FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 224812. February 19, 2020.]
FULGENCIO OBLIGACION, petitioner,vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedFebruary 19, 2020which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 224812 — FULGENCIO OBLIGACION v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
The Case
This petition assails the Decision 1 dated November 27, 2015 and Resolution 2 dated May 13, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 36854 affirming the conviction of petitioner Fulgencio Obligacion for robbery and carnapping under Article 295 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and Republic Act No. 6539 (RA 6539), 3 and denying his subsequent motion for reconsideration, respectively.
The Proceedings Before the Trial Court
The Charge
Petitioner was charged with violation of RA 6539 (carnapping) and robbery under the following Informations, respectively:
Criminal Case No. 11801(Violation of RA 6539-carnapping)
That on or about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of September 28, 2010, along the National Highway at Barangay Salugan, Camalig, Albay, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with short firearm caliber .38 revolver which he provided himself for the purpose, with intent to gain, by means of force, intimidation and physical violence, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and drive away Yamaha RS 100 Motorcycle bearing Plate No. EC-7569 with sidecar (Tricycle) belonging to complainant JESUS B. ANDES, divesting and depriving the latter of its possession against his will and consent, to his damage and prejudice and of the State.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 11802(Robbery)
That on or about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of September 28, 2010, along the National Highway at Barangay Salugan, Camalig, Albay, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, armed with short firearm caliber .38 revolver which he provided himself for the purpose, with intent to gain and to rob, with the employment of craft, by means of force, intimidation and physical violence and taking advantage of nighttime which facilitated the commission of his offense, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob and divest JESUS B. ANDES with cash money amounting to One Hundred Fifty Pesos (Php150.00) against the latter's will and consent, to his damage and prejudice and of the State.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.
On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Joint trial ensued.
The Prosecution's Version
On September 28, 2010, around 9 o'clock in the evening, Jesus Andes parked his tricycle along Lakandula Drive, Legaspi City to await passengers in the area. A man approached and asked Andes to bring him to Bañag, Daraga, Albay which happened to be outside Andes' usual route. Andes, nonetheless, took pity on the man as he realized there were no more available jeepneys to drive the man to Bañag. They agreed on a forty pesos (P40.00) fare. But the man later changed his mind and asked to be brought instead to Salugan, Camalig, Albay. For this, the man handed Andes one hundred fifty pesos (P150.00). 4
Before reaching the town of Salugan, the man suddenly asked Andes to stop the tricycle. The man alighted from the tricycle, walked towards the driver's side, poked a gun on Andes, and demanded back the money he gave him. The man also ordered Andes to step down from the tricycle. Andes initially refused but the man threatened to kill him. Fearing for his life, Andes was constrained to do as ordered. The man then drove off with the tricycle. 5
Andes immediately reported the incident to the Camalig Municipal Police Station. The police officers searched the area but failed to find the man. Andes and the Camalig police officers then went to the Guinobatan Police Station where they also reported the incident. There, they learned that an inmate from the Albay Provincial Jail had escaped that day. Andes and the Camalig police officers went to the Albay Provincial Jail. There, Andes was shown photos of an inmate who escaped. Andes recognized that the man in the photos was the same person who boarded his tricycle, poked a gun on him, took his money, and escaped using his tricycle. This man was later identified as petitioner Fulgencio Obligacion. 6
The Defense's Version
Petitioner denied the charges against him claiming that on September 28, 2010, he was incarcerated at the Albay Provincial Jail and escaped the next day. He hailed a tricycle to bring him to Bañag, Daraga, Albay. Before reaching Bañag, he asked the tricycle driver to bring him instead to Camalig and gave the latter one hundred fifty (P150.00) for his fare. The tricycle driver agreed. Upon reaching Camalig, he alighted from the tricycle and fled. 7
The Trial Court's Verdict
As borne in its Joint Judgment dated June 30, 2014, the trial court rendered a verdict of conviction, viz.:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crimes charged, Carnapping under Criminal Case No. 11801, and Robbery under Criminal Case No. 11802, and hereby sentences him to the straight penalty of imprisonment of Twenty (20) years for the crime of Carnapping, and imprisonment from 6 years, 8 mos. & 21 days to 8 years — which is the maximum period of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period — for the crime of Robbery. The period of his temporary confinement pending trial shall be credited to the accused.
As regards (the) civil liability, the Court hereby directs the accused to pay the offended party the sum of PhP150.00; the amount taken by the former from the latter.
xxx xxx xxx
SO ORDERED. 8
The trial court gave full credence to the testimony of Andes who positively identified petitioner as the person who on September 28, 2010, rode his tricycle, poked a gun on him, took his money and drove off with his tricycle. The trial court found petitioner's testimony to be positive, spontaneous, and straightforward.
The Proceedings Before the Court of Appeals
Petitioner's assigned errors:
Petitioner faulted the trial court for rendering the verdict of conviction notwithstanding that: 1) the out-of-court identification was highly suggestive because only his photos were shown to Andes who readily claimed it was he (petitioner) who took his money and tricycle; 2) there was a sufficient lapse of time between the incident and when he got identified; and 3) Andes could not have clearly seen his face because the incident occurred during nighttime and in a dark place. 9
Respondent's refutation:
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), through Assistant Solicitor General Magtanggol M. Castro and Associate Solicitor Dino Robert L. De Leon countered, in the main: Andes was neither coerced nor influenced when he positively identified petitioner as the one who took his money and tricycle. At best, the photos shown to Andes merely confirmed that the person who took his personal belongings was indeed petitioner.
The OSG further averred that the imposed penalties should be modified to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months to twenty (20) years for violation of RA 6539; and four (4) years, two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum, for robbery.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
By Decision dated November 27, 2015, the Court of Appeals affirmed in the main but modified the penalties, thus:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Joint Judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellant Fulgencio Obligacion is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of CARNAPPING under Criminal Case No. 11801 and ROBBERY under Criminal Case No. 11802 and hereby sentenced to suffer the penalties of: (a) seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to thirty (30) years for the crime of Carnapping; and (b) two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum, for the crime of Robbery.
SO ORDERED. 10
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied under Resolution dated May 13, 2016. 11
The Present Appeal
Petitioner now seeks affirmative relief from the Court repleading his argument that he was not properly identified as the person who robbed Andes of P150.00 and carnapped his tricycle.
The Core Issue
Was the petitioner properly identified as the person who committed the offenses charged?
Ruling
At the outset, petitioner does not refute the prosecution's evidence that the incident of robbery and carnapping being charged against him took place in the evening of September 28, 2010 in Camalig, Albay. He, nonetheless, denies liability for these offenses claiming it was not he who committed them. On this score, he faults his out-of-court identification for being allegedly highly suggestive. He also asserts that Andes could not have clearly seen him because the incident happened during nighttime and in a dark place.
In resolving the admissibility of out-of-court identification of suspects, the totality of circumstances test considers the following factors, viz.: 1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; 2) the witness' degree of attention at that time; 3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; 4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; 5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and, 6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. 12
Applying the totality-of-circumstances test here, we find as reliable Andes' out-of-court identification. First, when petitioner boarded the tricycle, Andes would naturally look at him as they talked about the place where to bring petitioner and the fare petitioner had to pay. Second, Andes, again, came face to face with petitioner when the latter alighted from the tricycle, proceeded towards the driver side, and at gun point threatened to give up his money and tricycle. Third, there was no showing that petitioner was wearing any hat or anything that would have obstructed Andes' view of his face. Fourth, Andes took no time and immediately reported the incident to the police. Fifth, at the police station, Andes positively identified petitioner as the person who at gun point robbed him of P150.00 and drove off with his tricycle.
Petitioner, nonetheless, asserts that Andes' out-of-court identification was highly suggestive because it was only his photos which the police showed to Andes.
We disagree. Records show that when Andes went to the police station and reported the incident of robbery and carnapping, the police officers merely informed him that a prisoner escaped on the same day. When Andes was shown pictures of the escapee, he identified him as the one who robbed him and carnapped his tricycle. Andes was neither coerced nor influenced by the police officers to point to petitioner as the culprit.
In People v. Musa, 13 the victim therein went to the police station where the police merely informed her of the date when the accused were arrested. Thereafter, she went to the cell where the appellants were detained and identified them as the persons who robbed her of her personal belongings. The Court ruled that there was no evidence that the police either prodded the victim to point to the appellants as the robbers, or suggested to her that the appellants were the suspects.
As for petitioner's assertion that the incidents of robbery and carnapping took place at nighttime and in a dark place, we find that the same does not diminish Andes' positive identification of petitioner as the culprit. Andes would have looked at petitioner when the latter boarded his tricycle, talked about where he was bound to, and negotiated for the fare. Along the way, petitioner ordered Andes to stop after which, petitioner alighted the tricycle, walked to the driver's side, poked a gun on Andes, took his money, and drove the tricycle away. Verily, Andes had a considerable amount of time to clearly see petitioner's face.
People v. Polangcus14 held that by human experience, the witness who had a close encounter with the accused could not be mistaken about the latter's identity. In that case, the Court rejected the accused's assertion that his identification was not reliable because the incident of murder took place during nighttime and in a dark place. The Court held that the face to face encounter of the witness with the accused immediately after the commission of the crime is more than sufficient evidence to establish that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime.
Indeed, the Court has invariably held that the natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive to see the appearance of their assailants and observe the manner the crime was committed. People v. Pepino15 citing People v. Esoy16 decreed:
x x x Most often the face of the assailant and body movements thereof, create a lasting impression which cannot be easily erased from a witness's memory. Experience dictates that precisely because of the unusual acts of violence committed right before their eyes, eyewitnesses can remember with a high degree of reliability the identity of criminals at any given time.
People v. Lugnasin17 further ordained that even assuming that an out-of-court identification was tainted with irregularity, the subsequent identification in court cured any flaw that may have attended it. Here, Andes in open court positively and categorically identified petitioner as the person who poked a gun on him, took from him the P150.00 he earlier paid, and drove away his tricycle. This in-court identification was independent and properly admitted by the Court for being credible.
Surely, petitioner's bare denial and alibi are inherently weak and have always been viewed with disfavor due to the facility by which they can be concocted. Thus, as between Andes' categorical testimony which has a ring of truth, on one hand, and petitioner's mere denial and alibi, on the other, the former prevails. 18 More, in the absence of proof to the contrary, the presumption is that Andes' testimony was not moved by any ill-will and was untainted by bias, and hence, worthy of belief and credence. 19
It is settled that when it comes to the issue of credibility of the victim or the prosecution witnesses, the findings of the trial courts carry great weight and respect and, generally, the appellate courts will generally not overturn these findings. For the trial courts are in the best position to ascertain and measure the sincerity and spontaneity of witnesses through their actual observation of the witnesses' manner of testifying, their demeanor and behavior in court. Unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, the trial court's assessment must be respected, for it had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying and detect if they were lying. The rule finds an even more stringent application where the said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals, 20 as in this case.
All told, petitioner's guilt for carnapping and robbery was proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Section 14 of RA 6539, as amended, penalizes carnapping, as follows:
x x x Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is defined in Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of motor vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and not more than seventeen years and four months, when the carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of persons, of force upon things; and by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.
Petitioner escaped from jail, hence, he is disqualified from the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. He should, therefore, be meted the straight penalty of thirty (30) years for committing the offense of carnapping by means of violence and intimidation.
On the crime of robbery, Article 294 (5) of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period. Petitioner is, therefore, sentenced to a penalty of eight (8) years, and twenty-one (21) days to ten (10) years of prision mayor.
Finally, the Court of Appeals correctly ordered petitioner to indemnify Andes the sum of P150.00 representing the amount he took during the commission of robbery. 21
WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated November 27, 2015 and Resolution dated May 13, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 36854 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, thus:
1. In Criminal Case No. 11801 for carnapping under Republic Act No. 6539 (RA 6539), Fulgencio Obligacion is sentenced to thirty (30) years; and,
2. In Criminal Case No. 11802 for robbery under Article 294 (5) of the Revised Penal Code, Fulgencio Obligacion is sentenced to eight (8) years, and twenty-one (21) days to ten (10) years of prision mayor.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Magdangal M. De Leon and concurred in by Associate Justice Elihu A. Ybañez and Associate Justice Victoria Isabel A. Paredes, rollo, pp. 30-45.
2. Id. at 47-48.
3. Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972.
4. Rollo, p. 33.
5. Id. at 33-34.
6. Id. at 34.
7. Id. at 36.
8. Id. at 91-92.
9. Id. at 71-80.
10. Id. at 44.
11. Id. at 47-48.
12. Vidar v. People, 625 Phil. 57, 69 (2010).
13. 609 Phil. 397, 417 (2009).
14. 822 Phil. 770, 778 (2017).
15. 777 Phil. 29, 54-55 (2016).
16. 631 Phil. 547, 556 (2010).
17. 781 Phil. 701, 715 (2016).
18. People v. Piosang, 710 Phil. 519, 527 (2013).
19. People v. Dagsa, 824 Phil. 704, 720, (2018).
20. People v. Gerola, 813 Phil. 1055, 1063-1064 (2017).
21. Marquez, et al. v. People, 700 Phil. 47, 67 (2012).