Mendoza v. People

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 254518. March 18, 2021.]

REMBRANDT EMBRY P. MENDOZA, petitioner,vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedMarch 18, 2021which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 254518 (Rembrandt Embry P. Mendoza,Petitioner, v. People of the Philippines,Respondent). — Petitioner Rembrandt Embry P. Mendoza (petitioner) assails the Decision 1 dated 28 November 2019 and Resolution 2 dated 16 November 2020 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 40721, affirming the Decision 3 dated 25 August 2017 of Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 168 of Marikina City in Criminal Case No. 2013-14951-MK.

Reiterating his arguments before the Court of Appeals (CA), petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari4 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court questioning the credibility of private complainant, AAA, 5 and the prosecution witnesses. Moreover, he asserts that Section 5 (b), Article III of Republic Act No. (RA) 7610 is inapplicable in this case.

On the credibility of witnesses, it is well-settled that the findings of the trial court are accorded great weight considering that the trial court judge has the opportunity to observe the witnesses and their demeanor during the trial and can best assess the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies. 6 Thus, the trial court's appreciation and evaluation of the testimonies of the witnesses, its factual findings and conclusions, when affirmed by the appellate court, are generally binding and conclusive upon this Court. 7 As held by the Court in the recent case of People v. Nocido: 8

The Supreme Court is guided by jurisprudence in addressing the issue of credibility of witnesses. First, the credibility of witnesses is best addressed by the trial court, considering that it is in a unique position to directly observe the demeanor of a witness on the stand. Since the trial judge is in the best position to determine the truthfulness of witnesses, the judge's evaluation of the witnesses' testimonies is given the highest respect, on appeal. Second, in the absence of substantial reason to justify the reversal of the RTC's assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the lower court's finding, particularly when no significant facts and circumstances, affecting the outcome of the case, are shown to have been disregarded. Third, the rule is even more stringently applied if the CA concurred with the RTC. (Emphasis supplied)

Undaunted, petitioner insists that Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 does not apply, thus, he must be acquitted of the charge.

In Olivarez v. Court of Appeals, 9 the Court explained that Article III of RA 7610 is captioned as "Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse" because Congress really intended to cover a situation where the minor may have been coerced or intimidated into lascivious conduct, not necessarily for money or profit. Citing People v. Larin10 and Amployo v. People, 11 the Court held that "a child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse when the child indulges in lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult." AIDSTE

Notwithstanding, and based on the crime charged and proven, We rule that the proper nomenclature for the acts constituting sexual assault on AAA, who was under 12 years of age, is "Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610" and not "Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to RA 7610." The case of People v. Adajar, 12 involving a dance instructor who sexually abused his ten (10)-year old student, applies squarely to this case, thus:

In view of the Tulagan doctrine, however, a modification of the penalty imposed, damages awarded, and nomenclature of the crime is in order. Considering the development of the crime of sexual assault from a mere "crime against chastity" in the form of acts of lasciviousness to a "crime against persons" akin to rape, as well as the rulings in Dimakuta v. People, and People v. Caoili, We hold that if the acts constituting sexual assault are committed against a victim under 12 years of age or is demented, the nomenclature of the offense should now be "Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610" instead of "rape by sexual assault under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 and penalized under 266-B of the RPC," as held by the CA.

With respect to the penalty imposed by the appellate court of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, We rule that the same must also be modified. In Dimakuta v. People, the Court held that "in instances where the lascivious conduct is covered by the definition under R.A. No. 7610, where the penalty is reclusion temporal medium, and the act is likewise covered by sexual assault under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the RPC, which is punishable by prision mayor, the offender should be liable for violation of Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, where the law provides for the higher penalty of reclusion temporal medium, if the offended party is a child victim." The reason for the foregoing is that, aside from affording special protection and stronger deterrence against child abuse, R.A. No. 7610 is a special law which should clearly prevail over R.A. No. 8353, which is a mere general law amending the RPC. In People v. Chingh, the Court noted that "it was not the intention of the framers of R.A. No. 8353 to have disallowed the applicability of R.A. No. 7610 to sexual abuses committed to children. Despite the passage of R.A. No. 8353, R.A. No. 7610 is still good law, which must be applied when the victims are children or those persons below eighteen (18) years of age or those over but are unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition.

Thus, instead of applying the penalty under Article 266-B of the RPC, which is prision mayor, the proper penalty should be that provided in Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, which is reclusion temporal in its medium period. This is because AAA was below twelve (12) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, and that the act of inserting his finger in AAA's private part undeniably amounted to "lascivious conduct." (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, the Information clearly stated that the victim was "eleven (11) years of age, a minor, at the time of the commission of the offense." Further, it was particularly alleged in the Information that petitioner kissed the minor victim on her lips, licked her neck and inserted his finger inside her private part." The offense charged was duly proven by the prosecution. Thus, petitioner should be convicted of "Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610" and not "Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to RA 7610."

Moreover, the penalty imposed should also be modified. We find that the RTC erred in considering minority of the victim as an aggravating circumstance since the victim's age or minority is already an element of the offense charged. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the maximum term of the indeterminate penalty imposable against petitioner should be the medium period of the penalty provided by law, which is fifteen (15) years, six (6) months, and twenty-one (21) days to sixteen (16) years, five (5) months, and ten (10) days. Thus, the Court finds it appropriate for petitioner to be meted the indeterminate sentence of twelve (12) years, ten (10) months and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

Moreover, in line with current jurisprudence, 13 the Court deems it necessary to increase the civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages to Php50,000.00 each. In addition, the imposition of Php15,000.00 as fine is proper in accordance with Section 31 (f), 14 Article XII of RA 7610. 15 The amount of damages awarded shall also earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of the Court's resolution until said amounts are fully paid.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 28 November 2019 and Resolution dated 16 November 2020 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 40721 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. We find petitioner REMBRANDT EMBRY P. MENDOZA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610, and sentence him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years, ten (10) months and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Petitioner is ordered to pay AAA the amounts of Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php50,000.00 as moral damages, and Php50,000.00 as exemplary damages, and to pay a fine of Php15,000.00 in accordance with Section 31 (f), Article XII of Republic Act No. 7610. The amount of damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of the Court's Resolution until the amounts are fully paid. AaCTcI

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

By:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 40-52; penned by Associate Justice Tita Marilyn Payoyo-Villordon and concurred in by Associate Justices Ramon R. Garcia and Victoria Isabel A. Paredes of the Eighth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.

2.Id. at 37-38.

3.Id. at 75-89; penned by Presiding Judge Lorna F. Catris-Chua Cheng.

4.Id. at 11-30.

5. The Court withholds the names of the victim, as well as that of her immediate family and household members and other information, pursuant to SC Administrative Circular No. 83-2015, issued on 27 July 2015 re: Protocols and Procedures in the Promulgation, Publication and Posting in the Websites of Decisions, Final Resolutions, and Final Orders Using Fictitious Names, as the same tend to establish or compromise the victim's identity.

6.See People v. ZZZ, G.R. No. 229862, 19 June 2019 [Per J. Leonen], citing People v. Quintos, 746 Phil. 809, 819-820 (2014); G.R. No. 199402, 12 November 2014 [Per J. Leonen]; see also People v. Palema, G.R. No. 228000, 10 July 2019 [Per J. Leonen].

7.See People v. XXX, G.R. No. 244288, 04 March 2020 [Per J. A.B. Reyes, Jr.], citing People v. Udtohan, 815 Phil. 449, 463 (2017); G.R. No. 228887, 02 August 2017 [Per J. Mendoza].

8. G.R. No. 240229, 17 June 2020 [Per C.J. Peralta].

9. 503 Phil. 421, 433 (2005); G.R. No. 163866, 29 July 2005 [Per J. Ynares-Santiago].

10. 357 Phil. 987 (1998); G.R. No. 128777, 07 October 1998 [Per J. Panganiban].

11. 496 Phil. 747 (2005); G.R. No. 157718, 26 April 2005 [Per J. Chico-Nazario].

12. G.R. No. 231306, 17 June 2019 [Per J. Peralta].

13.See People v. HHH, G.R. No. 248245, 26 August 2020 [Per J. Carandang]; see also People v. Sumayod, G.R. No. 230626, 09 March 2020 [Per J. Leonen].

14. SEC. 31. Common Penal Provisions. —

xxx xxx xxx

(f) A fine to be determined by the court shall be imposed and administered as a cash fund by the Department of Social Welfare and Development and disbursed for the rehabilitation of each child victim, or any immediate member of his family if the latter is the perpetrator of the offense.

15.See People v. Pagkatipunan, G.R. No. 232393, 14 August 2019 [Per J. Lazaro-Javier].