THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 215986. September 21, 2020.]
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, petitioner,vs. MA. LOURDES R. MANLULU, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedSeptember 21, 2020, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 215986 (OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, petitioner v. MA. LOURDES R. MANLULU, respondent). — This is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision 2 dated November 7, 2013 and Resolution 3 dated November 28, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 122264. The assailed CA Decision and Resolution reversed and set aside the Decision 4 dated December 21, 2009 and Order 5 dated May 31, 2011 of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) which held respondent Ma. Lourdes R. Manlulu (Manlulu) administratively liable for Simple Dishonesty in the case docketed as OMB-C-A-08-0446-I. After a judicious review of the records, this Court resolves to DENY the petition for failure to sufficiently show any reversible error on the part of the CA.
This case involves the anomalous barangay nutrition feeding program (Feeding Program) conducted by barangay officials Marilyn Ajesta (Ajesta), Luisa Young (Young), and Eufemia Balangue (Balangue); hereinafter collectively (barangay officials) in Barangay 611, Zone 61, District VI of Manila. Ajesta was then the Punong Barangay, Young the Barangay Kagawad, and Balangue the Barangay Treasurer and Chairman of the Barangay Committee on Appropriations of Barangay 611. Manlulu was the City Accountant of Manila who approved the disbursement of funds for this Feeding Program. 6
The barangay officials, together with their fellow barangay kagawads Jaime H. Din, Roberto A. Liwanag, Joseleo B. Dollentas, Malaya S. Mendoza, hereinafter collectively (private respondents), and Joselito D. Ferry issued Barangay Resolution No. 005 dated December 28, 2007, intended to be given retroactive effect, which scheduled the Feeding Program from December 3 to 23, 2007, with an approved budget of P16,910.00. However, it is undisputed that no such Feeding Program took place on these dates. 7
Nevertheless, Ajesta and Balangue prepared and sent an undated letter to Manlulu to process the release of P16,910.00 as reimbursement for alleged expenses of the Feeding Program. This letter was supposedly certified by Dr. Paz M. Franco (Franco) and Dr. Nilo O. Ortega (Ortega) as the health officers of the barangay. The barangay officials duly accomplished and signed the Request for Obligation and Appropriation (ROA) and submitted it to Manlulu for approval. The ROA was eventually approved and signed by Manlulu, and the amount for alleged reimbursement was released to Ajesta through Philippine National Bank Check Number 14477 dated January 31, 2008. 8
In addition to the glaring fact that no Feeding Program took place on the scheduled dates, it was claimed and proved that: (1) the signatures of Drs. Franco and Ortega on the supporting documents were falsified; (2) Dr. Franco was not in charge of Barangay 611; (3) Dr. Ortega was already retired from his post at the time of the Feeding Program; (4) the names on the list of malnourished children beneficiaries did not come from the health center; (5) some children on the list were not residents of Barangay 611; and (6) some children on the list were fictitious with non-existent addresses. 9
The foregoing anomalies caused private respondents to file a complaint dated August 5, 2008 for dishonesty against the barangay officials and Manlulu before the Ombudsman. The barangay officials and Manlulu allegedly falsified public documents, used falsified documents, violated Republic Act No. 3019, and committed acts unbecoming of a public officer. 10
On December 21, 2009, the Ombudsman issued its Decision 11 holding the barangay officials and Manlulu liable for Simple Dishonesty:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being substantial evidence to hold the respondents administratively liable for Simple Dishonesty, MARILYN C. AJESTA, LUISA B. YOUNG, EUFEMIA D. BALANGUE, and MARIA LOURDES R. MANLULU, is hereby meted a penalty of three (3) months suspension from the service.
The Order of Preventive Suspension is hereby LIFTED for having been rendered moot and academic.
SO ORDERED. 12
The Ombudsman held the barangay officials administratively liable for using documents that are admittedly falsified, and certifying a falsity by signing the ROA despite knowing that no Feeding Program took place on the indicated dates. 13 As for Manlulu, it held that she "participated in the anomalous scheme when [she] affixed [her] signature on the Request for Allotment dated December 28, 2007." 14
Manlulu filed a motion for reconsideration on May 9, 2011 but was denied by the Ombudsman in its Order 15 dated May 31, 2011:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 16
Manlulu thereafter filed an appeal to the CA through a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Manlulu argued on appeal that the barangay officials should be solely responsible for reviewing the supporting documents of the ROA which they submitted to her and that her participation in signing the ROA was ministerial as she was obligated merely to certify the availability of funds for disbursement. She maintained that she had no personal knowledge or participation in the preparation or use of the falsified documents. 17
On November 7, 2014, the CA rendered its now assailed Decision granting Manlulu's appeal. The CA reversed and set aside the Ombudsman's Decision and Order and absolved Manlulu from administrative liability for Simple Dishonesty: 18
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Ombudsman dated December 21, 2009 which was approved on March 9, 2011 finding Maria Lourdes R. Manlulu administratively liable for Simple Dishonesty in the case docketed as OMB-C-A-08-0446-I and its Order dated May 31, 2011 which was approved on September 6, 2011 denying the separate Motion for Reconsideration filed by Maria Lourdes R. Manlulu in the same case is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED. 19
The CA found that no evidence was presented to prove that Manlulu was involved in the falsities. The Ombudsman therefore erroneously relied on mere presumptions to hold her administratively liable:
x x x [N]o proof was presented to show any concealment of the truth on [Manlulu']s part nor proof of an act which would constitute dishonesty as committed by [Manlulu]. x x x
We opine that the Ombudsman failed to recognize the fact that no evidence was presented to substantiate [Manlulu's] alleged wrongdoing. It merely relied on presumptions and on Manlulu's admission that her signatures appearing on the falsified documents were genuine to uphold her administrative liability. Manlulu, however, was not proven to have taken an upper hand in ensuring that the documents were signed in order to facilitate the reimbursement by the Barangay Officials and for her to profit therefrom. Absent the substantial evidence to prove [Manlulu's] involvement in said falsities, We cannot sustain the Ombudsman's ruling. 20
The Ombudsman filed its motion for reconsideration on December 10, 2014 assailing the Decision but was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated November 28, 2014 for lack of merit. 21
Hence, the instant petition which raises the sole issue of whether or not the CA erred in reversing and setting aside the Decision and Order of the Ombudsman and absolving Manlulu from administrative liability for Simple Dishonesty.
The petition must be denied.
Dishonesty has been defined as the concealment or distortion of truth, which shows lack of integrity or a disposition to defraud, cheat, deceive, or betray, or intent to violate the truth. 22 It is intentionally making a false statement in any material fact, or practicing or attempting to practice any deception or fraud in securing his examination, registration, appointment or promotion. 23
This Court in Sabio v. Field Investigation Office24 elucidated that dishonesty, like bad faith, requires a determination of the person's intention and state of mind at the time of the commission of the offense:
Dishonesty, like bad faith, is not simply bad judgment or negligence, but a question of intention. In ascertaining the intention of a person charged with dishonesty, consideration must be taken not only of the facts and circumstances giving rise to the act committed by the respondent, but also of his state of mind at the time the offense was committed, the time he might have had at his disposal for the purpose of meditating on the consequences of his act, and the degree of reasoning he could have had at that moment. 25
In order to be held administratively liable for dishonesty, the complainant has the burden to prove the allegations in his or her complaint by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is "such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe, based on the evidence submitted, that the respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of. It need not be overwhelming or preponderant, as is required in an ordinary civil case, or evidence beyond reasonable doubt, as is required in criminal cases, but the evidence must be enough for a reasonable mind to support a conclusion." 26
It bears stressing that mere allegation and speculation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof. 27 The Court in Ombudsman v. De Villa28 absolved the respondent from administrative liability on the ground that no sufficient substantial evidence was presented to prove the acts allegedly committed. Verily, "a presumption or conjecture is not sufficient substantial evidence to sustain a finding of administrative liability." 29
Thus, although findings of fact by the Ombudsman are generally accorded with great weight and respect, if not finality by the courts, 30 this is not an absolute rule. It is settled that when factual findings by administrative or quasi-judicial agencies (e.g., Ombudsman) are not adequately supported by substantial evidence, they shall not be binding upon the courts. 31
In this case, a review of the records shows that the CA correctly held that there was insufficient evidence to hold Manlulu administratively liable. The Ombudsman cannot rely solely on the fact that Manlulu signed the ROA to immediately conclude that she participated in the anomalous scheme. The Ombudsman insists that Manlulu should have been forewarned with the falsified documents and taken measures to determine the authenticity of the documents submitted, but these are mere allegations that do not constitute evidence. 32
Taking into consideration the totality of circumstances and the evidence presented, the CA did not commit reversible error in finding that the Ombudsman failed to prove that Manlulu committed acts constituting dishonesty. There was no evidence as to how Manlulu allegedly participated in any of the falsities to ensure the reimbursement and profit therefrom. 33 Absent such evidence, the Ombudsman's findings erroneously relied on mere speculations and conjectures which are insufficient to establish substantial evidence.
We are also mindful of the CA Decision citing the ruling in Arias v. Sandiganbayan34 that heads of offices or agencies, similar to Manlulu, can rely to a reasonable extent on the good faith of their subordinates, especially if there are no compelling facts present to go beyond their recommendations. 35 The documents submitted to Manlulu in this case came from the barangay officials, accomplished through their official capacity and in the course of their regular functions. These documents were thus entitled to the presumption of regularity of official acts. 36 Moreover, the documents pertained to a small community feeding program which was not a project out of the ordinary and commonly conducted by barangays. It is also noted that Manlulu exercised diligence and exhibited good faith when she required her subordinates, the bookkeeper and the Chief of the Barangay Accounts Division, to evaluate and verify the documents and initial them before affixing her own signature thereon. 37
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 7, 2013 and Resolution dated November 28, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 122264 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED."
(Gesmundo, J., recused himself from the case due to his prior participation in a related case; Inting, J., designated additional Member per Raffle dated September 16, 2020; Zalameda, J., on official leave)
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 11-30.
2.Id. at 36-52; penned by Associate Justice Stephen C. Cruz, with Associate Justices Magdangal M. De Leon and Myra V. Garcia-Fernandez, concurring.
3.Id. at 54-56.
4.Id. at 57-71; penned by Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer Ruth Laura A. Mella, reviewed by PIAB-E Acting Director Hon. Mothalib C. Onos, and approved by PAMO Acting Assistant Ombudsman Hon. Mary Susan S. Guillermo and Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon Hon. Mark E. Jalandoni.
5.Id. at 72-76; penned by Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer Ruth Laura A. Mella, reviewed by PIAB-E Acting Director Hon. Mothalib C. Onos, and approved by PAMO II Assistant Ombudsman Hon. Marilou B. Ancheta-Mejica, and Overall Deputy Ombudsman Hon. Orlando C. Casimiro.
6.Id. at 37.
7.Id.
8.Id. at 38.
9.Id. at 38-39.
10.Id. at 37.
11.Id. at 57-71.
12.Id. at 70.
13.Id. at 64-66.
14.Id. at 67.
15.Id. at 72-76.
16.Id. at 75.
17.Id. at 44-47.
18.Id. at 36-52.
19.Id. at 51.
20.Id. at 49-50.
21.Id. at 54-56.
22. CSC Resolution No. 06-0538, April 4, 2006; Fajardo v. Corral, 813 Phil. 149, 157 (2017); Committee on Security and Safety, Court of Appeals v. Dianco, et al., 760 Phil. 169, 188 (2015).
23.Office of the Court Administrator v. Egipto Jr., A.M. No. P-05-1938, November 7, 2017, 844 SCRA 131, 141.
24. G.R. No. 229882, February 13, 2018, 855 SCRA 293.
25.Id. at 305.
26.Miro v. Mendoza, et al., 721 Phil. 772, 788-789 (2013).
27.Id. at 785.
28. 760 Phil. 937 (2015).
29.Id. at 953.
30. Section 27, Ombudsman Act of 1989; Cabalit v. Commission on Audit-Region VII, 679 Phil. 138, 157 (2012), citing Olivarez v. Sandiganbayan, 319 Phil. 45, 66 (1995).
31.Miro v. Mendoza, et al., supra note 26 at 784.
32.Rollo, pp. 22-24.
33.Id. at 49-50.
34. 259 Phil. 794 (1989).
35.Ombudsman v. Espina, 807 Phil. 529, 547 (2017).
36.Yap v. Lagtapon, 803 Phil. 652, 662 (2017).
37.Rollo, p. 47.