moises Valero Victa, Sr., as attorney-in-fact). — Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari(Petition) pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure filed by Agapita Pajarillo, as substituted by her legal heirs (petitioners), seeking the reversal of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals promulgated on October 1, 2013, which affirmed the two (2) Orders 2 both dated May 11, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 39, Daet, Camarines Norte, denying the their Motion to Set Aside Default and granting respondent's complaint for the annulment and/or cancellation of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-8992. In the alternative, petitioners pray that the case be remanded to the RTC to allow them to submit their Answer and that proceedings be conducted in accordance with the Rules.
On June 7, 2005, Moises Victa, Sr. (respondent) as attorney-in-fact of the Intestate Estate of the late Demetrio Victa (Demetrio), filed a Complaint 3 for annulment and/or cancellation of OCT No. P-8992 against the late Agapita Pajarillo (Agapita), the Department of Environment & Natural Resources (DENR) through the Community Environment Natural Resources Office (CENRO) (formerly the Bureau of Lands), Daet, Camarines Norte and the Register of Deeds, Daet, Camarines Norte. The complaint alleges that the late Demetrio died sometime in the year 1968, without any issue, leaving a real property identified as Lot 807, Pls-677-D, with an area of forty-seven thousand three hundred seven (47,307) square meters, more or less (subject property). 4 CAIHTE
According to respondent, the heirs of Demetrio only discovered on February 27, 2004 that OCT No. P-8992, dated March 7, 1979, 5 was issued in favor of Agapita. Respondent conducted his research at the Office of the DENR-CENRO and discovered that the issuance of petitioners' OCT No. P-8992 was based on the copy of a Deed of Absolute Sale which was executed by a certain Domingo Rivera (Rivera) in favor of Agapita sometime on March 6, 1974. 6 Respondent alleges that the heirs of Demetrio only discovered OCT No. P-8992 when they questioned the improvements being conducted by Agapita through hired hands. 7
As a result of this, respondent brought the case before the Office of the Barangay Captain for possible confrontation and mediation, but this proved unsuccessful as Agapita, through her son Joseph Pajarillo, made a settlement offer of up to P80,000.00 which the heirs of Demetrio rejected. 8
The complaint stated that the heirs of Demetrio discovered that there were only two (2) small parcels of land registered with taxes paid for, as certified by the Municipal Assessor of Mercedes, Camarines Norte. 9
Respondent wrote a letter to the DENR-CENRO inquiring on the former and current property ownership of Rivera. On May 23, 2005, DENR-CENRO issued a Certification stating that Rivera had no public land application in that office. 10 On the same date, respondent also wrote a letter addressed to the Provincial Assessor of Date, Camarines Norte, inquiring on the former and current property ownership of Rivera. 11 The Provincial Assessor issued a Certification on even date stating that Rivera appears not to own any property within the province. 12
Likewise, the Bureau of Lands failed to come up with a report on their investigation of the subject property, hence, the questioned OCT No. P-8992 is defective and questionable, irregular and fraudulent, and must be outright cancelled. 13
It was alleged that Demetrio Victa had occupied and possessed the subject property in an open, adverse, public, in the concept of an owner and in uninterrupted possession since 1950 and, after his death, was continued by his heirs who are now represented by respondent. In contrast, Agapita never set foot on the subject property nor paid any tax due thereon from the issuance of OCT No. P-8992. 14
Summonses were thereafter served through a certain Melchor Ibasco (Ibasco) at the Office of the Municipal Mayor of Mercedes, Camarines Norte, 15 where the son of Agapita Pajarillo was serving as the Mayor at the time.
On August 15, 2005, Atty. Archimedes Yanto (Atty. Yanto) entered his appearance as counsel for Agapita, and moved for an extension of time to submit her Answer. 16 A second Motion for Extension was filed by Atty. Yanto which was granted, giving Agapita until September 15, 2005 to file her Answer.
On October 10, 2005, without an Answer having been filed, respondent filed a Motion to Declare Defendants in Default. 17
On June 30, 2006, Agapita Pajarillo was declared in default and the respondent was allowed to present evidence ex-parte. 18 On August 23, 2006, the case was referred to a commissioner for reception of evidence. 19
On July 9, 2008, Atty. Santiago Ceneta (Atty. Ceneta), on behalf of Agapita, filed a Motion to Set Aside the Order of Default and Annul the Proceedings. 20 The motion narrated that Agapita was not informed of this case and neither did she authorize Atty. Yanto to appear for her because she was already staying then in Manila, and later had gone to the United States and stayed there for quite a time. 21 It also narrates that Agapita and Atty. Yanto were not furnished a copy of the Motion to Declare Defendant in Default, nor in the notice of hearing on the same motion. 22 Agapita was likewise not furnished with the RTC Order declaring her in default, and in all the notices of hearings with the commissioner. 23 Agapita narrated that it was only when she arrived from the United States that she came to know that there was a proceeding affecting her title, and she could not intervene to ventilate her side because the Order of Default divested her of personality to appear in the case. 24 On July 18, 2008, respondent was directed to comment on the Motion. 25
On May 11, 2009, the RTC issued an Order 26 denying the Motion to Set Aside the Order in Default, with the following discussion: DETACa
As to the summons and copy of the complaint, the officer of the court who served the same cannot be faulted as the complaint itself indicates the address of the defendant to be "c/o Mayor Pepito Lo, Mercedes, Camarines Norte."
As to Mr. Melchor Ibasco's referring the case to Atty. Archimedes Yanto, being a mere employee of the pajari of Mercedes, Camarines Norte, it is hard to believe that he would do so on his own accord, being aware that what he received was a "summons" in a case already filed in court, and unilaterally refer it Atty. Yanto [sic], a private practitioner who would certainly demand fees for his legal services, unless he was given specific instructions by the defendant himself. It should be noted that defendant was then, as alleged in the motion at bar, just staying in Manila where physical access or access by telephone is not only "not impossible" but very convenient.
It is also hard to believe that defendant did not authorize Atty. Yanto to appear in this case as no lawyer in his right senses, especially one with the reputation and caliber of Atty. Yanto, would formally appear in a case where his services were not engaged by the party concerned.
As to the Motion for default, indeed the records show that only defendant Agapita Pajarillo was furnished with a copy by the plaintiff. This in fact mislead [sic] this Court to follow suit when the order granting the motion for default was issued.
As to the hearings before the Commissioner, the notices reflect that defendant Agapita Pajarillo was constantly present during those hearings even presenting Atty. Archimedes Yanto himself before the Commissioner at the inception of the first ex-parte hearing, and even talking to the witnesses presented by the plaintiff. She also consistently inquired as to the subsequent settings of this case so that she knew when the next schedule would be. The reason why she was almost always present on those schedules [sic].
Given these facts, [petitioner] appears to have been afforded the notice that she is entitled to as in fact she availed of her privilege of being present during the hearings.
The grounds preferred [sic] by the [petitioner] as would justify the lifting of the order of default issued by this court do not convince this court at all.
WHEREFORE, the motion to set aside order of default by the defendant through her new counsel is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
On the same day, the RTC resolved the complaint filed by respondent, seeking the cancellation of OCT No. P-8992. It then issued an Order 27 as follows:
There is no doubt that with the sixty-five (65) years of open, public, uninterrupted and continuous possession of the land subject matter of this case by Demetrio Victa and his heirs has ripened into their absolute ownership of the same by operation of law.
"The one who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right." — Delfin vs. Billones, vs [sic] 485 SCRA 308
Plaintiffs correctly brought this matter to court when their possession was threatened by defendant's introducing a road towards their property.
As for the defendant, the evidence as established proves that she holds an empty and spurious title over the property. Defendant's unusual behavior support this fact. She never set foot on the property she supposedly owns. She never paid its realty taxes even until this case was filed by the plaintiffs and she did not mind the fact that the property she owns was already declared for taxation purposes in the name of another person (Demetrio Victa) when she caused it to be declared in her name. This, despite the fact that her title over the property had been issued as early as March 7, 1979 and she is a resident of Mercedes, Camarines Norte and has two (2) other properties in the barangay where the subject lot is located. aDSIHc
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Original Certificate of Title No. P-8992 issued in the name of Agapita V. Pajarillo as null and void and without any value or effect whatsoever.
[Respondent is] directed to pursue the necessary steps prescribed by law to complete their title over the property.
SO ORDERED. 28
Petitioners filed their appeal on July 13, 2010, which was denied in the CA Decision 29 dated October 1, 2013, thus:
While the Summons, based on the Sheriff's Return, had been irregularly served, jurisdiction over the person of the appellant was duly acquired by the RTC because she voluntarily appeared therein, thus: (1) after Summons was received by the Office of the Municipal Mayor, Pepito Pajarillo-Lo, son of the [Petitioner], Atty. Yanto, widely known in the community as the lawyer of [petitioner]'s family, entered a formal appearance as counsel for [petitioner] and filed Motions for time within which to file [petitioner's] Answer; (2) in his Comment and Opposition to the Motion, [Respondent] averred, and [petitioner] has not denied, that when summons was sent and delivered to [petitioner's] residence address, instructions were made to have the summons delivered to the Office of Mayor Pepito Lo, son of appellant, where, thereafter, Atty. Yanto entered his formal appearance; and (3) also in his Comment, [Respondent] stated that after [petitioner] was declared in default, and during the ex-parte hearing of the case, [petitioner], accompanied by Atty. Yanto, were inside the court premises, witnessed the proceedings, had ex-parte conversations with the witnesses presented by the appellee, and informed of the settings of the case, Court personnel affirmed the veracity of Respondent's statement.
xxx xxx xxx
The declaration of default was proper.
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In the case at bar, [petitioner] moved for the lifting of the default order after [respondent] had presented his evidence but before judgment, arguing that she learned of the case because she did not receive the summons. However, the records reveal that she did not specify when she first learned of the case, nor did she provide the RTC with her proper address, thereby lending credence to [respondent's] assertion, and the RTC's finding, that [petitioner] was at the significant times in the case, properly served with summons and notices through her address at "c/o the Mayor of Mercedes, Camarines Norte."
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED. The two Orders dated May 28, 2009, issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, Daet, Camarines Norte, in Civil Case No. 7502 for Annulment and/or Cancellation of OCT No. P-8992 are AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant Agapita Pajarillo. 30
Aggrieved, petitioners resorted to this Court via the present petition. 31 Thereafter, on January 13, 2015, petitioners filed a Supplement to the petition 32 raising the argument that respondent was not the real party in interest in the action for cancellation of a certificate of title. The Supplement to the Petition also asserted that respondent lacked legal personality to sue, claiming that there is no showing in the complaint that the intestate estate of Demetrio Victa underwent probate proceedings, nor that Moises Valero Victa was appointed administrator of the estate of Demetrio Victa. 33 ETHIDa
Upon order of the Court, the counsel for respondent filed his Comment/Opposition to the Petition for Review on Certiorari on July 15, 2015, asserting that there was voluntary appearance by the Agapita and the decision of the RTC was based on the merits and on the basis of the evidence presented before the commissioner. 34
Petitioners filed their Reply on August 18, 2017 35 stating that, contrary to the claim of respondent, the case was decided on mere technicality without affording them the right to present countervailing evidences and confront the witnesses of respondent. It reiterates that Agapita's presence in the hearings will not cure the defect which attended the declaration of default, and even assuming Atty. Yanto was authorized to represent Agapita, the latter should not be bound by the gross negligent act of her lawyer. 36
We consolidate the slew of issues involved in this case into the following:
1. Whether the Respondent was the proper party to bring an action to cancel a free patent and certificate of title in accordance therewith; and
2. Whether or not the declaration of default upon Agapita was proper.
We grant the petition.
Respondent was the proper
In the Supplement to the Petition, 37 petitioners invoked jurisprudence 38 in arguing that respondent was not the proper party to bring an action for the cancellation of certificates of titles obtained by free patent, thus:
[I]n Lucas v. Durian (102 Phil. 1157, September 23, 1957), the Court affirmed the dismissal of a Complaint filed by a party who alleged that the patent was obtained by fraudulent means and, consequently, prayed for the annulment of said patent and the cancellation of a certificate of title. The Court declared that the proper party to bring the action was the government to which the property would revert. Likewise affirming the dismissal of a Complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the Court in Nebrada v. Heirs of Alivio noted that the plaintiff, being a mere homestead applicant was not the real party in interest to institute an action for reconveyance. 39
Generally, the Director of Lands — or its successor, the Land Management Bureau under the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (LMB-DENR) — is the proper party to bring an action to cancel a patent and the certificate of title issued in accordance therewith. 40 This authority is grounded on Commonwealth Act No. 141, Section 3 which states that the "Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce shall be the executive officer charged with carrying out the provisions of the act through the Director of Lands, who shall remain under his immediate control." Under Section 4 of the same law, the Director of Lands shall have direct executive control of the survey, classification, lease, sale or any other form of concession or disposition and management of lands of the public domain.
In his complaint, respondent impleaded the DENR and made a prayer that the title over Lot 807, Pls-677-D be ordered issued in the name of the heirs of the late Demetrio Victa, represented by respondent, based on filed and pending Free Patent Application No. 45673. 41 The complaint also included, as an attachment, the copy of the said Application, which is intact with the Office of the Bureau of Lands, Daet, Camarines Norte. 42
The complaint's allegations, however, did not end there. Respondent also attached documents to corroborate their claim of a "long time lawful public, adverse, continued possession, ownership and occupancy." 43 Also attached were (1) a Free Patent Application over the same Lot 807, Pls 677-D, (2) a Notice of Collection of Tax Obligations in favor of Demetrio Victa, (3) a Tax Declaration in favor of Demetrio Victa, (4) a Certification from the Barangay Captain stating that the lot was surveyed by Engr. Arnold A. Naranjo (Engr. Naranjo), (5) a Certified Copy of the plan by Engr. Naranjo certifying that the subject parcel of land was within the alienable and disposable land declared under the name of Demetrio Victa, (6) a Certification by then Barangay Captain Elpidio L. Estuita (Brgy. Capt. Estuita) that he worked together with the children of the late Demetrio Victa during the copra harvest season by turno-turno arrangement in making copra in the hacienda, (7) a Certificate to File Action by Barangay Captain Felix Abanto (Brgy. Capt. Abanto), (8) letters dated February 27, 2004 addressed to the Municipal Assessor of Mercedes, Camarines Norte and the Provincial Assessor entitled, "Urgent Opposition for Further Negotiation of Lot 807, PLS-677-D, with an area of 47,307 square meters" and (9) a letter dated November 9, 2004 addressed to Brgy. Capt. Abanto entitled, "Urgent Notice and Request for Mediation/Confrontation and Dialogue of the Parcel of land, Lot No. 807, PLS-677-D." 44 cSEDTC
Indeed, a cursory reading of their position may lead to an initial impression that such action was merely intended towards cancelling the grant of free patent for the questionable manner it was obtained. An examination of the allegations in the Complaint, however, reveals that Respondent did not only question petitioners' certificate of title issued in accordance with the grant of a free patent, but that he also claimed ownership over the subject property, in behalf of the estate of the late Demetrio Victa.
The Court, in providing guidelines on the proper parties to file an action for the cancellation of a free patent, differentiated an ordinary civil action for declaration of nullity of free patents from an action for reversion. In the case of Heirs of Kionisala v. Heirs of Dacut, it was held:
An ordinary civil action for declaration of nullity of free patents and certificates of title is not the same as an action for reversion. The difference between them lies in the allegations as to the character of ownership of the realty whose title is sought to be nullified. In an action for reversion, the pertinent allegations in the complaint would admit State ownership of the disputed land. Hence in Gabila v. Barriga where the plaintiff in his complaint admits that he has no right to demand the cancellation or amendment of the defendant's title because even if the title were cancelled or amended the ownership of the land embraced therein or of the portion affected by the amendment would revert to the public domain, we ruled that the action was for reversion and that the only person or entity entitled to relief would be the Director of Lands.
On the other hand, a cause of action for declaration of nullity of free patent and certificate of title would require allegations of the plaintiff's ownership of the contested lot prior to the issuance of such free patent and certificate of title as well as the defendant's fraud or mistake; as the case may be, in successfully obtaining these documents of title over the parcel of land claimed by plaintiff. In such a case, the nullity arises strictly not from the fraud or deceit but from the fact that the land is beyond the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands to bestow and whatever patent or certificate of title obtained therefor is consequently void ab initio. The real party in interest is not the State but the plaintiff who alleges a pre-existing right of ownership over the parcel of land in question even before the grant of title to the defendant. In Heirs of Marciano Nagano v. Court of Appeals we ruled —
x x x from the allegations in the complaint x x x private respondents claim ownership of the 2,250-square meter portion for having possessed it in the concept of an owner, openly, peacefully, publicly, continuously and adversely since 1920. This claim is an assertion that the lot is private land x x x Consequently, merely on the basis of the allegations in the complaint, the lot in question is apparently beyond the jurisdiction of the Director of the Bureau of Lands and could not be the subject of a Free Patent. 45
In this case, not only did respondent alleged a pending free patent application, but also their open, continuous, exclusive possession in concept of owner since 1950. Respondent effectively asserted that the lot is private, and not public land that is under the jurisdiction of the Director of Lands or its successor LMB-DENR. On the basis of the allegations of the complaint, respondent was the proper party to institute the action with the RTC.
Nevertheless, despite the respondent being the proper party to file a complaint on the basis of assertions of ownership over the subject property, such proceeding should have observed the time-honored principles of due process in resolving his claim.
The service of summons was
Although what the respondent filed in the RTC was simply titled "Complaint" the record reveals that it was an action seeking to cancel OCT No. P-8992, on the ground that it was issued as fraudulent, irregular and void ab initio. 46 In the same breath, it also prayed that the title over the subject property be issued in the name of the heirs of the late Demetrio Victa, represented by Moises V. Victa. 47
Considering that this action affects title to real property, it is an action in rem48 which does not necessitate jurisdiction over the person of Agapita Pajarillo. As explained by the Court:
In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided that the latter has jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of law; or (b) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made effective. 49
Based on the above, jurisdiction over the res was established in this case. Nevertheless, jurisprudence has enunciated that in actions in rem, summons must also be served upon the defendant in order to satisfy the requirements of due process. 50
The Rules of Civil Procedure dictate the rules for service of summons to the defendant:
Section 6. Service in person in defendant. — Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by handling a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.
Section 7. Substituted service. — If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office in the regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
In this case, the Sheriff's Return 51 upon his service of summons stated thus:
SHERIFF'S RETURN
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This is to certify further than on August 1, 2005, the undersigned personally served the summons and a copy of the complaint to defendant Agapita Pajarillo (thru a certain Melchor Ibasco) at the Office of the Municipal Mayor of Mercedes, Camarines Norte, as evidenced by his signature and date of receipt appearing on the original thereof.
Daet, Camarines Norte, August 5, 2005.
It is undisputed that summons was neither served nor tendered to the Agapita in accordance with Section 6 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The requirements of Section 7 were also not met as the Sheriff admitted to serving the summons to the Office of the Municipal Mayor of Mercedes, Camarines Norte, which was neither her residence nor office in the regular place of business.
The RTC's discussion in considering this as sufficient service of summons employed a relaxed application of the Rules of Civil Procedure, stating thus:
This fact has always been admitted by defendant-appellant and thus, became a primary consideration of plaintiff-appellee in stating in his complaint that the former can be served with summons at the Local Government Unit of Mercedes, Camarines Norte through the Office of the Municipal Mayor. Clear from the hereinafter provided documents is the fact that defendant-appellant has been customarily notified through the Office of the Mayor of Mercedes, Camarines Norte and such notices were received on her behalf by the employees thereat. 52
It likewise ventured into speculation in saying that "it is hard to believe that Melchor Ibasco, being a mere employee of the Municipality of Mercedes, Camarines Norte would refer the case to Atty. Archimedes Yanto unilaterally and on his own accord, being aware that what he received was a summons in a case already filed in court." 53 The Court cannot affirm presumptive statements like this. acEHCD
The CA, on the other hand, categorically stated that the service of summons was defective and proceeded to discuss that the appearance of Atty. Yanto is construed as voluntary appearance as a means to acquire jurisdiction over the person of Agapita:
While the Summons, based on the Sheriff's Return, had been irregularly served, jurisdiction over the person of the appellant was duly acquired by the RTC because she voluntarily appeared therein, thus: (1) after Summons was received by the Office of the Municipal Mayor, Pepito Pajarillo-Lo, son of the [Petitioner], Atty. Yanto, widely known in the community as the lawyer of [petitioner]'s family, entered a formal appearance as counsel for [petitioner] and filed Motions for time within which to file [petitioner's] Answer; (2) in his Comment and Opposition to the Motion; [Respondent] averred, and [petitioner] has not denied, that when summons was sent and delivered to [petitioner's] residence address, instructions were made to have the summons delivered to the office of Mayor Pepito Lo, son of appellant, where, thereafter, Atty. Yanto entered his formal appearance; and (3) also in his Comment, [Respondent] stated that after [petitioner] was declared in default, and during the ex-parte hearing of the case, [petitioner], accompanied by Atty. Yanto, were inside the court premises, witnessed the proceedings, had ex-parte conversations with the witnesses presented by the appellee, and informed of the settings of the case, Court personnel affirmed the veracity of Respondent's statement. 54
An analysis of the grounds relied upon by the CA shows that it also relied on community customs, more than the guidelines in the Rules of Civil Procedure, thus:
It is interesting to note at the outset that in her brief, defendant-appellant attempted to claim ignorance on the processes and proceedings of the Honorable Court for allegedly being abroad at the time when the summons was served to Melchor Ibasco yet presented no evidence at all substantiating such averment. In contrast, her feigned ignorance was very well disproved by the entry of appearance of Atty. Archimedes O. Yanto who is a known a [sic] legal counsel of appellant's family and that of the Local Government of Mercedes where appellant's son was then and at this time, the incumbent Mayor. EcTCAD
This fact has always been admitted by defendant-appellant and thus, became a primary consideration of plaintiff-appellee in stating in his complaint that the former and be served with summons at the Local Government Unit of Mercedes, Camarines Norte through the Office of the Municipal Mayor. Clear from the hereinafter provided documents is the fact that defendant-appellant has been customarily notified through the Office of the Mayor of Mercedes, Camarines Norte and such notices were received on her behalf by the employees thereat.
These justifications are deviations from Section 20, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which provides that the defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The Court clarifies in jurisprudence that any form of appearance in court by the defendant, his authorized agent or attorney, is equivalent to service except where such appearance is precisely to object to the jurisdiction of the court over his person. 55
In this case, it is the contention of the petitioners that Atty. Yanto appeared and filed a Motion for Extension without her authority or even knowledge. The petition avers:
Atty. Archimedes O. Yanto, who was them among the lawyers of Mayor Pepito P. Lo (son of the defendant) without the knowledge and consent of the defendant Agapita Pajarillo who did not even know about the case, entered his appearance as counsel for the [petitioner] and moved for extension of time to file Answer. But until the extended time has expired, Atty. Yanto was not able to contact the defendant, thereby resulting in his failure also to file the required pleading, particularly the answer to the complaint. 56
Nevertheless, in holding that the RTC acquired jurisdiction over Agapita's through voluntary appearance, the CA relied on Atty. Yanto's acts of accompanying her inside the court premises, witnessing the proceedings, having ex-parte conversations with the witnesses presented by the appellee and being informed of the proceedings.
These statements, however, do not state with particularity what dates these appearances in court took place. While the respondent take this to mean that they were present together at the inception of the ex-parte hearing, the Court finds no corroborating facts to support this. The RTC, in an equally speculative manner, justified the Agapita's voluntary appearance through counsel in its finding that "[i]t is also hard to believe that defendant did not authorize Atty. Yanto to appear in this case as no lawyer in his right senses, especially with the reputation and caliber of Atty. Yanto, would formally appear in a case where his services were not engaged by the party concerned." 57
A finding of voluntary appearance through an agent of naturally necessitates the precondition that such appearance was authorized.
The Court has held that the legality of the representation of an unauthorized counsel may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. 58 In this case, although Agapita only formally registered her objections to Atty. Yanto's appearances on July 9, 2008, after the ex parte hearings had taken place, this should not bar her from raising the same. This is especially true considering the factual circumstances she raised in the Motion to Set Aside the Order of Default, such as her non-residence in Mercedes, Daet, Camarines Sur at the time the proceedings were taking place. Elementary fairness dictates that parties unaware of the unauthorized representation should not be held in estoppel just because they did not question on the spot the authority of the counsel. 59 HSAcaE
The rule on appearances of a lawyer is that "[u]ntil the contrary is clearly shown," an attorney is presumed to be acting under authority of the litigant whom he purports to represent. 60 In this case, the contrary has been sufficiently shown as Atty. Yanto was unable to show any proof of authority to represent Agapita before the RTC. Thus, the CA's findings must be reversed.
As a result of the RTC's act of allowing the service of summons to the Office of the Mayor and the appearance of counsel without proof of authority by Agapita, she was summarily declared in default and a judgment was rendered against her. This deprived her of her day in court to present the meritorious defense she attested to in her Affidavit of Merits 61 and eventually led to the deprivation of her title over the subject property without due process of law.
It is well-entrenched in jurisprudence that the policy of the law is to have every litigant's case tried on the merits as much as possible. 62 The Court further states:
Hence, judgments by default are frowned upon. A case is best decided when all contending parties are able to ventilate their respective claims, present their arguments and adduce evidence in support thereof. The parties are thus given the chance to be heard fully and the demands of due process are subserved. Moreover, it is only amidst such an atmosphere that accurate factual findings and correct legal conclusions can be reached by the courts. 63
With regard to the questioned Order declaring defendant in default, the rule laid out in Amil v. Court of Appeals64 is that trial courts should be liberal in setting aside orders of default and granting motions for new trial if the defendant appears to have a meritorious defense. Without resolving this controversy on the merits, we note the testimony of Forester Ramos during the proceedings, stating that the Free Patent Application of Agapita Pajarillo followed the correct procedure. 65 Parties must be given every opportunity to present their side. The issuance of orders of default should be the exception than the rule, to be allowed only in clear cases of obstinate refusal by the defendant to comply with the orders of the trial court. 66
The Court cannot turn a blind eye to the issue of due process in this case from the RTC's relaxation of the rules for the service of summons and voluntary appearance, and more so in the lack of subsequent notices to the party declared in default as required by Section 3 (a), Rule 9 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. 67 Technical rules serve a purpose. They are not made to discourage litigants from pursuing their case nor are they fabricated out of thin air. Every section in the Rules of Court and every issuance of this Court with respect to procedural rules are promulgated with the objective of a more efficient judicial system. 68 As the court discussed in the case of Santos v. Court of Appeals:
Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities that may be ignored at will to suit the convenience of a party. Adjective law is important in insuring the effective enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly and speedy administration of justice. These rules are not intended to hamper litigants or complicate litigation hut, indeed, to provide for a system under which suitors may be heard in the correct form and manner and at the prescribed time in a peaceful confrontation before a judge whose authority they acknowledge. The other alternative is the settlement of their conflict through the barrel of a gun. 69
Thus, to deny petitioners the opportunity to respond to the complaint for nullity of title will be to refuse them due process before they are deprived of their property. As this Court is duty-bound to protect and enforce constitutional rights, this we cannot allow. 70
Furthermore, the record reveals that petitioners filed a Motion to Set Aside the Order of Default and Annul Proceedings on July 7, 2008, yet this was not acted on by the RTC until it resolved the case on its merits on May 11, 2009. Anent this issue, the CA stated:
The fact that the Motion and the decision were issued on the same date, does not ipso facto mean that the procedure adopted by the RTC was defective. The case had been ripe for decision even prior to the filing of the Motion; and absent any specific circumstance to show, except for the date thereof, that the Orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion, we cannot presume or attribute grave abuse of discretion . . . Good faith, rather than bad faith, is presumed. 71 HESIcT
While We agree that the action taken by the RTC does not necessarily imply grave abuse of discretion, due process and fairness should have guided it to resolve the Motion to Set Aside Order of Default and Annul Proceedings 72 and the accompanying Affidavit of Merits 73 first before resolving the issue on the merits. This would have been especially prudent in this case as the eventual resolution of the motion was prejudicial to the rights of the movant.
The Court has, in analogous cases, found compelling justification to warrant the annulment of the judgment which declared a litigant in default and prevented them from participating in the proceedings. As discussed in the Yu v. Yu:
Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional cases as where there is no available or other adequate remedy. Section 2, Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that judgments may be annulled only on grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process. The objective of the remedy of annulment of judgment or final order is to undo or set aside the judgment or final order, and thereby grant to the petitioner an opportunity to prosecute his cause or to ventilate his defense.
xxx xxx xxx
Indeed, due process requires that those with interest to the thing in litigation be notified and given an opportunity to defend those interests.37 When defendants are deprived of such opportunity to duly participate in, and even he informed of, the proceedings, due to a deceitful scheme employed by the prevailing litigant, as in this case, there exists a violation of their due process rights. Any judgment issued in violation thereof necessarily suffers a fatal infirmity for courts, as guardians of constitutional rights cannot be expected to deny persons their due process rights while at the same time be considered as acting within their jurisdiction. 74
Thus, in order to afford petitioners of their day in court, and to afford the parties ample opportunity to thresh out their respective claims and defenses, the remand of the case to the RTC is proper. All other issues raised, such as Moises Valero Victa's appointment as the administrator of the estate, may be threshed out in these proceedings.
This Court, therefore, deems as proper the annulment of the RTC's two (2) Orders both dated May 11, 2009. The RTC Daet, Camarines Norte, is mandated to issue summons anew to petitioners at their current address.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 1, 2013 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 93405 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the assailed Orders both dated May 11, 2009 of Branch 39, Regional Trial Court of Daet, Camarines Norte as well as all issuances rendered pursuant thereto, are declared NULL and VOID.
The case is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 39 of Daet, Camarines Norte for further proceedings. The presiding judge of the said court is mandated to issue anew the required summons to petitioners and proceed with the trial of the case with dispatch. caITAC
SO ORDERED." Lopez, M, J., on official leave.
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Victoria Isabel A. Paredes, with Associate Justices Japar B. Dimaampao and Elihu A. Ybañez, concurring. Rollo, pp. 53-69.
2. Penned by Judge Winston S. Racoma. Id. at 129-130; 132-140-A.
3. Rollo, pp. 78-86.
4. Id. at 79.
5. Id. at 93.
6. Id. at 79.
7. Id. at 79-80.
8. Id. at 83.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 80.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 84.
15. Id. at 113.
16. Id. at 55.
17. Id. at 115-116.
18. Id. at 120.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 122-125.
21. Id. at 123.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 58.
26. Id. at 129-130.
27. Id. at 132-140-A.
28. Id. at 140-140-A.
29. Id. at 53-69.
30. Id. at 60-69.
31. Id. at 15-47.
32. Id. at 177-179.
33. Id. at 184.
34. Id. at 197-200.
35. Id. at 214-222.
36. Id. at 217.
37. Id. at 177-179.
38. Sps. Tankiko v. Cesar, 362 Phil. 184 (1999).
39. Id. at 194-195.
40. Director of Lands v. Gonzales, et al., 205 Phil. 312, 316 (1983).
41. Rollo, p. 80.
42. Id. at 81.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 81-82.
45. 428 Phil. 249, 260-261 (2002). Emphasis in the original.
46. Rollo, p. 84.
47. Id.
48. Rules of Court, Rule 4, Section 1.
49. Alba v. Court of Appeals, 503 Phil. 451, 459 (2005).
50. Gomez v. Court of Appeals, 469 Phil. 38, 49 (2004).
51. Rollo, p. 113.
52. Id. at 164.
53. Id. at 130.
54. Id. at 60-61.
55. Ramos v. CA, 336 Phil. 33 (1997).
56. Rollo, p. 21.
57. Id. at 130.
58. Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 336 Phil. 33, 45 (1997).
59. Id.
60. Azotes v. Blanco and Figura, 78 Phil. 739, 742 (1947).
61. Rollo, p. 127.
62. Titan Dragon Properties Corp. v. Veloso-Galenzoga, G.R. No. 246088 (2021).
63. Id.
64. 374 Phil. 659, 666 (1999).
65. Id. at 35-40.
66. Supra note 65.
67. Rule 9, Section 3 (a) Effect of order of default. — A party in default shall be entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings but not to take part in the trial.
68. Dr. Malixi, et al. v. Dr. Baltazar, 821 Phil. 423, 436 (2017).
69. 275 Phil. 894, 898 (1991).
70. See Borlongan v. Banco de Oro, 808 Phil. 505, 527 (2017).
71. Rollo, p. 63.
72. Id. at 122-126.
73. Id. at 127.
74. Yu v. Lim Yu, 787 Phil. 569, 578-585 (2016).