FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 194348. June 30, 2021.]
REYNALDO C. MANDAP, ET AL., petitioners,vs. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, PROVINCIAL OFFICE OF CAGAYAN, REPRESENTED BY VIRGILIO M. ACASILI, JR., ET AL., respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated June 30, 2021 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 194348 — (REYNALDO C. MANDAP, ET AL., petitioners v. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, PROVINCIAL OFFICE OF CAGAYAN, represented by VIRGILIO M. ACASILI, JR., ET AL., respondents). — This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioners Reynaldo C. Mandap, Faustino T. Salamanca, Jr., Heirs of Antonio Leo E. Antonio, represented by Roberto Q. Antonio, and Heirs of Faustino E. Salamanca, Sr., represented by Faustino T. Salamanca, Jr., and Nestor E. Duque (collectively, petitioners), praying for the reversal of the January 29, 2010 Decision 2 and November 11, 2010 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 108394. The CA affirmed the September 15, 2008 Resolution 4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Second Judicial Region, Branch 11, Tuao, Cagayan, which dismissed the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the petitioners.
Antecedents
On February 25, 1955, the Director of Lands for and in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines filed a petition for the settlement and adjudication of title over a tract of land containing 822.830 hectares denominated as Lot Nos. 91 and 106 of the Piat Public Land Subdivision Pls-149. 5 He prayed that said lots be declared in the name of the Republic. The case was raffled to the Court of First Instance of Cagayan First Branch (CFI Cagayan Branch I) and was docketed as Cadastral Case No. N-5 LRC Cad. Rec. No. N-86. 6
On January 27, 1956, an order of general default was issued against the whole world, except for Esperanza Hawkins (Esperanza), who claimed ownership in fee simple of a portion of Lot Nos. 91 and 106, and Francisco Lingan (Francisco) and Napoleon Lingan (Napoleon), who respectively claimed ownership over portions of Lot No. 91. 7
On September 30, 1957, the CFI Cagayan Branch I rendered a Decision in favor of the Director of Lands, thereby declaring Lot Nos. 91 and 106 as part of the public domain. 8
Aggrieved, Esperanza filed an appeal. On May 20, 1964, the CA Second Division rendered a Decision 9 in TA-R.G. Numeros 23792-R y 23793-R reversing the ruling of the CFI Cagayan Branch I. The CA Second Division declared Esperanza as the true and exclusive owner of Lot Nos. 91 and 106 comprising a surface land area of 822.830 hectares. The Decision of the CA became final and executory. 10
Pursuant to the CA Second Division's ruling, the Land Registration Commission issued Decree No. N-111052 for the registration of Lot Nos. 91 and 106 in favor of Esperanza. Accordingly, on June 17, 1977, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. O-867 was issued by the Register of Deeds for Lot Nos. 91 and 106 in Esperanza's name. 11
Here lies the source of confusion.
While the appeal before the CA Second Division was pending, the Director of Lands commenced another case for the settlement and adjudication of title over Lot Nos. 8319 and 8457 of the Cadastral Survey of Solana, Cagayan. He prayed that said lots be declared public lands. 12 The case was docketed as Cad. Case No. N-19 LRC Cad. Rec. No. N-248. Interestingly, Lot Nos. 8319 and 8457 were the same parcels of land denominated as Lot Nos. 91 and 106 of the Piat Cadastre and subject of the appeal before the CA Second Division. 13
On October 5, 1962, the Justice of the Peace of Solana, acting as a Cadastral Judge, adjudicated Lot Nos. 8319 and 8457 in favor of Francisco and Napoleon. 14 Then, on July 15, 1963, the Justice of the Peace of Solana ordered the issuance of a decree of registration over Lot Nos. 8319 and 8457 in favor of Francisco and Napoleon. Hence, on November 21, 1963, the Register of Deeds issued OCT No. O-465 in favor of Francisco and Napoleon. 15
After a series of voluntary transfers and conveyances from Francisco and Napoleon, Lot Nos. 8319 and 8457 were eventually acquired through purchase by Gregoria Padilla (Gregoria). Hence, on January 24, 1968, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-11083, with an area of 7,326,419 square meters, and TCT No. T-11082, measuring 726,477 square meters were issued in Gregoria's name. 16
Meanwhile, sometime after October 21, 1972, Lot No. 91 Pls-149 with an area of 732.6419 hectares located at Piat and registered in Esperanza's name was placed under Operation Land Transfer pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27. 17 After which, in 1973, Certificates of Land Transfer were issued in favor of the qualified tenant-farmer beneficiaries. 18
In view of the existence of two conflicting titles covering the same lands, on July 25, 1977, Henry Hawkins (Henry), Esperanza's successor-in-interest instituted an action 19 before the CFI of Tuao, Cagayan, for the cancellation of TCT Nos. T-11082 and T-11083 in Gregoria's name. The suit was docketed as Civil Case No. 563-T.
During the pendency of Civil Case No. 563-T, Esperanza executed Deeds of Transfer over Lot No. 91 in favor of the qualified farmer beneficiaries. Subsequently, Emancipation Patents were issued by the Department of Agriculture (DAR) in favor of said farmer-beneficiaries. 20
On March 19, 1982, the CFI of Tuao rendered a Decision in Civil Case No. 563-T declaring TCT Nos. T-11082 and T-11083 void ab initio and legally non-existent. 21
Gregoria appealed the CFI's judgment. 22
On July 14, 1989, the CA Thirteenth Division in CA-G.R. CV No. 01060 reversed the CFI's Decision and upheld the validity of TCT Nos. T-11082 and T-11083. 23
Subsequently, in June 1994, Gregoria, claiming ownership of the subject properties on the basis of the CA Thirteenth Division's Decision, sent a letter for Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) Coverage under the Voluntary Offer to Sell scheme. The offer involved a 100-hectare portion of Lot No. 8319 covered by TCT No. T-11083. 24
In view thereof, the DAR conducted an actual site inspection and discovered that the tract of land offered by Gregoria for CARP coverage is the same land registered in the name of Esperanza under OCT No. O-867. 25
Perplexed as to who is the true and lawful landowner, on September 7, 2009, the DAR instituted a Complaint for Interpleader 26 before the RTC of Tuao, Cagayan. The DAR prayed for an order to require the respondents Heirs of Esperanza on the one hand, and Gregoria on the other, to interplead and resolve their conflicting claims, and to ultimately determine who is entitled to the payment of just compensation. 27 The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 465-06-T. 28
On October 23, 2006, respondents filed their Answer. 29 They insisted on their title and right of ownership over the disputed properties as evidenced by OCT No. O-867 in the name of their predecessor Esperanza. In support thereof, they relied on the final and executory Decision dated May 20, 1964, by the CA Second Division in TA-R.G. Numeros 23792-R y 23793-R, which declared Esperanza as the lawful owner of Lot Nos. 91 and 106. 30
Meanwhile, the petitioners respectively filed their Answers-in-Intervention. 31 They claimed that they are the true and lawful owners of the subject properties having acquired them from Gregoria through the following conveyances, namely, (i) a dation in payment of 2,000,000 square meters to Leo Antonio and Faustino Salamanca, Sr.; (ii) a Deed of Sale dated December 2, 2004 involving 5,126,400 square meters to Reynaldo Mandap (Reynaldo) and Faustino Salamanca, Jr.; and (iii) a Deed of Sale on March 15, 2004 of 726,477 square meters to Reynaldo. 32
Thereafter, on April 24, 2008, petitioners filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. 33 They argued that a scrutiny of the material facts as alleged and admitted in the DAR's Complaint for Interpleader, respondents' Answer, their (petitioners') Answer-in-Intervention, and the comments and oppositions thereto, failed to raise a genuine issue of fact. They alleged that the pleadings centered on the principal issues regarding the ownership of the subject lands and the validity of Gregoria's conveyances to them vis-a-vis the retention limits set forth in Section 6 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657. They claimed that said issues are sham and unsubstantial. They argued that the issue of ownership had long been settled and resolved with finality in the CA Thirteenth Division's Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 01060, which upheld the validity of TCT Nos. T-11082 and T-11083 in Gregoria's name. Meanwhile, the issue regarding the retention limit is a question of law which may be resolved through a summary judgment. 34
Respondents filed a Comment/Opposition thereto. Then, the parties respectively filed their Reply and Rejoinder. 35
Ruling of the RTC
On September 15, 2008, the RTC denied the Motion for Summary Judgment. 36 The RTC ruled that the issue of ownership between the parties must still be litigated and proven. It noted that the Decision of the CA Thirteenth Division which petitioners harp on, did not actually resolve the issue of ownership with finality. Rather, the CA Thirteenth Division stated that the claims of the third-party plaintiffs must be ventilated in proper proceedings since said matter was not part of the issues raised on appeal. 37
The decretal portion of the RTC's Order reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for summary judgment interposed by the movants-intervenors is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
Let the pre-trial proceed on October 22, 2008.
SO ORDERED. 38
Dissatisfied with the ruling, on October 3, 2008, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration. However, the motion was denied by the RTC in its Order 39 dated March 27, 2009.
Thereafter, petitioners filed an appeal.
Ruling of the CA
On January 29, 2010, the CA rendered a Decision 40 affirming the RTC's ruling. The CA ratiocinated that while its Thirteenth Division affirmed the validity of TCT Nos. T-11082 and T-11083 in Gregoria's name, the latter's Decision was devoid of any categorical and conclusive pronouncement regarding the invalidity of OCT No. O-867 in Esperanza's name. It noted that the validity of OCT No. O-867 was never specifically placed in issue nor directly traversed before the CA Thirteenth Division or the CFI of Tuao. 41
Likewise, the CA stressed that OCT No. O-867 was never subjected to any direct nullification suit or independent cancellation proceeding, and is thus, still subsisting. On this score, the respondents' Answer where they based their title and ownership on OCT No. O-867 may not be regarded as an unfounded, fictitious or unsubstantial defense. Rather, such argument was a legitimate and plausible anchor of a valid claim or defense in the action for interpleader. 42 The CA concluded that since the matter of ownership is a significant issue and is disputed by the parties, a full-blown trial is necessary. 43
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari is DENIED, and accordingly, the assailed September 15, 2008 Resolution and March 27, 2009 Order of the court a quo are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 44
Aggrieved, on February 16, 2010, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied in the CA's November 11, 2010 Resolution. 45
Undeterred, petitioners filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari. 46
Issues
The main issues in the instant case are (i) whether or not the motion for summary judgment should be granted; and (ii) whether or not Gregoria's conveyances to petitioners violated the retention limit under Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657.
Petitioners lament that the RTC and the CA erred in denying their Motion for Summary Judgment. They insist that the defense raised by the respondents regarding the validity of OCT No. O-867 does not tender a genuine issue. 47 They harp on the ruling of the CA Thirteenth Division that affirmed validity of TCT Nos. T-11082 and T-11083. They surmise that the affirmance of said titles implied that respondents' OCT No. O-867 is void. 48 They further argue that the validity of OCT No. O-867 was squarely raised before the CFI of Tuao. 49 They point out that in Gregoria's Answer in said civil case, she questioned the validity of OCT No. O-867, thereby subjecting said title to a direct nullification suit or cancellation proceeding. 50
Moreover, petitioners urge that the second issue regarding the validity of Gregoria's conveyances to them involves a pure question of law. They argue that inasmuch as there are no disputed facts, the existence of such question of law shall not bar their plea for a summary judgment. 51 They further aver that the conveyances made by Gregoria to them are valid since Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657 does not per se prohibit the sale or disposition of agricultural lands. They also contend that Section 6 may not impair the obligation of contracts. 52
Finally, petitioners claim that the CA violated the principles of res judicata and stare decisis when it resuscitated the issue ownership over the subject lands by giving deference to the CA Second Division's Decision in TA-R.G. Numeros 23792-R y 23793R, despite the fact that such matter was already resolved by the CA Thirteenth Division. 53 They bewail that the CA Second Division's Decision finds no application to the case at bar since the petitioners and Gregoria are not parties thereto, and that it involves a different subject matter and cause of action. 54
On the other hand, respondents counter that they raised valid and genuine issues in their Answer. They retort that the Decision of the CA Thirteenth Division flaunted by petitioners did not lay to rest the issue of ownership. They explain that there was no explicit pronouncement in said Decision declaring OCT No. O-867 as null and void. 55 In fact, the matter regarding the validity of OCT No. O-867 was never placed in issue either before the CFI of Tuao or the CA Thirteenth Division. 56
Similarly, respondents aver that the CA Thirteenth Division may not reverse or modify the earlier Decision of the CA Second Division in TA-R.G. Numeros 23792-R y 23793-R which declared Esperanza as the true and exclusive owner of Lot Nos. 91 and 106. 57 The former may not reverse the latter's ruling, they being co-equal courts. 58
Furthermore, respondents point out that Gregoria and the petitioners never filed an action to annul OCT No. O-867. 59 Hence, said title is valid and binding against the whole world. 60 It remains irrevocable and indefeasible, and must be maintained and respected unless challenged in direct proceedings. 61
Lastly, respondents posit that the conveyances of the subject lands from Gregoria to the petitioners transgressed Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657. 62 Respondents state that since the conveyances are void, petitioners had no personality to intervene in the action for interpleader. 63
Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
A petition for review on certiorari
It is noted at the outset that the petition raises mixed questions of law and fact, which is generally prohibited in a Rule 45 petition. On the one hand, the rendition of a summary judgment is a question of law. A review by the appellate court of the propriety of a summary judgment based on the pleadings would not involve an evaluation of the probative value of any evidence, but would only limit itself to an inquiry regarding the proper application of the law on the given facts and supporting documents. 64
On the other hand, the matter regarding the validity of Gregoria's conveyances to the petitioners constitutes a question of fact that this Court may not resolve, as it is not a trier of facts. 65 Said issue entails sifting through the evidence submitted by the parties, such as the deeds of conveyances, affidavits, and various documents from the parties and the government agencies, to ultimately determine whether the conveyances transgressed the government's retention limits in the disposal of agricultural lands. Although the rule forbidding a re-evaluation of the evidence is not iron-clad, none of the exceptions 66 obtain to warrant a review of the facts.
In any event, the petition likewise fails on the merits.
Petitioners are not entitled to a
Significantly, the disposition of a civil action through a summary judgment is sanctioned by Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 1. Summary judgment for claimant. — A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his or her favor upon all or any part thereof.
Section 2. Summary judgment for defending party. — A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any time, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his or her favor as to all or any part thereof.
An examination of the Rules clearly reveals that a summary judgment is by no means a hasty one. 67 The party who moves for a summary judgment bears the burden of clearly proving the absence of a genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the complaint is patently unsubstantial and does not constitute a genuine issue for trial. 68 In turn, the adverse party may file an opposition to the motion and present affidavits, depositions, or other documents. 69 Thereafter, the court must scrutinize the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file and determine whether, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 70 Courts are called to exercise caution in disposing of a civil case through a summary judgment since this procedural device dispenses with a trial and deprives parties the opportunity to present their evidence in court. 71
Relatedly, the propriety of rendering a summary judgment hinges on the existence of a "genuine issue of fact" or one that requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim. 72 Notably, a factual issue is regarded as sham when by its nature, it cannot be proven or that the party tendering the same has no sincere intention or adequate evidence to prove it. This usually happens in denials made by defendants solely for the sake of raising an issue and thereby causing delay. 73
In the case at bar, petitioners argue that the defense of ownership raised by the respondents in their Answer (in the interpleader), failed to tender a genuine issue. 74
This Court disagrees.
A scrutiny of the respondents' Answer 75 reveals that it raised a highly contentious argument which must be resolved through a full-blown trial. Specifically, respondents averred that they own the subject properties as the holders of OCT No. O-867. 76 They likewise harped on the Decision of the CA Second Division in TA-R.G. Numeros 23792-R y 23793-R, which affirmed their predecessor Esperanza's ownership over the subject properties.
It bears stressing that the CA Second Division's Decision is a final and executory ruling that awarded ownership over the disputed property in favor of Esperanza. Said Decision led to the issuance of Decree No. N-111052 for the registration of Lot Nos. 91 and 106. In turn, OCT No. O-867 was issued in favor of Esperanza. 77 Based on the foregoing established facts, it is evident that the defense of ownership posited by respondents in their Answer undoubtedly raised an important and genuine issue with respect to the material fact of ownership, and correlatively, entitlement to just compensation.
This notwithstanding, petitioners staunchly insist that respondents' defense of ownership is sham and unsubstantial since said issue had been laid to rest in the CA Thirteenth Division's Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 01060 where the CA affirmed the validity of TCT Nos. T-11082 and T-11083 in Gregoria's name and, thus, impliedly declared OCT No. O-867 null and void.
The petitioners' arguments are erroneous in numerous respects.
First, a perusal of the CA Thirteenth Division's Decision reveals that said court did not declare OCT No. O-867 null and void. The body or dispositive portion does not contain a declaration regarding the invalidity of said title.
Second, the nullity of OCT No. O-867 was never raised as an issue either before the CFI of Tuao (which rendered the Decision appealed before the CA Thirteenth Division) or on appeal before the CA Thirteenth Division. In fact, the CA Thirteenth Division stated that the issues raised on appeal centered on the validity of TCT Nos. T-11082 and T-11083, and on the jurisdiction of the CFI of Cagayan Branch I to act as a cadastral court. 78
In addition, poring over the Complaint 79 for nullity of TCT Nos. T-11082 and T-11083 filed by Henry, and the Answer with Counterclaim 80 submitted by Gregoria, it becomes apparent that the parties never mentioned or prayed for a declaration of nullity of OCT No. O-867. It is interesting to note that in Gregoria's Answer, she only alleged that her title and that of her predecessors are older than Henry's, without arguing that said title is invalid for such reason. 81 More telling, in her Counterclaim, she merely prayed for an award of damages and the costs of suit, but never sought the cancellation of OCT No. O-867. 82 This clearly debunks the petitioners' argument in their petition where they falsely claimed that Gregoria sought the cancellation of OCT No. O-867. 83 Likewise, neither was the annulment of OCT No. O-867 sought in the Answer-in-Intervention 84 or the Cross-Claim and Third Party Complaint 85 filed in the same case.
Third, it is elementary that unless OCT No. O-867 is annulled in a direct proceeding, the same remains valid and effective. A Torrens title is irrevocable and indefeasible and the courts must see to it that the title is maintained and respected unless challenged in a direct proceeding. 86 It cannot be changed, altered, modified or diminished collaterally. 87 In fact, neither Gregoria nor any of her successors-in-interest instituted an action to annul Esperanza's title. 88 Hence, Esperanza's title is still a good title that is binding against the whole world. Moreover, it may not be conveniently annulled by mere implication, as petitioners mistakenly urge.
Fourth, the CA Thirteenth Division has no power to directly or impliedly annul or reverse the ruling of the CA Second Division. These two divisions belong to the same court. Thus, it was completely erroneous for petitioners to claim that the CA Thirteenth Division's Decision in effect reversed the pronouncement of the CA Second Division.
Fifth, the CA Thirteenth Division's Decision does not constitute res judicata, bar by conclusiveness of judgment, or a binding precedent in the action for interpleader. The petitioners are wrong in insisting on the application of the CA Thirteenth Division's Decision simply because it involved the same parties and the same properties as those embroiled in the action for interpleader. Actually, even Cadastral Case No. N-5 LRC Cad. Rec. No. N-86 from which the CA Second Division's Decision stemmed from, similarly involved the same parties and the same properties. It must be noted that Francisco and Napoleon from whom Gregoria (and eventually petitioners) obtained their title, were parties in the original civil case.
More importantly, although the CA Thirteenth Division upheld the validity of TCT Nos. T-11082 and T-11083, it did so only for the purpose of declaring that the title is valid, and not for the purpose of ultimately resolving the issue of ownership between the contending parties. Hence, petitioners cannot harp on said judgment as a basis for claiming a conclusive award of ownership in their favor.
In addition to the issue of ownership, the argument regarding the validity of Gregoria's conveyances to the petitioners, and consequently, the petitioners' right to intervene in the proceedings, as raised in the DAR's Opposition to the Motion for Leave to intervene, 89 and the respondents' Comment/Opposition to the Motion for Intervention, 90 respectively, further tender valid and genuine issues. Said issues are not simply questions of law as the petitioners tenuously claimed. Rather, they are matters that are best resolved by sifting through the evidence of the contending parties in a full-blown trial.
All told, the parties' pleadings, affidavits and documents are replete with diametrically opposed and conflicting claims. The matter of ownership and the validity of the conveyances may not be brushed aside as frivolous and sham so as to dispense with the presentation of evidence in a formal trial. Ultimately, a full-blown trial is still necessary to determine the lawful owner of the subject properties for the proper payment of just compensation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The January 29, 2010 Decision and November 11, 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 108394 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED." (Carandang, J.,no part; Rosario, J., designated additional Member per Raffle dated June 25, 2021)
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
by:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 3-61.
2.Id. at 74-87; penned by Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang (now a Member of this Court), with Associate Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr., and Amy C. Lazaro-Javier (now a Member of this Court), concurring.
3.Id. at 100-102.
4.Id. at 164-165. The Resolution was issued by Judge Orlando D. Beltran.
5.Id. at 461.
6.Id. at 194.
7.Id. at 174.
8.Id. at 174-175.
9.Id. at 529-552. See rollo, pp. 461-473 for the translated version of said Decision.
10.Id. at 175.
11.Id.
12.Id.
13.Id. at 194.
14.Id. at 175.
15.Id. at 195.
16.Id. at 75-76.
17.Id. at.
18.Id. at 176-177.
19.Id. at 202-209.
20.Id. at 77-78.
21.Id. at 77.
22.Id.
23.Id. at 77.
24.Id. at 78.
25.Id.
26.Id. at 167-172.
27.Id. at 79.
28.Id.
29.Id. at 173-187.
30.Id. at 79.
31.Id. at 233-236; 244-257; 317-331.
32.Id. at 80.
33.Id. at 366-385.
34.Id. at 23.
35.Id. at 24.
36.Id. at 164-165. The Resolution was issued by Judge Orlando D. Beltran.
37.Id. at 165.
38.Id.
39.Id. at 166. The Order was issued by Designate Judge Rolando R. Velasco.
40.Id. at 74-87.
41.Id. at 84.
42.Id. at 85.
43.Id. at 84.
44.Id. at 86-87.
45.Id. at 100-102.
46.Id. at 3-61.
47.Id. at 34.
48.Id. at 30-31.
49.Id. at 41.
50.Id.
51.Id. at 33.
52.Id. at 52-53.
53.Id. at 43; 46-47.
54.Id. at 51.
55.Id. at 613; 615.
56.Id. at 613.
57.Id. at 614.
58.Id.
59.Id. at 617.
60.Id. at 619.
61.Id.
62.Id. at 621.
63.Id.
64.Cucueco v. Court of Appeals, et al., 484 Phil. 254 (2004).
65.Heirs of Teresita Villanueva v. Heirs of Petronila Syquia Mendoza, 810 Phil. 172 (2017).
66. A review of the factual findings is justified under the following circumstances: (i) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (ii) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (iii) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (iv) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (v) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (vi) when in making its findings[,] the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (vii) when the findings are contrary to that of the trial court; (viii) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (ix) when the facts set forth in the petition[,] as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs[,] are not disputed by the respondent;' (x) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; [or] (xi) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. (Lamberto M. De Leon v. Maunlad Trans, Inc., et al., 805 Phil. 531 (2017).
67.Calubaquib, et al. v. Rep. of the Phils., 667 Phil. 653, 661-662 (2011), citing Viajar v. Judge Estenzo, 178 Phil. 561, 573 (1979).
68.YKR Corporation, et al. v. Philippine Agri-Business Center Corp., 745 Phil. 666, 685-686 (2014), citing Viajar v. Judge Estenzo, supra note 67.
69.Calubaquib, et al. v. Rep. of the Phils., supra note 67.
70.YKR Corporation, et al. v. Philippine Agri-Business Center Corp., supra note 68 at 684.
71.Id.
72.Calubaquib, et al. v. Rep. of the Phils., supra note 67, citing Eland Philippines, Inc. v. Garcia, et al., 626 Phil. 735, 755-756 (2010).
73.Id.
74.Rollo, p. 34.
75.Id. at 173-187.
76.Id. at 173.
77.Id. at 175.
78.Id. at 195.
79.Id. at 202-209.
80.Id. at 210-214.
81.Id. at 213.
82.Id. at 212-214.
83.Id. at 41.
84.Id. at 215-220.
85.Id. at 222-227.
86.Id. at 183.
87.Id.
88.Id. at 182.
89.Id. at 287-290.
90.Id. at 343-345.