FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 232967. December 5, 2018.]
JOSEFINA MILANES, petitioner, vs.COSMOS BOTTLING CORPORATION, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated December 5, 2018which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 232967 (Josefina Milanes v. Cosmos Bottling Corporation)
This petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision 2 dated April 21, 2017 and Resolution 3 dated July 19, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 36069, affirming with modification the Decision 4 dated August 15, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Caloocan City, Branch 129, in Criminal Case No. C-90387-90.
Facts of the Case
The CA summarized the antecedents as follows:
The petitioner [respondent herein] is a corporation existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Republic of the Philippines with principal address at the 23rd Floor, San Miguel Properties Centre, No. 7 St. Francis Street, Mandaluyong City. Petitioner alleged that, on various dates in April of 2004, respondent Josefina Milanes [petitioner herein], one of the petitioner's dealers, purchased various Cosmos products from the petitioner in the total amount of Six Hundred Eleven Thousand Three Hundred Thirty-Three pesos and 90 centavos (P611,333.90). In payment for the said purchases, the respondent issued the following checks:
|
Planters Bank Check No. |
Date |
Amount |
|
"0000165557" |
"07 April 2004" |
P19,120.00 |
|
"0000165558" |
"10 April 2004" |
P124,499.20 |
|
"0000165560" |
"08 April 2004" |
P416,485.50 |
|
"0000165562" |
"09 April 2004" |
P51,229.20 |
|
|
TOTAL |
P611,333.90 |
The petitioner released and delivered the products in the respondent's favor after the issuance of the said checks. Consequently, the petitioner issued Ex-Truck Charge Invoice No. 665773 (in the amount of P14,136.00), Ex-Truck Charge Invoice No. 664976 (in the amount of P4,94.00 n) and Official Receipt No. 549899 (indicating payment by the respondent through Check No. 165557) to cover the respondent's purchases. When the said checks were presented to Planters Development Bank, Caloocan Branch, the issuing bank, the same were dishonored for the reason "Account Closed."
On 22 April 2004, Roland I. Cruz, petitioner's District Sales Supervisor, sent a letter addressed to the respondent informing the latter that all the checks she issued were dishonored upon presentment, with a corresponding demand for the respondent to settle her unpaid obligation within seven (7) days from receipt of the letter. As observed by the MTC, this demand letter contains the signature of the respondent on its lower right portion. CAIHTE
On 05 July 2004, Joseph Michael A. Galvez, the petitioner's Territory Finance Head, issued another letter reiterating the tenor of the petitioner's previous demand letter. Despite such demands, the respondent refused to settle her unpaid obligations and make good the bounced checks, thus, the petitioner was compelled to file a Complaint-Affidavit against the respondent with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22).
The respondent, in her Sagot-Salaysay, vehemently denied all the charges against her. She countered that the checks issued by her were only in the form of a collateral as the petitioner refused to deliver its products without the issuance of the same. Moreover, the respondent contends that the checks issued by her, as to the amount and date thereof, were left blank, and that she entered into a Hauling Contract with the petitioner wherein any amount owed by her to the petitioner would be offset by the hauling rate that the petitioner would in turn, owe the respondent. The respondent likewise denied receipt of any demand letter or notice of dishonor.
An Information alleging four (4) counts of violation of BP 22 was filed against the respondent before the MTC of Caloocan City. During arraignment, the respondent, as accused therein, entered a plea of not guilty to the offense charged. Pre-trial was conducted and thereafter, trial ensued. 5
Ruling of the MTC
On April 24, 2013, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) rendered a Decision 6 finding the respondent [petitioner herein] guilty of four (4) counts of violation of BP 22 and ordering the latter to pay the face value of the checks that bounced, plus legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum until the decision becomes final, with a corresponding increase in the interest rate to twelve (12%) per annum from the date of the finality of the decision until the amount is fully paid.
Petitioner appealed to the RTC and argued that the prosecution failed to prove all the elements of the crime.
Ruling of the RTC
On August 15, 2013, the RTC rendered a Decision 7 reversing the MTC Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
In view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court a quo is reversed. Accused-Appellant is acquitted of four (4) counts for Violation of BP 22, for failure of the Prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, without prejudice to the institution of any civil action against her. (Emphasis ours)
SO ORDERED. 8
On September 17, 2013, respondent filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration arguing that a criminal action for violation of BP 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action and that the findings of fact of the MTC deserve great weight inasmuch as the civil liability of the accused was sufficiently established during the trial.
On September 30, 2013, the RTC issued an Order 9 denying petitioner's Motion for Partial Reconsideration. Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the case to the CA.
Ruling of the CA
On April 21, 2017, the CA rendered a Decision 10 affirming with modifications the RTC Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is partly GRANTED. The Decision dated 15 August 2013 and the Resolution dated 30 September 2013 issued by the RTC are hereby affirmed with modifications. The respondent is hereby ordered to pay:
1. In Criminal Case No. 231122, the actual face value of the check amounting to Fifty-One Thousand Two Hundred Twenty-Nine Pesos and Twenty Centavos (P51,229.20), with six percent (6%) legal interest per annum from the filing of the Information until the decision becomes final. The total amount shall thereafter earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of the judgment until its full satisfaction.
2. In Criminal Case No. 231123, the actual face value of the check amounting to Four Hundred Sixteen Thousand Four Hundred Eighty-Five Pesos and Fifty Centavos (P416,485.50), with six percent (6%) legal interest per annum from the filing of the Information until the decision becomes final. The total amount shall thereafter earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of the judgment until its full satisfaction.
3. In Criminal Case No. 231124, the actual face value of the check amounting to One Hundred Twenty-Four Thousand Four Hundred Ninety-Nine Pesos and Twenty Centavos (P124,499.20), with six percent (6%) legal interest per annum from the filing of the Information until the decision becomes final. The total amount shall thereafter earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of the judgment until its full satisfaction. DETACa
4. In Criminal Case No. 231125, the actual face value of the check amounting to Nineteen Thousand One Hundred Twenty Pesos (P19,120.00), with six percent (6%) legal interest per annum from the filing of the Information until the decision becomes final. The total amount shall thereafter earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of the judgment until its full satisfaction.
SO ORDERED. 11
In sum, the CA found basis to warrant the imposition of civil liability upon petitioner since the act or omission from which the crime might arise has been proven to exist. In addition, the CA modified the computation of the civil liability in that the interest to be applied from July 1, 2013 until full satisfaction is six percent (6%) per annum pursuant to Nacar vs. Gallery Frames, et al.12
Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant petition. Petitioner argues that the CA erred in ruling that the four (4) checks in question serve as evidence of her indebtedness despite the fact that they were incomplete on their face, particularly as regards the amounts and dates thereof.
Ruling of the Court
The crux of the controversy revolves around the determination of the civil liability of an accused acquitted from a charge for BP 22.
At the outset, it bears stressing that the general rule is that no independent civil action can be filed to recover the value of a bouncing check issued in contravention of BP 22. 13 A civil action is deemed instituted upon the filing of a criminal action for violation of BP 22, as provided under Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
"Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. — (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
xxx xxx xxx
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed. (Emphasis ours)
The RTC's declaration that petitioner's acquittal was "without prejudice to the institution of any civil action against her" is a glaring violation of the aforecited rule.
In Nissan Gallery-Ortigas v. Felipe, 14 the Court already settled the rule that an acquittal from BP 22 does not automatically carry the extinguishment of the corresponding civil liability of the accused. The Court thus expounded:
The rule is that every act or omission punishable by law has its accompanying civil liability. The civil aspect of every criminal case is based on the principle that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable. If the accused, however, is not found to be criminally liable, it does not necessarily mean that he will not likewise be held civilly liable because extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action. This rule more specifically applies when (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted. The civil action based on the delict is extinguished if there is a finding in the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.
It can, therefore, be concluded that if the judgment is conviction of the accused, then the necessary penalties and civil liabilities arising from the offense or crime shall be imposed. On the contrary, if the judgment is of acquittal, then the imposition of the civil liability will depend on whether or not the act or omission from which it might arise exists.
xxx xxx xxx
A person acquitted of a criminal charge, however, is not necessarily civilly free because the quantum of proof required in criminal prosecution (proof beyond reasonable doubt) is greater than that required for civil liability (mere preponderance of evidence). In order to be completely free from civil liability, a person's acquittal must be based on the fact he did not commit the offense. If the acquittal is based merely on reasonable doubt, the accused may still be held civilly liable since this does not mean he did not commit the act complained of. It may only be that the facts proved did not constitute the offense charged. 15 (Emphasis ours) aDSIHc
Unfortunately, in this case, the RTC did not make any pronouncement as to whether the act or omission from which the civil liability of petitioner may arise did not exist. As such, We examine the basis of petitioner's acquittal from the criminal charge for violation of BP 22.
In San Mateo v. People, 16 the Court held:
To be liable for violation of BP 22, the following essential elements must be present: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment. 17
Interestingly, although the RTC concluded that the third element was not proven beyond reasonable doubt, it failed to provide a clear basis for its conclusion. In this light, We share the CA's observations:
Here, the ground relied upon by the trial court [RTC] for acquitting the respondent is vague. The RTC declared that the prosecution failed to prove the third element, or the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds, however, it went on to speak about the 22 April 2004 letter which clearly refers to the petitioner's notice of dishonor. x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
If indeed, the RTC referred to the third element or the failure to prove the fact of dishonor, a cursory reading of the evidence on record would suggest that the back portions of the checks contain an annotation indicating: "Account Closed." This adequately demonstrates the fact of dishonor. If the RTC referred to the failure to prove respondent's receipt of the notice of dishonor as a basis to create a prima facie presumption of the second element, this is contradicted by the finding of the MTC that the 22 April 2004 demand letter contains a signature of the respondent on its lower right portion, a fact which clearly indicates receipt. 18 (Emphasis ours).
Considering that an acquittal may not be appealed without placing the accused in double jeopardy, 19 We shall not disturb the findings of the RTC as to the prosecution's failure to prove the third element of a BP 22 violation.
Assuming arguendo that the acquittal of petitioner was based on failure to prove beyond reasonable doubt the third element of the offense, it may be implied that the other elements of the offense were present in this case. The first element refers to the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value, which is essentially the act or omission from which petitioner's civil liability arose.
Moreover, as aptly noted by the CA, the RTC did not specifically reverse the MTC's factual findings as to the civil liability of the petitioner. In effect, it excused itself from ruling on the civil liability of the petitioner by declaring that the petitioner's acquittal is without prejudice to any civil action against her. The CA corrected the RTC in modifying its Decision by ruling on the civil aspect of the action. In relying on the factual findings of the MTC as to the civil liability of the petitioner, the CA concluded that the act or omission from which petitioner's civil liability arose, which was the making or the issuing of a worthless check, undeniably existed.
The CA correctly ruled that the civil aspect of the case was sufficiently proven by preponderance of evidence. Petitioner herself admitted that she signed the checks. Her obligations to respondent are further confirmed by various invoices and receipts issued to her, as well as the subject checks, all presented in evidence.
Respondent's argument that the subject checks were issued merely as collateral for the Hauling Contract executed between her and the respondent is inconsequential. As correctly held by the MTC and affirmed by the CA, the intent behind issuing a bounced check is immaterial as the gravamen of the offense under BP 22 is the mere issuance of a worthless check. Thus, petitioner remains liable for the value of the checks regardless of her intent as long as she issued the same. ETHIDa
In Nissan Gallery-Ortigas, 20 the issuer of the check argued that she cannot be held civilly liable after her acquittal from a BP 22 charge on the ground that she merely issued the subject check as an accommodation party. The Court refused to delve into the merits of her argument, thus:
The crux of the controversy pertains to the civil liability of an accused despite acquittal of a criminal charge. Such issue is no longer novel. In cases like violation of BP 22, a special law, the intent in issuing a check is immaterial. The law has made the mere act of issuing a bad check malum prohibitum, an act proscribed by the legislature for being deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Considering the rule in mala prohibita cases, the only inquiry is whether the law has been breached. The lower courts were unanimous in finding that, indeed, Purificacion issued the bouncing check. Thus, regardless of her intent, she remains civilly liable because the act or omission, themaking and issuing of the subject check, from which her civil liability arises, evidently exists. 21 (Emphasis ours)
As a final note, We reiterate the rule that in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45, only questions of law may be put into issue. Questions of fact cannot be entertained. 22 Petitioner essentially asks this Court to review the factual findings of the lower courts to determine her indebtedness to respondent. This is a factual issue beyond the scope of Our review as it would require a re-evaluation of the evidence presented before the lower courts.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision dated April 21, 2017 and the Resolution dated July 19, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 36069 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENA
Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 10-27.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez, concurred in by Associate Justices Normandie B. Pizarro and Samuel H. Gaerlan; id. at 31-42.
3.Id. at 44-44-A.
4. Penned by Judge Thelma Canlas Trinidad-Pe Aguirre; id. at 86-92.
5.Id. at 32-33.
6.Id. at 145-161.
7.Id. at 86-92.
8.Id. at 92.
9.Id. at 93.
10.Supra note 2.
11.Supra at 40-41.
12. 716 Phil. 267 (2013).
13.Heirs of Eduardo Simon v. Chan, et al., 659 Phil. 81, 96 (2011).
14. 720 Phil. 828 (2013).
15.Id. at 837-839.
16. 705 Phil. 630 (2013).
17.Id. at 636-637.
18.Rollo, pp. 37-38.
19. Sec. 1, Rule 122, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
20.Supra note 14.
21.Id. at 840.
22.Century Iron Works, Inc., et al. v. Bañas, 711 Phil. 576, 584 (2013).
n Note from the Publisher: Copied verbatim from the official copy.