SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 208604. September 30, 2013.]
CIPRIANO NAMOCATCAT, petitioner,vs. VIRGINIA O. MANIAL, ALFONSO ARIL, AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MALAYBALAY CITY, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated 30 September 2013 which reads as follows:
G.R. No. 208604 (Cipriano Namocatcat v. Virginia O. Manial, Alfonso Aril, and The Register of Deeds of Malaybalay City).
After a judicious review of the records, the Court resolves to DENY the instant petition and AFFIRM the February 27, 2013 Decision 1 and July 31, 2013 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 00878-MIN for failure of Cipriano Namocatcat (petitioner) to show that the CA committed any reversible error in upholding the dismissal of his complaint for reconveyance, quieting of title, and cancellation of Katibayan ng Orihinal na Titulo (KOT) Blg. P-43913 by the Regional Trial Court of Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon, Branch 11 (RTC). HEcSDa
It bears to note that both the RTC and CA found that petitioner failed to establish by preponderance of evidence his right over Lot 317 and the purported fraud and misrepresentations committed by Virginia O. Manial (respondent) in securing Free Patent and KOT Blg. P-43913. Settled is the rule that the conclusions of fact of the trial court when affirmed by the CA are deemed final and conclusive and can no longer be reviewed on appeal by this Court 3 except in certain instances 4 that do not obtain in this case. In any event, the Court has carefully reviewed the factual findings of the RTC and CA and found the same to be sufficiently anchored on the evidence on record.
Moreover, the CA correctly found that petitioner must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness or absence of respondent's evidence because the burden of proving the allegations in the complaint is not shifted to the adverse party, even if he were declared in default. 5
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) MA. LOURDES C. PERFECTODivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 20-29. Penned by Associate Justice Marie Christine Azcarraga-Jacob, with Associate Justices Romulo V. Borja and Ma. Luisa C. Quijano-Padilla, concurring.
2.Id. at 48-49. Penned by Associate Justice Marie Christine Azcarraga-Jacob, with Associate Justices Romulo V. Borja and Oscar V. Badelles, concurring.
3.Vda. de Gualberto v. Go, G.R. No. 139843, July 21, 2005, 463 SCRA 671, 682.
4."(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the cases, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, could justify a different conclusion . . . ." (Heirs of Dicman v. Cariño, 523 Phil. 630, 653-654 [2006].).
5.In Otero v. Tan (G.R. No. 200134, August 15, 2012, 678 SCRA 583, 598), the Court enunciated that —
"In civil cases, it is a basic rule that the party making allegations has the burden of proving them by a preponderance of evidence. The parties must rely on the strength of their own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defense offered by their opponent. This rule holds true especially when the latter has had no opportunity to present evidence because of a default order. Needless to say, the extent of the relief that may be granted can only be so much as has been alleged and proved with preponderant evidence required under Section 1 of Rule 133."