THIRD DIVISION
[OCA I.P.I. No. 18-2974-MTJ. August 28, 2019.]
LOURDES B. MORENO, complainant, vs.PRESIDING JUDGE JENNIFER B. ESCORPEZO-BAYAUA, BRANCH 13, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT [MeTC], MANILA, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedAugust 28, 2019, which reads as follows:
"OCA I.P.I. No. 18-2974-MTJ (Lourdes B. Moreno vs. Presiding Judge Jennifer B. Escorpezo-Bayaua, Branch 13, Metropolitan Trial Court [MeTC], Manila). — A Verified Complaint 1 dated March 28, 2018 was filed by Lourdes B. Moreno (complainant) charging Presiding Judge Jennifer B. Escorpezo-Bayaua (respondent) of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, Branch 13, with Gross Ignorance of the Law and Manifest Partiality in connection with Civil Case No. M-MNL-17-02440-SC, entitled "Rodrigo M. Leones v. Lourdes Moreno," for ejectment.
The complainant is the defendant in Civil Case No. M-MNL-17-02440-SC. She alleged that on January 31, 2018, the respondent issued a Decision 2 in favor of the plaintiff, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the defendant LOURDES MORENO and all persons claiming rights under her to vacate the premises designated as lot 11-G, located at 1543 Fabie St.[,] Paco, Manila. Defendant is also ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of:
1) P5,000.00 reasonable monthly rentals reckoned from July 26, 2017, the date the demand to vacate was made, until fully vacated;
2) P10,000.00 as attorney's fees[; and]
3) P8,451.80 cost of suit.
The defendant's claims are dismissed.
SO ORDERED. 3
On February 14, 2018, the complainant filed a Notice of Appeal 4 before the MeTC. Consequently, in an Order 5 dated February 15, 2018, the respondent gave due course to the appeal and ordered the transmission of the records to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The complainant stated that she tried to deposit a supersedeas bond in accordance with the decision but the MeTC personnel told her to instead file an appropriate pleading. 6
On February 19, 2018, the complainant filed a Manifestation 7 seeking to deposit with the Court P35,000.00 representing the total monthly rentals over the property for the period of July 26, 2017 to February 2018. However, the respondent issued an Order 8 declaring the manifestation moot in view of her previous Order dated February 15, 2018, which gave due course to the appeal and directed the transmittal of the records to the RTC.
Thereafter, the complainant filed a Motion to Deposit Rentals 9 dated February 28, 2018 with the RTC. In an Order 10 dated March 5, 2018, the RTC noted that the complainant did not file a supersedeas bond before the MeTC in order to stay the execution of the judgment pursuant to Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
The complainant contends that a mere filing of a notice of appeal does not mean that the court has already lost jurisdiction over the case since the appeal is deemed perfected only upon expiration of the last day to appeal of both parties. She further argues that when she filed the manifestation regarding the supersedeas bond on February 19, 2018, the appeal was not yet perfected. Thus, the respondent should have acted on the manifestation instead of declaring it moot and academic. According to the complainant, the respondent violated the Rules of Court by prematurely ordering the transmittal of the records of the case. 11
In her Comment, 12 the respondent asserts that the MeTC Manila had already lost jurisdiction over the case when it gave due course to the complainant's appeal pursuant to Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. She asserts that she acted in accordance with the Rules when she no longer acted upon the complainant's Manifestation dated February 19, 2018 considering that the appeal was already perfected per Order dated February 15, 2018. Furthermore, the complainant should have filed her supersedeas bond upon filing her notice of appeal. Instead, when the complainant filed her Manifestation, her appeal had already been given due course. Accordingly, the Court lost its jurisdiction to act on anything that pertains to the case. Hence, the respondent maintains that she had no other option but to render the Manifestation moot and academic.
Evaluation and Recommendation of the Court Administrator
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found that the complaint is dismissible for being judicial in nature and for lack of merit. It explained that the determination as to whether or not the court still had jurisdiction over the case pertains to the exercise of the respondent's adjudicative function, thus, the issue is judicial in nature. Therefore, the OCA stressed that the respondent cannot be the subject of disciplinary action, and that the issue is properly the subject of an appeal. 13
Moreover, the OCA noted that other than the complainant's bare allegations, no substantial evidence was presented to prove the charge that the respondent was guilty of manifest partiality. The order against the complainant does not necessarily connote bias and partiality towards the other party. Mere suspicion that a judge is partial to a party is not enough; there should be adequate evidence to prove the charge. 14
Finding that the acts complained of do not constitute Gross Ignorance of the Law and Manifest Partiality, the OCA recommended that the instant complaint be dismissed, thus:
It is respectfully recommended for the consideration of the Honorable Court that the instant administrative complaint against Hon. Jennifer B. Escorpezo-Bayaua, Presiding Judge, Branch 13, Metropolitan Trial Court, Manila, be DISMISSED for being judicial in nature and for utter lack of merit. 15 (Emphasis in the original)
Ruling of the Court
The Court agrees with the findings of the OCA. The record is bereft of any evidence to prove the complainant's contention that the respondent is guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law and Manifest Partiality.
A judge will not be liable for gross ignorance of the law for every erroneous order that he makes. It is a matter of public policy that in the absence of fraud, dishonesty, or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are generally not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. 16
It must be stressed that an administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every act of a judge deemed aberrant or irregular where a judicial remedy exists and is available. The acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action. A judge cannot be civilly, criminally, or administratively liable for his official acts, no matter how erroneous, provided he acts in good faith. 17 Well entrenched is the rule that a judge may not be administratively sanctioned for mere errors of judgment in the absence of showing of any bad faith, fraud, malice, gross ignorance, corrupt purpose, or a deliberate intent to do an injustice on his or her part. 18
Decisions rendered by judges are judicial acts. Judges are given reasonable latitude in the appreciation of the facts and understanding on applicable laws. To hold a judge administratively liable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders, assuming that he erred, would be nothing short of harassment and would make the position doubly unbearable. It is only where the error is so gross, deliberate and malicious or incurred with evident bad faith that administrative sanctions may be imposed against an erring judge. 19
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the administrative complaint against respondent Presiding Judge Jennifer B. Escorpezo-Bayaua, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 13, is hereby DISMISSED for being judicial in nature and for utter lack of merit.
SOORDERED." (Hernando, J., on wellness leave.)
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 2-7.
2.Id. at 8-11.
3.Id. at 11.
4.Id. at 12-13.
5.Id. at 15.
6.Id. at 3.
7.Id. at 16-17.
8.Id. at 18.
9.Id. at 20-21.
10.Id. at 22.
11.Id. at 3.
12.Id. at 30-38.
13.Id. at 48.
14.Id. at 36.
15.Id. at 50.
16. See Atty. Datuin, Jr. v. Judge Soriano, 439 Phil. 592, 598 (2002).
17.Biado, et al. v. Judge Brawner-Cualing, 805 Phil. 694, 701-702 (2017).
18.Atty. Ceniza-Layese v. JudgeAsis, 590 Phil. 56, 60 (2008).
19. Court Second Division's Resolution dated January 15, 2007 in OCA-IPI No. 05-2367-RTJ, entitled Jose Granada v. Judge Merlin Deloria.