FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 215221. September 14, 2021.]
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, petitioner,vs. GWENDOLYN F. GARCIA, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated September 14, 2021 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 215221 — OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. GWENDOLYN F. GARCIA
The Case
This Petition for Review 1 assails the following issuances of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 07553 entitled "Gwendolyn F. Garcia v. Office of the Ombudsman, Manuel T. Manuel, and Crisologo V Saavedra":
1) Decision 2 dated April 23, 2014, reversing the administrative finding of grave misconduct against respondent Gwendolyn F. Garcia (respondent); and
2) Resolution 3 dated October 10, 2014, denying the respective motions for reconsideration of Crisologo Saavedra (Saavedra) and the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB).
Antecedents
Sometime in 2006, Atty. Romeo Y. Balili, the court-appointed executor of the Estate of Luis V. Balili — which includes the Balili Estate, offered to sell the Balili Estate to the Province of Cebu which at that time had plans to construct a new airport. The Balili Estate comprised ten (10) parcels of land all situated in Naga, Cebu, with a total area of 247,317 square meters; and a parcel of land situated in Tina-an, Naga, Cebu, with an area of 1,929 square meters. 4
The offer was conveyed to Juan Bolo (Bolo), then a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cebu and Chairperson of the Committee on Provincial Properties. Bolo, in turn, relayed the offer twice to respondent, then provincial governor, first in 2006, and second, in June 2007. 5
In June 2007, respondent directed Bolo to inquire about the selling price of the Balili Estate and get the Appraisal Committee to assess the value of the lots. Bolo promptly complied.
By Resolution No. 23 dated July 10, 2007, Series of 2007, the Appraisal Committee valued the ten (10) parcels of land in Naga, Cebu at P610.00 per square meter. 6
On the initiative of Bolo, Resolution No. 187-2008 dated January 14, 2008 got enacted authorizing respondent to execute and sign, on behalf of the Province of Cebu, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) for the purchase of the ten (10) lots at P434.00 per square meter. Respondent approved Resolution No. 187-2008 on April 4, 2008. 7
Although Resolution No. 187-2008 authorized respondent to purchase only the ten (10) lots in Naga, Cebu, the subsequently executed MOA dated April 21, 2008 actually covered eleven (11), including the Tina-an lot at P400.00 per square meter. To correct the disparity, Bolo authored the passage of what later became Resolution No. 1781-2008 dated April 21, 2008, authorizing respondent to conform to the terms of the MOA. It was Acting Governor Gregorio Sanchez, Jr. 8 who approved Resolution No. 1781-2008.
The MOA stipulated that the total purchase price of P99,698,400.00 9 shall be paid in two (2) installments. The first installment of P48,849,200.00 was paid via Land Bank of the Philippines Check No. 218470 dated April 28, 2008. As for the second installment, the same was conditioned on the issuance of new certificates of title on all eleven (11) lots in the name of the Province of Cebu. Thus, new certificates of title for the ten (10) lots were issued in the name of the Province of Cebu. The Tina-an lot though turned out to be untitled, hence, no title could be issued in the name of the Province.
On October 7, 2008, the second installment of P49,077,600.00 was also paid. Notably, the total purchase price of P98,926,800.00 covered only the ten (10) lots with a total area of 247,317 square meters (x P400.00). 10
On September 2-3, 2009, representatives of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the OMB did a verification survey of the ten lots. It was discovered that about 202,456 square meters of the lots (valued at P80,982,400.00) are classified as timberland, thus, inalienable. Also, 196,696 square meters are underwater. 11
On the basis of an anonymous complaint, the Public Assistance and Corruption Prevention Office (PACPO) of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas charged respondent, among others, with grave misconduct. Two other similar complaints were likewise filed by Manuel T. Manuel (Manuel) and Saavedra, respectively. 12 The three (3) complaints pertained to the acquisition of the lots comprising the Balili estate.
In his Final Evaluation Report dated June 22, 2010, Graft Prevention and Control Officer III Roderick S. Blazo recommended that the anonymous complaint be upgraded to formal criminal and administrative cases. Consequently, on March 16, 2011, the OMB for the Visayas directed respondent and other individuals to file their respective counter-affidavits and the affidavits of their witnesses. 13
Respondent though filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the respective complaints of Manuel and Saavedra were allegedly defective since the affidavits of their witnesses were not attached to the complaint. Also, the OMB purportedly had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaints. 14
By Resolution dated August 26, 2011, Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer I Luz L. Awayan recommended the indictment of respondent and seven (7) others for violation of Section 3 (e), Republic Act No. 3019 (RA 3019) or the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-Morales approved the indictment but not for violation of Section 3 (e), RA 3019, but for technical malversation, thus:
Clearly, in light of the foregoing, respondent Garcia is probably guilty of Technical Malversation under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, let an Information for such violation be filed against respondent Garcia before the Sandiganbayan.
SO RESOLVED. 15
The separate requests of Manuel and Saavedra for respondent's preventive suspension were denied per OMB's twin Orders both dated May 11, 2011. 16
After due proceedings, the OMB rendered its Joint Decision dated January 9, 2013 in OMB-C-A-11-0079-B, OMB-C-A-11-0019-A, and OMB-C-A-11-0118-C, finding respondent guilty of grave misconduct, albeit by reason of her reelection as governor, no penalty was imposed on her. Thus:
WHEREFORE, this Office finds substantial evidence to hold GWENDOLYN F. GARCIA, JUAN V. BOLO, ANTHONY D. SUSUSCO, ROY G. SALUBRE, EULOGIO B. PELAYRE, and EMME T. GINGOYON guilty of Grave Misconduct. With respect to Garcia and Bolo, however, their administrative liability has been rendered moot and academic as previously discussed.
Sususco, Salubre, Pelayre, and Gingoyon are meted the penalty of DISMISSAL, together with the accessory penalties, pursuant to Sec. 52.A.3, Rule IV in relation to Sec. 58.a of CSC Resolution No. 991936, otherwise known as the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
The Bureau of Local Government Finance of the Department of Finance through its authorized representative is directed to implement the Decision of DISMISSAL from service on Roy G. Salubre and Emme T. Gingoyon.
The Department of the Interior and Local Government through its authorized representative is directed to implement this Decision of DISMISSAL on Anthony D. Sususco, and Eulogio B. Pelayre.
The implementing agencies are also directed to submit their compliance within ten (10) days from receipt of this Decision.
Finally, the administrative charge against respondents MARIFLOR D. VERO, MICHELLE V. LANGUIDO, ROGER L. DUMAYAC, PILAR C. YBURAN, VICTOR A. MAAMBONG, JULIAN DAAN, WILFREDO CAMINERO, PETER JOHN CALDERON, JOVEN MONDIGO, JR., TERESITA D. CELES, ROSEMARIE D. DURANO, WENCESLAO GAKIT, ALFRED FRANCIS M. OUANO, and BEA MERCEDE A. CALDERON is DISMISSED.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered in said respondents' 201 (Personal) File.
Let a copy of this be furnished to the Commission on Elections, Civil Service Commission and the Government Service and Insurance System.
SO ORDERED. 17 (Emphasis supplied)
Proceedings before the Court of Appeals
On respondent's petition for certiorari, she faulted the OMB with grave abuse of discretion for: a) not dismissing the administrative complaint against her despite her reelection as governor in the 2010 elections; and b) finding her guilty of grave misconduct even though she was not afforded the opportunity to file her counter-affidavit. 18
In refutation, the OMB posited that by reason of the Aguinaldo doctrine, respondent was not exonerated of the charge of grave misconduct but only cleared of administrative liability. Since no penalty was imposed on respondent, its Joint Decision dated January 9, 2013 had already attained finality, for appeal is only available to those meted penalties higher than public censure, reprimand, one-month suspension or a fine equivalent to one-month salary. 19 Further, the entry of the Joint Decision in respondent's personnel file is supported by CSC Memorandum Circular No. 08, s. 2007, which provides that all disciplinary actions, regardless of the outcome, will form part of the personnel file of the public officer concerned. Lastly, respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies when she did not file a motion for reconsideration of the Joint Decision. 20
In her reply, respondent essentially invoked anew the Aguinaldo doctrine and asserted that she correctly availed of the special civil action of certiorari considering the exceptional attendant circumstances here. 21
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
By its assailed Decision 22 dated April 23, 2014, the Court of Appeals ruled in petitioner's favor. It held that respondent properly availed of the special civil action of certiorari for she was not challenging the OMB's Joint Decision per se but the latter's authority to adjudicate the administrative complaints against her for grave misconduct despite her reelection in 2010. Citing a number of Supreme Court decisions, it ordained that the Aguinaldo doctrine or condonation doctrine prohibits the OMB from pronouncing respondent guilty of grave misconduct since the matter became moot when she got reelected as governor. Thus:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED, the Joint Decision dated 9 January 2013, rendered by the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-11-0079-B, OMB-C-A-11-0019-A and OMB-C-A-11-0118-C declaring petitioner Gwendolyn Garcia administratively guilty of grave misconduct is NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE insofar as petitioner Gwendolyn Garcia is concerned. Accordingly, let copies of this decision be furnished the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), the Civil Service Commission (CSC) and the Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS).
The government offices concerned are DIRECTED to notify this court within five (5) days from notice of their receipt of this Order.
SO ORDERED. 23
The respective motions for reconsideration of the OMB and Saavedra were denied under Resolution 24 dated October 10, 2014.
The Present Petition
The OMB sought affirmative relief via the present petition for review under Rule 45. It asserted that the condonation doctrine has no statutory and constitutional basis and should, thus, be reevaluated in light of the 1987 Constitution. It is not precluded from rendering a finding of guilt or innocence under the constitutional guiding principles and authority granted under Republic Act No. 6770. 25 Under existing laws, accountability is a strict and continuous responsibility of every public officer in the discharge of their official acts. The condonation doctrine does not amount to total exoneration because it only extinguishes administrative liability but not the administrative offense. 26
In her Comment 27 dated October 15, 2015, respondent riposted that the OMB has already conceded below that the condonation doctrine applies in this case, thus, it is now precluded from taking a different stand. In other words, since the twin administrative complaints against her had already been rendered moot by reason of the condonation doctrine, the OMB is precluded from finding her liable for grave misconduct. To emphasize, the condonation doctrine erases the offense, not merely the penalty.
In its Reply 28 dated December 21, 2017, the OMB reiterated the arguments raised in the petition.
The parties, thereafter, submitted their respective memoranda incompliance with Resolution 29 dated January 15, 2020.
In its Memorandum 30 dated June 30, 2020, the Office of the Ombudsman again reiterated its arguments.
Similarly, respondent also reiterated her arguments in Memorandum 31 dated March 12, 2020.
Our Ruling
The petition is denied.
Ombudsman Carpio-Morales v. CA32 explained the origin and concept of the condonation doctrine and categorically pronounced that condonation means the complete extinguishment of the offense and corresponding liability, thus:
C. The origin of the condonation doctrine.
Generally speaking, condonation has been defined as "[a] victim's express or implied forgiveness of an offense, [especially] by treating the offender as if there had been no offense."
The condonation doctrine — which connotes this same sense of complete extinguishment of liability as will be herein elaborated upon — is not based on statutory law. It is a jurisprudential creation that originated from the 1959 case of Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija (Pascual), which was therefore decided under the 1935 Constitution.
In Pascual, therein petitioner, Arturo Pascual, was elected Mayor of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, sometime in November 1951, and was later reelected to the same position in 1955. During his second term, or on October 6, 1956, the Acting Provincial Governor filed administrative charges before the Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija against him for grave abuse of authority and usurpation of judicial functions for acting on a criminal complaint in Criminal Case No. 3556 on December 18 and 20, 1954. In defense, Arturo Pascual argued that he cannot be made liable for the acts charged against him since they were committed during his previous term of office, and therefore, invalid grounds for disciplining him during his second term. The Provincial Board, as well as the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, later decided against Arturo Pascual, and when the case reached this Court on appeal, it recognized that the controversy posed a novel issue — that is, whether or not an elective official may be disciplined for a wrongful act committed by him during his immediately preceding term of office.
As there was no legal precedent on the issue at that time, the Court, in Pascual, resorted to American authorities and "found that cases on the matter are conflicting due in part, probably, to differences in statutes and constitutional provisions, and also, in part, to a divergence of views with respect to the question of whether the subsequent election or appointment condones the prior misconduct." Without going into the variables of these conflicting views and cases, it proceeded to state that:
The weight of authorities x x x seems to incline toward the rule denying the right to remove one from office because of misconduct during a prior term, to which we fully subscribe.
xxx xxx xxx
D. Testing the Condonation Doctrine.
Pascual's ratio decidendi may be dissected into three (3) parts:
First, the penalty of removal may not be extended beyond the term in which the public officer was elected for each term is separate and distinct:
Offenses committed, or acts done, during previous term are generally held not to furnish cause for removal and this is especially true where the constitution provides that the penalty in proceedings for removal shall not extend beyond the removal from office, and disqualification from holding office for the term for which the officer was elected or appointed. (67 C.J.S. p. 248, citing Rice vs. State, 161 S.W. 2d. 401; Montgomery vs. Nowell, 40 S.W. 2d. 418; People ex rel. Bagshaw vs. Thompson, 130 P. 2d. 237; Board of Com'rs of Kingfisher County vs. Shutter, 281 P. 222; State vs. Blake, 280 P. 388; In re Fudula, 147 A. 67; State vs. Ward, 43 S.W. 2d. 217).
The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms x x x.
Second, an elective official's reelection serves as a condonation of previous misconduct, thereby cutting the right to remove him therefor; and
[T]hat the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. (43 Am. Jur. p. 45, citing Atty. Gen. vs. Hasty, 184 Ala. 121, 63 So. 559, 50 LR.A. (NS) 553).
Third, courts may not deprive the electorate, who are assumed to have known the life and character of candidates, of their right to elect officers:
As held in Conant vs. Grogan (1887) 6 N.Y.S.R. 322, cited in 17 A.I.R. 281, 63 So. 559, 50 LRA (NS) 553 —
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When the people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct to practically overrule the will of the people. (Emphasis supplied)
Verily, it is incorrect for the OMB to argue that the condonation doctrine merely erases the penalty and not the offense. To repeat, the condonation doctrine obliterates the offense and, consequently, the liability as well.
Madreo v. Bayron33 clarified that the defense of condonation doctrine is no longer available if the public official's reelection happened on or after April 12, 2016. With the abandonment of the condonation doctrine in Carpio-Morales, which became final on April 12, 2016, any reelections of public officials on said date and onwards no longer have the effect of condoning their previous misconduct.
Here, the three complaints for grave misconduct were filed against respondent and other individuals prior to her reelection as Governor of the Province of Cebu in 2010. Since the events that transpired here occurred prior to the finality of Carpio-Morales on April 12, 2016, respondent can still avail of the benefits of the condonation doctrine as a consequence of her reelection in 2010. In fine, respondent's administrative liability — both the offense and penalty — are deemed completely erased. On this score, the Court of Appeals aptly ruled:
The uncontroverted fact is that the administrative cases for grave misconduct against herein petitioner were still pending or have not yet been decided after the reelection, yet surprisingly, public respondent did not, as it should have, dismiss these administrative cases. At the risk of being repetitive, an elective official's reelection would mean condonation of any misdeed/misconduct allegedly committed by him/her during his/her immediate previous term. Consequently, making the issue of such misconduct/misdeed moot and academic. This being so, there is no more justiciable controversy to be resolved.
xxx xxx xxx
Suffice it to say, in refusing to adhere to the settled principle, it would appear that public respondent disassociated the administrative cases against herein petitioner from Pascual, Lizares, Aguinaldo, et al., and made its own category and ruling. This, we cannot and should not allow ever mindful that our justice system conforms with the fundamental law on justice, law and equity, and in keeping with our solemn oath to equally protect the constitutional rights of every citizen in this nation.
Doubtless, public respondent acted whimsically, capriciously and arbitrarily amounting to lack of jurisdiction, when it still proceeded to adjudicate the administrative cases against petitioner after her reelection in utter disregard of the settled ruling in Pascual, Lizares, Aguinaldo, et al. More important, public respondent evaded its duty to dismiss the administrative cases against herein petitioner. And to give assent to public respondent's arguments would be tantamount to turning a blind eye to the clear intent of prevailing jurisprudence. 34
So must it be.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated April 23, 2014 and Resolution dated October 10, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 07553 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 12-31.
2. Penned by Associate Justice Gabriel T. Ingles with the concurrence of Associate Justices Ma. Luisa C. Quijano-Padilla and Marie Christine Azcarraga-Jacob, all members of the Special Eighteenth Division, id. at 38-55.
3.Id. at 58-63.
4.Id. at 15.
5.Id.
6.Id.
7.Id. at 16.
8.Id.
9. 249,246 square meters x P400 = P99,698,400.
10.Rollo, p. 16.
11.Id. at 16-17.
12.Id. at 39.
13.Id. at 40.
14.Id.
15.Id.
16.Id.
17.Id. at 38-39.
18.Id. at 42.
19.Id. at 43.
20.Id. at 44.
21.Id.
22.Id. at 38-55.
23.Id. at 54.
24.Id. at 58-63.
25. AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE FUNCTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
26.Rollo, pp. 12-31.
27.Id. at 84-95.
28.Id. at 126-132.
29.Id. at 168-169.
30.Id. at 142-162.
31.Id. at 169-195.
32. 772 Phil. 672, 754-762 (2015).
33. G.R. No. 237330, November 3, 2020.
34.Rollo, pp. 53-54.