FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 155904. January 23, 2013.]
BOY OCAMPO, RICARDO LINESES, FELIX CUPO, JUANITO CRUZADO, SERAFIN QUINTO, JOSEFA DE LEON, LUCILA LAMAMEGO, RIC SARMIENTO, LIGAYA DIZON, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES VICTOR DOMINGO AND CRISTETA GALVEZ, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated January 23, 2013 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 155904 — Boy Ocampo, Ricardo Lineses, Felix Cupo, Juanito Cruzado, Serafin Quinto, Josefa De Leon, Lucila Lamamego, Ric Sarmiento, Ligaya Dizon, petitioners, v. Spouses Victor Domingo and Cristeta Galvez, respondents.
The petitioners hereby seek the review and reversal of the decision promulgated on February 11, 2002, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed their petition for certiorari filed to assail the denial of due course by the Regional Trial Court in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro (RTC) to their notice of appeal on the ground that it had not specified the appellate court to which the appeal was being taken.
Respondent spouses, represented by their attorney-in-fact, Editha Carumbana, filed against the petitioners in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro a complaint for the abatement of a nuisance, and for the recovery of possession and damages, docketed as Civil Case No. R-4674, alleging that they were the owners of three parcels of land located in Camilmil, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, with a total area of 1,078 square meters; that the petitioners had constructed their houses on a portion of their properties as well as on the subdivision road leading to their properties; that said houses obstructed the access to their properties, rendering it impossible for them to use their vehicle in going to and coming from their properties; that they had no other access road to their properties; that they demanded for the petitioners to remove their houses, but the latter did not heed the demand; and that the petitioners' houses constituted a nuisance under Article 694, in relation to Article 699 and Article 705, of the Civil Code. 2 ETISAc
In their answer and counterclaim, 3 the petitioners denied the allegations of the complaint, and averred that the land where their houses stood was an abandoned property, and was not approved as a subdivision road; that the owner of the subdivision was the real party in interest; and that the respondents had no personality to bring the action against them due to their having occupied the land for the past 25 years.
The respondents later filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, 4 stating that they had earlier filed an action for unlawful detainer against the petitioners that the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) had decided in their favor, but that on appeal, the RTC had reversed the MTC and had ruled in favor of the petitioners by holding that the action for unlawful detainer was improper because the petitioners were occupying a subdivision lot that did not belong to the respondents; that based on the factual findings of the MTC, the conduct of a trial was no longer necessary; and that a judgment on the pleadings was warranted due to the petitioners' failure to tender an issue.
On September 15, 1999, 5 the RTC granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings upon finding that no factual but only legal issues remained to be resolved after the factual issues had been resolved by the MTC in the unlawful detainer case. The RTC directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda, together with their documentary evidence.
On June 23, 2000, the RTC resolved in favor of the respondents, disposing thus:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment on the pleadings is hereby rendered, as follows: DHSEcI
(a) Declaring as nuisance the houses or whatever structures built by the defendants on the Roxas Subdivision road leading to the plaintiffs' properties mentioned under paragraph 3 of the complaint;
(b) Ordering the defendants to remove their houses or whatever structures they have built on the subject road and on the plaintiffs' properties mentioned under paragraph 3 of the complaint;
(c) Ordering the defendants and all persons claiming rights under them to vacate the premises in question;
(d) Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally to pay the plaintiffs the following:
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages; and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as exemplary damages; and attorney's fees of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. 6
Receiving the decision on July 6, 2000, the petitioners filed in the RTC a notice of appeal on July 14, 2000, to wit:
NOTICE OF APPEAL
COME NOW, the defendants, thru the undersigned counsel and unto this Honorable Court most respectfully allege:
1. That on June 23, 2000, this Honorable Court issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
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2. That the Decision was received by the undersigned counsel on July 6, 2000 and has fifteen (15) days from the date within which to file Motion for Reconsideration or to appeal the said Decision, in which case has up to July 21, 2000 within which to filed (sic) the necessary pleadings.
3. That the Defendants shall be known as Defendants-Appellants while the Plaintiffs shall be known as Plaintiffs-Appellees;
4. That the Defendants hereby appeal the order of the Honorable Court being contrary to law, jurisprudence and evidence presented.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that this Notice of Appeal be given due course. 7
Thereafter, on July 24, 2000, the respondents moved to dismiss the appeal and to execute the judgment, 8 pointing out in the main that the notice of appeal was fatally defective because of its failure to specify the court to which the appeal was being taken, citing in support of the motion Section 5, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, viz.:
Section 5.Notice of Appeal. — The notice of appeal shall indicate the parties to the appeal, specify the judgment or final order or part thereof appealed from, specify the court to which the appeal is being taken, and state the material dates showing the timeliness of the appeal.
On November 20, 2000, the RTC denied due course to the notice of appeal. 9 HIESTA
Thence, through a petition for certiorari, the petitioners assailed in the CA the order denying due course to their notice of appeal and the rendition of the judgment on the pleadings in favor of the respondents. 10
On February 11, 2002, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari through the judgment under review, pointing out that the sole office of the writ of certiorari was the correction of jurisdictional defects; that certiorari did not lie because the petition for certiorari raised factual issues that were clearly beyond the province of a special civil action for certiorari; and that, at any rate, the RTC committed no grave abuse of discretion in rendering the judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the answer had failed to tender an issue, and in denying due course to the defective notice of appeal. 11
The petitioners sought reconsideration, but the CA denied their motion for reconsideration on November 5, 2002. 12
Issue
In this appeal, the petitioners insist that the CA erred in dismissing their petition for certiorari. They contend that, firstly, the attorney-in-fact of the respondents did not have the requisite special power of attorney to bind the respondents; secondly, that the respondents were not the real parties in interest to bring the action, but the owners of the subdivision or the Government; thirdly, that it was not their real intention to delay the proceedings; and, fourthly, that their notice of appeal was not defective for not stating that they were appealing to the CA.
Ruling
The petition for review has no merit.
To start with, the first three contentions of the petition tenders issues of fact. The petition thereby suffers because issues of fact are not proper to be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, whose Section 1 expressly limits the issues to be raised only to questions of law. That is enough reason to deny the appeal. The Court, not being a trier of facts, cannot be burdened with the consideration and resolution of issues of fact.
And, secondly, the matter of the defective notice of appeal posed in the fourth contention, albeit one of law, was correctly resolved by the CA.
Prior to the effectivity on July 1, 1997 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the rule requiring the party to specify in the notice of appeal the appellate court to which the appeal was to be taken was held to be merely directory, such that the failure to comply with the requirement was held to be not fatal to the appeal. 13 The rule then in force — Revised Rules of Court (1964) — as well as the Judiciary Act of 1948 expressly allowed an appellate court to certify the case to the proper appellate court for review should an appeal be erroneously taken to an appellate court that had no jurisdiction over the appeal. 14 Thus, the Court said in Valerio v. Tan: 15 cITaCS
Neither is the failure of petitioner to mention in his notice of appeal the court to which the appeal was being made fatal to the appeal. The rule requiring a party to specify the court to which the appeal is being made is directory merely. This is to be inferred from section 31 of Republic Act No. 296 (otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948), which provides that the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals to which a case has been appealed, may certify said case to the other court if it finds that the jurisdiction thereof pertains to the latter. In other words, an error in the court to which an appeal is made is not fatal to the appeal. So should failure to designate the court in the notice of appeal. 16
The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure has explicitly removed the discretion of the improper appellate court to transfer the erroneously-lodged appeal to the proper reviewing court. Instead, Section 2, Rule 51 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure now mandates the dismissal of the erroneously-taken appeal by the appellate court, and forbids the transfer of the appeal to the proper court, to wit:
Section 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of Appeals. —
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An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate court but shall be dismissed outright.
In denying due course to the notice of appeal of the petitioners because of their failure to state the court to which the appeal was being taken, the RTC rationalized in its order of November 20, 2000 as follows:
Perusal of said Notice of Appeal will reveal that indeed defendants utterly failed to specify which court they are appealing the questioned decision of June 23, 2000, whether to the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court. In fine defendants failed to show that they have complied with Section 5, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. DTSaHI
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It is to be noted in the above-quoted rule that the word specify is used twice, and the word shall is likewise used, obviously to lend emphasis to the mandatory nature of the provision. For otherwise, if the party appealing is not mandated to specify to which court the appeal is being taken, then the parties concerned and this Court would be in a guess work and at a loss in determining to which Court the appeal is being taken.
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Perforce, in the light of the foregoing discussions, the Court finds not to give due course to the Notice of Appeal and so holds that plaintiffs are entitled to the relief prayed for.
ACCORDINGLY, let a writ of execution be issued. 17
In passing upon the issue of whether the RTC thereby gravely abused its discretion, the CA sustained the RTC, observing that there was "nothing illicit about the public respondent's rejection of the petitioners' notice of appeal since the same egregiously ignored certain rudimentary requisites of the law concerning the filing of appeal." 18
We agree with the CA.
Indeed, the RTC did not abuse its discretion, least of all gravely, in so ruling upon the defective notice of appeal of the petitioners. The RTC only applied the clear provisions of Section 5, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and was neither arbitrary, nor capricious, nor whimsical. The RTC acted pursuant to its firm and regular duty as a court of law to follow the rules of procedure.
We indicate, on the other hand, that annulling the RTC's action on the basis of the mere say-so of the petitioners would be highly unwarranted. Section 1 of Rule 65, 19 Rules of Court, requires the certiorari petitioner to show that, one, the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and, two, there is neither an appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of amending or nullifying the proceeding. Verily, the sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which includes the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant the issuance of the writ of certiorari. 20 In order for the petition for certiorari to succeed, therefore, the petitioner should satisfactorily show that the respondent tribunal, board or officer was guilty of grave abuse of discretion. The abuse of discretion, to be grave, means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 21 That showing was not made herein by the petitioners. aTICAc
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED." REYES, J., took no part; VELASCO, JR., J., acting member per S.O. No. 1409 dated January 15, 2013.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 27-35; penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes (now a Member of the Court), with Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez (later Presiding Justice and Member of the Court, but already retired) and Associate Justice Roberto A. Barrios (deceased) concurring.
2.Id. at 39-41.
3.Id. at 47-53.
4.Records, pp. 54-65.
5.Rollo, pp. 55-56.
6.Id. at 65-66.
7.Id. at 67-68.
8.Records, pp. 111-118.
9.Rollo, pp. 73-72.
10.Id. at 32-33.
11.Id. at 27-35.
12.Id. at 37-38.
13.Heirs of Ramon Pizarro, Sr. v. Consolacion, No. L-51278, May 9, 1988, 161 SCRA 186, 193; Sonora v. Tongoy, G.R. No. L-33095, April 19, 1972, 44 SCRA 411, 417; Valerio v. Tan, 97 Phil. 558 (1955).
14.Section 3, Rule 50 of the Revised Rules of Court (1964) provides:
Section. 3. Where appealed case erroneously, brought. — Where the appealed case has been erroneously brought to the Court of Appeals, it shall not dismiss the appeal, but shall certify the case to the proper court, with a specific and clear statement of the grounds therefor.
Section 31, Chapter III, of Republic Act No. 296 (Judiciary Act of 1948) states:
Section 31. Transfer of cases from Supreme Court and Court of Appeals to proper court. — All cases which may be erroneously brought to the Supreme Court or to the Court of Appeals shall be sent to the proper court, which shall hear the same, as if it had originally been brought before it.
15.97 Phil. 558 (1955).
16.Id. at 560.
17.Rollo, pp. 73-74.
18.Id. at 34.
19.Section 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. (1a)
20.Tan v. Antazo, G.R. No. 187208, February 23, 2011, 644 SCRA 337, 342.
21.Delos Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, G.R. No. 153852, October 24, 2012; United Coconut Planters Bank v. Looyuko, G.R. No. 156337, September 28, 2007, 534 SCRA 322, 331.