FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 172350. August 3, 2016.]
MERIDIEN HIGH RISE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, and CENTURY PROPERTIES, INC., petitioners, vs. FOUZI ALI BONDAGJY, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated August 3, 2016, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 172350 — MERIDIEN HIGH RISE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, and CENTURY PROPERTIES, INC., Petitioners, v. FOUZI ALI BONDAGJY, Respondent.
This case concerns the disputed cancellation of the contract for the purchase of the entire floor of a high-rise condominium building in Makati City on the ground of alleged non-payment by the buyer. The latter has countered that he was not in arrears because there was an offsetting agreement between the parties the value of building materials he had delivered to the developer and his commissions from the sale of condominium units.
The following facts, as culled from the assailed decision promulgated on January 31, 2006 by the Court of Appeals (CA), 1 are undisputed.
On May 16, 1996, the respondent and petitioner Meridien High Rise Development Corporation (Meridien) entered into a contract whereby the former purchased from the latter the entire 35th Floor of its West of Ayala Condominium, inclusive of the eight condominium units (subject units) thereon, and eight parking slots for the total consideration of P54,279,200.00, payable in 36 monthly amortizations of P1,022,095.56 each, commencing on July 30, 1996 until June 30, 1999.
On May 17, 1996, the respondent issued ten checks to Meridien. The first check, in the amount of P1,200,000.00, was his reservation fee, and the rest, each in the sum of P1,022,095.56, were monthly payments corresponding to the period from July 30, 1996 to March 30, 1997.
On February 1, 1999, Meridien sent to the respondent a notice of cancellation of the contract for his being in arrears for 22 monthly amortizations. In his reply dated February 5, 1999, the respondent challenged the cancellation. AHCETa
When they could not amicably settle the issue between them, the respondent haled Meridien and its marketing arm, respondent Century Properties, Inc. (Century), before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) to assail and undo the cancellation. He alleged that he did not incur in delay in his obligations; that the value of the ceramic tiles and water closets he had delivered to Meridien pursuant to their offsetting agreement, and the proceeds of the sale of two of the subject units should have been credited to him; that their total would have been more than sufficient to update his account as of the time of the cancellation; and that he was further entitled to the reduction of the price of the subject units because the deletion of three floors of the condominium project constituted a unilateral alteration of the plans of the project by Meridien as the developer.
Maintaining the validity of the cancellation, Meridien and Century countered that the condominium project's master deed with declaration of restrictions (master deed) empowered Meridien to amend its plans and specifications; and that the respondent had been in default as early as in May 1997 for failing to pay his amortizations despite demands.
After the parties filed position papers, the HLURB Arbiter rendered a decision dated February 13, 2001, 2 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Declaring the cancellation of the complainant's firm offer/reservation agreement dated 16 May 1996 as improper and not valid;
2. Ordering the respondents to credit to complainant's account the following:
a) The complainant's commissions of the sale proceeds of other units at 35th Floor as a penthouse floor as agreed upon in the firm offer/reservation agreement dated 16 May 1996,
b) The amounts due on the swap agreement/offsetting materials supplied by complainant's Le Bond Trading Corporation to respondent Meridien, and
c) All payments made by the complainant in the purchase of the entire 35th Floor in the amount of TEN MILLION THREE HUNDRED NINETY EIGHT THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED SIXTY PESOS (P10,398,860.00); AND
3. In view of the unauthorized alterations made by the respondents on the penthouse floor purchased by the complainant, the respondents are hereby immediately directed to restore or return the 35th floor to its original plans or in the event of legal or physical impossibility to comply thereof, respondents are hereby ordered to reimburse and return all the payments made, agreed commissions and amounts due on the swap agreement as stated in the preceding paragraph to the complainant plus twelve percent (12%) interest[s] to be reckoned from the filing of complaint on October 07, 1999 until fully paid. ScHADI
SO ORDERED. 3
The petitioners elevated the case to the HLURB Board of Commissioners (HLURB Board) by petition for review.
On January 30, 2002, the HLURB Board dismissed the petition for review on the ground of the failure of the petitioners to post an appeal bond in accordance with Section 3 of Rule XII of the Rules of Procedure of the HLURB. 4
The petitioners moved for reconsideration of the dismissal, but the HLURB Board denied their motion on May 22, 2002. 5
The petitioners appealed to the Office of the President (OP), which, on June 18, 2003, affirmed the questioned order of the HLURB Board. 6
With their motion for reconsideration having been denied on September 4, 2003, 7 the petitioners assailed the decision of the OP in the Court of Appeals (CA) by petition for certiorari, imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction against the OP for affirming the dismissal order of the HLURB Board. 8
The petitioners stated in their petition for certiorari that the appeal bond was not required because the HLURB Arbiter's decision was not a monetary award, and did not order the payment of money to the respondent but merely directed them "to credit" to him unspecified amounts, i.e., commissions on the sale of certain condominium units and the value of construction materials subject of their offsetting agreement, as well as his P10,398,860.00 payment; and that the HLURB Arbiter and Board disregarded their right under Republic Act No. 6552 to terminate the contract on account of the respondent's failure to pay the monthly amortizations despite repeated demands. 9
In his comment, 10 the respondent insisted that the CA had no authority to take cognizance of the appeal because the HLURB decision had already attained finality due to the petition for review having been filed with the OP beyond the 15-day period for appeal; 11 that the posting of the appeal bond was mandatory; that assuming that the judgment was not specific on the amounts of the commissions and construction materials, the petitioners had exerted no effort to seek clarification from the HLURB; and that despite the third item in the HLURB's decision being specific on the liability of P10,398,860.00, the petitioners had not posted the appeal bond even in that amount, thereby manifesting their lack of intention to post the appeal bond. 12
Also, the respondent posited that the petitioners had no valid basis to cancel the contract because he did not receive any demand letter from them; 13 that he had received only the cancellation letter of February 1, 1999; 14 and that he did not incur in delay because he had delivered ten checks to Meridien (each in the amount of P1,022,095.56, or a total of P10,220,955.60) as amortization payments for April 30, 1997 to January 30, 1998 but Meridien did not deposit the checks for unknown reasons. 15
On January 31, 2006, the CA promulgated its assailed decision dismissing the petition for certiorari for its lack of merit. 16
Issues
In this appeal, the petitioners seek the review and reversal of the decision of the CA dismissing their petition for certiorari because:
. . . The Court of Appeals has decided PETITIONERS' case in a manner not in accord with law or with applicable decisions of the Supreme Court such that:
I — THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE APPEAL OF THE HLURB BOARD DECISION TO THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT MUST BE MADE WITHIN FIFTEEN (15) DAYS FROM RECEIPT OF THE ASSAILED DECISION AS PRESCRIBED IN SECTION 15 OF PD 957 AND SECTION 2 OF PD 1344, BUT THE TIME DURING WHICH A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS PENDING SHALL BE DEDUCTED FROM THE PERIOD FOR APPEAL COROLLARY WITH ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 18, S-1987 GOVERNING APPEALS FROM DECISIONS OF THE HLURB BOARD TO THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT. aICcHA
II — THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT THE HLURB DECISION ORDERING PETITIONERS TO CREDIT AMOUNTS TO BONDAGJY'S ACCOUNT FOR PURCHASE OF WEST OF AYALA CONDOMINIUM UNITS FROM PETITIONERS NEED TO BE SECURED BY AN APPEAL BOND ON PETITIONERS' APPEAL TO THE HLURB BOARD.
III — THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT PETITIONERS SHOULD HAVE POSTED AN APPEAL BOND EQUIVALENT TO AT LEAST THE AMOUNT OF P10,398,860.00 SPECIFIED IN A PORTION OF THE HLURB DECISION.
IV — THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT PETITIONERS SHOULD CREDIT THE ALLEGED COMMISSIONS FROM RE-SALE OF BONDAGJY'S WEST OF AYALA CONDOMINIUM UNITS AND THE VALUE OF ALLEGED MATERIALS, I.E., CERAMIC TILES AND WATER CLOSETS, SUPPLIED TO PETITIONERS' WEST OF AYALA PROJECT, TO THE PURCHASE PRICE OF SAID CONDOMINIUM UNITS WHEN IT SHOULD BE PAYABLE IN MONEY.
V — THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONERS' NOTARIZED NOTICE OF CANCELLATION SENT TO BONDAGJY ONE AND ONE-HALF YEARS LATER ON FEBRUARY 1, 1999 FROM HIS DEFAULT LAST MAY 1997 AND TAKING EFFECT AFTER THIRTY (30) DAYS BY VIRTUE OF RA 6552 IF NO SETTLEMENT IS MADE, DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE LAW.
VI — THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT AMENDMENTS TO THE MASTER DEED OF THE WEST OF AYALA CONDOMINIUM MUST COMPLY WITH SECTION 4 OF RA 4726 NOTWITHSTANDING AN EXPRESS PROVISION ON THE MANNER THEREOF PROVIDED UNDER THE WEST OF AYALA MASTER DEED.
. . . The Court of Appeals has departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such departure by the agencies a quo as to call for an exercise of the power of supervision:
VII — THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT CONSIDERED THE ALLEGED SECOND SET OF TEN (10) POSTDATED CHECKS COVERING BONDAGJY'S SUBSEQUENT INSTALLMENT PAYMENTS FOR APRIL 1997 TO JANUARY 1998 WHICH WAS INTRODUCED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL BEFORE THE HLURB BOARD AND WHICH WAS NOT ALSO CONSIDERED BY THE HLURB BOARD SINCE THE LATTER DISMISSED PETITIONERS' CASE ON TECHNICALITIES.
VIII — THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT CONSIDERED BONDAGJY'S ALLEGED ENTITLEMENT TO COMMISSIONS ON RE-SALE OF HIS WEST OF AYALA CONDOMINIUM UNITS, AS WELL AS TO THE SWAP AGREEMENT/OFF-SETTING OF MATERIALS, I.E., CERAMIC TILES AND WATER CLOSETS, FOR THE PURCHASE PRICE OF SAID CONDOMINIUM UNITS ABSENT ANY ADMISSIBLE AND/OR COMPETENT EVIDENCE THEREON. 17 EHaASD
Ruling of the Court
The appeal lacks merit.
To start with, the requirement for the appeal bond was imposed by Section 3 (c) of Rule XII of the HLURB 1996 Revised Rules of Procedure, which pertinently provides:
Sec. 3. Contents of the Petition for Review. — The petition for review shall contain the grounds relied upon and the arguments thereof, the relief prayed for and a statement of the date when the petitioner received a copy of the Decision.
In addition, the petitioner shall attach to the petition, the following:
xxx xxx xxx
c. In cases of an award of a money judgment in the complainant's favor, an appeal bond satisfactory to the Board equivalent to the amount of the award excluding interest, damages and attorney's fees.
The HLURB Board had dismissed the petitioners' petition for review on the ground that they had not posted "an appeal bond equivalent to the judgment" when they appealed the decision of the HLURB Arbiter to the HLURB Board. In affirming the dismissal, the CA opined that the posting of the appeal bond was not only mandatory but jurisdictional; hence, the non-compliance with the requirement was fatal and had the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory. 18
We agree with the CA. The rules of the HLURB, which required the posting of the appeal bond, among others, were controlling on the mode and manner of perfecting an appeal from the ruling of the HLURB Arbiter to the HLURB Board. The nature of the remedy of appeal as merely statutory demanded that the appealing party must strictly conform to such rules establishing the right to appeal; otherwise, the appeal would be lost.
The stance of the petitioners that the requirement for the posting of the appeal bond did not apply because the decision of the Arbiter did not contain a monetary award is unfounded. As the CA noted, they had raised the same issue when they sought the reconsideration of the denial of their petition for review by the HLURB Board, and the HLURB Board had denied their motion for reconsideration because "a bond equivalent to at least the amount of P10,398,860.00 as stated in the dispositive portion of the decision should have been posted to secure the monetary award" due to such sum having been admittedly received by them. 19 They could have taken the cue from said order of the HLURB Board and posted the appeal bond equivalent of P10,398,860.00 had their intention to appeal been genuine, thereby avoiding the adverse outcome they now suffer, but they did not.
The observation by the CA in this regard was appropriate, to wit:
In the case at bar, the sum of P10,398,860.00 was explicitly mentioned in the HLURB decision. Consequently, petitioners should have posted an appeal bond even for that amount, failing which, no appeal from the HLURB decision could have been perfected, rendering said decision final and executory (Globe General Services and Security Agency, et al. vs. NLRC, 249 SCRA 408). 20
Secondly, under Sections 1, 2 and 5 of Administrative Order No. 18, Series of 1987 (February 12, 1987), which governed appeals from the decisions of the HLURB Board to the OP, the time during which a motion for reconsideration was pending should be deducted from the period for appeal. Where such motion for reconsideration was filed during office hours of the last day of the period, the appeal must be made within the day following receipt of the denial of the motion by the appealing party. The appeal should indicate the specific material dates when it was filed within the period prescribed. The appeal could be dismissed for failure to comply with the orders of the OP issued in connection with the appeal. DaIAcC
It appears that the petitioners received the order of the HLURB Board denying their petition for review on March 7, 2002. 21 On March 20, 2002, or 13 days from their receipt of the order, they filed the motion for reconsideration. 22 The HLURB Board denied the motion on May 22, 2002, 23 and they received the denial on June 7, 2002. 24 The remaining period of appeal was two days counted from June 7, 2002, or until June 10, 2002 (June 9, 2002 being a Sunday). They filed their petition for review in the OP only on June 14, 2002, 25 or four days beyond the last day for perfecting their appeal. Thus, the CA concluded that the order of the HLURB Board attained finality and became executory on June 11, 2002 because the appeal had been filed out of time; and declared that "the OP did not acquire jurisdiction over petitioners' appeal and, necessarily, this Court acquired no appellate jurisdiction over the instant petition." 26
Clearly, the petitioners did not file a timely appeal from the ruling of the HLURB Board to the OP.
Lastly, even assuming that the appeal was perfected, the adverse substantive result would still have been unavoidable for the petitioners. In this connection, the following findings by the CA, to which we accord unqualified approval due to their being supported by substantial evidence, are worthy of reiteration, to wit:
Petitioners question the HLURB decision declaring the cancellation of the contract "improper and not valid." They claim that as of the cancellation, respondent was in arrears for 22 monthly amortization covering the period April 1997 to January 1998.
However, petitioners have not explained why they did not deposit the second set of checks (covering monthly amortizations for April 30, 1997 to January 30, 1998) issued by respondent to Meridien. They have not shown any flaw in the HLURB decision adjudging respondent entitled to commissions on the sale of certain condominium units and the value of the construction materials subject of the offsetting agreement which, if credited to him, would have updated his account with Meridien.
Neither have petitioners demonstrated error in the HLURB decision declaring that respondent had "acted in good faith when he suspended the payment of his monthly amortizations" on account of Meridien's failure to credit him with the abovementioned commissions and value of construction materials.
Moreover, petitioners do not deny that Meridien altered the plans of the condominium project by deleting three floors therefrom. They merely contend that the alteration was authorized under the condominium project's Master Deed. But even supposing that Meridien had such authority, the fact remains that the alteration had effectively diminished the value of the subject units, for which respondent is entitled to a corresponding price reduction.
Besides, We find no infirmity in the HLURB arbiter's ruling that, as provided in Sec. 4 of Rep. Act No. 4726, amendment of the Master Deed is subject to the conditions that "prior notification to all the registered owners are done" and that it shall be embodied in "an instrument executed by a simple majority of the registered owners of the property." These conditions do not appear to have been fulfilled in the case at bench.
Finally, petitioners have not demonstrated any flaw in the HLURB arbiter's conclusion that "(t)he indispensable requirement of notarial notice of cancellation has not been exercised or utilized by . . . Meridien as required under Section 4 of (Rep. Act No. 6552)." Sec. 4, id., reads:
Section 4. In case where less than two years of installments were paid, the seller shall give the buyer a grace period of not less than sixty days from the date the installment became due. If the buyer fails to pay the installment due at the expiration of the grace period, the seller may cancel the contract after thirty days from receipt by the buyer of the notice of cancellation or the demand for rescission of the contract by a notarial act.
It does not appear that Meridien had given respondent the requisite 60-day grace period and that it canceled the contract "after thirty days from receipt by (respondent) of the notice of cancellation or the demand for rescission of the contract by a notarial act." 27 TAacHE
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on January 31, 2006; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 68-77; penned by Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz (retired), with the concurrence of Associate Justice Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente (retired) and Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon.
2. Id. at 81-89.
3. Id. at 88-89.
4. Id. at 91-93.
5. Id. at 96-97.
6. Id. at 98.
7. Id. at 110.
8. Id. at 362-384.
9. Id. at 370-379.
10. Id. at 388-410.
11. Id. at 399-402.
12. Id. at 405-407.
13. Id. at 407.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 407-408.
16. Supra note 1.
17. Rollo, pp. 17-19.
18. Id. at 74.
19. Id. at 75.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 312.
22. Id.
23. Supra note 19.
24. Rollo, p. 324.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 73.
27. Id. at 75-77.