THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 221374. November 24, 2021.]
VISITACION MANGADAP-GUBAC, petitioner,vs. DENNIS GUBAC, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedNovember 24, 2021, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 221374 (VISITACION MANGADAP-GUBAC, petitioner v. DENNIS GUBAC, respondent). — This resolves a Petition for Review 1 seeking to reverse and set aside the Resolutions dated April 24, 2015 2 and November 4, 2015 3 of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner's Petition for Annulment of Judgment declaring her presumptively dead for failure to prosecute and denied her subsequent motion for reconsideration.
Dennis Gubac (Dennis) and Visitacion Mangadap-Gubac (Visitacion) were married on November 9, 1992, and thereafter, stayed at Calamagui 1st, Ilagan, Isabela. On July 25, 1993, Visitacion gave birth to their only son, Dixxi M. Gubac. 4
Dennis alleged that due to hardship in life, Visitacion left their conjugal home sometime in 1995 to look for better living abroad. From that time on, Visitacion never bothered to communicate with him. 5 His diligent efforts in searching for her whereabouts proved futile. Dennis claimed he had received unverified information that his wife had already passed away. He further claimed that the care and custody of their child, who was barely two years old when Visitacion left, were entirely placed on his hands. 6
On November 10, 2006, Dennis filed a petition for declaration of absence and presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage. The Regional Trial Court of Ilagan, Isabela, Branch 18, declared Visitacion presumptively dead on March 6, 2007. 7
On April 3, 2012, Visitacion filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment 8 before the Court of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Visitacion claimed that sometime in March 2012, she was surprised to hear that there was a court judgment rendered declaring her presumptively dead, thereby allowing Dennis to contract a subsequent marriage. 9
On March 20, 2012, she obtained copies of the said judgment and other pertinent pleadings, orders, and processes from the court a quo to verify the truthfulness of the rumor as to her declaration of presumptive death. 10
Visitacion prayed that the judgment be set aside because it was based on Dennis' fraudulent representations as to the circumstances of her absence. She averred that there was no truth to the allegation that she never communicated with Dennis. 11
She claimed that she left their conjugal home to work in Kuwait so she could provide for a better future for her family. She also maintained constant communication with Dennis and, in fact, religiously provided for the expenses of her family. She alleged that it was Dennis who stopped communicating with her for no justifiable reason. Dennis also prevented her son from communicating with her. From the time she left the conjugal home up to the time the petition was filed, Dennis supposedly had knowledge of her whereabouts. She claimed that the failed relationship between them was what prodded Dennis to file the petition. 12
Visitacion also argued that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over her because its November 16, 2006 Order setting the case for initial hearing was not published and summons was not served on her. 13
On March 11, 2013, Visitacion filed a Motion for Early Resolution 14 of her Petition for Annulment of Judgment. CAIHTE
On July 11, 2014, she received, through counsel, a Notice of Resolution 15 with Copy of Summons dated July 8, 2014 from the Court of Appeals, which states:
The Reply to Tracer, stating that registered letter No. MDS-5013 mailed at Manila on May 30, 2012 and addressed to respondent Dennis Gubac of Barangay Gugallon Norte Ramon, Isabela, was received by Virginia Y. Gubac, mother of the addressee, is NOTED.
Likewise, petitioner's March 13, 2013 "MOTION FOR EARLY RESOLUTION" is NOTED.
There being prima facie merit in the allegations of the instant "PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT," the same is given due course. Let summons be served on respondents, at once, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 47, Rules of Court, as amended. 16
On December 12, 2014, Visitacion received the Court of Appeals' Resolution 17 dated November 12, 2014, which states:
The verification report dated November 6, 2014 showing that no answer to petition has been filed as per CMIS, is NOTED. 18
On May 13, 2015, Visitacion received the Court of Appeals' Resolution dated April 24, 2015, which states:
Considering the CMIS verification report dated March 16, 2015 showing that no pleading was filed by petitioner to further prosecute her case despite receipt of the November 12, 2014 Resolution stating that no answer to petition has been filed by respondents, we DISMISS this Petition for Annulment of Judgment . . . for petitioner's failure to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time. 19
On May 28, 2015, Visitacion filed a motion for reconsideration. 20
In a November 4, 2015 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration "absent grounds to reverse, modify, or set aside the Resolution promulgated on April 24, 2015." 21
Hence, this Petition was filed.
In its February 29, 2016 Resolution, this Court required respondent to file a comment within ten days from notice. Petitioner was also directed to fully comply with the rules by submitting a proper verification and a valid certification of non-forum shopping with properly accomplished jurat. 22
Petitioner submitted her Compliance on September 26, 2016. 23 Respondent has not submitted his comment despite receipt of this Court's Resolution on April 21, 2016. 24
The sole issue is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the Petition for Annulment of Judgment on the ground of failure to prosecute.
Rule 47, Section 6 25 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that the procedure in ordinary civil cases will apply in annulment of judgment. Accordingly, after petitioner was notified of respondent's failure to file an answer, she should have filed a motion to declare respondent in default pursuant to Rule 9, Section 3. 26 This she failed to do, prompting the Court of Appeals to issue its April 24, 2015 Resolution or four months later, dismissing the petition for annulment of judgment for failure to prosecute.
Meanwhile, Rule 17, Section 3 27 provides that failure on the part of the plaintiff to prosecute their action for an unreasonable length of time or failure to comply with the rules of procedure without justifiable cause may result in the dismissal of the complaint. The dismissal of an action for failure to prosecute rests mainly on the sound discretion of the court. 28
Nonetheless, after reviewing the circumstances in this case, we find that the Court of Appeals had acted hastily in dismissing the petition for annulment of judgment. There was no clear intention on petitioner's part to delay the disposition of the case or a wanton failure to observe the procedural rules. 29 On the contrary, petitioner's March 8, 2013 Motion for Early Resolution stating that "for almost more than one (1) year of waiting . . . no resolution was issued yet" 30 and seeking the indulgence of the Court of Appeals to issue a resolution promptly, showed that she was very much interested in pursuing her case. DETACa
Moreover, we cannot ignore the serious implications if petitioner's allegations were true — that respondent was in bad faith when he filed his petition to declare her presumptively dead and when he contracted the subsequent marriage. For then, the subsequent marriage "lack[ed] the element of 'well-founded' belief under Article 41 of the Family Code, which is essential for the exception to the rule against bigamous marriages to apply." 31
In Polanco v. Cruz, 32 this Court held that "the extreme sanction of dismissal of the complaint might not be warranted if no substantial prejudice would be caused to the defendant, and there are special and compelling reasons which would make the strict application of the rule clearly unjustified." 33
In this case, no substantial prejudice would be caused to respondent, who ignored not only the Court of Appeals' order for him to file an answer but also this Court's resolution directing him to comment. On the other hand, a rigid application of the procedural rules would result in substantial injustice to petitioner. The Court of Appeals' dismissal of the petition for annulment of judgment would effectively deprive petitioner of her only remedy to nullify the effects of the declaration of presumptive death and the subsequent marriage of her husband. 34 This is because, unless otherwise declared, such dismissal for failure to prosecute constitutes an adjudication upon the merits and with prejudice to the filing of another action. 35
In sum, this Court finds that the interests of dispensing justice will best be served by requiring the Court of Appeals to proceed with the case to determine the truth of petitioner's factual allegations.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The April 24, 2015 and November 4, 2015 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 124064 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REINSTATED and REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED." (Gaerlan, J., designated additional Member per Raffle dated November 17, 2021)
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 11-35. Filed under Rule 45.
2.Id. at 36. The Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 124064 was penned by Associate Justice Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela and concurred in by Associate Justices Jane Aurora C. Lanton (Chair) and Melchor Quirino C. Sadang of the Special Former Tenth Division of the Court of Appeals, Manila.
3.Id. at 45. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justices Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela and concurred in by Associate Justices Jane Aurora C. Lantion (Chair) and Melchor Quirino C. Sadang of the Special Former Tenth Division of the Court of Appeals, Manila.
4.Id. at 56.
5.Id. at 60.
6.Id. at 61.
7.Id. at 55-56. The Judgment was penned by Judge Josefino H. Piamonte.
8.Id. at 57-80.
9.Id. at 16.
10.Id.
11.Id. at 65.
12.Id. at 66-67.
13.Id. at 76-77.
14.Id. at 84-85.
15.Id. at 89-90. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso (Chair) and concurred in by Associate Justices Jane Aurora C. Lantion and Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela.
16.Id.
17.Id. at 92.
18.Id.
19.Id. at 36.
20.Id. at 37-43.
21.Id. at 45.
22.Id. at 94.
23.Id. at 105-115.
24.Id. at 117.
25. SECTION 6. Procedure. — The procedure in ordinary civil cases shall be observed. Should a trial be necessary, the reception of the evidence may be referred to a member of the court of a judge of a Regional Trial Court.
26. SECTION 3. Default; declaration of. — If the defending party fails to answer within the time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party, and proof or such failure, declare the defending party in default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in its discretion requires the claimant to submit evidence. Such reception of evidence may be delegated to the clerk of court.
27. SECTION 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. — If for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court.
28.Solimon v. Fernandez, 735 Phil. 45 (2014) [Per J. Perez, Second Division].
29.Id. at 53.
30.Rollo, p. 85.
31.Santos v. Santos, 745 Phil. 118, 132 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
32. 598 Phil. 952 (2009) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, Third Division].
33.Id. at 959.
34. See Santos v. Santos, 745 Phil. 118 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
35. RULES OF COURT, Rule 17, Sec. 3. See also Azuelo v. Zameco II Electric Cooperative, Inc., 746 Phil. 154 (2014) [Per J. Reyes, Third Division].