SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 218076. January 13, 2021.]
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.DARDAGAN PANGAGA, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated13 January 2021which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 218076 (National Power Corporation v. Dardagan Pangaga). — This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court assails the Decision 2 dated August 14, 2014 and Resolution 3 dated April 16, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA)-Cagayan de Oro City in CA-G.R. CV No. 02737-MIN, which affirmed with modifications the Decision 4 dated October 27, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marawi City, Branch 10, in Civil Case No. 1334-95.
The following facts were established during trial. Towns neighboring Lanao Lake were inundated during heavy rains that occurred in 1979, 1984, 1986, 1989, 1993, 1994, and 1995 that caused severe damages to properties and livelihoods, including respondent Dardagan Pangaga's (respondent) profit-generating quarry land in Barangay Caloocan, Marawi, Lanao del Sur. It was, however, only in 1994 when respondent discovered that the proximate cause of the flooding was the petitioner National Power Corporation's (petitioner) operation of the Agus Regulation Dam which started in 1979. This prompted respondent to request from petitioner the release of water from the dam to allow Lake Lanao to take its natural course to Agus River to prevent overflow. The request went unheeded, instead he was asked to submit photos of the damage for possible indemnification. In a letter dated February 9, 1994, however, petitioner denied liability, averring that it maintained the water level below the maximum limit. Respondent, along with other claimants, then sought relief from Palawan Lomondaya, Agus 1 and 2 manager, to no avail. 5 Beset by clamors of indemnification from several others affected by the deluge, petitioner created a task force to validate the complaints. After investigations, petitioner's Board of Directors issued Resolution No. 94-343, 6 confirming the damages caused by the flooding; identifying the areas affected, which included Marawi City; and granting financial assistance to those affected. There was no allegation or proof, however, that the grant was released and apparently, respondent was one of those not indemnified. Left with no other recourse, respondent filed a Complaint 7 for damages against petitioner, before the RTC of Marawi City on April 17, 1995. On October 25, 2006, an Amended Complaint 8 was filed to include damages caused by the floods in 1996 and 2004.
Petitioner denied responsibility, claiming that it has regularly performed its duty under Memorandum Order (MO) No. 398 9 of the Office of the President, i.e., to maintain the normal maximum lake elevation at 702 meters and to build benchmarks to warn the inhabitants in the area that cultivation of land below the 702-meter mark is forbidden. Petitioner, instead, blamed respondent for maintaining a property below the 702-meter watermark; and also argued that the damage was caused by nature, which is beyond petitioner's control. 10
After trial, the RTC found preponderant evidence, showing petitioner's negligence in the operation of the dam, which caused damages to respondent's property. Citing also the relevant case of National Power Corporation v. CA11(NPC) in its Decision 12 dated October 27, 2011, the RTC disposed:
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Dardagan Pangaga and against defendant National Power Corporation[,] directing said defendant to pay unto plaintiff the following:
1. Defendant is ordered to pay plaintiff the sum of [P]3,500,000.00 as temperate damages, with legal interest at 12% per annum on the amount herein above adjudged from the date of finality of herein Decision until satisfaction thereof;
2. Defendant is ordered to pay plaintiff the sum of [P]200,000.00 as moral damages; CAIHTE
3. Defendant is likewise ordered to pay the Plaintiff the sum of [P]100,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4. Defendant is moreover ordered to pay the Plaintiff the sum of [P]200,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
5. Defendant is finally ordered to pay plaintiff the sum of [P]20,000.00 as litigation expenses.
The counter-claim of herein defendant is DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence.
Costs against defendant.
SO ORDERED.13 (Emphasis in the original.)
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA, which affirmed the RTC Decision with modifications as to the award of damages, thus:
WHEREFORE, the October 27, 2011 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Marawi City, in Civil Case No. 1334-95 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. The award for temperate damages is reduced to [P]2,500,000.00 and the award for litigation expense is DELETED. All other awards are SUSTAINED.
SO ORDERED. 14
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied, 15 hence, this petition under Rule 45. Petitioner maintains that it has no liability for the damages suffered by respondent because it regularly performed its function in the operation of the Agus Regulation Dam; 16 there is no direct causal relationship between the operation of the dam and the damages sustained by respondent; 17 and respondent's cause of action is barred by prescription and laches. 18 In addition, petitioner posits that the earlier case of NPC does not find application because there is no identity of parties, location, and rights being asserted. 19
We deny the Petition.
The Petition essentially implores this Court to review the RTC and CA's factual findings and appreciation of evidence, an undertaking which is beyond the scope of a judicial review under Rule 45. It is well-settled that the factual findings of the trial court, especially so when affirmed by the appellate court, is conclusive upon this Court. Although there are jurisprudentially-recognized exceptions 20 to this rule, the petitioner has the burden to allege, substantiate, and prove that the case clearly falls under the exceptions to warrant this Court's judicial review. This is consistent with the basic principle that this Court's review of appeals is, in the first place, not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion. 21 Here, petitioner did not allege, much less prove, that a re-assessment of the factual findings is warranted. Hence, we find no cogent reason to disturb the uniform findings and conclusions of the RTC and the CA.
In any case, we find preponderant evidence to sustain respondent by reason of quasi-delict under Article 2176 22 of the New Civil Code that "[w]hoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done." 23
First, that respondent's quarry land was damaged by the floods, was undisputed and evidenced by the photographs and testimonial evidence on record.
Second, petitioner is presumed to be negligent in its operation of the Agus Regulation Dam under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and it failed to adduce sufficient evidence to refute this presumption. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur or literally, "the thing speaks for itself," permits an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant when the wrongful or negligent act or omission is difficult to prove, like in this case wherein nature or an act of God (flash floods) ruined respondent's property. The Latin maxim speaks of the rule that, as a matter of common knowledge and experience and in the absence of an acceptable explanation from the defendant, the very nature of occurrences justifies an inference of negligence on the defendant's part when he has control of the thing causing the injury. In other words, the doctrine creates a prima facie case for the complainant and as such, the burden of evidence shifts to the defendant to prove that he did not act with negligence. 24 It effectively furnishes a bridge for the complainant, who has no knowledge of the cause of the damage or injury, to acquire from the defendant, who knows or should know the cause, an explanation of care that he should have exercised to prevent the damage or injury. 25
Records show that the operation of the dam disrupted the natural flow of the water from Lanao Lake to the Agus River as the release of water from the lake to the river is now controlled by petitioner through the Agus Regulation Dam. If not for the dam under petitioner's control, there would have been no overflow of water from Lanao Lake that causes the flooding. Petitioner's claim of diligence in maintaining the appropriate water level was negated by the actual state of the affected areas as borne by the records. Also, no contributory negligence can be imputed against respondent as there was no proof that his property was below the 702-benchmark. 26 Notably, these findings were similarly observed in the earlier NPC case cited by the RTC and the CA: DETACa
The facts, as unraveled by the trial court from the evidence on record, established that before the construction of the Agus Regulation Dam across the Agus River just beyond the Marawi City Bridge, no report of damages to landowners around the lake was ever heard. After its construction and when it started functioning in 1978, reports and complaints of damages sustained by landowners around the lake due to overflooding became widespread. The factual findings of the trial court rightly support its conclusions on this respect —
. . . Lake Lanao has only one outlet, the Agus River which in effect is the natural regulator. When the Lake level is high, more water leaves the lakes [sic] towards the Agus River. Under such a natural course, overflooding is remote because excess in water level of the lake, there is a corresponding increase in the volume of water drain down towards the Agus River and vice versa.
In order to achieve its goal of generating hydroelectric power, defendant NPC constructed the Intake Regulation Dam, the purpose of which being to control and regulate the amount of water discharged into the Agus River. With this dam, defendant NPC is able to either increase or decrease the volume of water discharged into the Agus River depending on the amount of power to be generated. When the lake level rises, [especially] during rainy days, it is indispensable to wide open the dam to allow more water to flow to the Agus River to prevent overflowing of the lakeshore and the land around it. But the NPC cannot allow the water to flow freely into its outlet — the Agus River, because it will adversely affect its hydroelectric power plants. It has to hold back the water by its dam in order to maintain the volume of water required to generate the power supply. As a consequence of holding back the water, the lands around the lake are inundated. This is even admitted by defendant's witness Mama Manongguiring. x x x.
Petitioner adduced in evidence its company records to bear out its claim that the water level of the lake was, at no point in time, higher than 702 meters. The trial court and the Court of Appeals, however, did not lend credence to this piece of evidence. Both courts below held that the data contained in petitioner's records collapse in the face of the actual state of the affected areas. During the ocular inspection conducted by the lower court where representatives of both parties were present, it was established that in the subject areas, the benchmarks as pointed out by the NPC representative, could not be seen nor reached because they were totally covered with water. This fact, by itself, constitutes an unyielding proof that the water level did rise above the benchmarks and inundated the properties in the area.
In the absence of any clear explanation on what other factors could have explained the flooding in the neighboring properties of the dam, it is fair to reasonably infer that the incident happened because of want of care on the part of NPC to maintain the water level of the dam within the benchmarks at the maximum normal lake elevation of 702 meters. An application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the thing speaks for itself, comes to fore. Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care. 27 (Emphases supplied and citations omitted.)
Third, with these established circumstances, the causal connection between the petitioner's negligence and the damages sustained by respondent's property is evident. Petitioner cannot legally and fairly argue that the damage sustained by respondent's property was caused by nature beyond its control, and as such, should be regarded as damnum absque injuria or damage without injury as this principle is premised upon the valid exercise of right. 28 Needless to say, negligence in the performance of a duty is antithetical to the valid exercise of a right. We quote the relevant doctrine in NPC:
NPC staunchly asserts that the damages, if any, were due to a fortuitous event. Again, we cannot agree with petitioner. We defer instead to the findings and opinions expressed by the Court of Appeals that NPC cannot escape liability on the mere excuse that the rise of water was due to heavy rains that were acts of God. The rainy season is an expected occurrence and the NPC cannot stop doing its duty when the rains fall. In fact, it is during these critical times that the NPC needs to be vigilant to make sure that the lake level does not exceed the maximum level. Indeed, negligence or imprudence is human factor which makes the whole occurrence humanized, as it were, and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God. 29 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)
We do not agree with the petitioner that the doctrine laid down in the earlier NPC case is inapplicable in the present case. Contrary to the petitioner's assertions, the facts of this case, save for the complainants and specific properties involved, are identical to those obtaining in the NPC decision. NPC involved claims for damages on properties brought about by flash floods that occurred due to the operation of Agus Regulation Dam; and properties situated in Marantao, a municipality in Lanao del Sur similarly situated close to Lake Lanao like Marawi City. The trial court aptly observed that the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by the NPC in this case were exactly the same as those presented in the earlier NPC case. 30 Therefore, the RTC and the CA correctly applied the time-honored principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere — "to adhere to precedents, and not unsettle things which are established" 31 — to settle the issue of whether petitioner's construction and operation of the dam caused the inundations that resulted in the damage to respondent's property. In any case, the NPC ruling was not solely relied upon as the RTC and CA evaluated the evidence on record in arriving at the present conclusions. 32
As to the issue on prescription and laches, we agree with the CA that these matters are no longer proper issues on appeal, considering that these were not included in the pre-trial order and were never raised during trial. As a rule, the defense of prescription cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, 33 except when the facts demonstrating the lapse of the prescriptive period be otherwise sufficiently apparent on the record. 34 The CA correctly observed that respondent's causes of action arising in 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, and 2004 are not barred by the 4-year prescriptive period under Article 1146, New Civil Code since the Complaint and Amended Complaint were timely filed in 1995 and 2006. Laches — a doctrine of equity which is applied to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly inequitable situation or in an injustice 35 — also finds no application because it was only in 1994 when respondent became aware that it was petitioner's dam operation which caused the flash floods that damaged his property, and since then he has been vigilant in asserting his right up to present. aDSIHc
Finally, we find it proper to modify the interest imposed on the monetary awards. The interest rate should be reduced to six percent (6%) per annum, and should be imposed on the total judgment award from finality of this Resolution until full payment in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence. 36
FOR THESE REASONS, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated August 14, 2014 and Resolution dated April 16, 2015 of the Court of Appeals-Cagayan de Oro City in CA-G.R. CV No. 02737-MIN are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that six percent (6%) interest per annum shall be imposed on the total monetary awards from finality of this Resolution until full payment.
SO ORDERED. (Rosario, J., designated additional Member per Special Order No. 2797 dated November 5, 2020.)"
By authority of the Court:
TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDivision Clerk of Court
By:
(SGD.) MA. CONSOLACION GAMINDE-CRUZADADeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 26-47.
2.Id. at 53-65; penned by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting (now a Member of this Court), with the concurrence of Associate Justices Edgardo A. Camello and Pablito A. Perez.
3.Id. at 67-69.
4.Id. at 135-164; penned by Presiding Judge Wenida B.M. Papandayan.
5.Id. at 54-55.
6.Id. at 255-257.
7.Id. at 70-84.
8.Id. at 85-99.
9. PRESCRIBING MEASURES TO PRESERVE THE LAKE LANAO WATERSHED, TO ENFORCE THE RESERVATION OF AREAS AROUND THE LAKE BELOW SEVEN HUNDRED AND TWO METERS ELEVATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES; signed on November 15, 1973.
10.Rollo, pp. 55-56.
11. 493 Phil. 218 (2005).
12.Supra note 4.
13.Rollo, pp. 163-164.
14.Id. at 64.
15.Id. at 67-69.
16.Id. at 34-36.
17.Id. at 37-39.
18.Id. at 42-45.
19.Id. at 40-42.
20. (1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based: (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record[.] Pascual v. Burgos, 776 Phil. 167, 182-183 (2016), citing Medina v. Mayor Asistio, Jr., 269 Phil. 225, 232 (1990).
21.Id. at 181.
22. ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
23. Requisites to establish quasi-delict: "(1) damages to the plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or omission, of which defendant, or some person for whose acts he must respond, was guilty; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between such negligence and damages[;]" Torreon v. Aparra, 822 Phil. 561, 575 (2017), citing Vergara v. CA, 238 Phil. 565, 568 (1987).
24.Josefa v. Manila Electric Company, 739 Phil. 114, 130 (2014); and Tan v. Jam Transit, Inc., 620 Phil. 668, 680-681 (2009).
25.Josefa v. Manila Electric Company, supra at 130-131.
26. These circumstances satisfy the requisites of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, viz.: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured; Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. v. Alberto, 680 Phil. 813, 827 (2012).
27.National Power Corporation v. CA, supra note 11, at 226-228.
28.Amonoy v. Spouses Gutierrez, 404 Phil. 586, 595 (2001).
29.National Power Corporation v. CA, supra note 11, at 230; see also National Power Corporation v. CA, 294 Phil. 415, 427 (1993); and Vasquez v. CA, 223 Phil. 147, 151 (1985).
30.Rollo, p. 151.
31.Tala Realty Services Corp., Inc. v. Banco Filipino Savings & Mortgage Bank, 788 Phil. 19, 26-27 (2016).
32.Rollo, pp. 62 and 141-146.
33.Dino v. CA, 411 Phil. 594, 603 (2001), citing Ramos v. Osorio, 148 Phil. 483 (1971).
34.Id., citing Gicano v. Gegato, 241 Phil. 139, 145 (1988); REVISED RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC, Rule 9, Sec. 1.
35.Sec. of the DPWH v. Sps. Tecson, 713 Phil. 55, 69-70 (2013).
36.Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 716 Phil. 267 (2013); see Torreon v. Aparra, supra note 23, at 595.