FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 164675. September 21, 2015.]
MAPFRE ASIAN INSURANCE CORPORATION (formerly PROVIDENT INSURANCE CORPORATION), petitioner, vs. ABELARDO A. AQUINO, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated September 21, 2015 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 164675 — MAPFRE ASIAN INSURANCE CORPORATION (formerly PROVIDENT INSURANCE CORPORATION), Petitioner, v. ABELARDO A. AQUINO, Respondent.
After the respondent's residential house was damaged on April 9, 1993 by an earthquake of Intensity 5 magnitude, he claimed against the insurance policy, but the petitioner denied the claim on the ground that the damage had been caused by soil subsidence, a risk not covered by the policy. He consequently sued the latter in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Parañaque City, which ruled in his favor on May 23, 1997, 1 disposing:
WHEREFORE, viewed in light of the foregoing, defendant is hereby ordered to pay plaintiff the following:
1. The amount of P398,065.85 representing actual damages;
2. The amount of P30,000.00 as moral damages;
3. The amount of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4. The amount of P20,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
5. The cost of suit.
SO ORDERED. 2
on the basis that even if there had been soil subsidence as the petitioner theorized, the undeniable fact that the proximate cause of the damage had been the earthquake remained.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC on April 30, 2004, 3 holding that the respondent had established that the "Earthquake Endorsement" was a rider in the fire insurance policy; and that the insurance contract should be accorded greater weight than the testimonial evidence offered by the petitioner to refute the claim. 4
Hence, in this appeal, the petitioner submits that the CA erred in finding that the proximate cause of the damage caused to the respondent's house was the April 9, 1993 earthquake. 5
Ruling
We deny the petition for review on certiorari.
Firstly, the determination of whether or not the petitioner established that soil subsidence, not the April 9, 1993 earthquake, had been the proximate cause of the damage to the insured house obviously requires the review of the evidence presented during the trial. Hence, this appeal cannot prosper considering that the appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to questions of law. 6 The limitation is applicable herein, for the Court is not a trier of facts. For this purpose, a question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while a question of fact arises when the doubt concerns the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. 7 A question, to be one of law, must not demand the examination of the probative value of the evidence of the parties; 8 if it does, it is one of fact. The test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same, but whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, the question is one of law; otherwise, the question is one of fact. 9
And, secondly, the factual findings of the lower tribunals are conclusive on the parties and are generally not reviewable by this Court, especially when, as here, the CA affirmed the findings.
Although this Court has recognized exceptions and reviewed the factual findings of the lower courts, specifically: (a) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (c) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (f) when in making its findings the CA or the trial court went beyond the issues of the case, or the findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (g) when the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when the findings of the CA are conclusions without citation to specific evidence on which they are based; (i) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (j) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence but are contradicted by the evidence on record; and (k) when the CA or the trial court manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. 10 Yet, none of the recognized exceptions obtain herein.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on April 30, 2004; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED." PERLAS-BERNABE, J., on official leave; JARDELEZA, J., acting member per S.O. No. 2188 dated September 16, 2015.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 73-85.
2. Id. at 85.
3. Id. at 43-51; penned by Associate Justice Danilo B. Pine (retired), with Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. (now a Member of this Court) and Associate Justice Arcangelita Romilla-Lontok (retired) concurring.
4. Id. at 48-49.
5. Id. at 13.
6. Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
7. Republic of the Philippines v. Malabanan, G.R. No. 169067, October 6, 2010, 632 SCRA 338.
8. Lorzano v. Tabayag, Jr., G.R. No. 189647, February 6, 2012, 665 SCRA 38, 46; Heirs of Pacencia Racaza v. Abay-abay, G.R. No. 198402, June 13, 2012, 672 SCRA 622, 628.
9. Leoncio v. De Vera, G.R. No. 176842, February 18, 2008, 546 SCRA 180, 184; Binay v. Odeña, G.R. No. 163683, June 8, 2007, 524 SCRA 248, 255-256; Velayo-Fong v. Velayo, G.R. No. 155488, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 320, 329-330.
10. Sampayan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156360, January 14, 2005, 448 SCRA 220, 229; The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126850, April 28, 2004, 428 SCRA 79, 85.