Olivarez Realty Development Corp. v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 216049. March 25, 2019.]

OLIVAREZ REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.LAGUNA WEST MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, INC., respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated March 25, 2019which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 216049 (OLIVAREZ REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. LAGUNA WEST MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, INC., Respondent.) — We DENY this petition seeking to annul the decision 1 and resolution 2 promulgated on August 27, 2014 and December 22, 2014 for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals (CA) committed reversible error in declaring the Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) between the petitioner and former Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) holders as invalid, thereby affirming the decision 3 dated June 13, 2013 rendered by the Office of the President in OP Case No. 08-J-397.

The CA held that the decision sought to be reviewed had already attained finality; that the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) has the jurisdiction to entertain and render judgment on the complaint; and that the DAR correctly invalidated the JVA between the petitioners and the former CLOA holders for having violated the provisions of Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1998.

The Court sees no reason to depart from the CA's conclusions.

The petitioner argued that the lower court erred in ruling that the DAR Secretary had jurisdiction to rule over the matter; that there was substantial compliance with R.A. No. 6657 considering that the questioned sale between the petitioner and the CLOA farmer-holders was just three (3) months short of the ten (10) year prohibition under the CARL; and that the appeal was timely made.

The Court disagrees.

Anent the issue of timeliness of the appeal, the CA had correctly affirmed the decision of the OP which dismissed the appeal for being filed out of time.

Administrative Order No. 18, series of 1987, issued by the Office of the President reads: CAIHTE

SECTION 1. Unless otherwise governed by special laws, an appeal to the Office of the President shall be taken within thirty (30) days from receipt by the aggrieved party of the decision/resolution/order complained of or appealed from. x x x

The time during which a motion for reconsideration has been pending with the Ministry/agency concerned shall be deducted from the period for appeal. But where such a motion for reconsideration has been filed during office hours of the last day of the period herein provided, the appeal must be made within the day following receipt of the denial of said motion by the appealing party.

The timeline below illustrates how the petitioner had lost the remedy of appeal, thus:

Date the Order of the DAR Secretary was issued	April 10, 2007
Date the Order was received by ORDC	April 18, 2007
Date ORDC filed its Partial Motion for Reconsideration	May 7, 2007
Days elapsed from receipt of Order to filing of Partial Motion for Reconsideration	Nineteen (19) days
Date of receipt of Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration	September 9, 2008
No. of days remaining from the thirty (30 days) period to file appeal	Eleven (11) days
Deadline to file the appeal with the Office of the President	September 20, 2008
Date appeal was filed	October 9, 2008

Evidently, the petitioner thought that it had thirty (30) days from receipt of the denial of their partial motion for reconsideration within which to file their appeal with the OP. The petitioner however failed to take into account that nineteen (19) days had already lapsed before they filed their motion for reconsideration and that only the time during which their motion was pending with the DAR Secretary would be deducted from the period for appeal.

In an attempt to have their appeal be given due course, the petitioner invoked the "fresh period" rule as enunciated in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, 4 arguing that the doctrinal rule equally applies to administrative bodies as well.

Such argument fails to persuade.

In Neypes, the Court ruled in this wise:

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.

Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution. 5

From the foregoing, the Court intended that the "fresh period rule" applies only to appeals filed before the regular and appellate judicial courts as correctly ruled upon by the CA.

At any rate, even if We apply the "fresh period rule" to the petitioner's appeal before the OP, they would only have fifteen (15) days from receipt of the denial of the motion for reconsideration on September 9, 2008 or until September 24, 2008 within which to file their appeal. Considering that the petitioner filed their appeal only on October 9, 2008, their appeal would still have been filed out of time.

We also reject the challenge posed by the petitioner against the jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary. DETACa

Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657 pertinently provides that the DAR is vested with "primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters" and "exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform" except those falling under the jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). 6 Hence, the DAR Secretary did not overstep his authority when he assumed jurisdiction over the matter and made a definitive ruling.

Finally, the petitioner posited that there was substantial compliance with the ten-year prohibition under the CARL considering that the sale just fell three (3) months short.

The argument fails to persuade.

The petitioner did not dispute that the sale occurred within the ten-year period. Since the subject parcels of agricultural land were awarded to the CLOA farmer-holder pursuant to the CARL, the provisions of the said law should apply in the disposition of agricultural lands.

Section 27 of the CARL provides:

Section 27. Transferability of Awarded Lands. — Lands acquired by beneficiaries under this Act may not be sold, transferred or conveyed except through hereditary succession, or to the government, or the LBP, or to other qualified beneficiaries for a period of ten (10) years: provided, however, that the children or the spouse of the transferor shall have a right to repurchase the land from the government or LBP within a period of two (2) years. Due notice of the availability of the land shall be given by the LBP to the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) of the barangay where the land is situated. The Provincial Agrarian Reform Coordinating Committee (PARCCOM) as herein provided, shall, in turn, be given due notice thereof by the BARC.

If the land has not yet been fully paid by the beneficiary, the rights to the land may be transferred or conveyed, with prior approval of the DAR, to any heir of the beneficiary or to any other beneficiary who, as a condition for such transfer or conveyance, shall cultivate the land himself. Failing compliance herewith, the land shall be transferred to the LBP which shall give due notice of the availability of the land in the manner specified in the immediately preceding paragraph.

In the event of such transfer to the LBP, the latter shall compensate the beneficiary in one lump sum for the amounts the latter has already paid, together with the value of improvements he has made on the land.

Section 27 of the CARL expressly prohibits the sale, transfer, or conveyance of the properties within ten years. Said prohibition is subject to four (4) exceptions which are wanting in the present case. In several cases, the Court has emphasized that any waiver and transfer of rights and interests within the 10-year prohibitory period under R.A. No. 6657 is void for violating the agrarian reform law as it defeats the main purpose of ensuring that the farmer-beneficiary shall continuously possess, cultivate, and enjoy the land he tills. 7

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition; AFFIRMS the August 27, 2014 decision and December 22, 2014 resolution promulgated by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 133174; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the cost of the suit. aDSIHc

SO ORDERED." Jardeleza, J., on official business.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 31-44; penned by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid (retired), with the concurrence of Associate Justice Romeo F. Barza (Now, Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals) and Associate Justice Ramon A. Cruz.

2.Id. at 46-48.

3.Id.

4. G.R. No. 141524, September 14, 2005, 469 SCRA 633.

5.Id. at 644-645.

6.Mateo v. Department of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 186339, February 15, 2017, 817 SCRA 421, 476.

7.Filinvest Land, Inc. v. Adia, G.R. No. 192629, November 25, 2015, 775 SCRA 494, 503.