Napoles v. Morales

EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. 216840-41. August 30, 2016.]

JANET LIM NAPOLES, petitioner, vs. HON. CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS OMBUDSMAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court en banc issued a Resolution dated AUGUST 30, 2016, which reads as follows:

"G.R. Nos. 216840-41 — JANET LIM NAPOLES, Petitioner, v. HON. CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS OMBUDSMAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, Respondents.

Under consideration is the petition for certiorari brought to annul the joint resolution issued on September 26, 2014 1 and joint order issued on November 26, 2014 2 in OMB-C-C-13-0317 and OMB-C-C-14-0007, whereby the Ombudsman found probable cause to charge the petitioner with three counts each of a violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), malversation of public funds and corruption of public officials respectively penalized under Article 217 and Article 212 of the Revised Penal Code. The charges arose from the anomalous disbursements of the allocation amounting to P50,500,000.00 under the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) of former Congressman Constantino G. Jaraula (Cong. Jaraula) of the Lone District of Cagayan de Oro City in the years from 2004 to 2007.

Antecedents

In March 2013, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) uncovered a scheme, now commonly known as the Pork Barrel Scam, 3 which allegedly involved the diversion and misuse of the PDAF appropriations allocated to legislators. The NBI discovered that during his term as congressman from June 2004 to May 2007 Cong. Jaraula had endorsed the implementation of his PDAF-funded livelihood projects in his legislative district to a certain non-governmental agency, the Countrywide Agri and Rural Economic Development Foundation, Inc. (CARED); 4 that per records of the Commission on Audit (COA), a total of P30,000,000.00 was taken from his PDAF in 2007 through Special Allotment Release Orders (SAROs) issued by the Department of Budget and Management, and the funds were transferred by his implementing agency, Technology Resource Center (TRC), to CARED as the project partner; 5 that the funds released to TRC were transferred to CARED through the execution of a memorandum of agreement (MOA); 6 that CARED was the mere "dummy" of the petitioner who had operated it through her JLN Corporation with address at Unit 2502, Discovery Center Suites, Ortigas Center, Pasig City; 7 that the majority of the incorporators, officers and members of CARED were her household helpers, relatives, employees, and friends who were aware of their involvement in the creation thereof, or whose signatures in the Articles of Incorporation were forged; 8 that CARED remained inactive and without any business activity since its incorporation up to March 10, 2007; 9 and that CARED submitted questionable documents or failed to liquidate or fully document the utilization of Cong. Jaraula's PDAF allocations because the funds were never really used for the intended projects or beneficiaries. 10

Thereafter, the NBI charged Cong. Jaraula, in conspiracy with the petitioner and others, with malversation of public funds, direct bribery, violations of Section 3 (b), (e), (g) and (j) and Section 4 (b) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and corruption of public officials for acquiring or receiving commissions, kickbacks or rebates of at least P20,843,750.00 from the projects financed by his PDAF allocation from 2004 to 2007. 11

The Field Investigation Office (FIO) of the Office of the Ombudsman further charged Cong. Jaraula and the petitioner, among others, with malversation of public funds for misappropriating Cong. Jaraula's PDAF for their personal use and benefit, and with violation of Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for giving unwarranted benefits to the petitioner and CARED in the implementation of the PDAF-funded projects. 12

In the assailed joint resolution dated September 26, 2014, the Ombudsman found probable cause to indict the petitioner for three counts each of the violation of Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, malversation, violation of Section 4 (b) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and corruption of public officials. 13 aICcHA

The petitioner moved for reconsideration of the joint resolution issued on September 26, 2014, but the Ombudsman denied the motion through the joint order of November 26, 2014, but dismissed the charge against her for the violation of Section 4 (b) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. 14

In due course, the Ombudsman filed the corresponding informations against the petitioner in the Sandiganbayan.

The petitioner alleges that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause against her because the NBI and FIO complaints were not sufficient in form and substance for not stating the approximate times of the commission of the offenses, the particular places where the offenses were committed, and the specific acts or omissions constituting the offenses; 15 that even assuming that the complaints were sufficient in form and substance, the elements of the violation of Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code were not alleged and substantiated; 16 that she could not be held liable for violation of Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act because she was not a public officer exercising administrative or judicial functions who could cause injury in any government dealings; 17 that she could not be charged with malversation of public funds because such crime required the perpetrator to be an accountable public officer, which she was not; 18 that the allegation of conspiracy was not duly established; 19 and that the assailed joint resolution and joint order were based on hearsay, self-serving and inadmissible evidence. 20

The petitioner thus prays that the Court render a decision:

1. SETTING ASIDE, REVERSING and NULLIFYING the Joint Resolution dated 26 September 2014 and the Joint Order dated 26 November 2014, which found probable cause to indict herein petitioner for Malversation under Art. 217 of the Revised Penal Code and for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, for being issued with grave abuse of discretion;

2. QUASHING the Informations for Malversation under Art. 217 of the Revised Penal Code and for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 and RECALLING the Warrants of Arrest issued against Petitioner;

3. DISMISSING the cases filed against Petitioner and are now pending before the Sandiganbayan entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Constantino Jaraula, et al.," docketed as "SB-15-CRM-0019- SB-15-CRM-0021" for Malversation and "SB-15-CRM-0016- SB-15-CRM-0018" for violation (sic) Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 for patent lack of factual and legal bases.

Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for. 21

Issue

Did the Ombudsman commit grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause against the petitioner for malversation of public funds, corruption of public officials, and violation of Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act?

Ruling of the Court

We dismiss the petition for lack of merit.

The Ombudsman has full discretion to determine, based on the attendant facts and circumstances, the existence of probable cause or the lack thereof. Thus, we have adopted the consistent policy of non-interference in the Ombudsman's exercise of her constitutionally mandated powers. Any finding to proceed or desist in the prosecution of a criminal case can only be assailed through certiorari in this Court on the ground that it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, which should mean an abuse of her discretion so grave and so patent as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 22 Indeed, grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction; her exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner, which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. 23

We cannot hold that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in this case. We have to underscore that —

. . . The quantum of evidence now required in preliminary investigation is such evidence sufficient to "engender a well-founded belief" as to the fact of the commission of a crime and the respondent's probable guilt thereof. A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties' evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. We are in accord with the state prosecutor's findings in the case at bar that there exists prima facie evidence of petitioner's involvement in the commission of the crime, it being sufficiently supported by the evidence presented and the facts obtaining therein. 24

The petitioner essentially attacks the sufficiency of the Prosecution's evidence against her, specifically, that the Ombudsman was not able to establish the elements of the offenses charged. Such attack is not proper in the present proceeding. The presence or absence of the elements of the crime is a matter evidentiary in nature, to be properly and competently passed upon only after a full-blown trial on the merits. It is axiomatic that the validity and merits of a party's defense, as well as the admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated and considered during trial proper instead of during the preliminary investigation. 25 EHaASD

The petitioner's contention that she was not a public officer, and, for that reason, could not be held liable for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act is also unfounded. The letter and spirit of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act clearly support the policy of the Government, in line with the principle that a public office is a public trust, to repress the acts and omissions of public officers and private persons alike that constitute graft or corrupt practices, or which may lead thereto. 26 That the petitioner was a private individual did not necessarily preclude her being charged with conspiring with public officers for violation of the provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. 27 Moreover, the presence of conspiracy, or the lack of it, must be duly supported by positive and conclusive evidence, 28 like the overt acts constituting the crime itself. 29 Such evidence is presented only during the course of the trial.

Accordingly, the proper course of action is to proceed to trial in the Sandiganbayan so that the merits of the case may be heard.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for certiorari; UPHOLDS the assailed joint resolution issued on September 26, 2014 and the joint order issued November 26, 2014 in OMB-C-C-13-0317 and OMB-C-C-14-0007; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit." Brion, J., on leave. (adv25)

Very truly yours,

 

(SGD.) FELIPA B. ANAMAClerk of Court

Footnotes

1. Rollo, pp. 34-101.

2. Id. at 102-142.

3. Id. at 40-41.

4. Id. at 41-42.

5. Id. at 43.

6. Id. at 45.

7. Id. at 42.

8. Id.

9. Id. at 47.

10. Id. at 48.

11. Id. at 51-52.

12. Id. at 52.

13. Id. at 94-98.

14. Id. at 137-139.

15. Id. at 12-13.

16. Id. at 13-19.

17. Id. at 16.

18. Id. at 18-19.

19. Id. at 20-22.

20. Id. at 22-30.

21. Id. at 30.

22. Ampil v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 192685, July 31, 2013, 703 SCRA 1, 18-19.

23. Casing v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 192334, June 13, 2012, 672 SCRA 500, 508.

24. Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 212140-41, January 21, 2015, 748 SCRA 1, 39; Paderanga v. Drilon, G.R. No. 96080, April 19, 1991, 196 SCRA 86, 92, 93.

25. Clay & Feather International, Inc. v. Lichaytoo, G.R. No. 193105, May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 516, 526.

26. Section 1, Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

27. See Go v. Fifth Division, Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 172602, April 13, 2007, 521 SCRA 270, 285, 286.

28. See Ladonga v. People, G.R. No. 141066, February 17, 2005, 451 SCRA 673, 686.

29. See Quidet v. People, G.R. No. 170289, April 8, 2010, 618 SCRA 1, 10.