Navarro v. Espenelli

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 211426. June 18, 2018.]

ALMA G. NAVARRO, petitioner, vs. SEGUNDO ESPENELLI, SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedJune 18, 2018which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 211426 (Alma G. Navarro v. Segundo Espenelli, substituted by his heirs).

This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed under Rule 45 prays for the reversal of the Decision 2 dated April 11, 2013 and Resolution 3 dated January 22, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 00969-MIN. The CA affirmed in toto the November 3, 2005 Decision 4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City, Branch 32, in Civil Case No. 400 for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of Ordinance No. 04, series of 1993.

Antecedents

On March 4, 1997, Segundo Espenelli (respondent) filed a Complaint before the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 32, for Annulment or Declaration of Nullity of Ordinance No. 04, Series of 1993. The ordinance is entitled "An Ordinance Amending Municipal Ordinance No. 06 Authorizing the Municipal Mayor to Issue Permit or License the Establishment, Operation and Maintenance of Cockpits, and Regulate Cockfighting and Commercial Breeding of Gamecocks in this Municipality[,] Provided that Existing Rights Should Not be Violated" (assailed ordinance). 5 The complaint originally impleaded Rodolfo G. Navarro, in his capacity as Mayor of Dapa; Pedro B. Gonzales, Jr., in his capacity as Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Bayan; and Ramon M. Gotinga, Wilifortes U. Penecitos, Ambrosio D. Bulac, Corazon T. Espaldon, Cayetano Sunico, Rosie M. Libay, Trinidad E. Consigo, Manuel A. Apolo, and Ian Joseph N. Penecitos, in their capacities as Members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. 6

Respondent principally alleged that the assailed ordinance was void and without legal effect, as it did not exist and had not been approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Surigao del Norte. 7

On December 22, 1998, the Complaint was amended to implead Alma G. Navarro (petitioner) who succeeded her husband, Rodolfo G. Navarro, as Mayor of Dapa; Municipal Treasurer Fernando Durero; and Barangay Captain Ernesto Bajas (Bajas). 8 Respondent further alleged that despite his being the sole and legitimate license holder for the operation of a cockpit in Dapa, Surigao del Norte, petitioner allowed Bajas to operate and hold a cockfight in Barangay Osmeña on Saturdays, and even permitted the construction of a cockpit. 9

On January 25, 1999, respondent filed a Second Motion for Leave of Court to File A Second Supplemental Complaint alleging that petitioner and the Dapa Chief of Police violently stopped the cockfight held in his cockpit on January 10, 1999. 10

After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a Decision dated November 25, 2005 in favor of respondent and declared the assailed ordinance void. It found that the assailed ordinance was not actually submitted and/or transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Surigao del Norte for appropriate action 11 as required by Section 57 12 of the Local Government Code. This was established by two certifications issued by Sangguniang Panlalawigan Secretary Leopoldo Lugo, both dated February 25, 1997, to the effect that Resolution No. 162[,] Series of 1993[,] is a resolution approving Ordinance No. 04[,] Series of 1993[,] of the Municipality of Dapa which imposes fees on users of the Municipal Gymnasium, and that based on the record of the sanggunian, there was no approved Municipal Ordinance No. 04 amending Municipal Ordinance No. 06 authorizing the Municipal Mayor to issue permit or license the establishment, operation and maintenance of cockpits, and regulate cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks in the Municipality of Dapa, provided that existing rights should not be prejudiced. 13 In conclusion, the RTC found it highly irregular if not incredible for the Municipality of Dapa to enact ordinances dealing with different subject matters but with the same ordinance number and series. 14

The RTC thus disposed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby decreed:

a. That Municipal Ordinance No. 04 Series of 1993, of the Sangguniang Bayan of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, is null and void and all acts emanating therefrom, based thereon or subsequent thereto are of no legal effect;

b. That plaintiff is hereby ordered to be restored to his status quo ante immediately without delay as if his rights thereto had never been interrupted;

c. That defendant Mayor ALMA NAVARRO and Chief of Police DIOSDADO MORALES, JR., are hereby jointly and severally condemned to pay the plaintiff the amount of ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00) by way of moral damages;

d. That in order to serve as deterrent for others committing similar acts, defendant Mayor ALMA NAVARRO and Chief of Police DIOSDADO MORALES, JR., are further jointly and severally condemned to pay the plaintiff the amount of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) by way of exemplary damages;

e. That defendant Mayor ALMA NAVARRO and Chief of Police DIOSDADO MORALES, JR., are likewise jointly and severally condemned to pay the plaintiff ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P150,000.00) by way of Attorney's Fees plus TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) per Court appearance;

f. That defendant Mayor ALMA NAVARRO and Chief of Police DIOSDADO MORALES, JR., are ordered to return all the things confiscated from the plaintiff and/or from the private individuals participating in the derby on January 10, 1999; and

g. To pay the litigation expenses and costs of the suit.

There being no proof to show any liability on the part of the other defendants, the case as to them, is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED. 15

On appeal, petitioner questioned the presiding judge's authority to decide the case, contending that he was ordered to focus solely on deciding cases that were already submitted for decision by virtue of an assisting judge having been assigned to hear and try pending cases. Petitioner also argued that the evidence on record supports a contrary conclusion. Nonetheless, the CA upheld the RTC's ruling.

In debunking the late Judge Jose Manuel Tan's alleged lack of authority to decide the case, the CA construed Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 77-2005 dated June 16, 2005 (as amended by A.O. No. 119-2005 dated August 9, 2005), designating an assisting judge for the court a quo and directing Judge Tan to devote more time resolving cases already submitted for decision, as a general directive for the expeditious resolution of pending cases before the said court and not a withholding of his authority to decide this case. 16

Anent the invalidity or legal inexistence of Municipal Ordinance No. 04, Series of 1993 relied on by petitioner, the CA found a wealth of evidence on record indicating that Municipal Ordinance No. 04, Series of 1993 transmitted to and approved by inaction of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan actually pertains to the imposition of fees on the use of the municipal gymnasium of Dapa. 17 From this, the CA concluded that the assailed ordinance purportedly granting the Mayor of Dapa authority to issue permits or licenses for the operation of cockpits was a phantom rider clause that was never part of the original legislation. 18

As to the petitioner's liability for damages, the CA agreed that as borne out by the evidence, petitioner's actuations since 1997 in issuing permits to certain individuals signify exploitation of public office for the benefit of cronies, in violation of the fundamental tenet that public office is a public trust. 19 The CA also considered the fact that the respondent was already 70 years old when he filed his complaint before the RTC. 20

Hence, petitioner's present recourse.

The Issues

I. Did the CA err in affirming the RTC Decision, which declared that the assailed municipal ordinance is inexistent, thereby a nullity, and held petitioner liable to respondent for damages? 21

II. Did the CA err in affirming the RTC Decision despite the late Judge Jose Manuel P. Tan being unable to legally render the judgment? 22

The Court's Ruling

After a thorough review of the records, We find no reversible error in the presently assailed decision and resolution of the CA.

As reiterated in City of Batangas v. Philippine Shell Petroleum Corporation and Shell Philippines Exploration B.V.:

This Court, not being a trier of facts, accords the highest degree of respect to the findings of fact of the trial court, especially where, as here, they have been affirmed by the CA; accordingly, these findings will not be disturbed. To be sure, such findings are binding and conclusive upon this Court, and it is not the Court's function in a petition for review on certiorari to examine, evaluate or weigh anew the probative value of the evidence presented before the trial court. 23

Indeed, there are recognized exceptions to the said rule, but none is present in this case. The CA carefully considered the same evidence before the RTC. We agree that the certification and testimony of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's Secretary leads only to one conclusion, i.e., Municipal Ordinance No. 04, Series of 1993 transmitted to and approved by inaction of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan actually pertains to the imposition of fees on the use of the municipal gymnasium of Dapa. It is indeed highly irregular, if not ridiculous, for the Municipality of Dapa to enact ordinances dealing with different subject matters but with the same ordinance number and series.

Having established that the assailed ordinance is legally inexistent and was apparently used by petitioner to favor private interests, petitioner cannot invoke the presumption of validity. Certainly, the presumption of validity ascribed to an ordinance prevails only in the absence of some factual foundation of record sufficient to overthrow the assailed issuance. 24 In this case, the presumption of validity ascribed to the assailed ordinance had been overturned by a preponderance of documentary and testimonial evidence.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED." Leonardo-de Castro, J., designated as Acting Chairperson of the First Division per Special Order No. 2559 dated May 11, 2018; Gesmundo, J., designated as Acting Member of the First Division per Special Order No. 2560 dated May 11, 2018.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENAActing Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 14-29.

2. Penned by Associate Justice Marie Christine Azcarraga-Jacob and concurred in by Associate Justices Edgardo T. Lloren and Henri Jean Paul B. Inting. Id. at 53-63.

3.Id. at 64-65.

4. Penned by Judge Jose Manuel P. Tan. Id. at 31-52.

5.Id. at p. 55.

6.Id.

7.Id.

8.Id.

9.Id. at 56.

10.Id.

11.Id.

12.Section 57. Review of Barangay Ordinances by the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan. —

   (a) Within ten (10) days after its enactment, the Sangguniang Barangay shall furnish copies of all Barangay ordinances to the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang bayan concerned for review as to whether the ordinance is consistent with law and city or municipal ordinances.

   (b) If the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang bayan, as the case may be, fails to take action on Barangay ordinances within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, the same shall be deemed approved.

   (c) If the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang bayan, as the case may be, finds the Barangay ordinances inconsistent with law or city or municipal ordinances, the Sanggunian concerned shall, within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, return the same with its comments and recommendations to the Sangguniang Barangay concerned for adjustment, amendment, or modification; in which case, the effectivity of the Barangay ordinance is suspended until such time as the revision called for is effected.

13. Rollo, p. 57.

14. Id. at 58.

15. Id. at 51-52.

16. Id. at 59-60.

17. Id. at 60-61.

18. Id.

19. Id. at 62.

20. Id.

21. Id. at 17 and 182.

22. Id.

23. G.R. 195003, June 7, 2017.

24. City of Batangas v. Philippine Shell Petroleum Corporation, supra.