Maria De Leon Transit [Transportation], Inc. v. Pasion

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 183634-35. October 8, 2014.]

MARIA DE LEON TRANSIT [TRANSPORTATION], INC., petitioner, vs. TOMAS D. PASION, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated October 8, 2014 which reads as follows:

"G.R. Nos. 183634-35 (Maria De Leon Transit [Transportation], Inc. v. Tomas D. Pasion). — We resolve this appeal filed by petitioner Maria De Leon Transit [Transportation] from the 12 May 2008 Decision 1 and 27 June 2008 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 100614 and 101057.

FACTS OF THE CASE

Respondent Tomas D. Pasion alleges that he had worked as a bus driver with petitioner since September 1987. On 30 December 2002, he arrived at petitioner's Manila station from Laoag City at nine in the evening. However, he was not allowed to drive a trip despite the many passengers waiting for a ride to the Ilocos province. He then decided to celebrate New Year's Eve in Manila; unfortunately, his left hand got injured while lighting firecrackers, prompting him to seek a leave of absence so that his wound could fully heal. This request was granted by petitioner. After two months of medication, respondent reported for work in March 2003, but was no longer allowed to resume his work. No notice had been sent to him informing him of his dismissal from employment. He kept on reporting at least twice a month until November 2003, but the dispatcher still refused to give him a driving assignment. He attempted to talk to the owners, but he was not entertained. Surprisingly, in April 2004, petitioner called him to report for work. But upon arrival, he was made to sign retirement papers, which he refused. Hence, he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. 3CcTIAH

On the other hand, petitioner admitted employing respondent as a bus driver. Allegedly, it was respondent who refused a driving assignment on 31 December 2002 because of exhaustion and a desire to celebrate New Year's Eve with his family in Manila. Unfortunately, his left hand got injured, which was why he was granted an indefinite leave of absence. In March 2003, he reported for work, but petitioner requested him to submit a second medical certificate showing that he was physically fit to drive, because the first one did not indicate his fitness to do so. Petitioner deemed a second medical certificate necessary, considering that it was his hand that had been badly injured, coupled with the fact that he was already 61 years old. Instead of submitting this requirement, he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. 4

In his Decision 5 dated 29 August 2005, Executive Labor Arbiter Irenarco R. Rimando ruled that "[t]he tribunal cannot sustain the argument of the [petitioner] that the [respondent] is not entitled to any of his claims because he was never dismissed from his employment. . . . If he cannot be reinstated a substitute relief must be given to him in the form of a separation pay." 6 In view thereof, petitioner was directed to pay respondent separation pay in the amount of P75,000 plus 10% as attorney's fees. 7acHDTA

Upon petitioner's appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) rendered a Resolution 8 dated 30 April 2007 affirming the Decision of Labor Arbiter Rimando. It stated that while respondent kept on reporting for work, he still failed to submit the medical clearance required by petitioner. The NLRC then concluded that respondent had not been dismissed, but that his case fell under Article 284 of the Labor Code or "Disease as Ground for Termination," entitling him to an award for separation pay. 9 Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but this motion was also denied in an NLRC Resolution 10 dated 3 July 2007.

THE CA RULING

On intermediate appellate review, the CA reversed the 30 April 2007 and 3 July 2007 Resolutions of the NLRC, declaring respondent to have been illegally dismissed. The CA ruled that to validly terminate an employee under Article 284, the following requisites must concur: (a) the employee suffers from a disease that cannot be cured for six months, and continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to the health of the employee or to that of the co-employees; and (b) a certification to that effect must be issued by a competent public health authority. In this case, neither party presented proof for both requisites. Verily, the burden of proving the validity of the dismissal rests on the employer. Absent a certification issued by a public health authority and petitioner having failed to comply with the twin-notice rule, the CA was constrained to rule that there was an illegal dismissal. 11

As to respondent's claim for reinstatement with the payment of backwages, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay and disturbance compensation, the CA ruled that reinstatement was not possible in view of the strained relations between the parties; and that petitioner was thus required to pay respondent separation pay equivalent to his one-month salary for every year of service, with interest at six percent per annum from the finality of the decision until fully paid, plus backwages and attorney's fees constituting 10 percent of the total amount awarded. However, as to service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, disturbance compensation, acceptance fees, and actual and moral damages, the claims were denied, because respondent never appealed the denial thereof by Executive Labor Arbiter Rimando or before any other proper forum. Hence, the judgment of Labor Arbiter Rimando insofar as the other monetary benefits are concerned had passed to the realm of finality. 12

We now rule on the final review of the case.

OUR RULING

We deny the Petition.

First, we address the issue of whether or not respondent was legally dismissed from service. The rule is that factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies such as the NLRC are generally accorded not only respect, but at times even finality, because of the special knowledge and expertise gained by these agencies from handling matters falling under their specialized jurisdictions. 13 It is also settled that this Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally embark on the evaluation of evidence adduced during trial. 14 This rule, however, allows for exceptions. One of these covers instances when the findings of fact of the trial court, or of the quasi-judicial agency concerned conflict or contradict those of the CA. When there is variance in the factual findings, it is incumbent upon this Court to reexamine the facts once again. 15

After a careful review of the records of the case, we see no reason to reverse or modify the findings of the CA. We cannot sustain the defense that petitioner did not dismiss respondent, but only required him to present a second medical certificate "in light of [its] duty as a common carrier to be extra-diligent in the supervision of its drivers." Petitioner must be reminded that management prerogative is not absolute. We have consistently held that "[b]y its very nature, encompassing as it could be, management prerogative must be exercised in good faith and with due regard to the rights of labor — verily, with the principles of fair play at heart and justice in mind. While we concede that management would best know its operational needs, the exercise of management prerogative cannot be utilized as an implement to circumvent our laws and oppress employees." 16 To require respondent to present a second medical certificate despite his having submitted one that stated he only needed a two-month healing period (which he has already complied with) was a circumvention of the law, so the non-production of the document did not justify his prolonged non-assignment. In Duterte v. Kingswood Trading Co., Inc., 17(Duterte), the Court said: CaEIST

Much was made by the NLRC — and the CA — about petitioner's refusal to comply with respondents' order to submit a medical certificate — irresistibly implying that such refusal is what constrained them to refuse to take petitioner back in.

We are not persuaded.

Even assuming, in gratia argumenti, that petitioner committed what may be considered an act of insubordination for refusing to present a medical certificate, such offense, without more, certainly did not warrant the latter's placement in a floating status, a veritable dismissal, and deprived of his only source of livelihood.

We are not unmindful of the connection between the nature of petitioner's disease and his job as a truck/trailer driver. We are also fully aware that petitioner's job places at stake the safety of the public. However, we do not agree with the NLRC that petitioner was validly dismissed because his continued employment was prohibited by the basic legal mandate that reasonable diligence must be exercised to prevent prejudice to the public, which justified respondents in refusing work to petitioner. Petitioner could have been admitted back to work performing other tasks, such as cleaning and maintaining respondent company's machine and transportation assets.

Moreover, even assuming without admitting that a second medical certificate was a valid prerequisite for the continued employment of respondent, the assumption does not hold water because he has consistently denied having received such instruction, 18 and petitioner failed to present any proof thereof.

That being said, petitioner failed to observe the long-standing requirement of procedural due process in labor cases — the twin-notice rule 19 — for the Court cannot sanction an arbitrary dismissal that is not founded on clearly established facts sufficient to warrant respondent's separation from work. 20

Consequently, we disagree with the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that respondent was validly dismissed under Article 284 of the Labor Code, 21 inasmuch as the provision clearly states that before an employer can legally dismiss an employee, the employer must "adduce a certification from a competent public authority that the disease of which its employee is suffering is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six months even with proper treatment." 22 This condition is not forthright in the instant case because respondent has already produced an earlier medical certificate. If petitioner doubts that certification, it is its responsibility to obtain a separate opinion declaring otherwise — one issued by a competent public health authority as required by Article 284. We held thus: TaDAIS

In Triple Eight Integrated Services, Inc. v. NLRC, the Court explains why the submission of the requisite medical certificate is for the employer's compliance, thus:

The requirement for a medical certificate under Article 284 of the Labor Code cannot be dispensed with; otherwise, it would sanction the unilateral and arbitrary determination by the employer of the gravity or extent of the employee's illness and thus defeat the public policy on the protection of labor. 23 (Emphases ours)

Second, concomitant to a finding of illegal dismissal is the grant of reliefs to the employee — specifically, reinstatement and backwages. These two reliefs provided are separate and distinct. In instances wherein reinstatement is no longer feasible, separation pay is granted. In effect, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to either reinstatement, if viable, or separation pay if reinstatement is no longer viable; and backwages. 24 In this case, considering that reinstatement is no longer feasible due to respondent's having reached the compulsory retirement age, separation pay in lieu of reinstatement 25 and backwages must be granted.

Third, as to whether respondent may receive backwages beyond the compulsory retirement age, we rule in the negative. This Court has consistently held that the backwages to be awarded to an illegally dismissed employee may only be tacked from the date of the illegal dismissal until the date the employee reaches the compulsory retirement age, 26 unless there is a bilateral and voluntary act between the employer and employee agreeing to a different retirement age. 27 The exception is not present in this case.

Last, as to the claim for service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, disturbance compensation, acceptance fees, and actual and moral damages, we agree with the CA that these claims must be denied because respondent never appealed the denial thereof by the Labor Arbiter or before any proper forum. In any event, illegal dismissal alone does not entitle the dismissed employee to moral damages; additional facts must be pleaded and proven to warrant the grant thereof. 28 These facts, however, were never pleaded in this case.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 100614 and 101057 are hereby AFFIRMED. Petitioner is declared guilty of illegal dismissal and is ordered to pay respondent separation pay equivalent to one-month pay for every year of service, in lieu of his reinstatement, plus his full backwages from the time his employment was terminated up to the date of his compulsory retirement age. Let this case be REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for the computation of respondent's separation pay, backwages and other monetary awards due. AaEcHC

SO ORDERED."

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETADivision Clerk of Court

Footnotes

1. Penned by Associate Justice Myrna Dimaranan Vidal, and concurred in by Associate Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes (now a member of this Court) and Vicente Q. Roxas; rollo, pp. 48-68.

2. Id. at 69-71.

3. Id. at 50-51.

4. Id. at 51-52.

5. Id. at 76-83.

6. Id. at 80.

7. Id. at 82-83.

8. Id. at 85-89.

9. Id. at 87-88.

10. Id. at 91-92.

11. Id. at 54-61.

12. Id. at 61-67.

13. General Milling Corporation v. Viajar, G.R. No. 181738, 30 January 2013, 689 SCRA 598, citing Eureka Personnel & Management Services, Inc. v. Valencia, 610 Phil. 444, 453 (2009).

14. Id. See also Bernarte v. Philippine Basketball Association, G.R. No. 192084, 14 September 2011, 657 SCRA 745.

15. Id., citing Janssen Pharmaceutica v. Silayro, 570 Phil. 215, 226-227 (2008).

16. Unicorn Safety Glass, Inc. v. Basarte, 486 Phil. 493, 505 (2004), citing Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Pascua, 456 Phil. 425 (2003).

17. 561 Phil. 11, 20 (2007).

18. Rollo, p. 132.

19. Sy v. Court of Appeals, 446 Phil. 404 (2003).

20. Id., citing Tiu v. NLRC, G.R. No. 83433, 215 SCRA 540, 551 (1992).

21. LABOR CODE, Article 284 — Disease as ground for termination. An employer may terminate the services of an employee who has been found to be suffering from any disease and whose continued employment is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his health as well as to the health of his co-employees: Provided, That he is paid separation pay equivalent to at least one (1) month salary or to one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service, whichever is greater, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one (1) whole year.

22. Duterte v. Kingswood Trading Co., Inc., supra note 17, at 19.

23. Id. at 19, citing Triple Eight Integrated Services, Inc. v. NLRC, 359 Phil. 955, 968 (1998).

24. Golden Ace Builders v. Talde, G.R. No. 187200, 5 May 2010, 620 SCRA 283, citing Macasero v. Southern Industrial Gases Philippines, 597 Phil. 494 (2009).

25. Jaculbe v. Silliman University, 547 Phil. 352 (2007).

26. See Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation v. Benedicto, G.R. No. 152843, 20 July 2006, 528 Phil. 148 (2006), citing Espejo v. National Labor Relations Commission, 325 Phil. 753 (1996). See also The New Philippine Skylanders, Inc. v. Dakila, G.R. No. 199547, 24 September 2012, 681 SCRA 658.

27. Jaculbe v. Silliman University, supra note 25, citing Soberano v. Secretary of Labor, 187 Phil. 873 (1980).

28. Torres v. Rural Bank of San Juan, Inc., G.R. No. 184520, 13 March 2013, 693 SCRA 357, citing M+W Zander Philippines, Inc. v. Enriquez, 606 Phil. 591, 612 (2009); Wensha Spa Center, Inc. v. Yung, G.R. No. 185122, 16 August 2010, 628 SCRA 311, 326.