FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 193341. June 5, 2013.]
DIONISIO S. NODADO, petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., EDGARDO A. COLICO, ANTONIO BEBIC AND M. OMAYAO, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated June 5, 2013 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 193341 (Dionisio S. Nodado, petitioner, versus Philippine Airlines, Inc., Edgardo A. Colico, Antonio Bebic and M. Omayao, respondents.). — The present petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision 1 dated May 27, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed the judgment 2 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) finding that petitioner Dionisio S. Nodado was illegally dismissed by Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) and Edgardo A. Colico.
PAL is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of air transportation. 3 Petitioner had been an employee of PAL since August 27, 1967. He rose from the ranks and was working as supervisor of the Terminal 2 Ramp at the Ramp Services Department of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport at the time of his dismissal on October 14, 2006. 4
In an audit by PAL of overtime payments granted to its employees, it was discovered that an unauthorized overtime payment totaling P71,595.22 representing 286.5 overtime hours for the period covering June 2005 to August 2006 was paid to petitioner. 5 CSHEAI
After due notice and hearing, petitioner was found guilty of violating the PAL Code of Discipline, which requires prior written authorization from an employee's immediate superior and approval by the Division/Department Head before such employee may render compensable overtime work. Petitioner was terminated from his employment effective October 14, 2006. 6
On December 21, 2006, petitioner filed a Complaint 7 against respondents for illegal dismissal, alleging that he rendered overtime work for 848 hours as evidenced by PAL's Electronic Timekeeping System and as attested to in an affidavit executed by nine co-workers. He also argued that he was not informed as to whether his requests for authority to render overtime services were approved; hence, he assumed that he was entitled to overtime pay. 8
In a Decision 9 rendered on February 18, 2008, Labor Arbiter Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr. dismissed the complaint for illegal dismissal, saying that petitioner willfully violated PAL's policy regarding overtime payment by receiving payroll money for unauthorized overtime work and by making false representations to the Timekeeping Clerk that he has been authorized to render overtime work. These acts, according to the Labor Arbiter, defrauded the company because petitioner received payment to which he was not entitled. Such acts, held the Labor Arbiter, constitute deliberate disobedience of management authority which are acts of gross misconduct and willful disobedience that warranted the termination of petitioner from his employment, pursuant to paragraphs (a) and (c) of Article 282 of the Labor Code. 10
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter's decision and held that petitioner was illegally dismissed.
The NLRC, in its Decision 11 dated July 21, 2008, explained that no written notice was given to petitioner that he failed to submit written authorizations for overtime work. Neither was there an allegation that PAL called his attention on the matter, so he thought that everything was in order. Hence, said the NLRC, petitioner's assumption that his written requests for authority were approved has factual basis. 12
Unsatisfied, PAL sought recourse with the CA which as aforesaid, reinstated the Labor Arbiter's Decision and held that petitioner was not illegally dismissed.
The CA held that petitioner's defiance of PAL's rules on overtime work constitutes willful disobedience of respondent's rules and regulations, fraud, and dishonesty. The CA sustained the Labor Arbiter's ruling that it is within the ambit of management prerogative to impose reasonable penalties upon employees who transgress the company's rules and regulations, and the deliberate disregard or disobedience of the rules and defiance of management authority cannot be countenanced. 13
The CA, however, for equitable reasons, ordered respondent to pay petitioner financial assistance equivalent to a month's salary. 14
Insisting that he was illegally dismissed, petitioner now assails the appellate court's decision before this Court raising the sole issue of whether he was guilty of willful disobedience, thus warranting the penalty of dismissal from employment. ScCEIA
We hold that petitioner is guilty of willful disobedience. The CA committed no reversible error in reinstating the Labor Arbiter's decision holding that petitioner was not illegally dismissed by PAL.
Willful disobedience by an employee of the lawful orders of the employer in connection with the employee's work constitutes a just cause for the termination of an employee. 15 For the willful disobedience by the employee to be considered a just cause for terminating his or her employment, the subject orders must be (1) reasonable and lawful; (2) sufficiently known to the employee; and (3) in connection with the duties which the employee had been engaged to discharge. 16
Salavarria v. Letran College 17 is instructive on this point. It explains:
Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the dictum that when employers issue rules and regulations operative in a workplace[, they] are deemed part of the contract of employment binding upon the employees who enter the service, on the assumption that they are knowledgeable of such rules. Thus, in the event of a violation, an employee may be validly terminated from his employment on the ground that "an employer can not rationally be expected to retain the employment of a person whose lack of morals, respect and loyalty to his employer, regard for his employer's rules and application of the dignity and responsibility, has so plainly and completely been bared." (Emphasis supplied.)
Jurisprudence 18 further provides that any employee may be dismissed for violation of a reasonable company rule or regulation for the conduct of the latter's business. The CA also cited Ramoran v. Jardine CMG Life Insurance Co., Inc., 19wherein an employee was validly dismissed for falsification of overtime authorization slips, a case analogous to the one at bar.
The pertinent provision of PAL's Overtime Compensation Policy 20 provides:
Prior written authorization from the immediate superior and approval by the Division/Department Head is necessary for an employee to render compensable work in excess of the regular working hours and/or on days-off or on company observed holidays. Only on the strength of such prior authorization and approval may corresponding payment be effected.
Clearly, PAL requires prior written authorization from an employee's immediate superior and Division or Department Head before such employee may render compensable overtime work. However, despite such policy, petitioner intentionally and willfully violated the same, receiving payroll money representing overtime payments for nine months by making false representations to the Timekeeping Clerk that he has received authorization and that these are being processed. 21
Indeed, the Labor Arbiter and the CA were both correct in saying that such acts are a deliberate disregard, disobedience and defiance of management authority which constitute acts of willful disobedience that warranted the termination of petitioner from his employment in accordance with paragraphs (a) and (c) of Article 282 of the Labor Code. 22 SCHcaT
However, the CA erred in awarding, for equitable reasons, financial assistance equivalent to a month's salary to petitioner. Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hyatt (SAMASAH-NUWHRAIN) v. Magsalin 23 states:
The grant of separation pay or some other financial assistance to an employee dismissed for just causes is based on equity. In Phil. Long Distance Telephone Co. v. NLRC, we ruled that severance compensation, or whatever name it is called, on the ground of social justice shall be allowed only when the cause of the dismissal is other than serious misconduct or for causes which reflect adversely on the employee's moral character. . . . (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
In this case, petitioner's misrepresentation as to his authority to render compensable overtime work is an act of serious misconduct, defined as a "transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment." 24 Being an act of dishonesty towards PAL, petitioner's act of misrepresenting possession of authority to render compensable overtime work will then disqualify him from receiving any financial assistance.
In addition, such misrepresentation is an act of fraud or dishonesty committed against PAL, which is another just cause for termination of employment. 25
The case of San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC, 26wherein two security guards of San Miguel Corporation were validly dismissed for falsifying their time cards likewise held that "[t]he falsification and fraud which the private respondents committed against their employer were inexcusable. . . . . Their acts constituted dishonesty and serious misconduct, lawful grounds for their dismissal under Art. 282, subpars. (a) and (c), of the Labor Code, . . . ."
Clearly, petitioner's fraudulent act of misrepresenting possession of authority to render compensable overtime work, which enabled him to receive unauthorized overtime pay, is not only an act of serious misconduct, but is also an act of fraud, both of which are just causes for termination.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court hereby AFFIRMS the May 27, 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 107674, reversing the judgment of the National Labor Relations Commission finding that Dionisio S. Nodado was illegally dismissed by Philippine Airlines, Inc., and Edgardo A. Colico. The award for financial assistance ordered by the Court of Appeals is, however, DELETED.
With costs against the petitioner.
The letter dated March 26, 2013 of the Judicial Records Division, Court of Appeals, Manila, transmitting the Court of Appeals rollo consisting of 666 pages is NOTED.
SO ORDERED." CAaDTH
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 411-428. Penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta and concurred in by Associate Justices Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla and Michael P. Elbinias. The assailed decision was rendered in CA-G.R. SP No. 107674.
2.Id. at 189-197. Penned by NLRC Commissioner Gregorio O. Bilog III and concurred in by Presiding Commissioner Lourdes C. Javier and Commissioner Tito F. Genilo.
3.Id. at 412.
4.Id.
5.Id.
6.ld. at413.
7.Id. at 28.
8.Id. at 31-34.
9.Id. at 135-156.
10.Id. at 153.
11.Supra note 2.
12.Id. at 193.
13.Id. at 425.
14.Id. at 428.
15.Art. 282. Termination by employer. — An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following just causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
16.C.A. Azucena, Jr., Vol. II, THE LABOR CODE WITH COMMENTS AND CASES 731 (6th ed., 2007).
17.357 Phil. 189, 195 (1998), citing Philippine-Singapore Transport Services, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 95449, August 18, 1997, 277 SCRA 506, 512.
18.See Soco v. Mercantile Corporation of Davao, 232 Phil. 488, 494-495 (1987).
19.383 Phil. 83, 101 (2000).
20.Rollo, p. 48.
21.Id. at 426.
22.Id.
23.G.R. Nos. 164939 & 172303, June 6, 2011, 650 SCRA 445, 458.
24.C.A. Azucena, Jr., supra note 16, at 725, citing Dept. of Labor Manual, Sec. 4343.01.
25.Art. 282. Termination by employer. — An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following just causes:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative;
xxx xxx xxx
26.256 Phil. 271, 275-276 (1989).