FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 186632. July 13, 2016.]
ONOFRE MONTERO, SR., LEOPOLDO NANA, PEDRITO ORTIZ, JR., RODEL PALO, ROMEO AMISTAD, RAMIL PEREZ, BARTOLOME EDROSOLAN, LEON GALANTA, JR., ANTONIO PINTO, ELIEZER BORJA, AND RUFINO ADRIATICO, petitioners, vs. MENCORP TRANSPORT SYSTEMS, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE DOMINION BUS, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated July 13, 2016 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 186632 (Onofre Montero, Sr., Leopoldo Nana, Pedrito Ortiz, Jr., Rodel Palo, Romeo Amistad, Ramil Perez, Bartolome Edrosolan, Leon Galanta, Jr., Antonio Pinto, Eliezer Borja, and Rufino Adriatico v. Mencorp Transport Systems, doing business under the name and style Dominion Bus). — Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 1 and Resolution 2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 82932. The CA Decision affirmed the Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 96 (RTC), which granted the complaint for damages filed by respondent against petitioners. The CA Resolution denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
FACTS
Petitioners are members of the Times Employees' Union (TEU), which they formed for purposes of collective bargaining with their employer, Times Transportation Company, Inc. (Times). 4
For alleged unfair labor practices committed by Times, the TEU filed a notice of strike, which was implemented on 3 March 1997. 5 The Secretary of Labor and Employment assumed jurisdiction over the case on 10 March 1997 and directed the TEU to report back for work. 6 The unfair labor practice case was then referred to the National Labor Relations Commission for proceedings.
On 27 May 1997, Times sold to respondent the former's certificate of public convenience to operate air-conditioned public utility bus service plying the following routes: San Fernando, La Union-Manila and Bangued, Abra-Manila and vice versa. 7 The sale was approved by the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board on 22 July 1997. 8
Suspecting that the sale was a mere ruse to enable Times to avoid its obligations and continue with its union-busting activities, the TEU again filed a notice of strike against Times and picketed the terminals of both Times and respondent on 17 October 1997. 9
The pickets prevented the ingress and egress of the buses from respondent's terminals in San Fernando, Bangued and Manila, resulting in a significant loss of revenues. 10 Because its officers were also threatened with harm, respondent filed a Complaint with Urgent Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction and/or Preliminary Mandatory Injunction 11 against petitioners before the RTC.
In their answer, petitioners raised two defenses: (1) that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint, because the transfer of the buses was a sham transaction; and (2) that the complaint states no cause of action, because the "pickets are moving and in no way hampered the legitimate operations of [respondent]." 12
RULING OF THE RTC
In a Decision dated 7 January 2003, the RTC ordered petitioners to pay respondent P180,500 as indemnity for loss of profits, P30,000 as attorney's fees and the costs of suit. 13 CAIHTE
The trial court found that the evidence of respondent showed petitioners' participation in the pickets that prevented respondent's buses from entering and leaving the terminals. 14 The RTC also noted that petitioners practically admitted that they had picketed the terminals of respondent when they claimed that the picket was moving and not hampering its operations. 15 Their acts were not excused by the existence of an unresolved labor dispute, because it did not involve respondent. 16
For violations of the rights of respondent, petitioners were ordered to pay the profits that the former had failed to earn. Furthermore, their prejudicial acts compelled respondent to incur expenses to protect its interest. Thus, the award of attorney's fees was proper. 17 The RTC, however, denied the claim of respondent for exemplary damages. It held that the picketing was actuated, not by bad faith, but by petitioners' belief that the sale of the buses was a mere ruse to defeat their demands for benefits. 18
Aggrieved, petitioners filed an appeal before the CA.
RULING OF THE CA
In the assailed Decision dated 16 September 2008, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision. 19
The appellate court accorded great weight to the RTC's factual finding that petitioners had actively participated in the picketing that prejudiced the rights of respondent. 20 The CA also noted the admission of petitioners that what they conducted was a "moving picket," 21 which did not preclude the possibility that the activity might have nonetheless caused damage to respondent.
Petitioners claim that respondent's complaint should have been dismissed by the RTC, because its verification and certification of non-forum shopping was signed by counsel. The CA ruled, though, that they raised this matter only for the first time on appeal. 22
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, 23 which the CA denied in the challenged Resolution dated 27 January 2009. 24
ISSUES
In the petition before us, petitioners raise the following issues:
1. Whether petitioners are liable for damages despite the absence of evidence showing their active participation in the picketing
2. Whether the complaint of respondent should have been dismissed for its defective verification and certification of non-forum shopping
OUR RULING
We deny the petition.
As aptly pointed out by respondent in its Comment, 25 only questions of law are entertained by this Court in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. For their part, petitioners invoke one of the exceptions 26 to this rule and claim that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in finding that they had participated in the picketing conducted at respondent's terminals. 27
Petitioners insist that they merely exercised their right to picket "as a means of communicating the facts of a labor dispute," and that picketing "is a phase of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the [C]onstitution." 28 They also point out that they can only be held liable if it can be shown that aside from participating in the picket, they also committed unlawful acts in the process. 29 DETACa
It appears that petitioners themselves are confused by their own defenses. First, they claim that the RTC had no basis for finding that they had picketed respondent's terminals. But in the same breath, they admitted that they had indeed done so as a form of speech to underscore the existence of a labor dispute.
Article 219 (1) of the Labor Code defines "labor dispute" as any controversy or matter concerning terms or conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee. We have had occasion to rule that the existence of a labor dispute is not negated by the fact that the parties do not have an employer-employee relationship. 30 However, it is necessary that the controversy between the parties relate to the terms and conditions of employment or to a change or an arrangement thereof. 31
In this case, the picketing by petitioners was born out of their suspicion that the sale of the certificate of public convenience and bus units was a mere ruse used by Times to avoid its obligations to the TEU. Nowhere was it said that respondent was in any way involved in the alleged union-busting activities undertaken by Times. While the lack of an employer-employee relationship between respondent and petitioners did not preclude the existence of a labor dispute, there was no controversy between them with regard to the terms and conditions of employment or to any change or arrangement thereof.
There is no merit either in the contention that petitioners did not commit unlawful acts in the course of the picket. Even assuming that they had the right to peaceably assemble at respondent's terminals in order to air their grievances, that right is not absolute. In Phimco Industries, Inc. v. Phimco Industries Labor Association, 32 the Court ruled that protected picketing does not include preventing ingress to and egress from the company premises. While it may be argued in this case that the picket was moving, peaceful and not attended by actual violence, it was still illegal if it effectively blocked entry to and exit from the company premises. 33
In this regard, the trial court held:
Testimonies of Alberto Bautista and Edmund Galamgam indicate that [petitioners] picketed at and barricaded [respondent's] 3 terminals, located at San Fernando, La Union, Bangued, Abra, and E. de los Santos Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City, beginning October 17, 1997 until October 21, 1997, thereby preventing its buses from entering and leaving the terminals. The testimonies are credible and competent enough in the absence of any reasons to doubt them. Moreover, [petitioners] inferentially admit [respondent's] claim of their picketing in the answer, except that they insist that the picketing was moving and did not hamper [respondent's] legitimate operations. 34
The above finding of the RTC was affirmed by the CA. As such, it is binding and conclusive upon this Court and, hence, not reviewable. 35 Absent any clear showing of abuse, arbitrariness or capriciousness on the part of the trial court, we refrain from disturbing the rulings of the courts a quo on this matter.
As regards the contention involving the defective verification and certification of non-forum shopping attached to the complaint of respondent before the RTC, we likewise affirm the CA ruling. A perusal of the pleadings of petitioners shows that the matter regarding counsel's signature therein was raised for the first time before the CA. 36
We adhere to the general principle that points of law, theories, issues of fact, and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court need not be — and ordinarily will not be — considered by a reviewing court, because they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. 37 Any question or objection as to the compliance of a complaint with the requirement of verification and certification of non-forum shopping should have been broached at the earliest opportunity in a motion to dismiss or a similar pleading in the proceedings before the trial court. 38
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 16 September 2008 and Resolution dated 27 January 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 82932 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED." BERSAMIN, J., no part; REYES, J., designated additional member per raffled dated January 28, 2015. aDSIHc
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 21-26. The Decision dated 16 September 2008 issued by the Court of Appeals Twelfth Division was penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok, with Associate Justices Mariano C. del Castillo (now a Member of this Court) and Romeo F. Barza concurring.
2. Id. at 27-28; dated 27 January 2009.
3. Id. at 54-57. The Decision dated 7 January 2003 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 96, in Civil Case No. Q-97-32560 was penned by Judge Lucas P. Bersamin (now a Member of this Court).
4. Id. at 47.
5. Id. at 47-48.
6. Id. at 48.
7. Id. at 22.
8. Id. at 41-44.
9. Id. at 48-49.
10. Id. at 22.
11. Id. at 33-38.
12. Id. at 55.
13. Supra note 3.
14. Id. at 55-56.
15. Id. at 56.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 57.
18. Id. at 56-57.
19. Supra note 1.
20. Id. at 24.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 26.
23. Id. at 29-32.
24. Supra note 2.
25. Rollo, pp. 95-99.
26. In Larena v. Mapili, 455 Phil. 944 (2003), this Court ruled:
The factual findings of the CA affirming those of the trial court are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal, except under any of the following circumstances: (1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are based; (7) the finding of absence of facts is contradicted by the presence of evidence on record; (8) the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court; (9) the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (10) the findings of the CA are beyond the issues of the case; and (11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties.
27. Rollo, p. 132.
28. Id. at 14-15, 132-133.
29. Id. at 15, 133.
30. San Miguel Corp. Employees Union v. Bersamira, 264 Phil. 875 (1990).
31. Id.
32. 624 Phil. 275 (2010).
33. Id.
34. Rollo, pp. 55-56.
35. Filinvest Alabang, Inc. v. Century Iron Works, Inc., G.R. No. 213229, 9 December 2015.
36. Rollo, pp. 66-76.
37. Santos v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 229 Phil. 588 (1986).
38. S.C. Megaworld Construction and Development Corp. v. Parada, G.R. No. 183804, 11 September 2013, 705 SCRA 584.