Navarrete v. People

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 253340. May 3, 2021.]

ROBERTO V. NAVARRETE, petitioner,vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedMay 3, 2021which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 253340 (Roberto V. Navarrete v. People of the Philippines). — After a judicious study of the case, the Court resolves to deny the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court for failure to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals (CA) committed any reversible error in the assailed Resolutions as to warrant the exercise of the Court's appellate jurisdiction.

The healing period stated by Bernardo Maralit's (Maralit) physician, Dr. Edgar Mendoza (Dr. Mendoza) in the Medical Certificate 2 is the proper basis to determine the existence of the second element of the crime of serious physical injuries, "illness or incapacity for work for more than 30 days." Paragraph 4, Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) states:

Article 263. Serious physical injuries. — Any person who shall wound, beat, or assault another, shall be guilty of the crime of serious physical injuries and shall suffer:

xxx xxx xxx

4. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, if the physical injuries inflicted shall have caused the illness or incapacity for labor of the injured person for more than thirty days.

xxx xxx xxx

To classify as serious physical injuries under the paragraph 4, Article 263 of the RPC, there must be evidence on the length of that period. The use of the disjunctive conjunction "or" indicates that either of the two elements may separately constitute the crime. The cited provision requires illness or incapacity for labor, not medical attendance. Noticeably, medical attendance is not even mentioned in said paragraph. 3 There is illness constituting serious physical injuries when the wound inflicted did not heal within 30 days. 4

In this case, there is sufficient evidence of the length of period of Maralit's illness based on the Medical Certificate Dr. Mendoza issued and as revealed in his testimony quoted below: ETHIDa

ATTY. BRINGAS:

You also answered in question no. 18 that the healing period is more than thirty (30) days. Is that correct?

WITNESS:

Yes, sir.

ATTY. BRINGAS:

By that healing, he would be incapacitated to work?

WITNESS:

No, sir. Just only after the healing of the bone, the strength of the bone with regards the proper alignment but he can work. 5

Though he was not incapacitated to report to work for more than 30 days, this did not negate the fact that his illness lasted for more than 30 days. Since the injury to his left eye required a healing period of more than 30 days, this circumstance qualifies as serious physical injuries under paragraph (4), Article 264 of the RPC. Thus, the argument of Roberto Navarrete (Navarrete) that Maralit was able to report to work on days he claimed to be incapacitated for labor, as reflected in the Daily Time Records' s Navarrete presented, is immaterial and will not excuse him from liability.

Notwithstanding the affirmance of Navarrete's conviction for serious physical injuries, it must be highlighted that the crime committed was preceded by a heated argument between him and Maralit. As narrated by Navarrete and his witness, Donaldo Saavedra, he was picking up papers Maralit threw at him during their heated exchange when Navarrete saw from the corner of his eye that Maralit was going to attack him. Navarrete parried the blows and, in the process, punched Maralit on his left eye. 6 Considering that Navarrete merely parried the blows from Maralit and that he only threw a single punch, these factors reveal that he did not intend to commit so grave a wrong as that committed. There was a notable and evident disproportion between the means he employed and the consequence of his act. Thus, Navarrete is entitled to the mitigating circumstance under paragraph 3, Article 13 of the RPC "that the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed."

Since the offense was attended by a mitigating circumstance without any aggravating circumstance to offset it, the imposable penalty is within the range of the minimum of that provided by law, arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, or from four (4) months and one (1) day to one (1) year. Accordingly, Navarrete is sentenced to suffer the straight penalty of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor.

Section 3 of Republic Act No. 11362, otherwise known as the "Community Service Act" 7 allows the rendition of community service in lieu of imprisonment in the service of penalty for arresto menor and arresto mayor. Navarrete may avail the privilege of this Act, if eligible.

The ruling of the lower court ordering Navarrete to pay Maralit P194,825.15 as actual damages and P50,000.00 as moral damages, plus interest of six percent (6%) per annum on the damages awarded from the date of finality of this decision until full payment stands.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. However, the prison sentence imposed by the Metropolitan Trial Court, as affirmed by the Regional Trial Court is MODIFIED as follows: Petitioner Roberto V. Navarrete is sentenced to suffer the straight penalty of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor. Petitioner Navarrete may avail of the provisions of the Community Service Act and its guidelines, if eligible.

Petitioner Roberto V. Navarrete is ORDERED to pay private complainant Bernardo S. Maralit P194,825.15 as actual damages and P50,000.00 as moral damages, plus interest of six percent (6%) per annum on the damages awarded from the date of finality of this Resolution until full payment.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

By:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 20-52.

2.Id. at 161.

3. Reyes, Luis B. The Revised Penal Code Book Two (17th edition), p. 542.

4.People v. Penesa, 81 Phil. 398 (1948).

5. TSN dated May 17, 2016, pp. 15-16.

6.Rollo, p. 71.

7. Section 3. Community Service. — Article 88a of Act No. 3815 is hereby inserted to read as follows:

Article 88a. Community Service. — The court in its discretion may, in lieu of service in jail, require that the penalties of arresto menor and arresto mayor be served by the defendant by rendering community service in the place where the crime was committed, under such terms as the court shall determine, taking into consideration the gravity of the offense and the circumstances of the case, which shall be under the supervision of a probation officer: Provided, That the court will prepare an order imposing the community service, specifying the number of hours to be worked and the period within which to complete the service. The order is then referred to the assigned probation officer who shall have responsibility of the defendant.

The defendant shall likewise be required to undergo rehabilitative counseling under the social welfare and development officer of the city or municipality concerned with the assistance of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). In requiring community service, the court shall consider the welfare of the society and the reasonable probability that the person sentenced shall not violate the law while rendering the service.

Community service shall consist of any actual physical activity which inculcates civic consciousness, and is intended towards the improvement of a public work or promotion of a public service.

If the defendant violates the terms of the community service, the court shall order his/her re-arrest and the defendant shall serve the full term of the penalty, as the case may be, in jail, or in the house of the defendant as provided under Article 88. However, if the defendant has fully complied with the terms of the community service, the court shall order the release of the defendant unless detained for some other offense.

The privilege of rendering community service in lieu of service in jail shall be availed of only once.