Miranda v. People

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 223538. May 14, 2021.]

PATRICK L. MIRANDA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated May 14, 2021 which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 223538 — (PATRICK L. MIRANDA, petitioner v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent). — For resolution before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 dated May 11, 2016 filed by Patrick L. Miranda (petitioner) assailing the Decision 2 dated September 7, 2015 and Resolution 3 dated March 4, 2016 issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 35885, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Patrick L. Miranda," which denied petitioner's appeal and affirmed the Decision 4 dated June 20, 2013 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 160 finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

The Facts

This case stemmed from the Information dated December 10, 2007, charging petitioner with the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the RPC:

That on or about the 28th day of January 2007, in the City of San Juan, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, received from the complainants Maria M. Pacheco and Ma. Cecilia Pacheco-Navarro an Isuzu Utility Vehicle (with Plate Number UHA 776) and the amount of Php38,000.00 representing the costs of the repair of the vehicle, with the express obligation on the part of the accused to repair the said vehicle and deliver the said vehicle to the private complainants not later than 31 July 2007; but the said accused, once in possession of the said Isuzu Utility Vehicle worth Php350,000.00 and the amount of Php38,000.00, and far from complying with his obligation, with grave abuse of confidence and unfaithfulness, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misapply, misappropriate and convert the aforesaid Isuzu Utility Vehicle and the amount of Php38,000.00 to his own personal use and benefit; and despite repeated demands for him to return the aforesaid vehicle and the amount of Php38,000.00 the accused failed and refused and continues to fail and refuse to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the aforementioned private complainants in the total amount of Php38,000.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 5

Facts

The facts as summarized by the CA are undisputed.

The prosecution presented private complainants as its witnesses: (1) Maria M. Pacheco (Pacheco); and (2) her daughter, Ma. Cecilia Pacheco-Navarro (Pacheco-Navarro), (collectively, private complainants).

According to the prosecution, Pacheco uses an Isuzu utility vehicle (hereinafter referred to as, Subject Vehicle) registered in the name of her daughter Pacheco-Navarro in connection with her business. 6 Private complainants brought the Subject Vehicle to petitioner for repairs. As initially agreed upon by the parties, only the flooring will be repaired for which private complainant paid the total amount of P12,000.00. However, after the prodding of petitioner, private complainants likewise agreed to have the door of the Subject Vehicle replaced and for its entire front to be repainted, for which the latter paid an additional P14,000.00, and P12,000.00, respectively. In all, three payments were made by Pacheco for the aggregate amount of P38,000.00. Only the latter two payments were issued acknowledgement receipts by petitioner. According to the agreement of Pacheco and petitioner, the repairs will be finished by the end of July 2007. Thereafter, Pacheco would often visit the repair shop of petitioner to get an update on the repairs. However, sometime in the middle of July 2007, she could no longer see the Subject Vehicle in petitioner's repair shop. Pacheco confronted petitioner and inquired where the Subject Vehicle was and the latter answered that it was located in an another garage. 7

Pacheco then brought the matter to the barangay authorities in Pasadena. During the proceedings before the Barangay, the parties entered into a written agreement before the Barangay Chairman of Pasadena, San Juan City, wherein petitioner undertook to deliver the repaired vehicle by the end of July. However, petitioner failed to fulfill his obligations as agreed upon during the barangay conciliation. Thus, the barangay Lupong Tagapamayapa issued a certification to file action. The Subject Vehicle was no longer returned to private complainants, which was then valued at P350,000.00. Due to the loss of the vehicle, private complainants were likewise constrained to hire other utility vehicles for their business. At the time when private complainant testified, she stated that they spent a total of P375,000.00 in hiring other vehicles during the span of three and a half years. 8

Ruling of the RTC

During trial, petitioner was given several opportunities to present his evidence, however he was consistently absent. Thus, on motion of the prosecution, petitioner's right to present evidence was deemed waived and the case was submitted for decision on the basis of the prosecution's evidence. 9

In its Decision 10 dated June 20, 2013, the RTC found petitioner guilty of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the RPC, viz.:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court hereby renders judgment finding accused PATRICK L. MIRANDA, GUILTY with moral certainty of the felony of estafa as defined under Article 315 paragraph one (b) of the Revised Penal Code and penalized elsewhere under the same Article 315, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to imprisonment of a minimum of one year of prision correccional as minimum, up to seven years of prision mayor minimum, as maximum, plus 13 years in incremental penalty of one year for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 but not exceeding 20 years.

He is hereby ordered to indemnify private complainant Ma. Cecillia Pacheco-Navarro the amount of P376,000.00 plus 6% annual interest from the time of the filing of the information.

Cost against accused.

SO ORDERED. 11

As found by the RTC, all the elements of the crime of estafa with abuse of confidence by misappropriation under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the RPC were proven beyond reasonable doubt: 12

In this case, the first element is established, aside from the testimonies of the twin prosecution witnesses, by accused's admission that he operated a motor repair shop where the subject vehicle of Ma. Cecilia Pacheco-Navarro was brought for repair. Similarly established are the second and third elements. The issue raised in the pre-trial regarding the whereabouts of the truck was answered by the twin testimonies cited, i.e., that it is missing, which is definitively indicative of accused's having disposed of the truck without right and therefore constitutive of misappropriation. The object of the misappropriation was owned by Ms. Pacheco-Navarro who was prejudiced thereby it being valued at P350,000.00 at the time of loss.

As to the fourth element, that of demand, the court holds that it is similarly established. In Joel P. Libuit v. People, also involving a car brought for repair which was not returned to the owner, it was held that demand was properly made when the private complainant returned to the motor shop after giving the petitioner a two-week extension to complete the car's repair and realized that his car was nowhere to be found. That was exactly what happened in this case. Similarly, in Asejo v. People, citing Tubb v. People, it was held that demand need not be formal or written.

As for the value of the subject vehicle, while no receipt was produced it is of judicial knowledge that a decade-old truck could have been worth not less than the P350,000.00 established by testimonial evidence and as alleged in the information. The misappropriation also included the amount paid for the repair. The court considers only P26,000.00, however, since it is the only amount supported by receipts. The aggregate sum misappropriated therefore amounts to P376,000.00. 13 (Citations omitted.)

Ruling of the CA

In a Decision 14 dated September 7, 2015, the CA affirmed the RTC's Decision, likewise finding that petitioner (accused-appellant therein) is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the RPC:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. ACCORDINGLY, the Decision dated June 20, 2013 of Branch 160 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, finding appellant Patrick L. Miranda guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the Crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED. 15

Unperturbed, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was eventually denied by the CA in its Resolution dated March 4, 2016. 16

Hence, the present Petition.

Petitioner, in the main, argues that the agreement entered into by the parties before the Barangay Chairman of Pasadena, was in the nature of a compromise agreement which had the force and effect of a court judgment that allegedly adjudicated the issues and questions regarding the Subject Vehicle. 17 Accordingly, petitioner contends that the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case on the basis of res judicata, as the issues have already been allegedly resolved. 18

Our Ruling

This Court finds no reversible error and affirms the Decision of the CA.

In the prosecution for estafa through misappropriation under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b), the following elements must be proven beyond reasonable doubt: (1) the offender's receipt of money, goods, or other personal property in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the same; (2) misappropriation or conversion by the offender of the money or property received, or denial of receipt of the money or property; (3) the misappropriation, conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) demand by the offended party that the offender return the money or property received. 19

The essence of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the owner. The words "convert" and "misappropriated" connote an act of using or disposing of another's property as if it were one's own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To misappropriate for one's own use includes not only conversion to one's personal advantage, but also every attempt to dispose of the property of another without right. 20

As correctly found by the CA and the RTC, the prosecution had proven beyond reasonable doubt that all the foregoing elements are present.

First. Pacheco entrusted to and delivered the Subject Vehicle to petitioner for repairs, and thereafter to return the same. In addition, Pacheco likewise made advance payments to cover the services of petitioner. 21

Second. The undisputed facts readily reveal that petitioner had misappropriated the Subject Vehicle entrusted to him for repair, when he disposed of it and failed to return the same to Pacheco. 22

Third. The misappropriation by petitioner of the Subject Vehicle was clearly to the detriment and prejudice of private complainant as they were clearly deprived of the advance payments made and the use of the Subject Vehicle for their business. 23

Fourth. Pacheco clearly made a demand for the return of the Subject Vehicle when she visited the garage of petitioner and saw that the Subject Vehicle was no longer there. In fact, private complainant's demand for the return resulted in the proceedings before the Barangay Chair of Pasadena, San Juan City. 24

The foregoing facts were not disputed nor denied by petitioner. Instead, in his defense, petitioner incessantly claims that the compromise agreement executed by the parties before the Barangay Chairman of Pasadena, served to adjudicate the issues and questions regarding the Subject Vehicle and asserts that the RTC no longer had any jurisdiction to try the criminal case against petitioner, on the basis of res judicata. 25

We find petitioner's argument completely without merit.

It has been a well-settled doctrine that criminal liability is not subject to compromise. A criminal case is committed against the People and parties cannot waive or agree on the extinguishment of criminal liability. The RPC does not include compromise as a mode of extinguishing criminal liability. 26

In Tamayo v. People, 27 involving a similar case of estafa, we ruled that the criminal liability for estafa is not affected by a compromise and that the private offended party may not waive or extinguish the criminal liability that the law imposes for the commission of the crime:

It is a hornbook doctrine in our criminal law that the criminal liability for estafa is not affected by a compromise, for it is a public offense which must be prosecuted and punished by the government on its own motion, even though complete reparation should have been made of the damage suffered by the private offended party. Since a criminal offense like estafa is committed against the State, the private offended party may not waive or extinguish the criminal liability that the law imposes for the commission of the crime. 28

In Firaza v. People29 and Recuerdo v. People, 30 we emphasized that in a crime of estafa, reimbursement or belated payment to the offended party of the money swindled by the accused does not extinguish the criminal liability of the latter. Thus:

The reimbursement or restitution to the offended party of the sums swindled by the petitioner does not extinguish the criminal liability of the latter. It only extinguishes pro tanto the civil liability. Moreover, estafa is a public offense which must be prosecuted and punished by the State on its own motion even though complete reparation had been made for the loss or damage suffered by the offended party. The consent of the private complainant to petitioner's payment of her civil liability pendent lite does not entitle the latter to an acquittal. Subsequent payments does not obliterate the criminal liability already incurred. Criminal liability for estafa is not affected by a compromise between petitioner and the private complainant on the former's civil liability.

Likewise, in Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Tonda, 31 we held that in a crime of estafa, reimbursement of, or compromise as to, the amounts misappropriated, after the commission of the crime, affects only the civil liability of the offender but does not extinguish his criminal liability, viz.:

[I]t is too well-settled for any serious argument that whether in malversation of public funds or estafa, payment, indemnification, or reimbursement of, or compromise as to, the amounts or funds malversed or misappropriated, after the commission of the crime, affects only the civil liability of the offender but does not extinguish his criminal liability or relieve him from the penalty prescribed by law for the offense committed, because both crimes are public offenses against the people that must be prosecuted and penalized by the Government on its own motion, though complete reparation should have been made of the damage suffered by the offended parties . . .

As in this case, the alleged compromise between petitioner and Pedro, wherein petitioner allegedly reimbursed to Pedro the amount swindled in exchange for Pedro's consent to dismiss the instant case, does not extinguish petitioner's criminal liability for estafa. 32

Thus, the doctrine that evolved from the aforecited cases is that a compromise or settlement entered into after the commission of the crime does not extinguish accused's liability for estafa. Neither will the same bar the prosecution of said crime. 33

Accordingly, the agreement entered into by the parties before the Barangay Chairman of Pasadena does not extinguish petitioner's criminal liability.

In addition, the compromise agreement entered into by the parties will not extinguish petitioner's criminal liability as the lupon has no authority to settle the same considering the explicit exemption under Section 408 (C) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160:

SECTION 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception Thereto. — The lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except:

(a) Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof;

(b) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the performance of his official functions;

(c) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or a fine exceeding Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00);

(d) Offenses where there is no private offended party;

(e) Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities or municipalities unless the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon;

(f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon;

(g) Such other classes of disputes which the President may determine in the interest of justice or upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.

The court in which non-criminal cases not falling within the authority of the lupon under this Code are filed may, at any time before trial motu proprio refer the case to the lupon concerned for amicable settlement." (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

In this regard, an agreement falling under any of the foregoing exceptions shall not have the force and effect of a final judgment. 34

In the instant case, petitioner was charged before the RTC with the crime of estafa with abuse of confidence by misappropriation under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the RPC, wherein Pacheco was defrauded in the total amount of P388,000.00; broken down as follows: (1) P350,000.00 (representing the value of the Subject Vehicle); and (2) P38,000.00 (representing the advances made by private complainant for its repair). Thus, the imposable penalty under Article 315, as amended 35 shall be arresto mayor in its maximum period, which is 4 months and 1 day to 6 months, to prisión correccional in its minimum period, which is 6 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months of imprisonment.

Accordingly, the imposable penalty clearly exceeds one (1) year, which falls within the exception to Section 408 of R.A. No. 7160, and is thus not subject to amicable settlement before the Lupon.

Moreover, petitioner's reliance in this Court's pronouncement in Miguel v. Montanez, 36 and Quiros v. Arjona, 37 lends no credence to his defense. 38 In both cases, neither involve the settlement of an offense or the extinguishment of criminal liability.

In Miguel v. Montanez, 39 the Kasunduan executed therein before the Lupon involved the payment of a loan, which subsequently resulted in a civil case for a collection of sum of money. While in Quiros v. Arjona, 40 the Agreement executed before the Lupon pertained a parcel of land. Clearly therefore, the foregoing cases, find no application in the instant case.

All told, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the CA.

Penalty

Although we affirm the findings and conclusions of the CA, We find it however, necessary to modify the imposable penalty.

Under Article 315 of the RPC, as amended, the imposable penalty for the crime of estafa shall depend on the amount defrauded:

Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). — Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:

1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over Two million four hundred thousand pesos (P2,400,000) but does not exceed Four million four hundred thousand pesos (P4,400,000), and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional Two million pesos (P2,000,000); but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.

2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount of the fraud is over One million two hundred thousand pesos (P1,200,000) but does not exceed Two million four hundred thousand pesos (P2,400,000).

3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, if such amount is over Forty thousand pesos (P40,000) but does not exceed One million two hundred thousand pesos (P1,200,000).

4th. By arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods, if such amount does not exceed Forty thousand pesos (P40,000): Provided, [t]hat in the four cases mentioned, the fraud be committed by any of the following means:

xxx xxx xxx

In the instant case, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA ruled that the prosecution was able to prove the value of the Subject Vehicle at P350,000.00, based on the testimony of the private complainant. However, only the amount of P26,000.00 of the advance payments made by private complainant was duly proven by official receipts issued by petitioner. Accordingly, the defrauded amount of P376,000.00 shall be the basis in determining the imposable penalty for petitioner.

As provided under Article 315, as amended by R.A. No. 10951, the prescribed penalty for estafa, where the amount is over P40,000.00 but does not exceed P1,200,000.00 is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correctional in its minimum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, there being no modifying circumstance, the maximum term of the penalty should be anywhere within the medium period of the prescribed penalty, which is one year and one day to one year, eight months. And the minimum term should be one degree lower from the prescribed penalty, which is arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, ranging from one month and one day to four months.

Accordingly, petitioner shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from one (1) month and one (1) day of arresto mayor as minimum, to one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated September 7, 2015 and Resolution dated March 4, 2016 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 35885 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Patrick L. Miranda is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of one (1) month and one (1) day of arresto mayor as minimum, to one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional as maximum. Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to PAY private complainant Maria M. Pacheco the amount of P376,000.00 as actual damages. Moreover, the monetary award shall earn an interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from the filing of the Information, on April 9, 2008, until June 30, 2013, and six percent (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 up to the finality of this judgment, and the total amount of the foregoing shall, in turn, earn an interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of the Resolution until full payment.

SO ORDERED." Zalameda, J., participated in the assailed CA Decision; Delos Santos, J., designated Additional Member per Raffle dated May 6, 2021.

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

By:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 11-27.

2.Id. at 32-42; penned by Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon with the concurrence of Associate Justices Pedro B. Corales and Rodil V. Zalameda (now a Member of this Court).

3.Id. at 44.

4.Id. at 71-73; penned by Judge Myrna V. Lim-Verano.

5.Id. at 56.

6.Id. at 33.

7.Id.

8.Id. at 33-34.

9.Id. at 72.

10.Id. at 71-73.

11.Id. at 73.

12.Id. at 72-73.

13.Id. at 72-73.

14.Id. at 32-42.

15.Id. at 41-42.

16.Id. at 44.

17.Id. at 18.

18.Id. at 17.

19.Arrivas v. Bacotoc, G.R. No. 228704, December 2, 2020.

20.Serona v. Court of Appeals, 440 Phil. 508, 518 (2002).

21.Id. at 33.

22.Id. at 33-34.

23.Id. at 34.

24.Id. at 33.

25.Id. at 18.

26.Osental v. People, G.R. No. 225697, September 5, 2018.

27. 582 Phil. 306 (2008).

28.Id. at 321.

29. 547 Phil. 572 (2007).

30. 526 Phil. 460 (2006).

31. 392 Phil. 797 (2000).

32.Tamayo v. People, supra note 27 at 321-322.

33.Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Reynado, 641 Phil. 208, 220 (2010).

34. Republic Act No. 7160, Section 416 provides:

SECTION 416. Effect of Amicable Settlement and Arbitration Award. — The amicable settlement and arbitration award shall have the force and effect of a final judgment of a court upon the expiration of ten (10) days from the date thereof, unless repudiation of the settlement has been made or a petition to nullify the award has been filed before the proper city or municipal court.

However, this provision shall not apply to court cases settled by the lupon under the last paragraph of Section 408 of this Code, in which case the compromise settlement agreed upon by the parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat chairman shall be submitted to the court and upon approval thereof, have the force and effect of a judgment of said court.

35. Republic Act No. 10951, An Act Adjusting the Amount or the Value of Property and Damage on Which a Penalty is Based, and the Fines Imposed under the Revised Penal Code, signed on August 29, 2017.

36. 680 Phil. 356 (2012).

37. 468 Phil. 1000 (2004).

38.Rollo, pp. 19-21.

39.Supra.

40.Supra.