THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 223403. February 28, 2018.]
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner,vs. FATIMA TENORIO, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR OF ILOCOS SUR, ANTONIO A. GUNDRAN, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE PROVINCIAL TREASURER OF ILOCOS SUR, REYNALDO BOTERES, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE MUNICIPAL ASSESSOR OF ALILEM, ILOCOS SUR, AND CRISTINA MONDERIN, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER OF ALILEM, ILOCOS SUR, respondents.
[G.R. Nos. 223460-61. February 28, 2018.]
LUZON HYDRO CORPORATION AND NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioners,vs. FATIMA TENORIO, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR OF ILOCOS SUR, ANTONIO A. GUNDRAN, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE PROVINCIAL TREASURER OF ILOCOS SUR, REYNALDO BOTERES, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE MUNICIPAL ASSESSOR OF ALILEM, ILOCOS SUR, AND CRISTINA MONDERIN, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER OF ALILEM, ILOCOS SUR, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated February 28, 2018, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 223403 (National Power Corporation v. Fatima Tenorio, in her official capacity as the Provincial Assessor of Ilocos Sur, Antonio A. Gundran, in his capacity as the Provincial Treasurer of Ilocos Sur, Reynaldo Boteres, in his official capacity as the Municipal Assessor of Alilem, Ilocos Sur, and Cristina Monderin, in her official capacity as the Municipal Treasurer of Alilem, Ilocos Sur) and G.R. Nos. 223460-61 (Luzon Hydro Corporation and National Power Corporation v. Fatima Tenorio, in her official capacity as the Provincial Assessor of Ilocos Sur, Antonio A. Gundran, in his capacity as the Provincial Treasurer of Ilocos Sur, Reynaldo Boteres, in his official capacity as the Municipal Assessor of Alilem, Ilocos Sur, and Cristina Monderin, in her official capacity as the Municipal Treasurer of Alilem, Ilocos Sur). — Before us are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari1 filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision 2 and Resolution 3 of the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc (CTA) dated January 7, 2015 and March 9, 2016, respectively, which ordered petitioner Luzon Hydro Corporation (LHC) to pay the real property tax assessment on machineries and equipment used in the operation of the Bakun AC Hydro Electric Power Plant.
The Antecedent Facts
On November 24, 1996, National Power Corporation (NPC), a government-owned and controlled corporation, entered into a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) for the design, construction, and operation of the Bakun AC Hydro Electric Power Plant, located in the Municipality of Alilem, Ilocos Sur, under a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) Agreement with the consortium composed of Northern Mini Hydro Corporation, Ever Electrical Manufacturing, Inc., Aboitiz Equity Ventures, Inc., and Pacific Hydro Limited, with LHC agreeing to assume all the rights and obligations of the Consortium under the PPA. On the other hand, NPC assumed the responsibility of paying real estate taxes and assessments, rates and other charges of the power plant and acquiring the necessary water permits from the National Water Regulatory Board (NWRB) and special land use permits from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
On November 18, 1998, NPC, LHC, and the Municipality of Alilem, Ilocos Sur entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) defining the respective commitments and obligations of the parties in the PPA, specifically requiring the Municipality of Alilem to help the parties in their obligations.
On July 2, 2003, LHC received two notices of assessment on the buildings and certain industrial machineries of the power plant. The first notice of assessment required LHC to pay the amount of P4,303,953.80, representing the Real Property Tax (RPT) for the 4th quarter of 2002 and the second notice of assessment for the amount of P17,233,175.00 for RPT for the year 2003.
On August 18, 2003, LHC filed a protest before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals of the Province of Ilocos Sur (LBAA). During the proceedings, NPC intervened, claiming responsibility for the payment of the RPT.
On April 1, 2005, LHC again received a notice of billing from the Municipal Assessor of Alilem, requiring it to pay the total sum of P77,184,226.24, representing the unpaid RPT for the years 2002 until 2005, to which LHC filed another protest before the LBAA.
Pending the proceedings before the LBAA, LHC, NPC, and the Municipality of Alilem entered into a Compromise Agreement where LHC and NPC shall partially pay the amount of P4,749,274.00 without prejudice to the payment of a higher tax or refund upon the final assessment of the RPT.
On March 16, 2009, the LBAA dismissed the protests for lack of merit and ordered LHC to pay the assessed RPT. The dispositive portion of the LBAA resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit, and Petitioner Luzon Hydro Corporation is hereby ORDERED to pay the realty taxes due on the subject real property to be computed based on the amount of Fair Market Value stated in the Tax Declaration Nos. 002-00510; 002-00511; 0[02]-00512; 002-00513; and 002-00444 and with an Assessment Level at the rate of Eighty Percent (80%) thereon, and after deducting the payments made, by virtue of their Compromise Agreement, LHC is ordered to pay the deficiency taxes due on the subject real property, plus the surcharges, penalties and interest from the fourth quarter of the year 2002 until it is fully paid, pursuant to and in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code (Republic Act No. 7160).
SO ORDERED. 4
The motion for reconsideration was also denied.
When the case was elevated to the Central Board of Assessment Appeals (CBAA), both the appeals of LHC and NPC, in a decision dated September 26, 2012, were dismissed for lack of merit. The CBAA ordered LHC liable to pay the assessed RPT, but removed the interest, surcharges, and penalties. The motions for reconsideration separately filed by LHC and NPC were also denied.
Aggrieved, NPC elevated the case to the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc (CTA) by filing a petition for review on May 30, 2013. 5 LHC, on the other hand, filed its petition for review on December 6, 2013. 6 The two cases were consolidated as they involved the same parties, arose from the same facts, and assailed the same decision.
Ruling of the CTA En Banc
In a decision promulgated on January 7, 2015, the CTA denied both petitions for review. The CTA held that the CBAA resolution has already attained finality for failure of LHC to timely file its petition for review before the CTA within the reglementary period, albeit NPC may have timely filed its petition for review, such was defective and invalid because it had no legal standing to protest the assessment of the CBAA. The assessment was clearly imposed against LHC, making NPC a stranger to the case.
The CTA gave no credence to LHC's averment that it had until December 6, 2013 to file its petition as it was only on November 6, 2013 when it received the CBAA decision. Looking into the records, the CTA determined that LHC received the same on May 22, 2013, thus, it only had until June 22, 2013 within which to file its petition for review. As the petition was filed only on December 6, 2013, it was clearly filed out of time. 7
Anent the issue on whether the subject properties are exempt from RPT, the CTA, on the basis of the import of paragraph (c), Section 234 of the Local Government Code (LGC), which commands that for properties to be exempt from RPT, the owner and the actual, direct, and exclusive user of the same must be a Government-Owned and Controlled Corporation (GOCC), determined that the subject properties were not exempt from RPT simply because the owner, LHC, is not a GOCC. The CTA held that it was undisputed that LHC, and not NPC, was the owner and the actual, direct, and exclusive user of the subject properties; therefore, the subject properties were not qualified as a "special class" subject to the 10% assessment level.
As regards the additional 55% assessment of the municipal assessor on the value of the machineries and equipment, the CTA pronounced that absent any proof to the contrary, the assessment of the municipal assessor enjoys presumption of regularity. The CTA took note of LHC's failure to comply with Sections 202 and 203 of the LGC requiring it to file a sworn statement within 60 days from acquisition or upon completion or occupancy of the improvement of the property. It was only after two notices of assessment that LHC filed its sworn statement without any documentary evidence to support it.
The CTA rejected LHC and NPC's contention that the Municipality of Alilem was bound by the PPA pursuant to the MOA, particularly in allowing NPC to assume the RPT liabilities of LHC. Referring to the stipulations in the MOA, the CTA found that there was no express provision in the MOA allowing such arrangement. Moreover, it classified the MOA as a contract of adhesion, where LHC and NPC induced the Mayor of Alilem to agree to the same. Given the ambiguities in the MOA, such ambiguities should be construed against LHC and NPC, the parties who prepared it. The dispositive portion of the decision of the CTA reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petitions for Review are DENIED, for lack of merit, additional to their respective jurisdictional defects. The Decision dated September 26, 2012 and Resolution dated March 21, 2013 of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in CBAA Case Nos. L-96 and L-99 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 8
Undaunted, LHC and NPC separately filed their motions for reconsideration, which the CTA denied. In its resolution dated March 9, 2016, the CTA explained that while it can take judicial notice of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 173, there was insufficient ground to suspend proceedings, which decision to suspend rests upon the discretion of the court. The CTA resolved that based on the circumstances, the suspension of the proceedings was more certain to result in delay. The CTA further declared that in any case, even with the denial of the motion to suspend the proceedings, the parties may still agree on a compromise, even after final judgment, and the non-suspension of the proceedings was not a bar to a compromise agreement and negotiations. CAIHTE
Hence, the present petitions separately filed by LHC and NPC. LHC and NPC postulate that the CTA committed a reversible error when it failed to suspend the proceedings to allow the parties to enter into an amicable settlement pursuant to E.O. No. 173, otherwise known as "Reduction and Condonation of Real Property Taxes and Interest/Penalties Assessed on the Power Generation Facilities of Independent Power Producers under Build-Operate-Transfer Contracts with Government-Owned and/or Controlled Corporations." LHC and NPC also insist that contrary to the ruling of the CTA, LHC is not the party responsible for the payment of the assessed RPT because LHC only enjoys naked ownership over the power plant. Instead, it is NPC, the beneficial owner, actual, direct and exclusive user of the energy generated by the power plant, which is responsible for the payment of the RPT. Corollary, therefore, NPC has a legal standing to question the RPT assessed on the subject properties. Besides, that the subject properties are exempt from RPT, it is also classified as a "special class" subject to the 10% assessment level under Sec. 216 of the LGC. LHC and NPC also submit that the additional 55% on the value of the machineries and equipment has no basis. Furthermore, the Municipality of Alilem must accord to the stipulations in the MOA allowing NPC to assume the tax liabilities of LHC.
Both LHC and NPC essentially raise the following issues:
I.
WHETHER LHC'S PETITION SHOULD BE DENIED FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE RULES OF CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING
II.
WHETHER THE CBAA RESOLUTION HAS ALREADY ATTAINED FINALITY
III.
WHETHER THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES ARE EXEMPT FROM RPT
IV.
WHETHER THE PROPERTIES CAN BE CONSIDERED AS A "SPECIAL CLASS" OF REAL PROPERTY TO BE SUBJECT TO THE LOWER 10% ASSESSMENT LEVEL
V.
WHETHER THE MUNICIPAL ASSESSOR IS CORRECT IN IMPOSING AN ADDITIONAL 55% ON THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTIES, REPRESENTING INSTALLATION COST OF 40% AND FREIGHT CHARGES OF 10% AS BASIS FOR THE ASSESSED RPT
VI.
WHETHER THE MUNICIPALITY OF ALILEM IS ESTOPPED FROM COLLECTING RPT FROM LHC BY VIRTUE OF THE MOA
VII.
WHETHER THE CTA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT SUSPENDING THE PROCEEDINGS TO GIVE THE PARTIES THE OPPORTUNITY TO AMICABLY SETTLE THE CASE PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 173
The Court's Ruling
First, the threshold issues.
I. Rene Manuel B. Ronquillo, LHC's
Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court mandates that the certificate against forum shopping be signed by the principal parties; however, should the principal party cannot sign the certification, the one signing must be duly authorized through a Special Power of Attorney (SPA). 9 In case of juridical entities, however, the person signing must be vested with authority through a board resolution or secretary's certificate to sign on behalf of the corporation. Absent any board resolution or secretary's certificate designating the person to file the petition and sign the certification, the petition is deemed fatally defective and is subject to dismissal.
In the case at bar, while LHC submitted a verification and certification against forum shopping signed by its President, Rene Manuel B. Ronquillo (Ronquillo), a review of the records reveals that no board resolution or secretary's certificate accompanied the petition. 10 Accordingly, the petition, having no valid board resolution or secretary's certificate authorizing Ronquillo to sign the certificate against forum shopping and file the instant petition on its behalf, is fatally defective and warrants dismissal. 11
II. The CBAA resolution has
LHC insists that the petition for review was timely filed on December 6, 2013 since it received the March 21, 2013 CBAA Resolution on November 6, 2013.
This Court has, on several occasions, pronounced the elementary rule that it is not a trier of facts. It is not the function of this Court to examine, review or evaluate the evidence all over again. Absent any evidence that findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; or when there is grave abuse of discretion, the findings of the trial court are final and conclusive. 12 Following the foregoing disquisition, absent any of the aforementioned circumstances, the Court affirms the findings of fact of the lower court. In any case, to dispel any doubts, a review of the Registry Return Receipt reveals that LHC received the CBAA's resolution on May 22, 2013, giving LHC 30 days from receipt of the decision or ruling or after the expiration of the period fixed by law or until June 22, 2013 to file its petition for review. Since the petition was filed only on December 6, 2013, it is clearly 167 days late, way beyond the reglementary period. 13 Having failed to timely appeal to the CTA, the CBAA resolution has attained finality.
Neither can LHC find reprieve in the fact that NPC timely filed its petition for review before the CTA. A pleading filed by a party, whose legal interest is lacking, can never halt the finality of a decision. As correctly resolved by the CTA, NPC has no legal standing to protest the RPT liabilities of LHC, which reasons will be further discussed below. This issue on whether a party can be accountable for the tax liability of another by virtue of a contractual assumption has been elucidated by the Court in National Power Corporation v. Province of Quezon, et al. (Napocor). 14 In Napocor, the Court clarified that mere contractual assumption of tax liability is insufficient; it must be supplemented by an interest that the party assuming the liability holds over the property. Simply stated, legal interest denotes that the party assuming tax liability must have the use and possession of the property, 15 which the NPC clearly lacks. We echo the words of the Court in Napocor on the unenforceability of a contractual assumption of tax liability of a third party on the government, in this wise:
We further stated that the tax liability must be a liability that arises from law, which the local government unit can rightfully and successfully enforce, not the contractual liability that is enforceable only between the parties to the contract. In the present case, the Province of Quezon is a third party to the BOT Agreement and could thus not exact payment from Napocor without violating the principle of relativity of contracts. Corollarily, for reasons of fairness, the local government units cannot be compelled to recognize the protest of a tax assessment from Napocor, an entity against whom it cannot enforce the tax liability. 16
Nonetheless, despite the fact that the present petition suffers from a fatal infirmity and warrants dismissal for lack of a board resolution or secretary's certificate authorizing Ronquillo to file and sign the petition on behalf of LHC and that the assailed CBAA resolution has already attained finality, to finally put to rest the present case, the Court shall discuss each substantial issue in seriatim.
III. The subject properties are
Section 234 of the LGC enumerates the properties exempt from RPT. Section 234 of the LGC reads:
Section 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax. — The following are exempted from payment of the real property tax:
(a) Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions except when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person;
(b) Charitable institutions, churches, parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit or religious cemeteries and all lands, buildings, and improvements actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable or educational purposes;
(c) All machineries and equipment that are actually, directly and exclusively used by local water districts and government owned or controlled corporations engaged in the supply and distribution of water and/or generation and transmission of electric power;
(d) All real property owned by duly registered cooperatives as provided for under R.A. No. 6938; and
(e) Machinery and equipment used for pollution control and environmental protection.
Except as provided herein, any exemption from payment of real property tax previously granted to, or presently enjoyed by, all persons, whether natural or juridical, including all government-owned or controlled corporations are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code. 17 [emphasis supplied]
Thus is the requirement carved in paragraph (c), Section 234 of the LGC that machines and equipment must be actually, directly and exclusively used by a GOCC engaged in the generation and transmission of electricity to be exempt from RPT, where "actual use," as defined in Sec. 199 of the LGC, "refers to the purpose for which property is principally or predominantly utilized by the person in possession thereof." 18 That NPC's contention, nay deftly put, that LHC has mere naked ownership of the subject properties and that it has "beneficial ownership" as the exclusive buyer and user of all the power generated by the plant, cannot be countenanced. Section 199 cannot be clearer that the actual user also pertains to the person in possession. That it is LHC, and not NPC, which has actual, direct and exclusive use of the power plant is impossible to refute. As correctly observed by the CTA, it is LHC which has possession and control of the power plant. 19 Contrary to LHC's position that it merely has naked ownership over the properties, and that NPC is the actual and ultimate user that distributes energy to its consumers after LHC generates power, the factual circumstances reveal otherwise — LHC is the owner and user of the properties. Indubitably, as LHC has sole possession and actual, direct, and exclusive use of the properties, the assessed properties are not exempt from RPT.
IV. The properties cannot be considered
Section 216 of the LGC defines "special classes" of real property as those actually, directly and exclusively used for hospitals, cultural, or scientific purposes, and those owned and used by local water districts, and GOCC's rendering essential public services in the supply and distribution of water and/or generation and transmission of electric power, which assessment level depends on the actual use of the property. Not far from the proviso in paragraph (c), Section 234 of the LGC, Section 216 of the same law requires that to be considered as a "special class," the properties must be "owned and used" by a specific entity, a GOCC. Compared to the requirements to be exempt from RPT, which only requires actual, direct, and exclusive possession, the requirements to be considered as a "special class" are more stringent and confer indispensable the two-fold qualities, i.e., ownership and use. The inescapable fact and as earlier intimated, therefore, is, NPC is neither the owner nor the possessor of the properties. A quick reference to the PPA, specifically Article 2.13, points that the owner of the properties is LHC. 20 Thus, the evident conclusion is that, considering LHC is both the owner and possessor of the properties, the said properties cannot be subject to the 10% level assessment simply because LHC is not a GOCC.
The kind of agreement entered into also belies any claim of ownership or even use of the subject properties by NPC. To recall, the agreement entered into was a BOT contract. Designed to allow the government to procure properties with lesser and protracted expense from the public coffers caused by the construction and management of the property, the contractor shall be the owner of the properties until its transfer at the end of the Cooperation Period. 21 But the equivocal fact is, the Cooperation Period is yet to expire. Verily, there is no gainsaying that the ownership, therefore, remains with LHC. 22
V. The municipal assessor is correct in
Petitioners' argument that the municipal assessor committed a grave error in imposing an additional 55% on the value of the assessed RPT is without basis.
Despite requests to submit a sworn statement from June to November 2001, LHC belatedly submitted a sworn statement only on September 5, 2002, in complete repugnance to Section 202 of the LGC, which requires the person acquiring real property or making an improvement thereon to file the statement "within sixty (60) days after the acquisition of such property or upon completion or occupancy of the improvement, whichever comes earlier." 23 Besides the belated submission, the sworn statement had no receipts or documents to support it. Once the owner of a real property refuses or fails to make a declaration within the prescribed time, the municipal assessor is authorized to make the declaration himself, on behalf of the owner, pursuant to Section 204 of the LGC, to wit:
Section 204. Declaration of Real Property by the Assessor. — When any person, natural or juridical, by whom real property is required to be declared under Section 202 hereof, refuses or fails for any reason to make such declaration within the time prescribed, the provincial, city or municipal assessor shall himself declare the property in the name of the defaulting owner, if known, or against an unknown owner, as the case may be, and shall assess the property for taxation in accordance with the provision of this Title. No oath shall be required of a declaration thus made by the provincial, city or municipal assessor. 24
It is worthy to underscore the several lapses LHC committed. First, it failed to file a sworn statement within 60 days after its acquisition of the properties. Second, despite repeated demands, LHC still refused to file a sworn statement. Third, while it indeed filed a sworn statement although belatedly, the sworn statement contained no documents or receipts to support it. Fourth, even in the proceedings before the LBAA and CBAA, LHC was remiss in its duty to protect its interest and present the necessary documentary evidence to dispute the assessment of the municipal assessor. Consistent with our pronouncement in FELS Energy, Inc. v. The Province of Batangas, absent proof of any grave abuse of discretion or bad faith, the assessment of the municipal assessor shall enjoy presumption of regularity. 25 The assessment is presumed correct and made in good faith and shall be accorded great weight and respect. To be clear, the decision of the municipal assessor to perform his duty and make a unilateral declaration was due to LHC's blatant transgressions of the law.
VI. The Municipality of Alilem is not
LHC and NPC aver that by entering into the MOA, the Municipality of Alilem consented to NPC's assumption of LHC's RPT liability. We are not persuaded.
There is nothing in the MOA where the Municipality of Alilem consented to the arrangement that NPC shall assume LHC's liability to pay RPT. No such tenor can be inferred from the MOA. A reading of the MOA reveals that the Municipality of Alilem's responsibility is merely to "assist" and "support" the project. 26 Albeit the Municipality of Alilem may have been a party to the MOA, to impose upon the latter the terms and conditions stipulated in the PPA, which it is not a party thereto, is stretching the vinculum juris afar. Never can the PPA vicariously apply to a stranger.
In any case, we cannot allow such agreement to evade the law. While by contractual agreement NPC obliged itself to assume tax payments, no contractual agreement can amend the law.
VII. The CTA committed no reversible
E.O. No. 173, otherwise known as the "Reduction and Condonation of Real Property Taxes and Interest/Penalties Assessed on the Power Generation Facilities of Independent Power Producers under Built-Operate-Transfer Contracts with Government Owned and/or Controlled Corporations," directs courts to suspend proceedings to allow the parties to negotiate the case during the pendency of the case. Basic is the rule that the grant or denial of a motion for postponement rests upon the sound discretion of the courts. While LHC has admirably expressed its interest to a possible compromise agreement, courts are not under any compulsion to grant the motion especially if it is manifestly to delay the proceedings. Nevertheless, the denial or grant of the motion to suspend proceedings in view of the purported compromise agreement does not bar the parties from entering into one. The parties may agree on a compromise agreement anytime even after the finality of judgment. 27 In fact, at the time LHC moved for the suspension of the proceedings, despite the CTA's denial of the motion, the parties were not barred from entering into a compromise agreement, which, up to this moment, if the parties were truly sincere in their intent, should have come up with the purported compromise agreement. But no such compromise agreement has reached this Court. Therefore, albeit the denial of the motion, LHC still has the opportunity to settle the case. DETACa
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. The Decision and Resolution dated January 7, 2015 and March 9, 2016, respectively, of the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc in CTA EB No. 1024 and 1096 are AFFIRMEDin toto.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Consolidated per Resolution dated June 1, 2016; rollo (G.R. Nos. 223460-61), p. 102.
2. Penned by Associate Justice Ma. Belen M. Ringpis-Liban with Associate Justices Roman G. Del Rosario, Juanito C. Castañeda, Jr., Lovell R. Bautista, Erlinda P. Uy, Caesar A. Casanova, Esperanza R. Fabon-Victorino, Cielito N. Mindaro-Grulla, and Amelia R. Cotangco-Manalastas, concurring; rollo (G.R. No. 223403), pp. 39-57; rollo (G.R. Nos. 223460-61), pp. 46-64.
3.Rollo (G.R. No. 223403), pp. 63-71; rollo (G.R. Nos. 223460-61), pp. 69-77.
4.Rollo (G.R. No. 223403), p. 16.
5. Docketed as CTA EB No. 1024, entitled "National Power Corporation v. Fatima Tenorio, in her official capacity as Provincial Assessor of Ilocos Sur, Antonio A. Gundran, in his capacity as the Provincial Treasurer of Ilocos Sur, Reynaldo Boteres, in his official capacity as the Municipal Assessor of Alilem, Ilocos Sur, and Cristina Monderin, in her official capacity as the Municipal Treasurer of Alilem, Ilocos Sur."
6. Docketed as CTA EB No. 1096, entitled "Luzon Hydro Corporation and National Power Corporation v. Fatima Tenorio, in her official capacity as the Provincial Assessor of Ilocos Sur, Antonio A. Gundran, in his capacity as the Provincial Treasurer of Ilocos Sur, Reynaldo Boteres, in his official capacity as the Municipal Assessor of Alilem, Ilocos Sur, and Cristina Monderin, in her official capacity as the Municipal Treasurer of Alilem, Ilocos Sur."
7.See separate concurring opinion of CTA Presiding Justice Roman G. Del Rosario, rollo (G.R. No. 223403), pp. 58-61; rollo (G.R. Nos. 223460-61), pp. 65-68.
8.Rollo (G.R. No. 223403), p. 56; rollo (G.R. Nos. 223460-61), p. 63.
9. RULES OF COURT, Rule 7, Sec. 5.
10.Rollo (G.R. Nos. 223460-61), p. 44.
11.Cosco Philippines Shipping, Inc. v. Kemper Insurance Company, 686 Phil. 327, 337 (2012).
12.Co. v. Vargas, 676 Phil. 463, 471 (2011).
13. Sec. 11, R.A. No. 1125, as amended by R.A. No. 9282.
14. 624 Phil. 738 (2010).
15.Id. at 748.
16.Id. at 745.
17. LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE, Sec. 234.
18. LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE, Sec. 199.
19. Rollo (G.R. No. 223403), pp. 49-52; rollo (G.R. Nos. 223460-61), pp. 56-59.
20. Rollo (G.R. No. 223403), pp. 51-52; rollo (G.R. Nos. 223460-61), pp. 58-59.
21. Rollo (G.R. No. 223403), p. 50; rollo (G.R. Nos. 223460-61), p. 57; R.A. No. 7718, Sec. 2, par. b:
"(b) Build-operate-and-transfer. — A contractual arrangement whereby the project proponent undertakes the construction, including financing, of a given infrastructure facility, and the operation maintenance thereof. The project proponent operates the facility over a fixed term during which it is allowed to charge facility users appropriate tolls, fees, rentals, and charges not exceeding those proposed in its bid or as negotiated and incorporated in the contract to enable the project proponent to recover its investment, and operating and maintenance expenses in the project. The project proponent transfers the facility to the government agency or local government unit concerned at the end of the fixed term which shall not exceed fifty (50) years: Provided, That in case of an infrastructure or development facility whose operation requires a public utility franchise, the proponent must be Filipino or, if a corporation, must be duly registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission and owned up to at least sixty percent (60%) by Filipinos.
"The build-operate-and-transfer shall include a supply-and-operate situation which is a contractual arrangement hereby the supplier of equipment and machinery for a given infrastructure facility, if the interest of the Government so requires, operates the facility providing in the process technology transfer and training to Filipino nationals."
22. Tatad, et al., v. Garcia, et al., 313 Phil. 296, 323 & 326 (1995) as cited in National Power Corporation v. Province of Quezon, et al., 624 Phil. 738 (2010).
23. LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE, Sec. 202.
24. LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE, Sec. 204.
25. FELS Energy, Inc. v. The Province of Batangas, et al., 545 Phil. 92, 107-108 (2007).
26. Rollo (G.R. No. 223403), p. 55; rollo (G.R. Nos. 223460-61), p. 62.
27. Atty. Agustin, et al. v. Cruz-Herrera, 726 Phil. 533, 544 (2014).