THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 212784. September 7, 2020.]
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, petitioner,vs. VICTORIANO A. CALAYCAY, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedSeptember 7, 2020, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 212784 (OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, petitioner v. VICTORIANO A. CALAYCAY, respondent). — This Petition for review on certiorari1 filed by the petitioner Office of the President (OP) under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeks to annul and set aside the Amended Decision 2 dated January 27, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 106668 and its Resolution 3 dated May 27, 2014 denying the Motion for Reconsideration thereof.
The antecedent facts follow:
Jocelyn Enriquez (Enriquez) planned to set up a recruitment agency in the Philippines in order to bring nurses to work in Mississippi, USA. She sought assistance from a certain Ester Santiago, who intimated that her relative, Victoriano R. Calaycay (respondent), a National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Commissioner, could help her in processing the requirements with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). 4
Enriquez and her business partner, Danny Kaszovits initially met with respondent and Dennis Gabionza (Gabionza). In the subsequent meetings, they were joined by Zomer A. Ochavillo (Ochavillo) and Augustus A. Hidalgo (Hidalgo), lawyers of the POEA. The group asked from Enriquez payment of the amount of P400,000.00 in exchange for assistance with the processing of license to operate a recruitment agency, P200,000.00 of which would be given as downpayment and the remaining balance payable upon release of the license. 5
With the help of her cousin, Enriquez reported the incident to the POEA Administrator who then referred the same to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). On the basis of Enriquez' sworn statement, an entrapment operation was planned. 6
On December 1, 2007, at around 7:00 p.m., respondent, Ochavillo, Hidalgo, and Gabionza met Enriquez at the coffee shop of Century Park Hotel. There, Enriquez handed the P200,000.00 marked money to respondent who then handed the same to Gabionza. Enriquez then signaled the NBI that the transfer was complete. Respondent, Ochavillo, Hidalgo, and Gabionza were then arrested; and the marked money recovered. When tested for the presence of fluorescent powder specks in their hands, respondent, Gabionza, and Ochavillo tested positive, while Hidalgo yielded a negative test result. 7
On December 14, 2007, the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission administratively charged the respondent and his companions of the crimes of Direct Bribery, Corruption of Public Officials, and violations of Section 3 (a) and (c) of Republic Act No. 3019. Pending investigation, respondent was placed under preventive suspension. 8
On July 10, 2007, the petitioner rendered its Decision 9 ruling as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, and as recommended by PAGC, respondents Victoriano R. Calaycay, Augustus A. Hidalgo and Dennis T. Gabionza are hereby found GUILTY of conspiring with each other in violation of Section 3(c) of RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for asking P400,000.00 from Jocelyn Enriquez as consideration for the processing of a POEA license [sic] to operate a recruitment agency in the Philippines. Respondents Calaycay and Hidalgo are therefore DISMISSED from service, with the accessory penalties of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and the disqualification for reemployment in the government service for committing acts punishable under the Anti-Graft laws in accordance with Section 22, paragraph 1 (Grave Offenses) in relation to Section 9 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO 292. Respondent Zomer A. Ochavillo is found NOT GUILTY conspiracy [sic] due to insufficiency of evidence. No administrative sanction can be imposed on respondent Gabionza as he is a private individual.
SO ORDERED. 10
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration and an Urgent Omnibus Motion to Suspend Proceedings and/or Defer Resolution or in the Alternative Reopen Administrative Proceedings and Issue Summons to Private Complainant. 11
In the meantime, respondent filed an application for optional retirement, which was approved by NLRC Chairperson Gerardo C. Nograles in a letter 12 dated September 8, 2008. 13 Respondent then informed the OP of the approval and prayed that the same be considered in the resolution of his motions. 14
On October 27, 2008, the petitioner issued an Order 15 holding that in view of respondent's retirement, the ultimate penalty or dismissal in administrative cases has been rendered moot and academic, thus:
IN VIEW THEREOF, the records of the case are hereby referred to and transmitted to the Office of the Ombudsman for the determination of appropriate liability.
SO ORDERED. 16
However, subsequently or on December 2, 2008, the petitioner issued a Resolution, 17viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motions for Reconsideration of respondents Victoriano R. Calaycay, Augustus A. Hidalgo and Dennis T. Gabionza are hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED. 18
On the criminal aspect, the Sandiganbayan rendered its Decision 19 on February 6, 2012 dismissing the charge against the respondent and absolving him from liability. 20
Acting on the respondent's appeal of the petitioner's December 2, 2008 Resolution, the CA rendered its Decision on July 31, 2012, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant Petition for Review (with Extremely Urgent Application/Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction) is DISMISSED and the assailed Order dated December 2, 2008 rendered by the [petitioner] Office of the President is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 21
On September 10, 2012, the respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion for Reconsideration and/or Clarification 22 of the July 31, 2012 Decision of the CA.
On January 27, 2014, the CA rendered the herein assailed Amended Decision, granting the respondent's Motion and adjudging as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. The Order dated December 2, 2008 is declared NULL and VOID, the October 27, 2008 Order having attained finality on November 25, 2008.
SO ORDERED. 23
Petitioner sought reconsideration 24 of the CA's Amended Decision but the same was denied by the CA in its Resolution 25 dated May 27, 2014.
Thus, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, whereby the petitioner submits the following issues for the Court's consideration:
I
Whether the October 27, 2008 Order was a ruling on Calaycay's motion for reconsideration.
II
Whether the administrative case against Calaycay should be dismissed based on his acquittal in the Sandiganbayan. 26
Petitioner argues that the October 27, 2008 Order of the OP was not intended as a ruling on the respondent's motion for reconsideration and as such does completely dispose of the matter of his administrative liability. Rather, it is the December 2, 2008 Resolution which is controlling in view of its explicit denial of the respondent's motion for reconsideration in its dispositive portion. 27
Moreover, the petitioner avers that the respondent's acquittal before the Sandiganbayan does not render the case before the OP moot or warrant its dismissal, as administrative proceedings warrant a different and lower quantum of proof. 28
In response, the respondent claims that he is innocent of the charges against him. He claims that the Order dated October 27, 2008 of the OP should be controlling with respect to his administrative liability; and there being no action taken thereon, the same has attained finality on November 25, 2008. Consequently, the respondent posits that the December 9, 2008 Resolution of the OP is a patent nullity and cannot supersede or alter its October 27, 2008 Order. 29
Moreover, contrary to the petitioner's submission, the respondent states that a reading of the text of the issuance is necessary in order to determine the issue resolved therein. Herein, it is evident from the body of the Order dated October 27, 2008 that it resolved the respondent's Motion for Reconsideration. Simply, the OP had already resolved the administrative aspect of the case when it issued its Order dated October 27, 2008. Considering that such Order has already attained finality, the OP cannot, in a subsequent issuance, impose any penalty or sanction. 30
On October 19, 2016, thru a Notice of Death with Manifestation, 31 the Court was informed that the respondent had died on September 30, 2016. Subsequently, in compliance with the Court's order, the respondent's counsel filed a verified declaration 32 which the Court noted in its Resolution 33 dated July 12, 2017.
The petition is not meritorious.
Respondent was charged with a grave offense punishable by the extreme penalty of dismissal, which however has been rendered moot by the approval of the respondent's application for optional retirement and supervening death. Nonetheless, the issue of liability must still be settled in view of the accessory penalties that come with the finding of guilt for a grave offense, which includes, among others, the forfeiture of leave and retirement benefits; and as well to determine whether the respondent is entitled to payment of salaries withheld during the period of his preventive suspension. 34 Otherwise stated, the death of a respondent in an administrative case renders the case moot and academic as the penalties of dismissal and disqualification are personal. However, where the release of monetary benefits is dependent upon exoneration, the administrative case must proceed notwithstanding the respondent's death in order to clear the respondent's name and/or to entitle his or her legal heirs to receive what is due them under the law. 35
With this determination, the Court proceeds to resolve the effect of the respondent's acquittal in the criminal case proceeding from the same act that is the subject of the administrative charges against him. This issue is not novel. The Court has previously ruled that an administrative proceeding is independent from criminal cases even though they were based on the same facts or incidents. This is because the quantum of proof required in an administrative proceeding is substantial evidence which is lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt that is required in a criminal case. 36 Thus:
[a] finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding of liability in the administrative case. Conversely, respondent's acquittal does not necessarily exculpate him administratively. In the same vein, the trial court's finding of civil liability against the respondent will not inexorably lead to a similar finding in the administrative action before this Court. Neither will a favorable disposition in the civil action absolve the administrative liability x x x. The basic premise is that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first two will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa. 37 (Citation omitted)
Therefore, the respondent's acquittal by the Sandiganbayan has no effect on his administrative liability. Even an acquittal based on insufficiency of evidence, as in this case, would not preclude the administrative proceeding or result in relief from administrative liability. 38
Even so, prior to the actual determination of administrative liability, the December 2, 2008 Resolution.
On this score, the Court agrees with the CA. A cursory reading of the two issuances reveals that they resolve the same subject matter, that is, the separate motions for reconsideration filed by the respondent, Hidalgo, and Gabionza.
Primarily, the Court finds that there is no ambiguity or conflict in the body and dispositive portion of the petitioner's October 27, 2008 Order so as to provide room for interpretation. 39 The body of said Order dearly spelled out and explicitly stated the matter to be resolved therein, viz.:
ORDER
This resolves the separate motions of Victoriano R. Calaycay, Augustus A. Hidalgo, and Dennis T. Gabionza, all of whom are seeking reconsideration of the Decision of this Office dated July 10, 2007, which dismissed respondents Calaycay and Hidalgo from the service, found respondent Ochavillo as not guilty and imposed no sanction on respondent Gabionza as he is a private individual.
xxx xxx xxx
It might be that the retirement of the respondent does not automatically lead to the dismissal of the complaint x x x. But retirement from government service renders the ultimate penalty of dismissal in administrative cases moot and academic, though the records of the case may be forwarded to the Office of the Ombudsman for the determination of possible criminal liabilities as the evidence may warrant. 40
Whereas the dispositive portion of the Order provided a concise summary of the petitioner's ruling, that is, the referral of the case to the Office of the Ombudsman for determination of criminal liability. While not specifically stated, the discussion clearly evinces that the petitioner considered closed the administrative case pending before it in view of the respondent's optional retirement.
Seemingly impelled by a recognition that it has made a mistake, the petitioner then issued its December 2, 2008 Resolution, again stating that it is resolving the same separate motions for reconsideration that is the subject of its Order. The Resolution would have superseded the Order as it now contains an express denial of the motions, were it not for the fact that the same has been issued when the Order has already attained finality.
Regardless of whether the Order is correct or not, the fact is it has become final and can no longer be altered. Petitioner's October 27, 2008 Order was received by the respondent on November 10, 2008. 41 No action having been taken thereon, the Order has attained finality on November 25, 2008. 42 Public policy demands that administrative decisions must end sometime. In the absence of any showing that the subject Order was rendered without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, no court has the power to revive, review, change, or alter a final and executory judgment or decision. 43
While the petitioner's October 27, 2008 Order has the effect of dismissing the administrative complaint, considering nonetheless that the respondent had not been actually exonerated nor was it found that his suspension is unjustified, respondent is not entitled to salary during the period of his preventive suspension. 44
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Amended Decision dated January 27, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 106668 and its Resolution dated May 27, 2014 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 57-78.
2.Id. at 41-47; penned by Associate Justice Socorro B. Inting and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and Mario V. Lopez (now Members of this Court).
3.Id. at 54-55.
4.Id. at 95.
5.Id. at 15.
6.Id. at 95.
7.Id.
8.Id. at 95-96.
9. Signed by Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita for the President, id. at 94-101.
10.Id. at 101.
11.Id. at 16.
12.Id. at 116.
13.Id. at 16.
14.Id.
15.Id.at 117-118.
16.Id. at 118.
17.Id. at 146-149.
18.Id. at 149.
19.Id. at 213-215; rendered by Associate Justice Roland B. Jurado and concurred in by Associate Justices Alexander Gesmundo (now a Member of this Court) and Alex L. Quiroz.
20.Id. at 215.
21.Id. at 27.
22.Id. at 29-38.
23.Id. at 46-47.
24.Id. at 48-53.
25.Id. at 54-55.
26.Id. at 66.
27.Id. at 67-69.
28.Id. at 73.
29.Id. at 289.
30.Id. at 290-293.
31.Id. at 315-317.
32.Id. at 321-323.
33.Id. at 325.
34. Cf. GSIS v. Civil Service Commission, 279 Phil. 866, 872-873 (1991).
35. Cf. Atty. Yaranon v. Judge Rubio, 160 Phil. 768, 771 (1975).
36.Ganzon v. Arlos, 720 Phil. 104, 118 (2013); Miralles v. Hon. Go, 402 Phil. 638, 652 (2001).
37.Miralles v. Hon. Go, supra, citing Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza, 374 Phil. 1, 10 (1999).
38.Ganzon v. Arlos, supra at 118.
39.Ruby Industrial Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 348 Phil. 480 (1998).
40.Rollo, pp. 117-118.
41.Id. at 44.
42. ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 18, Section 7, s. 1987.
43.Samahan ng Magsasaka at Mangingisda ng Sitio Naswe, Inc. v. Tan, 784 Phil. 727, 741 (2016).
44.Civil Service Commission v. Cruz, 670 Phil. 638, 644 (2011).