Manila International Airport Authority v. First United Constructors Corporation

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 192087. January 24, 2018.]

MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY (MIAA), petitioner,vs. FIRST UNITED CONSTRUCTORS CORPORATION (FUCC), respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated 24 January 2018 which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 192087 (Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) vs. First United Constructors Corporation (FUCC)). — Assailed via the instant petition for review on certiorari are the Court of Appeals' (CA) Resolutions dated February 3, 2010 1 and April 16, 2010 2 in CA-G.R. SP No. 112450. In the assailed resolutions, the CA denied Manila International Airport Authority's (MIAA) motion for extension of time to file its petition for certiorari over the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission's (CIAC) Order 3 that granted the First United Constructors Corporation's (FUCC) motion to stay execution in CIAC Case No. 35-2001, but only insofar as the manner of computing the interest in the bond required from FUCC was concerned.

The Antecedents

MIAA is a government corporation mandated to provide safe, efficient and reliable airport facilities, accommodation and service for international and domestic air travel. 4 Sometime in 2001, FUCC, a contractor, filed a Request for Adjudication with the CIAC for its claim against MIAA in relation to rock excavation works it performed under their construction contract for the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) Overall Drainage System Project. The case was docketed as CIAC Case No. 35-2001. 5

On April 2, 2002, the CIAC rendered its Decision 6 in CIAC Case No. 35-2001, with fallo as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of [FUCC] and award is hereby made, as follows:

[MIAA] is hereby ordered to pay [FUCC], the following amounts[:]

 

Cost of rock excavation	Php57,531,793.56
6% interest for 4.1614 yrs of Php57,531,793.56 per annum	Php15,927,101.73
Attorney's fee[s] (15% of Php57,531,793.56)	Php8,629,769.03
Cost of Arbitration	Php904,104.53
12% per annum interest for Php73,458,895.29 (Php57,531,793.56 plus Php15,927,101.73) From promulgation of this decision until fully paid (2 months estimates)	Php1,469,177.91
TOTAL	Php84,461,946.76

 

Claimant's request for interests of money borrowed from its affiliates in the amount of Php30,712,587.35 is hereby denied for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED. 7

Two petitions were thereafter filed by MIAA with the CA. First, MIAA appealed the CIAC Decision dated April 2, 2002 via a petition for review docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 72053. Second, MIAA filed a petition for certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 71534, which assailed the CIAC's issuance of a writ of execution for the amount adjudged in the CIAC Decision. In the meantime, FUCC was able to garnish the funds of MIAA and withdraw therefrom the amount of P84,461,946.76. 8

On September 29, 2003, the CA rendered in CA-G.R. SP No. 72053 its Decision 9 affirming the CIAC's decision, with modification in that the awarded interest and attorney's fees were deleted, while arbitration and other costs were ordered equally shared by the parties. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the CIAC dated April 2, 2002 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

1) Petitioner MIAA is hereby ordered to pay respondent FUCC the cost of the rock excavation at the rate of P921.35 per cubic meter, or the total amount of P57,531,793.56 for the 62,442.93 cubic meters of excavated rock;

2) The awards of legal interest and attorney's fees are hereby DELETED;

3) Arbitration and other costs are to be shared equally by the parties.

SO ORDERED. 10

MIAA and FUCC separately moved for reconsideration, but both motions were denied by the CA except as to the excess payment that was already received by FUCC from MIAA. In a Resolution 11 dated July 28, 2004, the CA resolved:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby:

a. DENY FUCC's Motion for Partial Reconsideration for lack of merit;

b. DENY MIAA's Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit, except with respect to the refund of the excess payment that MIAA paid to FUCC representing the difference of P26,930,153.20 between the amount found by the CIAC to be due and the reduced amount we found in our Decision of September 29, 2003. FUCC is hereby DIRECTED to refund the said amount to MIAA upon the finality of our September 29, 2003 Decision and of this Resolution.

SO ORDERED. 12

FUCC no longer appealed to the Supreme Court; MIAA then argued that insofar as FUCC was concerned, the CA Resolution dated July 28, 2004 became final and executory fifteen days from FUCC's receipt of a copy of the CA resolution. 13 MIAA, on the other hand, elevated the issue to the Supreme Court, but its petition docketed as G.R. No. 164806 was denied by the Court in a Minute Resolution 14 dated June 6, 2007 that became final and executory on November 8, 2007. 15

Thereafter, MIAA filed with the CIAC a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution 16 on FUCC's return of the excess payment of P26,930,153.20. FUCC opposed the motion but on August 18, 2009, the CIAC still issued an Order 17 granting MIAA's motion for execution. This prompted FUCC to file a Motion to Post Bond to Stay Execution. 18 It appeared that during the pendency of G.R. No. 164806, the CA rendered its Decision 19 in CA G.R. SP No. 71534 that sustained the CIAC's issuance of a writ of execution in FUCC's favor. The CA Decision contained the statement that, "[the CA] had no more jurisdiction to entertain the appeal since the judgment sought to be reviewed in the meantime had attained finality." 20 For FUCC, the pronouncement in effect declared that MIAA no longer had the right to question the CIAC's original decision dated April 2, 2002 through CA-G.R. SP No. 72053.

Thus, in its motion to stay execution, FUCC argued:

2. If the [CIAC] grants the motion of [MIAA] and allows the execution of the Decision of the [CA] dated 29 September 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 72053, [FUCC] will raise the crucial issue of the nullity of said Decision to the [CA] and ultimately to the Supreme Court, which has not squarely ruled upon said issue.

3. Should that event come to pass, [FUCC] respectfully prays of the [CIAC] that, in the interest of justice, the execution of the Decision dated 29 September 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 72053 be stayed and [FUCC] allowed to post a bond conditioned upon the performance of the Decision dated 29 September 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 72053 or the payment of the amount of P26,930,153.20 to [MIAA], plus interest thereon, should the Supreme Court finally decide that the Decision dated 29 September 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 72053 is valid and should be executed. 21

The Ruling of the CIAC

On October 12, 2009, the CIAC rendered an Order 22 granting FUCC's motion to stay execution, subject to the following conditions:

a) That [FUCC] shall post a bond equivalent to the principal amount of Php26,930,153.20 plus 12% interest per annum reckoned from the time the above CA Decision had become final and executory on 08 November 2007 (as per Entry of Judgment, G.R. No. 164806) until the principal amount and interest are fully paid; and

b) The bond for the principal amount and interest shall have a validity period of one year and shall automatically be renewed upon expiration in the event that the issue being raised is not yet resolved with finality. 23 (Emphasis supplied)

Dissatisfied, MIAA filed a motion for reconsideration, which was however denied by the CIAC in an Order 24 dated November 16, 2009. Meanwhile, FUCC had in fact filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 111077, which assailed the CIAC's Order dated August 18, 2009 on the basis of the following circumstances that transpired after the CA rendered its Decision dated September 29, 2003 and Resolution dated July 28, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 72053:

While the petition [G.R. No. 164806] was pending, the [CA] rendered another decision — this time in CA-G.R. SP No. 71534. In this Second Decision dated 23 June 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 71534, the CA denied due course to MIAA's petition for certiorari and ruled that the CIAC Decision dated 02 April 2002 had already attained finality and that the [CA] had no more jurisdicition to entertain the appeal of MIAA (referring to the appealed case docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 72053) since the judgment sought to be reviewed (i.e., the CIAC Decision dated 02 April 2002) had in the meantime attained finality.

The [CA] in effect declared that its earlier Decision dated 29 September 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 72053 was an absolute nullity or a void judgment.

Therefore, what controls and what should be enforced between the parties is the CIAC Decision dated 02 April 2002 that has already been implemented, and not the Decision dated 29 September 2003 and the Resolution dated 28 July 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 72053, that deleted the award of legal interest and attorney's fees and orders FUCC to refund to MIAA the amount of P26,930,153.20. 25

The matter was allegedly raised by FUCC in G.R. No. 164806, but was not squarely resolved by the Court. 26

From the CIAC's order granting the motion to stay execution, MIAA intended to file a petition for certiorari with the CA to question the reckoning date from which the interest that was ordered to be a part of the bond should begin to run. MIAA received on November 27, 2009 27 a copy of the CIAC Order dated November 16, 2009, and thus had until January 26, 2010 within which to file its petition for certiorari. On January 26, 2010, it filed with the CA a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Certiorari asking for an additional period of 30 days from January 26, 2010, or until February 25, 2010, within which to file the petition.

The Ruling of the CA

On February 3, 2010, the CA issued a Resolution 28 denying MIAA's motion for extension of time. The resolution provides in part:

On January 26, 2010, [MIAA] filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Certiorari asking for an additional thirty (30) days from January 26, 2010, or until February 25, 2010 within which to file its intended petition for certiorari. Counsel for [MIAA] reasoned that it has foreseen its inability to prepare and file the intended petition within the reglementary period due to voluminous and pressing workload on equally important cases coupled with her almost daily appearance in court. 29 (Emphasis supplied)

For the appellate court, heavy workload is not sufficient reason to deviate from the 60-day rule on the filing of petitions under Rule 65. Further, the CA explained that under the Rules of Court, A.M. No. 07-7-12 SC and prevailing jurisprudence, petitions for certiorari should be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or order denying a motion for reconsideration. The dispositive portion of the CA resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, [MIAA's] Motion for Extension of time to File Petition for Certiorari is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, this case is deemed CLOSED and TERMINATED.

SO ORDERED. 30

By February 9, 2010, MIAA had filed its petition for certiorari with the CA. 31 After its receipt of the CA Resolution that disallowed the motion for extension of time, MIAA filed a motion for reconsideration, which was however still denied by the CA in a Resolution 32 dated April 16, 2010, with fallo that reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, [MIAA's] motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED. 33

The Present Petition

Hence, this petition for review by which MIAA invokes two grounds. First, the CA allegedly erred in denying the motion for extension of time to file the petition for certiorari. Second, the CA should have ruled that in the computation of the bond to be posted by FUCC, the 12% interest on the principal sum of P26,930,153.20 should be reckoned from the time the CA's Decision dated September 29, 2003 and Resolution dated July 28, 2004 became final and executory as to FUCC, which was in 2004. 34

The Court's Ruling

The petition is denied.

Strict application of the 60-day

The CA correctly denied MIAA's motion for extension of time to file the petition for certiorari. Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, reads:

Sec. 4. When and where petition filed. — The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.

If the petition relates to an act or omission of a municipal trial court or of a corporation, a board, an officer or a person, it shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed with the Court of Appeals or with the Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same is in aid of the court's appellate jurisdiction. If the petition involves an act or an omission of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed with and be cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.

In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the petition shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. (Emphases supplied)

Prior to the amendment effected by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, the old rule ended with the following provision — "No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling reason and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days." 35 In Laguna Metts Corporation v. CA, 36 the Court explained the implication of the deletion of this portion, to wit:

While the proper courts previously had discretion to extend the period for filing a petition for certiorari beyond the 60-day period, the amendments to Rule 65 under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC disallowed extensions of time to file a petition for certiorari with the deletion of the paragraphs that previously permitted such extensions.

xxx xxx xxx

If the Court intended to retain the authority of the proper courts to grant extensions under Section 4 of Rule 65, the paragraph providing such authority would have been preserved. The removal of the said paragraph under the amendment by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC of Section 4, Rule 65 simply meant that there can no longer be any extension of the 60-day period within which to file a petition for certiorari.

The rationale for the amendments under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC is essentially to prevent the use (or abuse) of the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to delay a case or even defeat the ends of justice. Deleting the paragraph allowing extensions to file petition on compelling grounds did away with the filing of such motions. As the rule now stands, petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration. 37 (Emphasis in the original.)

Jurisprudence still provides exceptions to the strict application of the 60-day period rule in the filing of petitions for certiorari. In Thenamaris Philippines, Inc. v. CA, 38 the Court listed the following as among the recognized exceptions: (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (4) the merits of the case; (5) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (6) lack of showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (7) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (8) there was fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without appellant's fault; (9) the demands of substantial justice and fair play; and (10) importance of the issues involved. 39 None of these exceptions attends the present case.

The Court finds no satisfactory ground invoked by MIAA in its motion for extension with the CA. MIAA's counsel sought an extension of time to file the petition by merely asserting her heavy workload on equally important cases and appearances in courts. When she filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA's resolve to deny the extension, she still presented a lame excuse, as she allegedly believed that A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC, which allowed an extension of time not exceeding 15 days, was still operative.

The foregoing claims do not qualify as sufficient reasons to allow the deviation from the 60-day rule. Time and again, the Court has held that heavy workload, standing alone, is not a compelling reason to justify a request for extension of time to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Heavy workload is relative and often self-serving. 40 Even counsel's reliance to the rule that has long been amended is appalling. Granting that A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC remained operative, the old rule merely allowed an extension of 15 days, while MIAA's motion to extend asked for an extension of 30 days.

In any case, even as the Court looks into the merits of the petition to further determine whether or not a liberal application of the rules may be allowed, it finds MIAA's arguments untenable.

MIAA does not assail the CIAC's resolve to stay.

It bears stressing that before the CA, MIAA no longer challenged the CIAC's resolve to grant the deferment of an execution, but was only concerned with the manner by which CIAC computed the bond to be posted by FUCC. Similarly, in the present petition, MIAA does not question the CIAC's Order granting the motion to stay execution in its entirety, but only the reckoning period for the computation of the interest to be included in the bond. Accordingly, CIAC's petition ended with the following prayer:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Supreme Court that:

1. The petition be given due course;

2. The assailed Resolutions of the [CA] dated February 3, 2010 and April 16, 2010 be annulled and set aside;

3. A Decision be promulgated requiring respondent FUCC to post a bond equivalent to the principal amount of Php26,930,153.20 plus 12% interest per annum reckoned from the time the [CA] Decision and Resolution dated September 29, 2003 and July 28, 2004 respectively had become final and executory as to respondent FUCC, which is reckoned after the lapse of fifteen (15) days after the date when it received the said Resolution.

Other reliefs just and equitable under the premises are likewise prayed for. 41 (Emphasis in the original)

Even if FUCC did not appeal the CA's decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 72053, it justified its motion to stay execution by the confusion on the effect of the CA's decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 71534 on the CA's prior ruling in CA-G.R. SP No. 72053. This even prompted it to actually institute CA-G.R. SP No. 111077, which was anchored on the sole ground that the CIAC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it granted MIAA's motion for issuance of a writ of execution, 42 given the following incidents:

In ascribing grave abuse of discretion upon the CIAC, [FUCC] claims that [the CA's] September 29, 2003 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 72053 (hereinafter Decision under Rule 43) was nullified by the Decision dated June 23, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 71534 (hereinafter Decision under Rule 65). It points out that the June 23, 2005 Decision under Rule 65 stated that the appellate court "had no more jurisdiction to entertain the appeal since the judgment sought to be reviewed had in the meantime attained finality." Hence, the CIAC gravely abused its discretion when it granted [MIAA's] motion for issuance of writ of execution for the refund of P26,930,153.20. 43

CA-G.R. SP No. 111077 was not decided by the CA until January 21, 2011, when it sustained the validity of the CIAC's Order dated August 18, 2009. 44 The CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 111077 was affirmed by the Court via a Resolution on May 30, 2011 in G.R. No. 195407.

In any case, irrespective of the merits of CA-G.R. SP No. 111077 and the CIAC's considered grounds to support the motion to stay execution, MIAA's recourse to the CA was not to assail the basis of the Order that granted the motion to stay execution, as its intended petition dealt only on the formula for the computation of the imposed bond.

The reckoning date for the computation of interest could not have differed between MIAA and FUCC, notwithstanding the fact that the latter no longer appealed the CA decision to the Supreme Court. The disposition by the Supreme Court of MIAA's appeal from the CA would necessarily affect the liability of FUCC. Considering that MIAA opted to elevate the CA decision to the Supreme Court, its liability to FUCC became finally adjudged only after the Court had decided on the appeal from the CA. Given the appeal, it was the Supreme Court's resolution that became final and executory. MIAA's insistence that the CA resolution had become final and executory as against FUCC in 2004 was misplaced.

In insisting that the CA's resolution had become "final and executory," MIAA appears to confuse this with the settled principle that a party who does not appeal, or file a petition for certiorari, is not entitled to any affirmative relief, and thus could not seek modification or reversal of the judgment or claim affirmative relief. 45

The Court likewise mentions that in view of Circular No. 799 issued by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas on June 21, 2013, the rate of interest for loans or forbearance of money, goods or credits and the rate allowed in judgments, in the absence of an express contract as to such rate of interest, is already at 6% per annum beginning July 1, 2013. At any rate, it appears that the ground relied upon by FUCC and considered by the CIAC in allowing the stay of the execution had been finally resolved in G.R. No. 195407, which then apparently renders the issue on the bond already moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Resolutions dated February 3, 2010 and April 16, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 112450 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED." (Caguioa, J., no part being a former counsel of the parties; Jardeleza, J., designated additional member per Raffle dated December 11, 2017).

 

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) MA. LOURDES C. PERFECTODivision Clerk of Court

By:

TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1. Penned by Associate Justice Ramon R. Garcia, with Associate Justices Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente and Rodil V. Zalameda concurring; rollo, pp. 28-30.

2.Id. at 32-34.

3.Id. at 85.

4.Id. at 9.

5.Id. at 120.

6. Issued by Arbitral Tribunal Chairman Jacinto M. Butalid and Members Reynaldo T. Viray and Rosauro S. Paderon; id. at 120-136.

7.Id. at 136.

8.Id. at 11.

9.Id. at 42-63.

10.Id. at 62.

11.Id. at 65-67.

12.Id. at 67.

13.Id. at 12-13.

14.Id. at 68.

15.Id. at 69.

16.Id. at 70-75.

17.Id. at 76-79.

18.Id. at 80-82.

19.Id. at 240-250.

20.Id. at 248.

21.Id. at 80-81.

22.Id. at 85-86.

23.Id. at 85.

24.Id. at 93-94.

25.Id. at 210.

26.Id. 210-211.

27.Id. at 97.

28.Id. at 28-30.

29.Id. at 28.

30. Id. at 30.

31. Id. at 32; 95-110.

32. Id. at 32-34.

33. Id. at 33.

34. Id. at 15.

35. See Republic of the Phils. v. St. Vincent de Paul Colleges, Inc., 693 Phil. 145, 153 (2012).

36. 611 Phil. 530 (2009).

37. Id. at 535-537.

38. 725 Phil. 590 (2014).

39. Id. at 600-601.

40. Heirs of Ramon B. Gayares v. Pacific Asian Overseas Shipping Corp., et al., 691, Phil. 46, 54 (2012), citing Laguna Metts Corporation v. CA, 611 Phil. 530, 537 (2009).

41. Rollo, p. 21.

42. Id. at 269.

43. Id. at 269-270.

44. Id. at 265-273.

45. Corinthian Gardens Association, Inc. v. Sps. Tanjangco, 578 Phil. 712, 723 (2008).