Nable v. Vicsal Development Corp.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 225612. April 3, 2019.]

ANABELLE B. NABLE, PEACHY C. PANES, ANGELINA A. CHAPPELL AND ANALIE S. MANATAD, petitioners, vs.VICSAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND/OR METRO AYALA, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated 03 April 2019which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 225612 — ANABELLE B. NABLE, PEACHY C. PANES, ANGELINA A. CHAPPELL and ANALIE S. MANATAD, petitioners, versus VICSAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and/or METRO AYALA, respondents.

Before the Court is a Petition for Review 1 (Petition) under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Resolutions dated January 26, 2016 2 and June 24, 2016 3 in CA-G.R. SP No. 09762.

Facts

Anabelle B. Nable, Peachy C. Panes, Angelina A. Chappell and Analie S. Manatad (collectively, petitioners) were employees of Vicsal Development Corporation (respondent), a domestic corporation operating a department store in Cebu City. Petitioners were hired as sales clerks and "display-in-charge" of the department store's Jewelry Department, tasked to handle, safekeep, monitor, and sell high value jewelry. 4

Respondent ordered the conduct of an inventory of its items and discrepancies were discovered; 167 gold necklaces and 46 diamond jewelry were missing, worth a total of P5,105,205.00. 5

On April 22, 2013, respondent issued a Show Cause Memo with Notice of Preventive Suspension to its employees, including herein petitioners. They were made to explain their alleged work negligence, non-observance of standard procedure, and acts of fraud/theft resulting to loss of company property. 6

On April 26, 2013, respondent served a Notice of Investigation to petitioners. The latter submitted their respective written explanations the following day. 7

Thereafter, respondent conducted an administrative investigation and petitioners were questioned regarding the lost jewelry items. The initial findings of the investigation identified another employee, Lucia Birondo (Birondo), as the perpetrator. It was discovered that she had pawned the missing jewelry at different pawnshops in Cebu City. A criminal case for qualified theft was then filed against Birondo. 8 AScHCD

During the administrative investigation, petitioners admitted laxity in the performance of their functions. They also revealed several lapses in observance of company procedure despite their work involving high-value merchandise. 9

Respondent had previously issued "Memo No. SP-2k-027," which prescribed the standard procedures for safekeeping, display, and selling of items in the Jewelry Department of the mall. However, as admitted by petitioners, there were days when they neglected to conduct the mandatory inventories of the items twice a day. On the occasions when the required daily inventories were actually conducted, petitioners merely compared and copied each other's logbooks without performing their own physical count. On the occasions when physical counts were actually conducted and discrepancies discovered, petitioners merely relied on Birondo's representations that the items unaccounted for were kept in the selling area. Lastly, despite noticing discrepancies in the inventory and missing items, none of them reported the discrepancies to their supervisor. 10

On May 3, 2013, respondent served Notices of Termination to petitioners. Thereafter, petitioners filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, non-payment of 13th month pay, refund of cash bond, multi-purpose savings contributions, canteen share, and moral and exemplary damages. 11

During the preliminary conference before the LA, the parties settled the monetary claims of petitioners. The only issue remaining was whether petitioners were illegally dismissed. 12

The LA ruled in favor of petitioners, holding that the penalty of dismissal was too harsh and not commensurate with the offense committed. The LA awarded separation pay to petitioners, in lieu of reinstatement. 13

On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the LA Decision in its Decision 14 dated March 26, 2014. The NLRC held that petitioners' dismissal was valid on the ground of gross neglect of duty and loss of trust and confidence. The NLRC ruled that petitioners occupied positions of trust, in the same class as cashiers, auditors, property custodians, or those employees who, in the normal and routine exercise of their functions, regularly handle significant amounts of money or property. Petitioners failed to observe the standard procedures laid down in Memo No. SP-2k-027, resulting in enormous loss to respondent. Their laxity allowed Birondo to succeed in carrying out her criminal scheme. 15

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration (MR), which the NLRC denied in its Resolution 16 dated May 20, 2014.

Petitioners elevated the case to the CA.

On January 26, 2016, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari for having been filed outside the reglementary period. The petition was filed almost six months from petitioners' receipt of the Resolution denying the MR. Moreover, no competent evidence of petitioners' identities was submitted in the Verification and Certification against forum shopping in violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Commission. 17

Petitioners filed an MR, which the CA denied on June 24, 2016. 18

Hence, this Petition.

Petitioners seek the reversal of the CA's decision invoking their former counsel's negligence in failing to file a petition for review within the reglementary period. Petitioners contend that their case is an exception to the general rule that negligence of counsel binds the client. They allege that they were denied their right to due process during the administrative investigation as they were not represented by or provided with counsel. They also attribute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the NLRC in holding that their dismissal was valid.

Issue

Whether the CA erred when it dismissed the petition for certiorari on procedural grounds.

Ruling

The Petition lacks merit.

It is an established rule that the client is bound by the counsel's acts, including mistakes or negligence of counsel, in the pursuance of a case. The Court held in APEX Mining, Inc. v. Court of Appeals: 19 AcICHD

It is settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. This is based on the rule that any act performed by a counsel within the scope of his general or implied authority is regarded as an act of his client. 20

The Court elucidated the rationale for the rule in Boaz International Trading Corp. v. Woodward Japan, Inc.: 21

x x x The rationale for the rule is easily discernible. If the negligence of counsel be admitted as a reason for opening a case, there would never be an end to litigation so long as there is a new counsel to be hired every time it is shown that the prior one had not been sufficiently diligent, experienced or learned. 22

The rule is not without some exceptions as held by the Court in Sps. Friend v. Union Bank of the Philippines: 23

x x x (1) [W]here reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law; (2) when its application will result in outright deprivation of the client's liberty or property; or (3) where the interests of justice so require. x x x 24

The instant case does not fall under any of the above exceptions. Accordingly, petitioners are bound by the negligence of their counsel. The Court finds no compelling reason to warrant the relaxation of the rules in this case. Not only was the appeal before the CA filed extremely late, it was also defective.

The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a component of due process. It is a mere statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. 25 A party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the requirements of the Rules, failing which, the right to appeal is lost, as in this case. In this light, the CA could not be faulted, as it did not err, in dismissing the case for being filed out of time, and because the Verification and Certification against Forum shopping did not contain competent evidence of petitioners' identities, in violation of Section 12, 26 Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.

Even if the Court were to overlook the technical defects of petitioner's appeal, still the Court denies the petition as it lacks merit on the substantive issue.

Petitioners ascribed grave abuse of discretion on the NLRC, averring that they were deprived of their right to due process during the administrative proceedings because there were not represented by or provided with counsel. This does not deserve serious consideration.

The essence of due process is to be given reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit evidence in support of one's defense. Due process in the context of employment disciplinary proceedings was elucidated in Perez v. Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company: 27

x x x [T]he employer may provide an employee with ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself with the assistance of a representative or counsel in ways other than a formal hearing. The employee can be fully afforded a chance to respond to the charges against him, adduce his evidence or rebut the evidence against him through a wide array of methods, verbal or written.

After receiving the first notice apprising him of the charges against him, the employee may submit a written explanation (which may be in the form of a letter, memorandum, affidavit or position paper) and offer evidence in support thereof, like relevant company records (such as his 201 file and daily time records) and the sworn statements of his witnesses. For this purpose, he may prepare his explanation personally or with the assistance of a representative or counsel. He may also ask the employer to provide him copy of records material to his defense. His written explanation may also include a request that a formal hearing or conference be held. In such a case, the conduct of a formal hearing or conference becomes mandatory, just as it is where there exist substantial evidentiary disputes or where company rules or practice requires an actual hearing as part of employment pretermination procedure. x x x 28

Thus, in labor disciplinary proceedings, representation by counsel is not indispensable. In fact, counsel is not indispensable even in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter. 29

The employee has a right to procure his own counsel. However, if he opts not to be represented by counsel, it is not the duty of the employer to provide him with one. The duty to provide counsel only applies in criminal proceedings as against the State, when the accused does not have a lawyer, or cannot afford the services of a lawyer. 30 TAIaHE

The records show that respondent observed substantive and procedural due process in the conduct of the investigation and the eventual termination of petitioners' employment. Respondents complied with the two-notice rule: petitioners were sent Show Cause Memoranda and Notices of Investigation. An administrative proceeding was conducted where petitioners were able to explain their side. Finally, notices of termination were given to petitioners after respondent found that they committed gross neglect in the performance of their duties resulting to loss of trust and confidence. Respondents had just cause to terminate petitioners' employment after they admitted to several infractions of Memo No. SP-2k-027. They may not have been involved in the theft, yet, their carelessness in the performance of their duties allowed Birondo to steal P5 million worth of jewelry.

All told, the Court finds no fault on the part of the CA in simply applying the rules. To be sure, petitioners were unable to prove any exceptional circumstance to warrant relaxation of the rules in their favor.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed Resolutions dated January 26, 2016 and June 24, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 09762 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED." (REYES, J., JR., J., on wellness leave)

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) MARIA LOURDES C. PERFECTODivision Clerk of CourtBy:TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 12-46.

2.Id. at 48-50. Penned by Associate Justice Pablito A. Perez, with Associate Justices Pamela Ann Abella Maxino and Gabriel T. Robeniol concurring.

3.Id. at 52-53.

4.Id. at 20-21, 85, 92.

5.Id. at 86, 89, 91.

6.Id. at 86.

7.Id. at 89.

8.Id. at 86.

9.Id. at 90.

10. See id. at 90, 92-93.

11. See id. at 85.

12. See id. at 85, 86.

13. See id. at 84.

14.Id. at 84-99.

15. See id. at 92-98.

16.Id. at 100-101.

17. Resolution dated January 26, 2016, id. at 48-50.

18. Resolution dated June 24, 2016, id. at 52-53.

19. 377 Phil. 482 (1999).

20.Id. at 493.

21. 463 Phil. 676 (2003).

22.Id. at 687.

23. 512 Phil. 810 (2005).

24.Id. at 815.

25.Boardwalk Business Ventures, Inc. v. Villareal, 708 Phil. 443, 445 & 452 (2013).

26. SEC. 12. Competent Evidence of Identity. — The phrase "competent evidence of identity" refers to the identification of an individual based on:

   (a) at least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing the photograph and signature of the individual x x x;

   (b) the oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the instrument, document or transaction who is personally known to the notary public and who personally knows the individual, or of two credible witnesses neither of whom is privy to the instrument, document or transaction who each personally knows the individual and shows to the notary public documentary identification.

27. 602 Phil. 522 (2009).

28. Id. at 541.

29. LABOR CODE, ART. 228. [222] Appearances and Fees. — (a) Non-lawyers may appear before the Commission or any Labor Arbiter only:

   1. If they represent themselves; or

   2. If they represent their organization or members thereof.

30. 1987 CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.