Mamba, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 249343 and 249382. July 6, 2022.]

FRANCISCO N. MAMBA, JR., WILLIAM N. MAMBA, FREDERICK G. BALIGOD, MERLINA B. DAYAG, ANABEL S. TURINGAN, JOSE O. PALACPAC, TERESITA V. ESPINOSA, JULIANA FILIPINA F. PADILLA, LETICIA A. ACOB, and PETRA B. DELOS SANTOS, petitioners,vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedJuly 6, 2022, which reads as follows:

"G.R. Nos. 249343 and 249382 (Francisco N. Mamba, Jr., William N. Mamba, Frederick G. Baligod, Merlina B. Dayag, Anabel S. Turingan, Jose O. Palacpac, Teresita V. Espinosa, Juliana Filipina F. Padilla, Leticia A. Acob, and Petra B. Delos Santos, v. Hon. Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines). — This Petition for [Certiorari] with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction 1 seeks to reverse and set aside the Resolutions dated 05 August 2019 2 and 13 September 2019 3 of the Sandiganbayan in SB-19-CRM-0048 to 0049, which denied the Motion to Quash Informations for Inordinate Delay 4 and Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Defer Arraignment, respectively.

Antecedents

Petitioners were criminally charged with violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019 5 for their involvement in the purchase of fertilizers under a program initiated and funded by the government in 2004, a failed project that came to be known as the Fertilizer Fund Scam. 6

On 16 June 2014, the Commission on Audit found that irregularities attended the procurement of said fertilizers under said program. 7 The Field Investigation Office (FIO) of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) initially conducted its fact-finding investigations. It filed a complaint against petitioners for violation of Section 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019, Malversation through Falsification of Public Documents as defined under Article 217 in relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, 8 and Section 65 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9184 or the Government Procurement Act 9 on 01 June 2011. 10

Meanwhile, the fact-finding investigation was completed on 10 November 2011, and the Investigation Report and the Complaint were subsequently approved by the Ombudsman. On 10 July 2017, the Ombudsman issued a Resolution finding probable cause against petitioners and recommending the filing of Informations against them. Subsequently, or on 05 April 2019, two Informations for violations of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 were filed against petitioners and their co-accused before the Sandiganbayan. 11

Before they could be arraigned, however, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash Informations for Inordinate Delay, contending that it took the Ombudsman an unreasonable delay of 14 years to conduct and complete the investigation and resolution of the cases against them, thus, violating their constitutional right to speedy trial and/or disposition of cases. 12

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

On 05 August 2019, the Sandiganbayan denied the Motion to Quash:

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the motion is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The arraignment of the accused on August 16, 2019 at 8:30 in the morning shall proceed as scheduled.

SO ORDERED. 13

The Sandiganbayan emphasized that inordinate delay is not one of the grounds to quash an Information under the Rules of Court. In any case, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, fact-finding investigations are no longer included in the period of determination of inordinate delay. It starts only upon the filing of the formal complaint and the subsequent conduct of preliminary investigation. Thus, in the instant cases, the count starts only on 28 November 2011 when the FIO Complaint was submitted for preliminary investigation up to the filing of the Informations in Court on 05 April 2019, belying petitioners' claim of a 14-year delay. The Sandiganbayan further held that the delay in the disposition of the cases is not capricious, whimsical, or arbitrary as to render rights nugatory, especially considering the scope of facts, the number of respondents, the complexity of issues and layers of reviewing authorities, and the transition of leadership of the Office of the Ombudsman. 14

The Sandiganbayan denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Defer Arraignment in its Resolution dated 13 September 2019. 15

Hence, this petition. CAIHTE

Issue

The sole issue in this case is whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners' Motion to Quash Informations for Inordinate Delay. 16

Ruling of the Court

We grant the petition. The Court rules that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying the Motion to Quash. 17

The right to a speedy disposition of cases is enshrined in Section 16, Article III of the Constitution, viz.:

Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies

Notably, Section 12, Article XI of the Constitution further requires the Ombudsman to act promptly on all complaints filed before it:

Section 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof.

This same mandate can be found in Section 13 of RA 6770, 18 otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989:

Section 13. Mandate. — The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against officers or employees of the government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants in order to promote efficient service by the Government to the people.

In resolving issues involving the right to a speedy disposition of cases, the Court laid down the following guidelines in Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division (Cagang):

First, the right to speedy disposition of cases is different from the right to speedy trial. While the rationale for both rights is the same, the right to speedy trial may only be invoked in criminal prosecutions against courts of law. The right to speedy disposition of cases, however, may be invoked before any tribunal, whether judicial or quasi-judicial. What is important is that the accused may already be prejudiced by the proceeding for the right to speedy disposition of cases to be invoked.

Second, a case is deemed initiated upon the filing of a formal complaint prior to a conduct of a preliminary investigation. This Court acknowledges, however, that the Ombudsman should set reasonable periods for preliminary investigation, with due regard to the complexities and nuances of each case. Delays beyond this period will be taken against the prosecution. The period taken for fact-finding investigations prior to the filing of the formal complaint shall not be included in the determination of whether there has been inordinate delay.

Third, courts must first determine which party carries the burden of proof. If the right is invoked within the given time periods contained in current Supreme Court resolutions and circulars, and the time periods that will be promulgated by the Office of the Ombudsman, the defense has the burden of proving that the right was justifiably invoked. If the delay occurs beyond the given time period and the right is invoked, the prosecution has the burden of justifying the delay.

If the defense has the burden of proof, it must prove first, whether the case is motivated by malice or clearly only politically motivated and is attended by utter lack of evidence, and second, that the defense did not contribute to the delay.

Once the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution, the prosecution must prove first, that it followed the prescribed procedure in the conduct of preliminary investigation and in the prosecution of the case; second, that the complexity of the issues and the volume of evidence made the delay inevitable; and third, that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result of the delay. DETACa

Fourth, determination of the length of delay is never mechanical. Courts must consider the entire context of the case, from the amount of evidence to be weighed to the simplicity or complexity of the issues raised.

An exception to this rule is if there is an allegation that the prosecution of the case was solely motivated by malice, such as when the case is politically motivated or when there is continued prosecution despite utter lack of evidence. Malicious intent may be gauged from the behavior of the prosecution throughout the proceedings. If malicious prosecution is properly alleged and substantially proven, the case would automatically be dismissed without need of further analysis of the delay.

Another exception would be the waiver of the accused to the right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial. If it can be proven that the accused acquiesced to the delay, the constitutional right can no longer be invoked.

In all cases of dismissals due to inordinate delay, the causes of the delays must be properly laid out and discussed by the relevant court.

Fifth, the right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial must be timely raised. The respondent or the accused must file the appropriate motion upon the lapse of the statutory or procedural periods. Otherwise, they are deemed to have waived their right to speedy disposition of cases. 19

In the more recent rulings in Martinez III v. People, 20Javier v. Sandiganbayan (Javier), 21 and Catamco v. Sandiganbayan (Catamco), 22 the Court further supplemented the parameters established by Cagang.

Applying the foregoing line of cases, the Court finds that herein petitioners' right to speedy disposition of cases was indeed violated by the Ombudsman's inordinate delay in conducting preliminary investigation. 23

To determine whether inordinate delay exists, Cagang explains that a case is deemed initiated upon the filing of a formal complaint prior to the conduct of preliminary investigation. The court must examine whether the Ombudsman followed the specified time periods for the conduct of the preliminary investigation. 24

In Javier and Catamco, the Court observed that the rules of the Ombudsman did not provide for specific time periods to conclude preliminary investigations. However, considering that the Rules of Court find suppletory application to proceedings before the Ombudsman, the time periods provided therein would be deemed applicable. Accordingly, Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the investigating prosecutor has 10 days "after the investigation x x x [to] determine whether or not there is sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial." This 10-day period may seem short or unreasonable from an administrative standpoint. However, given the Court's duty to balance the right of the State to prosecute violations of its laws vis-à-vis the rights of citizens to speedy disposition of cases, the Court ruled that citizens ought not to be prejudiced by the Ombudsman's failure to provide for particular time periods in its own Rules of Procedure. 25

On 15 August 2020, mere weeks after the promulgation of Javier and Catamco, the Ombudsman introduced welcome developments to its rules of procedure through Administrative Order No. (AO) 1, Series of 2020. Under AO 1, the Ombudsman now has clearly specified time periods for conducting not only preliminary investigations, but also fact-finding investigations and administrative adjudications. 26

For preliminary investigations, AO 1 provides:

Section 8.  Period for the conduct of Preliminary Investigation. — Unless otherwise provided for in a separate issuance, such as an Office Order creating a special panel of investigators/prosecutors and prescribing the period for completion of the preliminary investigation, the proceedings therein shall not exceed twelve (12) months for simple cases or twenty-four months (24) months for complex cases, subject to the following considerations:

(a) The complexity of the case shall be determined on the basis of factors such as, but not limited to, the number of respondents, the number of offenses charged, the volume of documents, the geographical coverage, and the amount of public funds involved.

(b) Any delay incurred in the proceedings, whenever attributable to the respondent, shall suspend the running of the period for purposes of completing the preliminary investigation.

(c) The period herein prescribed may be extended by written authority of the Ombudsman, or the Overall Deputy Ombudsman/Special Prosecutor/Deputy Ombudsman concerned for justifiable reasons, which extension shall not exceed one (1) year.

In the present case, the formal complaint was filed on 28 November 2011. Petitioners were able to submit their joint counter-affidavits on 25 April 2012. However, after filing their counter-affidavits, it took the Ombudsman more than five (5) years, two (2) months and fifteen (15) days to issue the Resolution dated 10 July 2017 finding probable cause against petitioners. 27

Applying either the short 10-day period under the Rules of Court, following Javier and Catamco, or the more generous 12 to 24-month periods under AO 1, assuming arguendo that the same is made to apply retroactively, it is apparent that the Ombudsman exceeded the specified time period for preliminary investigations. Thus, following Cagang, the burden of proof shifted to the prosecution, which must establish that the delay was reasonable and justified under the circumstances. Once the burden of proof shifts, the prosecution must prove the following: first, that it followed the prescribed procedure in the conduct of preliminary investigation and in the prosecution of the case; second, that the complexity of the issues and the volume of evidence made the delay inevitable; and third, that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result of the delay. 28

In this regard, We note that the prosecution failed to justify the delay incurred during preliminary investigation. It attempted to justify such delay by pointing out that the case is not simple as it involves a substantial amount of money, intricate transactions, and numerous parties. The prosecution also claimed that the layers of review and change in administration contributed to the delay. 29

We are not persuaded. aDSIHc

In Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan, 30 the Court ruled that absent any extraordinary complication, which the Ombudsman must adequately prove, such as the degree of difficulty of the questions involved in the case, or any event external thereto that effectively stymied the Ombudsman's normal work activity, any delay in the resolution of the preliminary investigation is not justified. 31 Further, in Cagang, the Court held that once delay is established, the prosecution has the burden to prove, among others, that the issues are so complex and the evidence so voluminous such that delay was all but inevitable.

Here, the prosecution relied on hare assertions and failed to provide clear proof of the circumstances causing the delay. The Ombudsman took more than five years to resolve the preliminary investigation from the time that petitioners had filed all their counter-affidavits. From then on, there was no longer any participation from petitioners that could have caused the five-year delay in deciding the case before the Ombudsman. To stress, there is a need for the Ombudsman to explain why there was such a delay. Pursuant to Cagang, the Ombudsman must be able to establish that the complexity of issues and volume of evidence necessitated the delay, and that the accused — herein petitioners — suffered no prejudice as a result of the delay. On this point, the Ombudsman has failed to comply. 32

Considering the foregoing, the Sandiganbayan erred when it blindly agreed with the Ombudsman's attempts to justify the lengthy delay of five years despite the glaring lack of proof to support such claim.

Finally, Cagang requires that the right to speedy disposition of cases must be timely raised. Directly relating to this requirement, Javier noted that the Ombudsman's own procedural rules prohibit motions to dismiss, except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Thus, persons with pending cases before the Ombudsman have no legitimate avenues to assert their fundamental right to speedy disposition of cases at the preliminary investigation level. As such, the Court held it was sufficient for them to timely assert their right at the earliest possible opportunity, even after preliminary investigation. 33

We find that petitioners timely asserted their rights because they filed the Motion to Quash Informations for Inordinate Delay and Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Defer Arraignment at the earliest opportunity. Before they were even arraigned, they already filed the Motion to Quash Informations for Inordinate Delay and Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Defer Arraignment on the ground of violation of their right to speedy disposition of cases. To the mind of the Court, this shows that petitioners did not sleep on their rights and did in fact raise the same at the earliest opportunity. Certainly, this could not be construed as acquiescence to the delay. 34

Given the inordinate delay of five (5) years, two (2) months and fifteen (15) days in the conduct of the preliminary investigation and the Ombudsman's clear failure to provide sufficient justification, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it refused to uphold the petitioners' timely asserted right to speedy disposition of cases. Consequently, the criminal actions filed against petitioners should be abated and dismissed. 35

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated 05 August 2019 and 13 September 2019 of the Sandiganbayan Fifth Division in SB-19-CRIM-0048 to 0049 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is ordered to DISMISS Criminal Case Nos. SB-19-CRM-0048 to 0049 for violation of petitioners' constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

By:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

Footnotes

1. Rollo, pp. 3-18.

2. Id. at 19-26; penned by Associate Justice Maryann E. Corpus-Mañalac and concurred in by Associate Justices Rafael R. Lagos and Maria Theresa V. Mendoza-Arcega.

3. Id. at 27-35.

4. Id. at 37-42.

5. Entitled "ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT." Approved: 17 August 1960.

6. Id. at 19, 37.

7. Id. at 5-6, 20, 46-53.

8. Entitled "AN ACT REVISING THE PENAL CODE AND OTHER PENAL LAWS." Approved: 08 December 1930.

9. Entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE MODERNIZATION AND REGULATION OF THE PROCUREMENT ACTIVITIES OF THE GOVERNMENT AND OTHER PURPOSES." Approved: 10 January 2003.

10. Rollo, p. 99.

11. Id. at 99-100.

12. Id. at 37-45, 100.

13. Id. at 26.

14. Id. at 21-26.

15. Id. at 27-36.

16. Id. at 6-12.

17. See Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), G.R. Nos. 236177-210, 03 February 2021; Javier v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 237997, 10 June 2020; Martinez III v. People, G.R. No. 232574, 01 October 2019; and Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan, 714 Phil. 55 (2013).

18. Entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE FUNCTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." Approved: 17 November 1989.

19. 837 Phil. 815, 880-882 (2018).

20. G.R. No. 232574, 01 October 2019.

21. G.R. No. 237997, 10 June 2020.

22. G.R. Nos. 243560-62 & 243261-63, 28 July 28 2020.

23. Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), supra note at 17.

24. Id.

25. Id.

26. Id.

27. Rollo, pp. 23-24.

28. Alarilla v Sandiganbayan(Fourth Division), supra note at 17.

29. Rollo, pp. 20, 29-30, 106-107.

30. Supra note at 17.

31. Id. at 63.

32. Javier v. Sandiganbayan, supra note at 17.

33. Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), supra note at 17.

34. See Javier v. Sandiganbayan, supra at note 17.

35. Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), supra note at 17.