SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 202096. March 14, 2018.]
CRISPIN L. MANIQUIS, petitioner,vs. PCI LEASING & FINANCE, INC., [NOW KNOWN AS BDO LEASING AND FINANCE, INC.], respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated14 March 2018which reads as follows: AScHCD
"G.R. No. 202096 (Crispin L. Maniquis vs. PCI Leasing & Finance, Inc., [now known as BDO Leasing and Finance, Inc.]). — This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Crispin L. Maniquis (petitioner) assailing the Decision 1 dated February 18, 2011 and Resolution 2 dated May 18, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 111300.
Antecedent Facts
The facts show that the petitioner was formerly the Accounts Officer and Senior Assistant Manager of PCI Leasing & Finance, Inc., now known as BDO Leasing & Finance, Inc. (respondent) until his resignation in December 2004. During his employment with the respondent, he handled the account of Spouses Dante and Lourdes Gutierrez (Spouses Gutierrez), who obtained a loan from the bank in the amount of P48,246,000.00. To secure the payment of the said loan, Spouses Gutierrez executed several chattel and real estate mortgages over their properties located in Pampanga, Quezon City and San Juan. Unfortunately, they defaulted in the payment of their obligations which prompted the respondent to institute a foreclosure proceedings over the mortgaged properties. 3
Subsequently, separate auction sales were conducted on July 29-31, 2003 over the mortgaged properties situated in Pampanga, Quezon City and San Juan, respectively, where the respondent emerged as the highest bidder. Thereafter, the corresponding certificates of sale were issued to the respondent and annotated on the titles of the properties. 4
On October 15, 2003, within the one-year redemption period, the respondent allowed Spouses Gutierrez to redeem the property by selling the properties in Pampanga to Mr. Andy Paredes for P14,500,000.00, after which they were issued a Certificate of Redemption. Spouses Gutierrez, however, impugned the validity of the auction sale of the San Juan and Quezon City properties, alleging that the loan secured by the said properties had already been covered by the proceeds of the sale of the Pampanga properties. 5
For failure of Spouses Gutierrez to redeem the San Juan and Quezon City properties, the petitioner, in his capacity as Senior Assistant Manager of the respondent, executed an Affidavit of Consolidation dated August 30, 2004, pertaining to the San Juan property, which states, thus:
"10. Within one year from the annotation of the certificate of sale (on TCT No. 9-700-R), no redemption of the mortgaged property was made;
11. Therefore, absolute ownership over the mortgaged property is now consolidated in favor of [respondent] by operation of law." 6
A similar affidavit was executed by the petitioner, pertaining to the Quezon City property. Pursuant to the said affidavits, the titles to the San Juan and Quezon City properties were transferred to the respondent. Even then, Spouses Gutierrez refused to surrender the possession of the said properties. This prompted the respondent to file a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession over the San Juan properties with the RTC of Pasig City. 7
For its part, Spouses Gutierrez filed a Complaint for Nullification of Foreclosure, Certificate of Sale and Title, and Reconveyance, plus Damages. Attached to the said complaint was the Affidavit dated August 29, 2005 executed by the petitioner, who had already resigned from his employment with the respondent. The affidavit substantially provides as follows:
"8. This shows that [respondent] actually waived its right over the foreclosure and sale of properties covered by Promissory Notes Nos. 15509 (CTC No. 9700-R), 15608 (CCT. No. N-10444), 15609 and 16308 (TCT No. 156111) and, in fact, the P14,500,000.00 which was received by [respondent] from the proceeds of the sale of San Fernando City, Pampanga properties was applied as full payment of all the loans covered by the Real Estate Mortgages, with an excess amount of over P2,000,000.00 which was applied as partial payment of the loans covered by the Chattel mortgages." 8
The stark contrast of the Affidavit dated August 29, 2005 executed by the petitioner with his Affidavit of Consolidation dated August 30, 2004 prompted the respondent to institute a complaint for perjury against him as I.S. No. 07-01-00539. It alleged that the petitioner knowingly and deliberately made false statements under oath in his Affidavit dated August 29, 2005 which were totally inconsistent with the Affidavit of Consolidation dated August 30, 2004 which he earlier executed.
For his part, the petitioner denied the charge against him. He claimed that the Affidavit of Consolidation dated August 30, 2004 was prepared by Atty. Florecita R. Gonzalez (Atty. Gonzalez), the representative of the respondent, who made him believe that notwithstanding the payments made by the petitioner, the bank may still proceed with the foreclosure and consolidation of title over the mortgaged properties. He asseverated that he was compelled to sign the affidavit of consolidation after Spouses Gutierrez defaulted in the payment of the court-approved restructuring agreement. He further relayed that later on, he found out that the statements contained in the affidavit of consolidation he signed were illegal, hence, the execution of Affidavit dated August 29, 2005 to rectify his previous statements. 9 AcICHD
After the conduct of the preliminary investigation, the investigating prosecutor issued Resolution 10 dated February 4, 2008, finding probable cause to charge the petitioner with perjury. The pertinent portions of the resolution read as follows:
Evaluating the evidence on hand, this Office finds that there exists sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that [petitioner] is probably guilty of the crime leveled against him, and thus, should stand trial.
xxx xxx xxx
A reading of the records would readily show that the second affidavit is completely contradictory from that of the first affidavit, and if the first one is true, then the second affidavit is a deliberate falsity since both were executed by [petitioner].
xxx xxx xxx
Wherefore, it is hereby recommended that [petitioner] Crispin L. Maniquis be charged with Perjury defined and penalized under Art. 183 of the Revised Penal Code, and let the attached Information be filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City. Bail recommended is P6,000.00. 11
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied in Resolution 12 dated July 15, 2008.
Unperturbed, the petitioner filed a petition for review before the Office of the Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ Secretary). And, in a Resolution 13 dated January 27, 2009, the said office reversed the finding of the City Prosecutor and held that there exists no probable cause to charge the petitioner in court. The said resolution substantially states, thus:
We carefully examined the record, and we found no probable cause to indict [petitioner] for perjury for executing his affidavit dated August 29, 2005. [Petitioner] executed the said affidavit after realizing that his earlier affidavits of consolidation were not legally in order. [Petitioner] executed it in good faith and to make the record straight. Thus, even if the later affidavit is false, it does not make [petitioner] liable for perjury as the same is not due to a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood but due to a mistake of fact. x x x
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed resolution is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The City Prosecutor of Pasig City is directed to withdraw the information for perjury against [petitioner] CRISPIN L. MANIQUIS and to report the action taken thereon within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.14
Unyielding, the respondent filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied in Resolution 15 dated September 4, 2009.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Upon filing of a petition for certiorari, however, the CA nullified the issuances of the DOJ Secretary in its Decision 16 dated February 18, 2011, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. Finding grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the [DOJ Secretary], the assailed Resolutions dated January 27, 2009 and September 4, 2009 are hereby NULLIFIED. The City Prosecutor of Pasig City is hereby directed to file the necessary Information for Perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code against [petitioner] Crispin Maniquis.
SO ORDERED.17
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the same in its Resolution 18 dated May 18, 2012. Hence, this petition.
The petitioner argues that the CA, in reversing the finding of the DOJ Secretary, effectively interferes with the power of supervision and control of the latter over prosecutors. 19 He likewise claims that the CA did not define the action of the DOJ Secretary which could have amounted to grave abuse of discretion. 20
Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
In the instant case, the petitioner laments the CA's reversal of the ruling of the DOJ Secretary, who found no probable cause to hold him for trial during the preliminary investigation. TAIaHE
In Callo-Claridad vs. Esteban, et al., 21 the Court had the occasion to discuss the nature of a preliminary investigation, to wit:
A preliminary investigation, according to Section 1, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, is "an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial." The investigation is advisedly called preliminary, because it is yet to be followed by the trial proper in a court of law. The occasion is not for the full and exhaustive display of the parties' evidence but for the presentation only of such evidence as may engender a well-founded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty of the offense. The role and object of preliminary investigation were "to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious, and oppressive prosecutions, and to protect him from open and public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expenses and anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the State from useless and expensive prosecutions." 22
Verily, "the determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation is a function that belongs to the public prosecutor. It is an executive function, the correctness of the exercise of which is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon." 23 This, however, does not mean that the ruling of DOJ is absolutely beyond the ambit of this Court to review. While the public prosecutor is given a wide latitude in the determining the existence or non-existence of probable cause, his finding may still be questioned on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. Thus, in Callo-Claridad, the Court declared:
[B]y way of exception, judicial review is permitted where the respondent in the preliminary investigation clearly establishes that the public prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion, that is, when the public prosecutor has exercised his discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, patent and gross enough as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. 24
The rationale is that there is a need for checks and balance in order to ensure that the public prosecutor does not renege on his duty and also to prevent abuse in the exercise of discretion. But in deference to that same discretion granted to the public prosecutor, it is only in the instance of grave abuse of discretion that his findings may be challenged and set aside.
In Villareal vs. Aliga, grave abuse of discretion is defined as follows:
"[C]apricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law, or to act in contemplation of law or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility." 25
After an examination of the facts and records of the instant case, the Court perceives no reversible error on the CA's reversal of the issuances of the DOJ Secretary. On the contrary, we find that the DOJ Secretary indeed gravely abused his discretion in reversing the finding of probable cause of investigating prosecutor who had carefully laid down the basis of his findings.
It bears pointing out that in the Resolution dated February 4, 2008, the investigating prosecutor made a clear demonstration of how the petitioner could have committed the crime of perjury by making reference to documentary evidence and enumerating the elements of the crime. His presentation was, in fact, plain and simple and undoubtedly based on evidence and established facts. Surprisingly, in the Resolution dated January 27, 2009, the DOJ Secretary reversed the recommendation of the investigating prosecutor, dismissing the well-defined grounds and conclusion of the investigating prosecutor on the ground of the supposed "good faith" of the petitioner. The claim of good faith, however, is a defense better established in a full-blown trial and it is the court who will decide whether his claim is enough to exculpate him from the charge against him.
In Unilever Philippines, Inc. vs. Tan, the Court emphasized, thus:
[D]etermination of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime has been committed and there is enough reason to believe that it was committed by the accused. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. What is merely required is "probability of guilt." 26
The CA is correct in holding that the apparent presence of the material elements of the crime of the perjury is sufficient to substantiate the conclusion that the petitioner might probably be guilty of the crime charged. The crime perjury of which the petitioner was charged pertains to the willful and corrupt assertion of a falsehood under oath or affirmation administered by authority of law on a material matter. 27 The elements of the felony are:
(a) That the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material matter.
(b) That the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to receive and administer oath.
(c) That in that statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood.
(d) That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal purpose. 28
In the instant case, the petitioner admitted executing under oath two affidavits which are completely inconsistent with each other. He executed Affidavit of Consolidation dated August 30, 2004, apparently in representation of the interest of the respondent, his employer at that time, and then executed Affidavit dated August 29, 2005, after he was separated from employment, disclaiming what he stated in his previous affidavit. His statements refer to a material matter as, in fact, the issue to which it pertains is a subject of a litigation and his affidavit was submitted as evidence therein. As it is, there is reasonable ground to hold him for trial for perjury and good faith is not sufficient to preclude the filing of charge against him. To begin with, it is not an element of the crime, but merely a defense. As such, he may properly ventilate it before the court during the trial.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated February 18, 2011 and Resolution dated May 18, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 111300 are AFFIRMED. cDHAES
SO ORDERED." (Perlas-Bernabe, J., no part due to prior action in the Court of Appeals in a related case; Jardeleza, J., additional member as per raffle dated March 12, 2018).
Very truly yours,
MA. LOURDES C. PERFECTODivision Clerk of Court
By:
(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang, with Associate Justices Racoon R. Garcia and Manuel M. Barrios, concurring; rollo, pp. 49-66.
2.Id. at 68-73.
3.Id. at 50.
4.Id.
5.Id. at 51.
6.Id.
7.Id.
8.Id. at 52.
9.Id. at 53.
10.Id. at 88-91.
11.Id. at 89-91.
12.Id. at 93.
13.Id. at 75-79.
14.Id. at 77-78.
15.Id. at 81.
16.Id. at 49.
17.Id. at 65.
18.Id. at 72.
19.Id. at 23.
20.Id. at 21.
21. 707 Phil. 173 (2013).
22.Id. at 184.
23. People of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 361 Phil. 401, 410 (1999).
24. Supra note 21, at 185-186.
25. Villareal v. Aliga, 724 Phil. 47, 61 (2014).
26. Unilever Philippines, Inc. v. Tan, 725 Phil. 486, 497-498 (2014).
27. Criste Villanueva v. Secretary of Justice, 512 Phil. 145, 161 (2005).
28. Id.