FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 194029. April 1, 2014.]
ANTONIO V. MARTEL, JR. AND SPOUSES PEPITO AND VIOLETA NG, petitioners, vs. WILSON ORFINADA, SR., REPRESENTED BY ALICE AFRICA, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated April 1, 2014 which reads as follows:
"G.R. NO. 194029 — ANTONIO V. MARTEL, JR. AND SPOUSES PEPITO AND VIOLETA NG, Petitioners, versus WILSON ORFINADA, SR., REPRESENTED BY ALICE AFRICA, Respondent.
This treats the Motion for Reconsideration 1 of the Court Resolution 2 dated May 30, 2011 denying the petition for lack of merit and directing the parties to thresh out their respective claims in more appropriate proceedings in view of the conflicting claims over the property.
To recall, the petition arose from a claim by Insurance Savings Investment Agency, Inc. (ISIA) over vast tracts of land bounded by the Pasig River in the North, by the Tunisan River in the South, by the Laguna de Bay in the East and by the Manila de Bay in the West. 3
ISIA filed a case for annulment of title against the Republic of the Philippines and a Supplemental Complaint No. 9 against herein respondent Wilson Orfinada, Sr., (Orfinada) and Antonio V. Martel and spouses Pepito and Violeta Ng (petitioners) involving parcels of land consisting of about 221,688 square meters. A cross-claim was filed by the petitioners against their co-respondent Orfinada. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 147, dismissed both Supplemental Complaint No. 9 and the Cross-Claim in separate Orders dated December 6, 1999 4 and December 9, 1999, 5 respectively.
The petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion on the Order dated December 6, 1999 (dismissing the Supplemental Complaint No. 9) but failed to file a written motion for reconsideration of the Order dated December 9, 1999 (dismissing the cross-claim).
On August 8, 2000, the RTC issued an Order 6 setting aside the Order dated December 9, 1999 and reinstated the petitioners' Cross-Claim against Orfinada. Furthermore, the RTC rendered judgment 7 on August 22, 2000 declaring Original Certificate of Title No. 383 and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 38910-A in the name of Orfinada as null and void ab initio. SHDAEC
Orfinada appealed the above orders to the Court of Appeals (CA). In its Decision 8 dated July 9, 2010, the CA granted the petition in this wise:
The assailed RTC Decision is SET ASIDE and the 9 December 1999 order dismissing the cross-claim is REINSTATED. The Notice of Lis Pendens on Orfinada's TCT No. 38910-A is cancelled with respect to the entries pertaining to Supplemental Complaint No. 9 and cross-claim in Civil Case No. 93-452 (for Annulment of Title).
SO ORDERED. 9
The petitioners elevated the CA Decision before this Court, which denied the petition through a Resolution 10 dated May 30, 2011, finding no reversible error committed by the CA in not admitting Supplemental Complaint No. 9.
The petitioners filed the present Motion for Reconsideration. They also filed a motion for early resolution 11 where they pray that the Court resolve the case instead of the petitioners pursuing "more appropriate proceedings" to settle once and for all the conflicting claims of the parties over the subject properties. To the petitioners, a remand or re-filing of the case would be a tedious process. Candidly, they also averred that the proceedings may even last beyond their lifetimes and they may never see the end of their efforts; in fact, respondent Orfinada has already passed away. 12
The petitioners also filed a Motion to Refer the Case to the Court En Banc 13 pursuant to Bar Matter No. 209, In the Matter of the Amendment and/or Clarification of Various Supreme Court Rules and Resolutions, where the following cases are considered en banc cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(7) Cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the Court En Banc or in division may be modified or reversed;
xxx xxx xxx
(9) All other cases as the Court En Banc or by a majority of its actual membership may deem of sufficient importance to merit its attention. 14 (Emphasis supplied)
According to the petitioners, the present case falls within those cases which must be referred to the Court en banc in the interest of justice. Moreover, there is a need to reconcile seemingly conflicting rulings of the Court concerning the subject property. The cases said to contain the conflicting rulings by the Court according to the petitioners are the following:
a. G.R. No. 91413, Fusilero, et al., v. Court of Appeals, et al., 2 July 1990, decreeing that Benito J. Lopez and Pepito Ng are innocent purchasers for value and in good faith of lands registered under TCT Nos. 5-61176 and 5-61177;
b. G.R. No. 123751, Heirs of Irene Garcia v. Court of Appeals, et al., 21 October 1996, which affirmed in toto the CA Decision dated 27 November 1995 in CA-G.R. CV No. 45297. The Honorable Court held that TCT Nos. S-61176 and S-61177, cancelling TCT No. 31346, cover a property located in Almanza, Las Piñas, Metro Manila. HcTEaA
c. G.R. No. 141145, Republic v. Wilson Orfinada, Sr., and Lucresia K. Orfinada, 12 November 2004, which upheld respondents' TCT No. 38910-A as a valid title including its antecedent title OCT No. 383 in the name of Guillermo Cruz, thereby denying the Republic's petition and affirming the "Joint Decision" of the appellate court in CA-G.R. CV No. 32815. 15
In his Comment on the Motion to Refer the Case to the Court En Banc, Orfinada agreed that in this manner, the Court could write finis as regards the validity of his title once and for all. Nevertheless, Orfinada proposed that the case be remanded to the CA first for further reception of evidence as was done in Manotok IV v. Heirs of Homer L. Barque 16prior to the elevation of the matter before this Court.
Through a Resolution 17 dated October 10, 2011, the Court denied the petitioners' Motion to Refer the Case to the Court En Banc, "in view of SC Circular No. 2-89 which provides that the Court En Banc is not an appellate court to which decisions/resolutions of a Division may be appealed."
We take note that the petitioners' right over the subject land has been upheld by the Supreme Court in several cases 18 and they were even considered as innocent purchasers in good faith and for value. Nevertheless, taking into consideration that Orfinada's title was also upheld by no less than this Court in another Decision, 19 we hold that the petitioners and Orfinada's rights have been established separately, only that these were determined against their corresponding opposing parties in those cases. Pitted against each other, however, the petitioners and Orfinada would have to present evidence anew as this Court cannot cancel a Torrens title without a direct proceeding for that purpose. Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree 20 provides:
Section 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. — A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. (Emphasis ours)
Based on the evidence to be presented in appropriate proceedings, this Court may finally adjudicate whose title should be annulled. It must be borne in mind that the petition is but an offshoot of a main case, 21 which might be improperly affected by any shortcut in the proceedings. "[C]onsidering that there are factual and legal issues that still need to be threshed out, and that this Court is not a trier of facts, the appropriate action is to remand the case to the CA for further proceedings." 22
In Manotok IV v. Heirs of Homer L. Barque, 23 the Court made the following pronouncement:
At the same time, the Court recognizes that there is not yet any sufficient evidence for us to warrant the annulment of the Manotok title. All that the record indicates thus for is evidence not yet refuted by clear and convincing proof that the Manotok's claim to title is flawed. To arrive at an ultimate determination, the formal reception of evidence is in order. This Court is not a trier of fact or otherwise structurally capacitated to receive and evaluate evidence de novo. However, the Court of Appeals is sufficiently able to undertake such function. AIDTHC
The remand of cases pending with this Court to the Court of Appeals for reception of further evidence is not a novel idea. It has been undertaken before — in Republic v. Court of Appeals and more recently in our 2007 Resolution in Manotok v. Court of Appeals. Our following explanation in Manotok equally applies to this case:
"Under Section 6 of Rule 46, which is applicable to original cases for certiorari, the Court may, whenever necessary to resolve factual issues, delegate the reception of the evidence on such issues to any of its members or to an appropriate court, agency or office. The delegate need not be the body that rendered the assailed decision.
The Court of Appeals generally has the authority to review findings of fact. Its conclusions as to findings of fact are generally accorded great respect by this Court. It is a body that is fully capacitated and has a surfeit of experience in appreciating factual matters, including documentary evidence.
In fact, the Court had actually resorted to referring a factual matter pending before it to the Court of Appeals. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, this Court commissioned the former Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals to hear and receive evidence on the controversy, more particularly to determine "the actual area reclaimed by the Republic Real Estate Corporation, and the areas of the Cultural Center Complex which are 'open spaces' and/or 'areas reserved for certain purposes,' determining in the process the validity of such postulates and the respective measurements of the areas referred to." The Court of Appeals therein received the evidence of the parties and rendered a "Commissioner's Report" shortly thereafter. Thus, resort to the Court of Appeals is not a deviant procedure.
The provisions of Rule 32 should also be considered as governing the grant of authority to the Court of Appeals to receive evidence in the present case. Under Section 2, Rule 32 of the Rules of Court, a court may, motu proprio, direct a reference to a commissioner when a question of fact, other than upon the pleadings, arises upon motion or otherwise, in any stage of a case, or for carrying a judgment or order into effect. The order of reference can be limited exclusively to receive and report evidence only, and the commissioner may likewise rule upon the admissibility of evidence. The commissioner is likewise mandated to submit a report in writing to the court upon the matters submitted to him by the order of reference. In Republic, the commissioner's report formed the basis of the final adjudication by the Court on the matter. The same result can obtain herein." 24 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED. The instant case, however, is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for the purpose of hearing and receiving evidence. Further, the Court of Appeals is tasked to make and submit its Report and Recommendation before this Court.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
EDGAR O. ARICHETADivision Clerk of Court
By:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 415-423.
2. Id. at 410-414.
3. Id. at 76.
4. Issued by Judge Teofilo Guadiz, Jr.; id. at 56-58.
5. Id. at 59.
6. Id. at 73-75.
7. Id. at 76-94.
8. Penned by Associate Justice Mario V. Lopez, with Associate Justices Magdangal M. de Leon and Rodil V. Zalameda, concurring; id. at 38-50.
9. Id. at 49.
10. Id. at 410-414.
11. Id. at 484-486.
12. Id. at 486.
13. Id. at 429-441.
14. Id. at 435-436.
15. Id. at 434-435.
16. G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605, December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 468.
17. Rollo, pp. 444-445.
18. Pilar Development Corporation v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, Spouses Pepito L. Ng and Violeta N. Ng, and Spouses Antonio V. Martel, Jr. and Juliana Ticson, G.R. No. 155943, August 19, 2013; Court Resolution dated January 15, 1997 in G.R. No. 123751 (Heirs of Irene Garcia v. CA); Court Resolution dated July 2, 1990 in G.R. No. 91413 (Fusilero v. CA).
19. Republic of the Philippines v. Spouses Orfinada, Sr., 485 Phil. 18 (2004).
20. Presidential Decree No. 1529.
21. Insurance Savings & Investment Agency, Inc. v. Republic of the Philippines, Civil Case No. 93-452.
22. Dela Cruz v. Heirs of Pablo Sunia, G.R. No. 158379, February 29, 2012, 667 SCRA 246, 253.
23. Supra note 16.
24. Id. at 507-508.