THIRD DIVISION
[A.M. No. P-17-3716. July 19, 2017.]
DOMINADOR DELA PEÑA MONESIT, complainant,vs. IMELDA G. YPARRAGUIRRE, COURT STENOGRAPHER III, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated July 19, 2017, which reads as follows:
"A.M. No. P-17-3716 [Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 15-4440-P] (Dominador Dela Peña Monesit v. Imelda G. Yparraguirre, Court Stenographer III). — For our consideration is the Complaint-Affidavit 1 dated January 21, 2015 filed by Dominador Dela Peña Monesit (Monesit) charging Imelda G. Yparraguirre (respondent), Court Stenographer III, Branch 40 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Tandag City, Surigao del Sur with gross dishonesty, gross misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Monesit, a former court interpreter in the Municipal Trial Court of Tandag, Surigao del Sur, alleged that sometime in April 2010, he and respondent organized a loan business partnership with one Liza A. Auza (Auza), the Officer-in-Charge Clerk of Court of Tandag, Surigao del Sur. Each of them equally contributed capital from April 2010 to January 2012. Respondent was elected as treasurer to take charge of the money and operation of the business because she had more time to entertain loan applicants even during office hours and had access to a computer issued to her by the Court. With interest pegged at 4% per month, their lending business grew. However, when Monesit secured a copy of the business statement of account, he discovered several discrepancies in their finances in the total amount of P209,191.49 upon comparison with his own personal record. 2
In January 2015, Monesit confronted respondent about the discrepancies. He asked for a copy of the business assets, which respondent printed from her computer. Monesit demanded P209,191.49 as his fair share of the assets, but respondent bluntly answered that she could not produce the money in cash because it was still a collectible from the borrowers. Monesit discovered that, indeed, there was a collectible of P407,065.05, and that what was on hand was a measly P1,900.00. Monesit accused respondent of blatantly breaching the trust reposed in her as treasurer of their business partnership. 3
In her Comment, 4 respondent explained that there was no business partnership between her, Monesit, and Auza. What they put up was only an emergency assistance fund in place of an employees' cooperative, which did not push through because of lack of capital contributions from other court employees. Respondent claimed that she was authorized to extend emergency assistance to their fellow court employees with a 4% monthly interest using their initial capital of P60,000.00. 5 SDAaTC
Respondent claimed that Monesit also borrowed from their fund on several occasions. In November 2014, Monesit asked respondent for another loan of P50,000.00. Respondent, however, denied his request for fear that Monesit would eventually withdraw his capital contribution and free himself of bad accounts. In January 2015, Monesit allegedly threatened respondent in writing that he would file an administrative complaint against her if she failed to settle the amount due him. In February 2015, they allegedly agreed to dissolve the fund and Monesit manifested that he would no longer file an administrative case against respondent. 6
Respondent asserted that she did not commit any act intended to injure Monesit's dignity and honor, as in fact, she always accommodated his requests for financial updates. 7 She also denied having committed any conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. She acknowledged her mistake in extending emergency loans to court employees without authority from the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), but the issue has become moot and academic in view of the dissolution of the fund. She maintained that the complaint was not about her conduct as a court employee but was anchored on Monesit's goal to extort money from her. She thus prayed that the complaint against her be dismissed for being malicious, baseless, and derogatory. 8
In its report, 9 the OCA held that while the evidence at hand is insufficient to hold respondent liable for gross dishonesty, gross misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, it cannot be denied that her acts fell short of the high standards of propriety expected of court employees. The OCA noted that whether it was a cooperative or a mere setting up of an emergency fund, it cannot be denied that respondent engaged in moneylending activities during office hours without prior authority from the Court. Respondent failed to dispute the allegations that she entertained clients even during office hours and used the Court's supplies in her business. 10
The OCA concluded that respondent violated Administrative Circular (AC) No. 5 dated October 4, 1988, which enjoins all officials and employees of the Judiciary from being commissioned as insurance agents or from engaging in any related activities. She also violated Canon I, Section 5 of the Code of Conduct for Court Employees, which provides that court personnel shall use the resources, property and funds under their judicial custody in a judicious manner and solely in accordance with the prescribed statutory and regulatory guidelines or procedures. 11
Considering that this was respondent's first offense in her close to twenty (20) years of service in the judiciary, the OCA recommended that she be suspended from office without pay for a period of one (1) month, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. 12
While we agree with the findings and conclusions of the OCA, we find respondent guilty of simple misconduct, as well. We also modify the penalty imposed on her.
The acts done by respondent are clearly not related to the performance of her official functions as a court stenographer. The moonlighting she engaged in was done during office hours; it involved transacting with other court employees who availed of loans. In addition, respondent used the Court's supplies in her business. Respondent admitted that she conducted her business without authority from the Court. Thus, respondent is guilty of violating Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 5 13 dated October 4, 1988, which prohibits all officials and employees of the Judiciary from engaging directly in any private business, vocation or profession, even outside their office hours. This prohibition aims to ensure that full-time officers and employees of the courts render full-time service, for only through this can any undue delays in the administration of justice and in the disposition of court cases be avoided. The nature of the work of court employees and officials demanded their highest degree of efficiency and responsibility, but they would not ably meet this demand except by devoting their undivided time to the government service. This explains why court employees have been enjoined to strictly observe official time and to devote every second or moment of such time in serving the public. 14
Moreover, in admittedly engaging in her unauthorized business, respondent fell short of the standard required of court employees, let alone public servants in general. Her money-lending activities — which were done even during office hours and within the court premises — surely put the integrity of her office under suspicion, as it gave the impression that she took advantage of her position and abused the confidence reposed in her in doing her business. 15
In Corpuz v. Rivera 16 and Re: Dolores T. Lopez, et al., 17 we found respondents, who both engaged in a similar money-lending business, guilty of simple misconduct. We defined misconduct in office as any unlawful behavior by a public officer in relation to the duties of his office that is willful in character. The term embraces acts that the officeholder had no right to perform, acts performed improperly, and failure to act in the face of an affirmative duty to act. 18 In order to differentiate gross misconduct from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in the former. Stated differently, if the misconduct does not involve any of the aforesaid qualifying elements, the person charged is only liable for the lesser offense of simple misconduct. 19 The Court has invariably imposed commensurate sanctions upon court employees found and declared to be violating Administrative Circular No. 5. The sanctions have depended on the gravity of the violations committed and on the careful consideration of the personal records of the employees concerned, like their prior administrative cases. 20 acEHCD
Here, respondent committed simple misconduct as there was no showing that her inappropriate acts were tainted with corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule. 21 Simple misconduct is a less grave offense that is punishable under Rule IV, Section 52 of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service by suspension from one month and one day to six months for the first offense, and dismissal for the second offense. Considering that this is respondent's first offense in her almost twenty (20) years of government service, the Court deems it appropriate to impose upon her the penalty of suspension without pay for a period of one (1) month and one (1) day, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
We hasten to add that complainant is equally deserving of censure for also engaging in the moneylending business in 2010 when he was still a court interpreter. 22
WHEREFORE, we find Imelda G. Yparraguirre, Court Stenographer III of the Regional Trial Court of Tandag City, Surigao del Sur, Branch 40 GUILTY of simple misconduct. Accordingly, she is hereby SUSPENDED without pay for a period of one (1) month and one (1) day and is STERNLY WARNED that repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 3-6.
2.Id. at 3-4.
3.Id. at 4.
4.Id. at 21-27.
5.Id. at 21-22.
6.Id. at 22-23.
7.Id. at 24-25.
8.Id. at 27.
9.Id. at 52-57.
10.Id. at 55-56.
11.Id. at 56.
12.Id. at 57.
13. Re: Prohibition to Work as Insurance Agents, October 4, 1988.
14.Re: Anonymous Letter-Complaint on the Alleged Involvement and for Engaging in the Business of Lending Money at Usurious Rates of Interest of Ms. Dolores T. Lopez, SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer, and Mr. Fernando M. Montalvo, SC Supervising Judicial Staff Officer, Checks Disbursement Division, Fiscal Management and Budget Office, A.M. No. 2010-21-SC, September 30, 2014, 737 SCRA 195, 210.
15.Corpuz v. Rivera, A.M. No. P-16-3541, August 30, 2016, 801 SCRA 572, 582.
16.Id.
17.Supra note 14.
18.Id. at 212.
19.Supra note 15 at 581.
20.Supra note 14 at 212.
21.Supra note 15 at 582.
22.Rollo, p. 52. See Benavidez v. Vega, A.M. No. P-01-1530, December 13, 2001, 372 SCRA 208.