THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 245616. July 29, 2019.]
MARINA C. MATA KHATIBI, petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND CARMELITA LIM, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedJuly 29, 2019, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 245616(Marina C. Mata Khatibi v. People of the Philippines and Carmelita Lim). — Sometime in 2004, petitioner Marina C. Mata Khatibi (Marina), a contractor for office uniforms, ordered four fabric samples (referred to as Lady Diane [Waffle], Francheska, Carlos P-stripe and Milan Check) from a textile supplier, respondent Carmelita Lim (Lim). Marina sewed the fabrics into prototype office uniforms for the employees of the Social Security System (SSS) and submitted the same for consideration to the SSS Bids Committee. Since Marina's designs were chosen, she ordered from Lim the four fabrics in bulk. Marina issued four postdated checks each amounting to PhP624,323.75, corresponding to the four fabrics, as payment to Lim. Two out of the four postdated checks are the subject of the case. Between December 2004 and the last week of January 2005, the fabrics were delivered in batches to Marina's factory in Singalong, Manila.
Meanwhile, SSS rejected two of the delivered fabrics, specifically Lady Diane (Waffle) and Francheska, because these were not of the same quality as the original prototypes presented by Marina. Marina then informed Lim and requested her to change the fabrics. Lim refused and insisted that the delivered fabrics were correct. Marina had the two fabrics tested at the Philippine Textile Research Institute of the Philippines, which in turn affirmed that there was a variance between the samples given and the ones delivered in terms of breakage, thickness, and number of yarn. Marina sent the test results to Lim and advised the latter not to deposit the checks until the fabrics are changed. However, Lim proceeded to deposit the checks which were subsequently dishonored for reasons "Drawn Against Insufficient Fund (DAIF)" and "Stopped Payment Order/Drawn Against Insufficient Fund (SPO/DAIF)."
Because of this, Lim, through counsel, allegedly sent a demand letter dated September 12, 2006 to Marina but it went unheeded. Lim filed criminal complaints for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP Blg. 22) against Marina, which were docketed at the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) in Mandaluyong City, Branch 60.
In a Joint Decision 1 dated June 16, 2015, the MeTC acquitted Marina from the criminal charges but found her civilly liable. Hence, the dispositive portion of the MeTC's Joint Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, for failure of the prosecution to prove the criminal aspect of this case by proof beyond reasonable doubt, judgment is hereby rendered ACQUITTING accused MARINA CONCEPCION MATA-KHATIBI for two (2) counts of Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. She is, however, held civilly liable and is thus ordered to pay the private complainant the amount of One Million Two Hundred Forty-Eight Thousand Six Hundred Forty-Seven Pesos and Fifty Centavos (PhP1,248,647.50) representing the face value of the checks plus costs. 2
The MeTC held that there is no proof to show that Marina received the notice of dishonor. For this reason, Marina's criminal liability under BP Blg. 22 was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, her civil liability for the value of the subject checks which were issued for a consideration has been proven by preponderant evidence.
Marina then filed a Notice of Partial Appeal to elevate the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and to dispute the award of civil damages.
In a Decision 3 dated June 27, 2016, the RTC of Mandaluyong City, Branch 208, affirmed in toto the Joint Decision dated June 16, 2015 of the MeTC.
Marina asked for a reconsideration but was denied through an Order dated September 1, 2017. She then elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Review.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision 4 dated August 31, 2018, affirmed the Decision dated June 27, 2016 of the RTC. It emphasized that the issue concerns the civil aspect of the BP Blg. 22 case. Thus, it held that an acquittal resulting from failure of the prosecution to prove all the elements of the offense beyond reasonable doubt does not extinguish the civil liability for the dishonored checks, even if there was reasonable doubt as to the receipt of the demand letter by Marina.
Marina then asked for a reconsideration but was denied in a Resolution dated February 21, 2019. She filed a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review on certiorari which this Court granted. Subsequently, the petitioner filed the instant petition.
The Court denies the Petition as it failed to show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in the assailed Decision and Resolution.
The arguments raised by petitioner Marina are a mere rehash, all of which had already been exhaustively passed upon by the MeTC, the RTC, and the Court of Appeals, which all ruled that she was civilly liable. Petitioner Marina asks the Court to re-assess the factual incidents of the case which is beyond the purview of this Court's power of review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Since this Court is not a trier of facts, only questions of law may be raised. Furthermore, where the Court of Appeals affirms the factual findings of the trial court, these findings generally become binding upon this Court, save for a few exceptions which do not apply in this case. 5
However, the Court modifies the appealed Decision with regard to the interest on the monetary awards following the guidelines laid down by the Court in Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 6 to wit:
[I]n the absence of an express stipulation as to the rate of interest that would govern the parties, the rate of legal interest for loans or forbearance of any money, goods or credits and the rate allowed in judgments shall no longer be twelve percent (12%) per annum — as reflected in the case of Eastern Shipping Lines and Subsection X305.1 of the Manual of Regulations for Banks and Sections 4305Q.1, 4305S.3 and 4303P.1 of the Manual of Regulations for Non-Bank Financial Institutions, before its amendment by BSP-MB Circular No. 799 — but will now be six percent (6%) per annum effective July 1, 2013. It should be noted, nonetheless, that the new rate could only be applied prospectively and not retroactively. Consequently, the twelve percent (12%) per annum legal interest shall apply only until June 30, 2013. Come July 1, 2013 the new rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be the prevailing rate of interest when applicable.
Corollarily, in the recent case of Advocates for Truth in Lending, Inc. and Eduardo B. Olaguer v. Bangko Sentral Monetary Board, this Court affirmed the authority of the BSP-MB to set interest rates and to issue and enforce Circulars when it ruled that "the BSP-MB may prescribe the maximum rate or rates of interest for all loans or renewals thereof or the forbearance of any money, goods or credits, including those for loans of low priority such as consumer loans, as well as such loans made by pawnshops, finance companies and similar credit institutions. It even authorizes the BSP-MB to prescribe different maximum rate or rates for different types of borrowings, including deposits and deposit substitutes, or loans of financial intermediaries."
Nonetheless, with regard to those judgments that have become final and executory prior to July 1, 2013, said judgments shall not be disturbed and shall continue to be implemented applying the rate of interest fixed therein.
To recapitulate and for future guidance, the guidelines laid down in the case of Eastern Shipping Linesare accordingly modified to embody BSP-MB Circular No. 799, as follows:
I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts is breached, the contravenor can be held liable for damages. The provisions under Title XVIII on "Damages" of the Civil Code govern in determining the measure of recoverable damages.
II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 6% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages, except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code), but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 6% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.
And, in addition to the above, judgments that have become final and executory prior to July 1, 2013, shall not be disturbed and shall continue to be implemented applying the rate of interest fixed therein. (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted.)
Based on the foregoing, the amount of One Million Two Hundred Forty-Eight Thousand Six Hundred Forty-Seven Pesos and Fifty Centavos (PhP1,248,647.50) shall be subject to interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date the judicial demand was made or when the Information 7 was filed, until June 30, 2013, and thereafter, 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until finality of this judgment.
Moreover, once the judgment in this case becomes final and executory, the said monetary award shall be subject to legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby resolves as follows:
(a) To DENY the Petition for Review for failure to establish any reversible error by the Court of Appeals in its assailed Decision dated August 31, 2018 and Resolution dated February 21, 2019 in CA-G.R. SP No. 153483;
(b) To AFFIRM WITH MODIFICATIONS the Decision dated August 31, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 153483, viz.:
(i) The amount of PhP1,248,647.50 shall be subject to interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date the Information was filed until June 30, 2013, and at the rate of 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until the date of finality of this judgment; and
(ii) The monetary award shall be subject to interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment until full satisfaction of the same; and
(c) To NOTE the Manifestation and Compliance dated June 11, 2019 filed by Atty. Ariel R. Subia, counsel of petitioner, with respect to his MCLE Compliance and proof of service of the Motion for Extension upon the Office of the Solicitor General.
SO ORDERED." JARDELEZA, J., additional member per Raffle dated June 10, 2019 vice INTING, J.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 32-54; penned by Acting Presiding Judge Norma M. Ramos.
2.Id. at 53.
3.Id. at 55-59; penned by Presiding Judge Esteban A. Tacla, Jr.
4.Id. at 19-25; penned by Associate Justice Manuel M. Barrios with Associate Justices Japar B. Dimaampao and Henri Jean Paul B. Inting (now a member of this Court) concurring.
5.Pascual v. Burgos, 776 Phil. 167, 182 (2016).
6. 716 Phil. 267, 280-283 (2013). See Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board Circular No. 799, Series of 2013.
7. See Young v. Court of Appeals, 493 Phil. 280, 291 (2005).