Mamaril v. Qua

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 206732. November 10, 2021.]

MARIFE E. MAMARIL, petitioner, vs.DR. JOSEFINO C. QUA, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated10 November 2021which reads as follows: AaCTcI

"G.R. No. 206732 (Marife E. Mamaril v. Dr. Josefino C. Qua). — This is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision 2 dated November 27, 2012 and Resolution 3 dated April 15, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 125167. The CA affirmed with modification the Decision 4 dated February 29, 2012 and Resolution 5 dated April 4, 2012 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC LAC No. 01-000281-12, which in turn reversed the Decision 6 dated October 31, 2011 of the Labor Arbiter (LA) in NLRC-NCR Case No. 06-08595-11.

The Antecedent Facts

Petitioner Marife E. Mamaril (Mamaril) was employed as a medical secretary since March 1993 for the shared clinic of Dr. Josefino C. Qua (Dr. Qua), Dr. Tiong Sam Lim (Dr. Lim), and Dr. Wilson de Guzman (Dr. De Guzman) at Cardinal Santos Medical Center. She worked for three hours a day during the clinic hours of 3:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. from Monday to Saturday.

Mamaril initially received a monthly salary of P10,000.00. This salary was a combination of the amounts she received from each of the doctors. Dr. Qua, being the most active user of the clinic, paid her P4,500.00 a month, while Dr. Lim and Dr. De Guzman paid her P2,500.00 and P3,000.00 a month, respectively. However, Dr. De Guzman relinquished his participation in the clinic sometime in February 2011. This resulted in the decrease of Mamaril's monthly salary by P3,000.00 representing the compensation she used to receive from him. 7

On the first week of May 2011, Mamaril asked Dr. Qua for a raise in her salary to cover for transportation expenses and her family's needs. According to Mamaril, Dr. Qua was angered by this and she was told that she did not have a right to ask for a raise, and would be dismissed at the end of the month. 8

Mamaril continued to work at the clinic until the end of May when she found out that a certain Lizette Mercado (Mercado) was hired to replace her effective June 1, 2011. 9 She took this as confirmation that her employment was terminated and stopped reporting to work. She immediately filed this case for illegal dismissal the following day seeking payment of backwages and separation pay.

In his defense, Dr. Qua alleged that Mamaril was not a regular employee since she only worked part-time from 3:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. Moreover, despite the lenient work hours, she was always tardy and usually reported to work at around 4:30 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. already. There were times when the clinic had to request help from other health aides and personnel just to cover for her. Hence, when she requested for a raise, it was denied due to her poor work performance and short working hours. She was then informed that if she found employment elsewhere with her desired salary, it would not be taken against her if she left. 10

It was further claimed that Mamaril was never dismissed from work and is instead guilty of abandonment. She received her salary at the end of May and then unilaterally determined that she was illegally dismissed and filed a labor complaint. 11

The parties underwent the mandatory conciliation and mediation proceedings but no settlement was reached. The LA thus ordered the parties to file their respective position papers. 12 Mamaril filed a Reply 13 to Dr. Qua's Position Paper.

The LA Ruling

The LA rendered its Decision 14 finding that Mamaril was illegally dismissed and is entitled to payment of unpaid wages, backwages, and separation pay:

WHEREFORE, responsive to the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring respondent guilty of illegal dismissal. Accordingly, respondent is ordered jointly and severally liable:

(1) To pay complainant the amount of [P]57,738.32 representing her backwages, computed only up to the promulgation of this decision;

(2) To pay complainant the amount of [P]189,072.00 representing her separation pay;

(3) To pay complainant the amount of [P]126,144.00 representing her underpayment of wages.

SO ORDERED.15

The LA gave credence to Mamaril's claim that Dr. Qua dismissed her in May 2011 after he was angered by her request for a raise. It rejected Dr. Qua's argument that Mamaril abandoned her employment since this is inconsistent with the filing of a labor complaint and there was no reason for her to forfeit her accrued benefits.

Aggrieved, Dr. Qua appealed 16 the decision to the NLRC.

Dr. Qua argued on appeal that the LA should have dismissed the complaint for failure to implead Dr. Lim and Dr. De Gunman who were indispensable parties as co-employers of Mamaril. The LA also should not have granted Mamaril the full rights of a regular employee since she only worked part-time. Lastly, there was no basis to award backwages, separation pay, and other damages because Mamaril was not illegally dismissed.

The NLRC Ruling

The NLRC rendered its Decision 17 partially granting the appeal. It reversed the LA Decision but awarded Mamaril financial assistance:

WHEREFORE, the decision under review is hereby, REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another entered, ordering the respondent to pay the complainant, FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE in the total amount of FORTY THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS ([P]40,500.00 = [P]2,250.00 x 18 years).

All other claims are, DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.18

The NLRC considered Mamaril as having multiple employers. Each doctor in the clinic had a distinct employment relationship with her. This is evidenced by the fact that each doctor paid her separately in proportion to the hours she served them. Thus, when Dr. De Guzman left the clinic, Mamaril's pay was decreased only by P3,000.00 which was the compensation she regularly received from him.

The decrease in Mamaril's pay was therefore due to her cessation of work for Dr. De Guzman. If there was any illegal dismissal, it should solely be against Dr. De Guzman since he was the only doctor who terminated his employment relations with her. Dr. Qua cannot legally be held liable in any way for this.

However, the NLRC noted that considering Mamaril has served Dr. Qua for nearly two decades, she should not be left empty-handed and be given financial assistance out of compassion, equity, and social justice.

Mamaril filed a motion for reconsideration 19 of the decision but was denied by the NLRC in its resolution 20 for lack of merit.

Undeterred, Mamaril questioned the NLRC decision and resolution through a petition for certiorari21 with the CA. The petition essentially reiterated her previous arguments, to which Dr. Qua filed a comment. 22

The CA Ruling

The CA rendered its Decision 23 denying Mamaril's petition and deleting the award of financial assistance. However, it held that the employment relationship of the parties was never severed and therefore ordered Mamaril to report back to work. The CA pertinently disposed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 29 February 2012 and Resolution dated 04 April 2012 of the National Labor Relations Commission (Second Division) in NLRC NCR 06-08595-11 (LAC No. 01-000281-12) are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the financial assistance of Php40,500.00 awarded to petitioner is DELETED, the previous employment [relationship] is RESTORED, and petitioner is REQUIRED to report back to her place of work at the Cardinal Santos Medical Center clinic of private respondent Dr. Josefino C. Qua and Dr. Tiong Sam Lim.

SO ORDERED.24

The CA concluded that Mamaril failed to support her claim of dismissal with clear and convincing evidence. Although the employer has the burden to prove that the termination was for just or authorized cause, it is incumbent for the employee to first establish the fact of dismissal. In this case, Mamaril did not present sufficient proof that she was dismissed or that Dr. Qua prevented her from returning to work. 25

However, it also held that Mamaril did not abandon her work. It appreciated her statement that she needed to sustain her family's needs as a strong factor negating an intention to leave employment. Hence, as there was neither illegal dismissal nor abandonment, the equitable solution would be for Mamaril to report back to work. 26

Mamaril filed a motion for reconsideration 27 of the decision, but was denied by the CA in its resolution. 28

Hence, the instant petition.

The Parties' Arguments

Mamaril, in her petition, alleged that the finding that she did not abandon her employment supports the conclusion that she was illegally dismissed. In the absence of abandonment, there was clearly no just or authorized cause for her dismissal. Her illegal dismissal without due process was evidenced by Dr. Qua's hiring of Mercado to replace her effective June 1, 2011. 29

Dr. Qua filed a comment 30 to the petition arguing that Mamaril failed to prove that she was dismissed. On the contrary, Mamaril admitted that she was the one who refused to report for work. 31 There can also be no fault in failing to afford her due process since she was the one who immediately filed the labor complaint a day after she decided to stop reporting to work. She deprived Dr. Qua the opportunity to give her the required notices and hearing to deal with her unauthorized absences.

The Issue

The sole issue in this case is whether or not Mamaril was illegally dismissed.

Ruling of the Court

The petition is denied.

On a preliminary note, the issue in this case admittedly involves a question of fact which is beyond the scope of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This Court is not a trier of facts and generally resolves only questions of law. 32 However, this case falls under a recognized exception to this rule when factual findings of the LA, the NLRC, and the CA are conflicting. 33 The instant review and re-evaluation of factual issues is therefore warranted and necessary.

Mamaril was neither illegally

It is settled in illegal dismissal cases that employers have the burden to prove that the termination of employment was for a just or authorized cause. However, this burden of proof arises only when the fact of dismissal is prima facie established. It is incumbent on employees to first prove with substantial evidence that they were actually dismissed. Clearly, if there is no dismissal, there can be no possible issue as to its legality or illegality. 34

This Court has notably pronounced that "[b]are allegations of dismissal, when uncorroborated by the evidence on record, cannot be given credence. Moreover, the evidence to prove the fact of dismissal must be clear, positive and convincing." 35

It was thus held in Claudia's Kitchen, Inc. v. Tanguin36 that an employee who relied only on an uncorroborated claim that she was allegedly barred from entering the workplace miserably failed to prove the fact of her dismissal.

Similarly, it was stressed in Atienza v. Saluta37 that a claim of dismissal must be substantiated by impartial and independent evidence. The employee must show an overt act on the part of the employer proving the dismissal. The employee's bare claim cannot suffice since it is self-serving, conjectural, and without probative value. This Court elucidated:

Respondent's bare claim of having been dismissed from employment by the petitioner, unsubstantiated by impartial and independent evidence, is insufficient to establish such fact of dismissal. Bare and unsubstantiatedallegations do not constitute substantial evidence and have no probative value. It must be emphasized that aside from the allegation that he was verbally terminated from his work, respondent failed to present any competent evidence showing that he was prevented from returning to his work. Reyes did not issue any statement to corroborate the claimed termination of the respondent. That he was refused to be given his salary covering the period from December 15, 2014 to December 22, 2014 did not at all prove the fact of his termination. It must be taken into account that salaries of employees may not be released for myriad of reasons. Termination may only be one of them. The Court reiterates the basic rule of evidence that each party must prove his affirmative allegation, that mere allegation is not evidence. The Court must also stress that the evidence presented to show the employee's termination from employment must be clear, positive, and convincing. Absent any showing of an overt or positive act proving that petitioner had dismissed the respondent, the latter's claim of illegal dismissal cannot be sustained — as the same would be self-serving, conjectural, and of no probative value. 38 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied, citations omitted)

Guided by the foregoing, a judicious review of this case shows that Mamaril failed to discharge her burden to prove the fact of her dismissal.

The CA aptly observed that "[p]etitioner's [Mamaril's] claim that after she asked for a salary increase, private respondent [Dr. Qua] got angry and informed her that she would be dismissed by the end of May 2011, and that by the last week of May 2011 a new employee was hired to take over her job, thereby confirming her termination, is not supported by clear and convincing evidence." 39

No evidence was presented to show a positive and overt act on the part of Dr. Qua dismissing Mamaril from employment. There was also no evidence that Dr. Qua prevented her from reporting back to work after May 2011. On the contrary, Mamaril admitted in the Single Entry Approach Form she filed with the LA that she was the one who unilaterally decided not to report to work anymore:

Humingi lang ako ng increase kay Dr. Josefino C. Qua kasi NABAWASAN NG AKO NG ISANG BOSS at tumaas na ang pamasahe at lahat. Nagalit sa akin dahil wala akong karapatan humingi ng increase DAHIL MAIKSI LAMANG ANG ORAS KO NA PINAPASOK samantalang pumapasok naman ako ng tama. Minsan INAAMIN KO, NALA-LATE AKO DAHIL SA LAYO NG HOUSE. Samantalang pag wala akong hinihingi na increase ok naman sya sa akin. x x x Tapos di na maganda ang treatment niya sa akin palagi sumisimangot, mainit na ulo niya sa akin. KAYA NAGPASYAHAN KO NA DI NA PUMASOK KAHIT DI NIYA AKO BAYARAN NG SEPARATION PAY. 40 (Emphasis supplied)

Mamaril's claim that her termination from employment was confirmed by Dr. Qua's hiring of Mercado is also bereft of merit.

As duly established by the evidence on record, Dr. Qua did not hire Mercado to replace her. Mercado submitted an Affidavit 41 proving that she was not Dr. Qua's employee, but a registered nurse employed solely by Intellicare Asalus Corporation (Intellicare) since 2009. She was stationed in the same clinic as Mamaril only out of convenience since Dr. Qua was the coordinator of Intellicare for the entire Cardinal Santos Medical Center. She did not serve the doctors in the clinic and her functions were strictly limited to assisting Intellicare members availing of medical services in the hospital.

It is noted that Mamaril undoubtedly knew Mercado's work status and duties since they personally knew each other and worked together at the same clinic since 2009. Mamaril's attempt to make it appear that Mercado was a new employee who entered the picture to replace her only on June 1, 2011 reeks of bad faith and cannot be countenanced.

Consequently, the CA correctly ruled that Mamaril was not dismissed by Dr. Qua. It necessarily follows that there can be no question on the legality of a dismissal which is non-existent.

This likewise negates Mamaril's claims for backwages, separation pay, and other damages. These awards are granted pursuant to Article 279 of the Labor Code only when there is a conclusive finding of illegal dismissal.

The finding of the CA that Mamaril did not abandon her work is also affirmed. There is abandonment of employment when there is "a deliberate and unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment." 42 The employer must prove that there was a deliberate and unjustified refusal by the employee to resume employment without any intention of returning. 43

The nature of abandonment in labor cases and the elements which need to be proved were discussed in Tan Brothers Corporation of Basilan City v. Escudero44 as follows:

As defined under established jurisprudence, abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his employment. It constitutes neglect of duty and is a just cause for termination ofemployment under paragraph (b) of Article 282 of the Labor Code. To constitute abandonment, however, there must be a clear and deliberate intent to discontinue one's employment without any intention of returning. In this regard, two elements must concur: (1) failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor and being manifested by some overt acts. Otherwise stated, absence must be accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not want to work anymore. It has been ruled that the employer has the burden of proof to show a deliberate and unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment without any intention of returning. 45 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied, citations omitted)

In this case, Dr. Qua failed to sufficiently prove the elements of abandonment. Mamaril's intention to abandon her work is negated by her filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal. This is also supported by Mamaril's length of service for Dr. Qua and allegations that she needed her job to provide for herself and her family.

All told, Mamaril was neither dismissed nor deemed to have abandoned her employment. The employer-employee relationship between Dr. Qua and Mamaril was therefore never truly severed making the remedy of reinstatement, in the legal sense, impossible. The result of this situation, as applied in Rodriguez v. Sintron Systems, Inc., 46 is to merely declare "that the employee may go back to his work and the employer must then accept him because the employment relationship between them was never actually severed."

Dr. Qua should thus reinstate Mamaril to her former position, or substantially-equivalent position, without payment of backwages. If Mamaril does not want to return to work, she is considered to have resigned. 47 If reinstatement to her former position is no longer possible, considering her failure to work was occasioned neither by abandonment nor termination, it has been recognized that each party must bear their own economic loss. 48

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated November 27, 2012 and Resolution dated April 15, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 125167 are AFFIRMED. Respondent Dr. Josefino C. Qua is ORDERED to REINSTATE petitioner Marife E. Mamaril to her former position without payment of backwages or other monetary claims.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDivision Clerk of Court

Footnotes

1. Rollo, pp. 10-24.

2. Id. at 26-38. Penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo with Associate Justices Franchito N. Diamante and Melchor Quirino C. Sadang concurring.

3. Id. at 154-155.

4. Id. at 114-124. Penned by Presiding Commissioner Raul T. Aquino with Commissioners Teresita D. Castillon-Lora and Napoleon M. Menese concurring.

5. Id. at 144-146.

6. Id. at 79-87. Penned by Labor Arbiter Joel S. Lustria.

7. Id. at 28.

8. Id. at 27.

9. Id. at 46.

10. Id. at 28.

11. Id. at 28-29.

12. Id. at 52-59, and 70.

13. Id. at 71-77.

14. Id. at 79-87.

15. Id. at 87.

16. Id. at 88-109.

17. Id. at 114-124.

18. Id. at 123-124.

19. Id. at 125-129.

20. Id. at 144-146.

21. Id. at 39-51.

22. Id. at 156-174.

23. Id. at 26-38.

24. Id. at 35-36.

25. Id. at 33-34.

26. Id. at 35.

27. Id. at 147-152.

28. Id. at 154-155.

29. Id. at 15-16.

30. Id. at 193-206.

31. Id. at 196-197.

32. Brown Madonna Press, Inc. v. Casas, 759 Phil. 479, 491 (2015).

33. Atienza v. Saluta, G.R. No. 233413, June 17, 2019.

34. Italkarat 18, Inc. v. Gerasmio, G.R. No. 221411, September 28, 2020; Rodriguez v. Sintron Systems, Inc., G.R. No. 240254, July 24, 2019.

35. Rodriguez v. Sintron Systems, Inc., id.

36. 811 Phil. 784, 795 (2017).

37. Supra note 33.

38. Id.

39. Rollo, p. 33.

40. Id. at 160-161.

41. Id. at 110-111.

42. Borja v. Minoza, 812 Phil. 133, 147 (2017).

43. Id.

44. 713 Phil. 392 (2013).

45. Id. at 400-401.

46. Supra note 34.

47. Id.

48. Borja v. Minoza, supra note 42 at 147, citing MZR Industries v. Colambot, 716 Phil. 617, 628 (2013).