THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 195692. March 6, 2019.]
GLORIA PADILLO, petitioner,vs.CHRISTOPHER MAGNAYE AND JESUS FERNANDEZ, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedMarch 6, 2019, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 195692 (GLORIA PADILLO, petitioner v. CHRISTOPHER MAGNAYE AND JESUS FERNANDEZ, respondents). — This Court resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 assailing the September 17, 2010 Decision 2 and February 15, 2011 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 93569. It upheld the Regional Trial Court January 16, 2009 Decision 4 finding Gloria Padillo (Padillo) liable to Christopher Magnaye (Magnaye) and Jesus Fernandez (Fernandez) for damages.
On December 10, 2002, at around 5:30 p.m., Magnaye parked his car, a Nissan Exalta sedan with plate number WSW 297, in front of Auto Fix Shop at the shoulder of Ortigas Avenue Extension, Cainta, Rizal. He left the engine running as he ran to the shop to grab some documents from his father-in-law, Gaspar San Buenaventura (San Buenaventura). 5
A few minutes after entering the shop, Magnaye heard a loud crash. He later discovered that a Hino Bus, driven by Ramon Lojo, crashed into the rear portion of a passenger jeepney, driven by Guidofredo Solamillo, Jr., which had stopped behind Magnaye's car. Due to the impact, the jeepney rear-ended Magnaye's car, pushing it forward to hit a nearby electric post. San Buenaventura witnessed the entire collision since he had been standing outside the shop. 6
Magnaye filed a Complaint for Damages 7 against Gloria Padillo (Padillo), the owner of the Hino Bus, and Jesus Fernandez (Fernandez), the the jeepney owner. He sought the payment of actual damages, transportation expenses, moral damages, and attorney's fees. 8
In his Answer, 9 Fernandez contended that the proximate cause of the damages to Magnaye's car was the Hino Bus driver's negligence, since the impact of the collision propelled the jeepney forward, hitting Magnaye's car. Thus, he filed a counterclaim for moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. By way of cross-claim, he also alleged that Padillo should be made to pay P38,000.00 for the damages sustained by his jeepney, as well as moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. 10 aScITE
Meanwhile, Padillo, in her Answer, 11 asserted that she exercised diligence in selecting and supervising her employees. She added that the proximate cause of the incident was Magnaye's and Fernandez's negligence in failing to park their vehicles properly. Likewise, she sought a counterclaim for moral damages and attorney's fees. 12
During trial, Padillo presented evidence proving that she was not the owner of the Hino Bus, and thus, could not be held liable for the incident. 13
In its January 16, 2009 Decision, 14 the Regional Trial Court held Padillo liable to Magnaye and Fernandez for damages. It found that Padillo failed to exercise the diligence required in the selection and supervision of the driver of her Hino Bus. 15 It explained that while the registered owner of the Hino Bus was Ventures Tour & Transport Services, of which Padillo was only an incorporator, she did categorically admit in her Answer that she was the owner. 16
The dispositive portion of the Regional Trial Court Decision read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of Plaintiff Christopher R. Magnaye and Defendant Jesus Fernandez on his cross-claim, against Defendant Gloria Padillo for the latter to pay the following:
1. Actual damages in the amount of Php217,765.00 for auto repairs and Php20,000.00 for transportation expenses and attorney's fees in the amount of Php20,000.00, in favor of Plaintiff Christopher R. Magnaye;
2. Actual damages in the amount of Php35,000.00 and attorney's fees in the amount of Php20,000.00, in favor of Defendant Jesus Fernandez.
SO ORDERED. 17
Magnaye filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration while Padillo filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Both Motions were denied by the trial court in its April 20, 2009 Order. 18
Thus, Padillo appealed before the Court of Appeals. 19
In its September 17, 2010 Decision, 20 the Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the trial court. It considered the evidence presented by Padillo consisting of a Land Transportation Office Official Receipt, which showed that Ventures Tour & Transport Services was the registered owner of the Hino Bus. The Court of Appeals, however, found that the Official Receipt was dated October 30, 2003, about a year after the incident. Thus, the receipt failed to establish that Padillo did not own the bus at the time of the incident. The Court of Appeals also noted Padillo's admissions in her pleadings before the trial court that she owned the Hino Bus. 21
Further, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's finding that the proximate cause of the incident was the bus driver's negligence, since it was he who had the clear vantage point of the two (2) vehicles in front of him. It explained that Fernandez's jeepney had been in full stop and only hit Magnaye's car because the Hino Bus rear-ended it. 22 It further found that since Padillo failed to prove that she had exercised diligence in selecting and supervising the bus driver, she should be held liable for damages. 23
The Court of Appeals also found no error in the trial court's ruling that Magnaye was the real party-in-interest, despite his vehicle's Certificate of Registration and Official Receipt having been issued on December 13, 2002, or three (3) days after the incident. It held that the documents merely formalized Magnaye's ownership of the car since he already possessed it, and was driving it, at the time of the incident. The Court of Appeals, however, deleted the award of transportation expenses to Magnaye for lack of basis. 24
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision and Order of the RTC are hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION deleting the award of transportation expenses to plaintiff-appellee CHRISTOPHER MAGNAYE in the amount of P20,000.00. The rest of the Decision stands.
SO ORDERED. 25 HEITAD
Padillo filed a Partial Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied by the Court of Appeals in its February 15, 2011 Resolution. 26
On March 9, 2011, Padillo filed before this Court a Motion for Extension. 27 She requested for an extension of 30 days to file a petition for review on certiorari alleging that the service to the Court of Appeals had to be done by registered mail due to distance and lack of personnel.
In its April 4, 2011 Resolution, 28 this Court denied the Motion for Extension. It held that the reasons for service of the Motion to the Court of Appeals being done through registered mail were false, considering that the Motion was filed personally before this Court even before the reglementary period expired.
On June 7, 2011, Padillo filed a Motion for Reconsideration. 29 She prayed for this Court's "kind indulgence and understanding" 30 as she had "no intention of violating the Rules." 31 She also noted that all adverse parties had been served with copies of the Motion for Extension. Lastly, since her Petition for Review on Certiorari 32 was filed within the requested extension period, she prayed that it be admitted.
In its June 13, 2011 Resolution, 33 this Court granted the Motion for Reconsideration and allowed the filing of the Petition. Hence, the present Petition 34 was filed.
Petitioner submits that her admission in her Answer and at pre-trial that she was the owner of the Hino Bus was a "palpable mistake." 35 She argues that this should not be taken against her, as documentary evidence shows Ventures Tours & Transport Services as the actual registered owner. 36 She further contends that the proximate cause of the incident was respondent Magnaye's failure to properly park his car along Ortigas Avenue Extension and respondent Fernandez's negligence in unloading jeepney passengers on a no-loading area. She explains that the Hino Bus driver was forced to step on the brakes when respondent Fernandez's jeepney suddenly stopped in front of it to allow a passenger to alight. 37
Petitioner further argues that respondent Magnaye was not the real party-in-interest since the damaged Nissan Exalta sedan was only registered in his name on December 13, 2002, three (3) days after the incident. 38 She also contends that she should not be held liable for damages since respondents' Job Order Estimates and Charge Slips were insufficient to prove the amount of damages that should be awarded. 39
Respondent Magnaye, on the other hand, counters that petitioner's admissions in her Answer and in her pre-trial brief were binding on her. He argues that the Official Receipt petitioner presented, showing that she was not the registered owner of the Hino Bus, was inconclusive. As explained by the Court of Appeals, he pointed out that it was dated October 30, 2003, almost a year after the incident. 40
Respondent Magnaye also posits that the proximate cause of the incident was the negligence of the Hino Bus driver who had the clear vantage point of the vehicles in front of it. Moreover, he submits that he was able to substantiate his claim for actual damages by a preponderance of evidence. 41 The Court of Appeals, he avers, did not err in finding that he was the real party-in-interest since the registration receipt merely formalized his ownership of the vehicle, of which he already possessed. 42
Respondent Fernandez, for his part, asserts that the trial court and the Court of Appeals did not err in finding petitioner liable to respondents for the damage caused. 43
The sole issue before this Court is whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in finding petitioner Gloria Padillo liable for damages to respondents Christopher Magnaye and Jesus Fernandez.
The Petition is denied.
Petitioner's claim that she should not be held liable for damages, as she was not the registered owner of the Hino Bus, is a factual matter that cannot be entertained in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
There is a question of fact when there is doubt as to the veracity of the alleged facts. The determination of a question of fact requires a review of the records or an examination of the probative value of the evidence. 44
Here, petitioner denies her liability by alleging that she was not the owner of the Hino Bus that rear-ended respondent Fernandez's jeep and caused damage to respondent Magnaye's car. To resolve this issue, however, requires this Court to review the records and evidence she presented before the trial court. Thus, the Petition raises questions of fact.
It is settled that this Court is not a trier of facts. Rule 45 of the Rules of Court requires that a petition for review on certiorari must only raise questions of law. 45 As a general rule, factual findings of the lower courts will be affirmed if they are supported by substantial evidence. 46 ATICcS
There are, of course, exceptions to the general rule, as summarized in Medina v. Mayor Asistio, Jr.: 47
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures . . . ; (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible . . . ; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion . . . ; (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts . . . ; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting . . . ; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee . . . ; (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court . . . ; (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based . . . ; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents . . . ; and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record. . . . 48
The presence of these exceptions, however, will not automatically warrant this Court's review. Appeal is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion. 49 In Pascual v. Burgos, 50 this Court explained that a party "must demonstrate and prove" 51 that the case is among the exceptions, and that a review of the factual findings is necessary for the full determination of the issues of the case.
Petitioner has not alleged that her case falls under any of the exceptions to the review of factual findings. Thus, this Court is constrained to uphold the uniform findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that petitioner was the registered owner of the Hino Bus involved in the collision. According to the trial court:
[I]t would appear that the registered owner of the Hino bus with Plate No. NYG 800 was Ventures Tour & Transport Service per LTO O.R. No. 9187191-6 (Exh. "1" — Padillo) and not Defendant Gloria Padillo. However, Defendant Padillo explicitly and without qualification admitted in Paragraph 3 of her Answer that she is the owner of the Hino bus involved in the vehicular accident. Sec. 11, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court states: "Material averment in the complaint, other than those as to the amount of unliquidated damages, shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied." 52
Petitioner, however, argues that her admissions were "palpable mistakes" that should not be taken against her. This is in view of the Official Receipt showing that the registered owner of the Hino Bus was Ventures Tour & Transport Services. Rule 129, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 4. Judicial admissions. — An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
The Official Receipt would have been sufficient to contradict her prior admissions had it been dated on or around the time of the incident. Yet, as the Court of Appeals found:
Adopting a different tack, GLORIA PADILLO, during trial, claimed that the subject bus was registered in the name of VENTURES TOUR & TRANSPORT SERVICES, INC., of which she is a mere incorporator, and that consequently, she should not be held personally liable in the instant case. On the witness stand, she presented the Land Transportation Office (LTO) official receipt pertaining to the aforesaid vehicle, which reflects the name of the said company as owner of the bus. However, a cursory examination of the LTO official receipt will show that the same was dated October 30, 2003, or almost a year after the vehicular incident transpired on December 10, 2002. Thus, it failed to establish that the ownership of the bus did not pertain to GLORIA as of the date of the incident. 53 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
Likewise, petitioner alleges that she should not be held liable since the collision was not caused by the negligence of the Hino Bus driver, but rather, by respondent Magnaye who failed to properly park his car and respondent Fernandez who negligently made an abrupt stop to let a passenger alight.
"Negligence, that is, a failure to comply with some duty of care owed by one to another, is a mixed question of law and fact[.]" 54 The duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff is a question of law. Whether there was negligence, however, requires an examination of the facts and evidence, and thus, is a question of fact. 55 TIADCc
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the Hino Bus was the proximate cause of the damages sustained by respondent's vehicles. Vda. de Bataclan v. Medina56 defines proximate cause as:
'[T]hat cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.' And more comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. 57
Respondent Fernandez's jeepney was in full stop behind respondent Magnaye's Nissan Exalta sedan. 58 Respondent Magnaye's car only sustained damage because respondent Fernandez's jeepney was propelled forward by petitioner's Hino Bus. Had the Hino Bus not rear-ended respondent Fernandez's jeepney, there would have been no damage caused to respondent Magnaye's car. In Raynera v. Hiceta: 59
It has been said that drivers of vehicles "who bump the rear of another vehicle" are presumed to be "the cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other evidence[."] The rationale behind the presumption is that the driver of the rear vehicle has full control of the situation as he is in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him. 60
When a driver causes damage to another through negligence in the performance of duties, there arises a rebuttable presumption that the driver's employer has been negligent. To overcome this presumption, the employer must prove that he or she exercised the diligence of a bonus pater familias 61 in the selection and supervision of the driver. Absent this, the presumption of negligence becomes conclusive. 62
Here, petitioner failed to present any evidence that she exercised the required degree of diligence. Thus, she is conclusively presumed to be negligent, and is liable under Article 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code, which provide:
ARTICLE 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
xxx xxx xxx
ARTICLE 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
Petitioner, however, posits that respondent Magnaye was not the real party-in-interest 63 here since he only became the registered owner of the Nissan Exalta sedan three (3) days after the incident, or on December 13, 2002. This is an argument that is too shallow to even consider. When respondent Magnaye filed his Complaint dated September 5, 2003, 64 he was the registered owner of the vehicle. He was, thus, the party that stood to be injured or benefited from the judgment in the suit.
Lastly, petitioner assails the award of actual damages to respondents, arguing that their claim lacked sufficient evidence.
Actual damages are awarded as compensation for pecuniary loss that has been duly proven. 65 They are not presumed, and must be proven "with a reasonable degree of certainty premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable." 66 SDAaTC
According to the Court of Appeals, respondents' entitlement to actual damages had been "duly established by competent proof[,]" 67 citing the Folder of Exhibits in the records of the trial court. Petitioner alleges that these pieces of evidence were insufficient, yet she failed to attach copies of these documents. Thus, her allegation on the insufficiency of the evidence is unsubstantiated and cannot be entertained. The award of actual damages stands.
However, the award of attorney's fees to respondents must be deleted. Upon a perusal of the assailed judgments, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals failed to specify which instance in Article 2208 68 of the Civil Code would justify the award. Thus, the award of damages must be modified accordingly.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals September 17, 2010 Decision and February 15, 2011 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 93569 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Gloria Padillo is ordered to pay respondent Christopher Magnaye actual damages in the amount of Two Hundred Seventeen Thousand Seven Hundred Sixty-Five Pesos (P217,765.00), and respondent Jesus Fernandez actual damages in the amount of Thirty-Five Thousand Pesos (P35,000.00). The award of attorney's fees is DELETED for lack of basis.
All damages awarded shall be subject to interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this Resolution until its full satisfaction. 69
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of CourtBy:(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 8-22.
2.Id. at 23-31. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe (now a member of this Court), and concurred in by Associate Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes (now a retired member of this Court) and Elihu A. Ybañez of the Third Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
3.Id. at 32. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe (now a member of this Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes (now a retired member of this Court) and Elihu A. Ybañez of the Third Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
4.Id. at 47-50. The Decision, in Civil Case No. 03-6956, was penned by Presiding Judge Ronaldo B. Martin of Branch 73, Regional Trial Court, Antipolo City.
5.Id. at 24.
6.Id.
7.Id. at 33-36.
8.Id. at 24.
9.Id. at 39-41.
10.Id. at 40-41.
11.Id. at 37-38.
12.Id.
13.Id.
14.Id. at 47-50.
15.Id. at 49-50.
16.Id. at 48.
17. Id. at 50.
18. Id. at 26.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 23-31.
21. Id. at 27.
22. Id. at 28-29.
23. Id. at 29.
24. Id. at 30.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 32.
27. Id. at 3-6.
28. Id. at 6-A.
29. Id. at 52-54.
30. Id. at 52.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 8-22.
33. Id. at 55-56.
34. Id. at 8-22. Comment of respondent Magnaye (rollo, pp. 58-64) was filed on August 11, 2011, while Comment of respondent Fernandez was filed on June 26, 2012 (rollo, pp. 70-72). Petitioner's Consolidated Reply (rollo, pp. 83-88) was filed on November 16, 2012. Parties were ordered to submit their respective Memoranda (rollo, pp. 107-113, 127-137, and 151-159) on March 6, 2013 (rollo, pp. 101-102).
35. Id. at 153.
36. Id. at 152-154.
37. Id. at 154.
38. Id. at 155.
39. Id. at 156-157.
40. Id. at 109-110.
41. Id. at 111.
42. Id. at 112.
43. Id. at 131.
44. See Century Iron Works v. Bañas, 711 Phil. 576 (2013) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
45. See RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, Sec. 1 provides:
SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. — A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.
46. See Pascual v. Burgos, 776 Phil. 167, 182 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division] citingCommissioner of Internal Revenue v. Embroidery and Garments Industries (Phil.), Inc., 364 Phil. 541, 546 (1999) [Per J. Pardo, First Division]; Siasat v. Court of Appeals, 425 Phil. 139, 145 (2002) [Per J. Pardo, First Division]; Tabaco v. Court of Appeals, 309 Phil. 442, 447 (1994) [Per J. Bellosillo, First Division]; Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 241 Phil. 776, 781 (1988) [Per J. Paras, Second Division]; and Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Leobrera, 461 Phil. 461, 469 (2003) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, Special First Division].
47. 269 Phil. 225 (1990) [Per J. Bidin, Third Division].
48. Id. at 232 citing Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 (1953) [Per J. Tuason, En Banc]; De Luna v. Linatoc, 74 Phil. 15 (1942) [Per J. Bocobo, En Banc]; Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 453 (1955) [Per J. Concepcion, En Banc]; Dela Cruz v. Sosing and Court of Appeals, 94 Phil. 26 (1953) [Per J. Bautista Angelo, En Banc]; Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.; Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance Company, Inc., 103 Phil. 401 (1958) [Per J. Concepcion, En Banc]; Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 146 Phil. 1065 (1970) [Per J. Zaldivar, En Banc]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 226 Phil. 496 (1986) [Per J. Feria, En Banc]; and Salazar v. Gutierrez, 144 Phil. 233 (1970) [Per J. Makalintal, En Banc].
49. RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, Sec. 6.
50. 776 Phil. 167 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division]
51. Id. at 184.
52. Rollo, p. 48.
53. Id. at 28.
54. Santos v. Rustia, 90 Phil. 358, 362 (1951) [Per J. Feria, En Banc]. See Corpus Juris, vol. 45, Sec. 852.
55. Id.
56. G.R. No. L-10126, October 22, 1957 [Per J. Montemayor, En Banc].
57. Bataclan v. Medina, 102 Phil. 181, 186 (1957) [Per J. Montemayor, En Banc] citing AmJur, vol. 38, pp. 695-696.
58. Rollo, p. 29.
59. 365 Phil. 546 (1999) [Per J. Pardo, First Division].
60. Id. at 554-555 citing Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 267 Phil. 188 (1990) [Per J. Medialdea, First Division].
61. The phrase translates to "good father of the family." The accurate, gender-neutral phrase would be "good head of the family."
62. See Viron Transportation Company, Inc. v. Delos Santos, 399 Phil. 243 (2000) [Per J. Gonzaga-Reyes, Third Division].
63. See RULES OF COURT, Rule 3, Sec. 2 provides:
SECTION 2. Parties in Interest. — A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.
64. Rollo, p. 36.
65. CIVIL CODE, Art. 2199 provides:
ARTICLE 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.
66. Marikina Auto Line Transport Corporation v. People, 520 Phil. 809, 825 (2006) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., First Division].
67. Rollo, p. 30.
68. CIVIL CODE, Art. 2208 provides:
ARTICLE 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:
(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;
(2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;
(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;
(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;
(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly valid, just and demandable claim;
(6) In actions for legal support;
(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers;
(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability laws;
(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;
(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;
(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.
In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.
69. Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 716 Phil. 267 (2013) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].