Modesto, Jr. v. Andres, Jr.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 234349. June 28, 2021.]

ANDRES D. MODESTO, JR. AND ANALYN M. MODESTO, petitioners,vs. HON. MARIO G. ANDRES, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIQUE, BRANCH 64, AND ATTY. JOSE P. MENDOZA, JR., respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedJune 28, 2021, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 234349 (Andres D. Modesto, Jr. and Analyn M. Modesto v. Hon. Mario G. Andres, Jr., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Antique, Branch 64, and Atty. Jose P. Mendoza, Jr.) — This is a petition for certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, alleging that respondent Presiding Judge Hon. Mario G. Andres, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 64, Bugasong, Antique, gravely abused his discretion in denying petitioners Andres D. Modesto, Jr. and Analyn M. Modesto's Motion for Summary Judgment and their Motion for Reconsideration.

On May 20, 2016, herein private respondent Atty. Jose P. Mendoza, Jr. (private respondent), as a legitimate heir of the late Jose E. Mendoza, Sr. and Consolacion P. Mendoza, filed a Complaint 1 for recovery of personal property with damages against herein petitioners, the spouses Andres D. Modesto, Jr. and Analyn M. Modesto, (petitioners) in the RTC, Branch 64, Bugasong, Antique.

In his Complaint, private respondent alleged that during the lifetime of his parents, Jose E. Mendoza, Sr. and Consolacion P. Mendoza, they owned a large and complete sugarcane mill, which they used to mill sugarcane and manufacture muscovado sugar at their sugar farm in Sta. Justa, Tibiao, Antique. He was very familiar with the family sugarcane mill (Moleno), as it was operating in their family farm since he was in elementary and high school, college, and before he left the country to study abroad in 1969. After the death of his father in 1991, the management of the farm was left to his mother, including the custody of a complete unused sugarcane mill. Sometime in 1994, Andres D. Modesto, Jr. of San Francisco Sur, a friend of the Mendoza family, borrowed the complete and in good operating condition sugarcane mill from Consolacion P. Mendoza, to be installed by him as sugarcane mill in Mablad, Barbaza, Antique, the birthplace of his wife, on the promise that he would give muscovado sugar to Consolacion P. Mendoza. 2

As Consolacion P. Mendoza did not receive any payment in the form of muscovado sugar for the use of the sugarcane mill, she asked for the return of the family sugarcane mill sometime in 1998. However, instead of returning the sugarcane mill in good condition, Andres D. Modesto, Jr. delivered some scrap iron and metals at the residence of Consolacion P. Mendoza at Sta. Justa, Tibiao, Antique, which was promptly returned. Private respondent witnessed Andres D. Modesto, Jr. delivered the scrap metals and iron in 1998 because he was vacationing at that time at their family residence in Antique from abroad. 3

Private respondent sent a demand letter 4 dated February 1, 2016 to the petitioners for the return of the complete sugarcane mill in good working condition and/or compensation for its value, but the same was unheeded. According to private respondent, the estimated reasonable value of the complete and operating sugarcane mill in good condition today is between P700,000.00 to P900,000.00. As no settlement was reached at the Office of the Lupong Tagapamayapa, Barangay San Francisco Sur, Municipality of Tibiao, Province of Antique, a Certificate to File Action 5 dated April 18, 2016 was issued. 6

In his complaint, private respondent prayed that the RTC render judgment ordering the petitioners to: (1) return the complete and in good order sugarcane mill owned by the Mendoza family; and if they would be unable to return the same, to pay him the sum of P800,000.00, representing its present market value; (2) pay interest at 12 percent of the amount due from the date of formal demand until judgment; and (3) pay attorney's fees in the sum of P20,000.00 and costs of suit. 7

In their Answer with Counterclaim, 8 petitioners denied the allegations of private respondent and admitted only their stated place of residence and the non-settlement of the complaint in the Office of the Lupong Tagapamayapa. As special and affirmative defenses, petitioners alleged that their transaction with Consolacion P. Mendoza was purely a verbal agreement and not evidenced by any written contract. Further, there was no inventory of the spare parts of the sugarcane mill. There was also no agreement between them as to the amount of muscovado sugar that Consolacion P. Mendoza was entitled to receive in the event that the sugarcane mill becomes operational. When they took possession of the sugarcane mill, Andres D. Modesto, Jr. discovered that the said machine was lacking in major spare parts and the model had become obsolete and was impossible to operate and virtually worthless except for its scrap value. Because of the obsolescence and difficulty of securing the much needed spare parts, petitioners were constrained to return to Consolacion P. Mendoza the borrowed sugarcane mill which she accepted, but she strongly urged Andres Modesto, Jr. to exert extra effort to find spare parts to make the machine operational. Not long afterwards, Consolacion P. Mendoza returned the sugar mill machine to Andres D. Modesto, Jr., reiterating her request to exert extra effort in making it operational. Because of the extreme difficulty in finding available spare parts for the old and obsolete sugar mill machine, the same was just stored in the petitioners' store and was never installed in Mablad, Barbaza, Antique. 9

Petitioners stated that they were willing to give back the machine to private respondent, with counterclaim for reasonable storage fee for the prolonged storage of the sugarcane mill in their store, which could have been devoted to other important use in their business. Petitioners also prayed for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of joinder of indispensable parties, lack of merit, and lack of cause of action and for the award of storage fee, moral damages and attorney's fees. 10

During the pre-trial proper held on May 5, 2017, the parties admitted the following facts:

1. The identity and places of residen[ce] of the parties where they can be served with summons and court processes;

2. The plaintiff (herein private respondent) is the legitimate son of the late Jose P. Mendoza, Sr. and Consolacion P. Mendoza of Sta. Justa, Tibiao, Antique;

3. The defendants (herein petitioners) accepted the verbal offer of Mrs. Consolacion Mendoza in 1994 to borrow the Moleno (sugarcane mill); and

4. The agreement between the defendants and Mrs. Consolacion Mendoza [was] made verbally without written any agreement. 11

The Pre-trial Order 12 stated that the issues to be resolved in this case are:

1. Whether or not the Sugarcane Mill (Moleno) owned by the Mendoza family was complete and in good order when it was leased to the defendants in 1994;

2. Whether or not the defendants are liable to the plaintiff for the return of the complete Sugarcane Mill (Moleno) to the Mendoza family or pay its present value;

3. Whether or not plaintiff's cause of action for this case prescribed under Article 1145 of the Civil Code of the Philippines;

4. Whether or not defendant Mrs. Modesto is entitled to be dropped as party defendant to this case not being included in the Certificate to File Action issued by Brgy. San Francisco Sur, Tibiao, Antique;

5. Who between the plaintiff and the defendants are entitled to damages? 13

On June 7, 2017, petitioners filed with the RTC a Motion for Summary Judgment 14 for lack of genuine issue and serious controversy in this case on the following grounds: (1) The complaint showed that private respondent's cause of action was based on a verbal or oral contract between Consolacion P. Mendoza and Andres D. Modesto, Jr. in 1994; (2) the Complaint was filed only on May 20, 2016, or after 22 years have elapsed; and (3) the cause of action had long prescribed since Article 1145 15 of the Civil Code provides that an action upon an oral contract prescribes in six years.

Petitioners contended that as the filing of the complaint has been barred by the statute of limitations, granting their motion for summary judgment became a matter of course because there was no more genuine issue to be resolved by the RTC except the issue of prescription which could obliterate all other issues in the case.

In an Order 16 dated September 8, 2017, the RTC denied the motion for lack of merit. It stated that aside from the technicalities on violation of the rules on motion and service of pleadings, 17 there were still real issues which needed to be resolved, and the court would need the presentation of evidence in order to be guided in disposing of the case. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed, which was denied by the RTC in an Order 18 dated September 27, 2017.

Thereafter, petitioners brought the instant petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, stating that they are raising only pure questions of law:

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE VERBAL OR ORAL CONTRACT ENTERED INTO BY THE PARTIES IN 1994 HAD ALREADY PRESCRIBED IN 2016 OR AFTER 22 YEARS UNDER ARTICLE 1145 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES[;]

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFENSE OF PRESCRIPTION NOT PLEADED IN THE ANSWER IS DEEMED WAIVED BY THE DEFENDANTS EVEN IF THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT AND OTHER PLEADINGS OF THE PLAINTIFF CLEARLY SHOWS THAT THE ACTION HAS ALREADY PRESCRIBED[;]

III. WHETHER OR NOT PRESCRIPTION AS A DEFENSE THAT HAS SET IN THE CASE OBLITERATES ALL OTHER ISSUES IN THE DISPUTE MAKING THE GRANTING OF THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT A MATTER OF COURSE[;]

IV. WHETHER OR NOT DEFENDANTS' DEFENSE OF LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION INCLUDES PRESCRIPTION OF ACTION[.] 19

It must be pointed out that petitioners filed this petition under Rule 65, and not Rule 45 of the Rules of Court where questions of law may be entertained. The RTC's Order denying the Motion for Summary Judgment is an interlocutory order, 20 and petitioners correctly filed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which is the remedy provided for such circumstance under Section 1, 21 Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.

Thus, the main issue is whether or not respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying petitioners' Motion for Summary Judgment.

Petitioners contend that respondent's action has prescribed, and the issue of prescription to be resolved by the RTC would obliterate the other four issues raised in the Complaint. Hence, they filed the Motion for Summary Judgment under Section 2, Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, which provides that "[a] party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or crossclaim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any time move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his or her favor as to all or any part thereof."

Petitioners allege that respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in denying their Motion for Summary Judgment and their Motion for Reconsideration. They pray that the RTC Order denying their motion for summary judgment be reversed and set aside, and respondent Judge be declared without jurisdiction to decide the case and ordered to dismiss the same.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is unmeritorious.

Rule 35 of the Rules of Court provides for the rule on Summary Judgment as follows:

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Sec. 2. Summary judgment for defending party. — A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any time, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof.

Sec. 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. — The motion shall be served at least ten (10) days before the time specified for the hearing. The adverse party may serve opposing affidavits, depositions, or admissions at least three (3) days before the hearing. After the hearing, the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

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A summary judgment, or accelerated judgment, is a procedural technique to promptly dispose of cases where the facts appear undisputed and certain from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits on record, or for weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of the litigation to avoid the expense and loss of time involved in a trial. 22 When the pleadings on file show that there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried, the Rules allow a party to obtain immediate relief by way of summary judgment, that is, when the facts are not in dispute, the court is allowed to decide the case summarily by applying the law to the material facts. 23

In this case involving the recovery of possession of a sugarcane mill, the Court notes that all the factual allegations of the respondent in his complaint were denied by petitioners in their Answer with Counterclaim except as to petitioners' place of residence and the non-settlement of the complaint at the barangay level. Respondent seeks the recovery of the sugarcane mill that was lent by his mother, Consolacion P. Mendoza, to petitioners in good condition, in return for muscovado sugar or recovering the monetary value thereof, while petitioners contend that the sugarcane mill was lacking spare parts and was never used by them, but merely stored in their store, for which they seek payment of storage fee as counterclaim. Firmly settled is the rule that where there is an issue of fact joined by the parties or where the facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, neither one of them can pray for summary judgment. 24 Instead, what takes place is a trial, wherein the parties may submit their respective witnesses and evidence in support of their respective factual contentions. 25

Petitioners filed the Motion for Summary Judgment on the ground that respondent's action, which was filed in court after 22 years, has prescribed because their agreement with Consolacion P. Mendoza was merely an oral agreement. Under Article 1145 of the Civil Code, an action upon an oral contract prescribes in six years; thus, petitioners contend that all the other issues need not be resolved as it is clear that the action has prescribed.

In his Comment, 26 private respondent countered that petitioners are of the mistaken belief that prescription starts from the date when the oral contract was entered into. He asserts that the verbal agreement entered into in 1994 between his mother Consolacion P. Mendoza and petitioner Andres D. Modesto, Jr. for the latter's use of the sugarcane mill, in exchange for muscovado sugar produced, is without a fixed period. This explains why the sugarcane mill owned by the Mendozas was not returned and is admittedly in the possession of the petitioners. Private respondent points out that under Article 1197 27 of the Civil Code, the court shall fix the period in an agreement that has no fixed period. He contends that by express provision of law, in an agreement without a fixed period, the court will fix the period at which time the period of prescription will occur. In this case, private respondent submits that since a formal demand letter dated February 1, 2016 was sent by him to petitioners, the period of prescription of five years under Article 1149 28 of the Civil Code will only start at that time.

The Court notes that during pre-trial, petitioners admitted that they "accepted the verbal offer of Mrs. Consolacion P. Mendoza in 1994 to borrow the Moleno (sugarcane mill)." In their Answer, petitioners expressed willingness to return the sugarcane mill, at the same time asking for payment of storage fee as counterclaim. Hence, petitioners admit that the ownership of the sugarcane mill in their possession belongs to Consolacion P. Mendoza (deceased), and it was borrowed by them. It appears from the pleadings that there was no agreement when the sugarcane mill should be returned. Thus, private respondent sent a demand letter dated February 1, 2016 to petitioners for the return of the complete sugarcane mill, in good working condition and/or compensation for its value, but the same was unheeded, so this case was filed. Whether or not the action has prescribed is one of the issues before the trial court.

In the early case of US v. Serapio, 29 this Court held that under the Civil Code, the prescription of an action refers to the time within which an action must be brought after the right of action has accrued. The prescriptive statutes serve to protect those who are diligent and vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights. The rationale behind the prescription of actions is to prevent fraudulent and stale claims from springing up at great distances of time, thus, surprising the parties or their representatives when the facts have become obscure from the lapse of time or the defective memory or death or removal of the witnesses. Prescription applies even to the most meritorious claims. 30 As such, in determining whether a cause of action has prescribed, it is necessary to determine when the violation, amounting to an infringement of a right, occurred. It is only upon the infringement of a right that a cause of action accrues. Mere execution of a contract, stating the rights and obligations of the parties, does not immediately produce a cause of action. There must be a violation involved, and coupled therewith is the need to allege when the violation occurred. This is necessary in order to determine the starting point in counting the period of prescription of an action.

In the instant case, it is not clear from the pleadings when the cause of action of private respondent accrued. The opposing claims of the parties, which resulted from the different ways they interpreted the oral agreement between Consolacion P. Mendoza and Andres D. Modesto, Jr., involve conflicting factual averments that require the presentation of evidence. Trial is necessary to thresh out such issue.

As to petitioners' counterclaim for storage fee and moral damages in the Motion for Summary Judgment, absent a trial and established facts of the case, there is no basis to enable the RTC to decide on the propriety of granting or denying the aforesaid counterclaim. Hence, the RTC correctly denied the Motion for Summary Judgment, stating that "aside from the technicalities raised by the plaintiff on defendants' violation of the rules on motion and service of pleadings, there are still real issues which need to be resolved, and the court needs the presentation of evidence in order to be guided in its decision in the disposal of the case." 31

It bears noting that trial courts have limited authority to render summary judgments, and they may do so only in cases where there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact, 32 which does not hold true in this case.

In view of the foregoing, respondent Judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the Motion for Summary Judgment. By "grave abuse of discretion" is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 33 It has been held that "abuse of discretion alone is not sufficient, but that the abuse must be so grave, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined or to act at all, in contemplation of law." 34 For certiorari to lie, there must be a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power. 35 Clearly, none of these acts are present in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court

By:

(SGD.) RUMAR D. PASIONDeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1. Docketed as Civil Case No. 0277, rollo, pp. 27-30.

2.Id. at 27-28.

3.Id. at 28.

4.Id. at 33.

5.Id. at 35.

6.Id.

7.Id. at 38.

8.Id. at 44-49.

9.Id. at 45-47.

10.Id. at 47-48.

11. Pre-trial Order, id. at 68-69.

12.Id. at 68-71.

13.Id. at 70.

14.Id. at 72-81.

15. Art. 1145. The following actions must be commenced within six years:

(1) Upon an oral contract.

(2) Upon a quasi-contract.

16.Rollo, pp. 17-18.

17. The motion was served through registered mail with no explanation in the motion why the movant resorted to such mode of service.

18.Rollo, pp. 19-20.

19.Id. at 4-5.

20.SeeHome Development Mutual Fund Pag-IBIG Fund v. Sagun, et al., 837 Phil. 135, 194 (2018).

21. Section 1. Subject of appeal. — An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.

No appeal may be taken from:

(a) An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration;

(b) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from judgment;

(c) An interlocutory order;

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In any of the foregoing circumstances, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action as provided in Rule 65. (As amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, December 1, 2007.)

22.Philippine Business Bank v. Chua, 649 Phil. 131, 141 (2010).

23.Id.

24.Archipelago Builders v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 272 Phil. 30, 36 (1991).

25.Id.

26.Rollo, pp. 133-139.

27. Art. 1197. If the obligation does not fix a period, but from its nature and the circumstances it can be inferred that a period was intended, the courts may fix the duration thereof.

The courts shall also fix the duration of the period when it depends upon the will of the debtor.

In every case, the courts shall determine such period as may under the circumstances have been probably contemplated by the parties. Once fixed by the courts, the period cannot be changed by them.

28. Art. 1149. All other actions whose periods are not fixed in this Code or in other laws must be brought within five years from the time the right of action accrues.

29. 23 Phil. 584 (1912), cited in Antonio, Jr. v. Engr. Morales, 541 Phil. 306, 310 (2007).

30.Antonio Jr. v. Engr. Morales, supra.

31.Rollo, p. 18.

32.Spouses Amiana v. Development Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 157832 (Minute Resolution), January 15, 2014, citing Archipelago Builders v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra note 23, at 37.

33.Imutan v. Court of Appeals, 190 Phil. 233, 239 (1981).

34.Id.

35.Id.