Malicdem, Jr. v. Autoallee Group, Inc.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 252318. September 30, 2020.]

CRESCENDO D. MALICDEM, JR., 1petitioner,vs. AUTOALLEE GROUP, INC. AND JUSTIN MARCUS KOA, 2respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated30 September 2020which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 252318 (Crescendo D. Malicdem, Jr. v. Autoallee Group, Inc. and Justin Marcus Koa). — The Court resolves to DENY the Petition for failure of petitioner Crescencio D. Malicdem, Jr. (Malicdem) to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals (CA) committed any reversible error in the challenged Decision 3 and the Resolution 4 in CA-G.R. SP No. 153127. After reviewing the Petition and its annexes, the Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the CA in: (1) granting and admitting private respondent Autoallee Group, Inc.'s (Autoallee) motion for extension to file petition and petition for certiorari, respectively; (2) not giving consideration to Malicdem's contention that the certiorari petition should be dismissed for technical infirmities; and (3) reversing the National Labor Relations Commission's (NLRC) finding that Malicdem was illegally dismissed.

Motion for Extension to File

In the En Banc ruling in Domdom v. Sandiganbayan, 5 the Court clarified that the fact that no mention is made in Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 07-07-12-SC, of a motion for extension to file petition (motion for extension), unlike in the previous formulation, does not make the filing of such pleading absolutely prohibited. Thus:

That no mention is made in the above-quoted amended Section 4 of Rule 65 of a motion for extension, unlike in the previous formulation, does not make the filing of such pleading absolutely prohibited. If such were the intention, the deleted portion could just have simply been reworded to state that "no extension of time to file the petition shall be granted." Absent such a prohibition, motions for extension are allowed, subject to the Court's sound discretion. The present petition may thus be allowed, having been filed within the extension sought and, at all events, given its merits. (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, the CA has granted the Autoallee's motion for extension after finding merit in Autoallee's invocation, in its motion for reconsideration to the earlier dismissal, of the grounds of: (1) higher interest of justice; (2) injustice that will be caused if the petition is not given due course; and (3) merits of the case. The Court sees no reason to override the exercise of sound discretion of the CA. More so that Autoallee's argument in its certiorari petition, that it did not dismiss Malicdem as evidenced by the notices to return to work, is highly meritorious and was in fact sustained by the CA in its decision. In addition, Autoallee immediately filed its petition for certiorari, nine (9) days after the original deadline and within the prayed ten-day extension, which only proves that the motion for extension was not meant to delay the earlier termination of the case. Clearly, with Autoallee's immediate filing of the petition after praying for an extension, there is no significant prejudice to the substantive rights of the litigants in the case. The CA, therefore, is justified for its liberal application of the rule in order to serve rather than defeat the ends of justice.

Alleged Procedural Defects in

There is no merit in Malicdem's position that the petition for certiorari should have been dismissed by the CA for failure to state the material dates as to when Autoallee received the NLRC Decision dated 31 May 2017 and when it filed a motion for reconsideration thereof. Malicdem's allegation is already squarely addressed by the CA in its 10 March 2020 Resolution, pointing out that a cursory reading of the certiorari petition reveals that the date of filing of the subject motion is on 30 June 2017. 6 As to the date of receipt of the NLRC Decision, the subject petition for certiorari clearly stated that it is on 21 June 2017. 7 Moreover, in Barroga v. Data Center College of the Philippines, 8 the Court held that failure to state these two dates in the petition may be excused if the same are evident from the records of the case. It was further ruled by this Court that the more important material date which must be duly alleged in the petition is the date of receipt of the resolution of denial of the motion for reconsideration, which Autoallee has duly complied with.

The Court likewise rejects Malicdem's argument that the subject petition for certiorari should have been dismissed by the CA for failure to attach the Reply and the Answer to the Memorandum of Appeal of Complainant-Appellant filed by Autoallee before the NLRC and the illegal dismissal Complaint and the Reply filed by Malicdem before the Labor Arbiter.

In Gutierrez v. Valiente, 9 the Court described what constitutes relevant or pertinent documents under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court:

With regard to the failure to attach material portions of the record in support of the petition, Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court requires that petition for certiorari shall be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof, such material portions of the records as are referred to therein, and other documents relevant or pertinent thereto; and failure of compliance shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.

xxx xxx xxx

These documents, however, are not at all relevant to the petition for certiorari. Since the issue of whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion pertained only to the Orders dated May 15, 2000, June 23, 2003, June 9, 2004 and September 9, 2004, copies of said Orders would have sufficed as basis for the CA to resolve the issue. It was in these Orders that the RTC supposedly made questionable rulings. Thus, the attachment of these Orders to the petition was already sufficient even without the other pleadings and portions of the case record. Moreover, Spouses Gutierrez corrected the purported deficiency by submitting the required documents in their Motion for Reconsideration.

In Air Philippines Corporation v. Zamora, the Court clarified that not all pleadings and parts of case records are required to be attached to the petition; only those pleadings, parts of case records and documents which are material and pertinent, in that they may provide the basis for a determination of a prima facie case for abuse of discretion, are required to be attached to a petition for certiorari, and omission to attach such documents may be rectified by the subsequent submission of the documents required. (Citations omitted)

Based on the foregoing, copies of the NLRC Decision dated 31 July 2017 and Resolution dated 31 May 2017 attached by Autoallee to its certiorari petition did suffice. Even if pleadings or documents mentioned by Malicdem were arguably "relevant and pertinent for proper appreciation of the antecedent facts and the complete disposition of the case x x x," the failure to attach the same does not warrant the dismissal of the petition. The CA could have simply required their subsequent submission. The CA, however, has already rendered a decision which makes such action moot and academic. It might not be amiss to point out, though, that the fact that the CA has rendered an exhaustively discussed decision only proves that the documents sought to be attached by Malicdem are not indispensable to the determination of the merit of the petition for certiorari filed by Autoallee.

The CA Rightfully Reviewed

As a rule, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is valid only when the question involved is an error of jurisdiction, or when there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the court or tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions. Hence, courts exercising certiorari jurisdiction should refrain from reviewing factual assessments of the respondent court or agency. Occasionally, however, and as emphasized by the CA, courts are constrained to wade into factual matters when the evidence on record does not support those factual findings; or when too much is concluded, inferred or deduced from the bare or incomplete facts appearing on record; and when the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter came up with conflicting findings in labor cases. 10 Such is the case here.

No Illegal Dismissal nor

The CA is correct in explaining that when a mail matter is sent by registered mail, there exists a presumption, set forth under Section 3 (v), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, that it was received in the regular course of mail. The facts to be proved in order to raise this presumption are: (a) that the letter was properly addressed with postage prepaid; and (b) that it was mailed, 11 which are present in this case. Nonetheless, while a mailed letter is deemed received by the addressee in the ordinary course of mail, this is still merely a disputable presumption subject to controversion, and a direct denial of the receipt thereof shifts the burden upon the party favored by the presumption to prove that the mailed letter was indeed received by the addressee. 12 In this case, the two notices sent by Autoallee to Malicdem through registered mail were never served upon Malicdem as the same was returned with postal notation "moved out," which logically rebutted the aforesaid presumption. Accordingly, Malicdem could not be said to have ignored any return to work order so as to say that he deliberately and unjustifiably refused to resume his employment. It is also noteworthy that Malicdem wasted no time in filing a complaint to protest his purported illegal dismissal from employment. The filing of the complaint belies Autoallee's charge of abandonment of work. On the contrary, the same leads to the logical conclusion that Malicdem had no such intention to abandon his work.

Meanwhile, in illegal dismissal cases, the fact of dismissal must be established first by the employee through the positive and overt acts of an employer indicating the intention to dismiss before the burden is shifted to the employer to show that the dismissal was legal. 13 In the present case, the Court agrees with the CA that Malicdem failed to establish through substantial evidence that he was terminated. Other than his bare allegation of being terminated from employment, there was nothing to show that Malicdem was dismissed from work or was prevented from returning to his work. Indeed, the CA is right when it held that Malicdem's claim of being dismissed was only his unsubstantiated conclusion. Further, Autoallee sent to Malicdem two notices to return to work just days after the latter stopped reporting for work. As astutely observed by the CA, while these two notices were not received by Malicdem, the same are nonetheless proof of Autoallee's lack of intention to dismiss him from employment since it still considered him as its employee as of that time.

There being no dismissal to speak of, the CA correctly concluded that the status quo between Autoallee and Malicdem as employer and employee, respectively, should be maintained. Consequently, there is no justification to grant backwages, or any other monetary claims for lack of evidence and legal basis to substantiate the same. Where the employee's failure to work was occasioned neither by his abandonment nor by the termination of employment, it is not right to shift the burden of economic loss to the employer; in that instance, each party must bear his own loss. 14

Payment of Separation Pay In

In cases where no dismissal took place, the proper award is reinstatement without backwages, not as a relief for any illegal dismissal but on equitable grounds. 15

The CA awarded Malicdem separation pay in lieu of reinstatement by applying the doctrine of strained relations. However, the CA's conclusion that the parties' relations has been strained is based on mere presumption which falls short of the well-entrenched requirement that strained relations must be demonstrated as a fact. The doctrine of strained relations should not be used recklessly or applied loosely nor be based on impression alone. It must be adequately supported by substantial evidence showing that the relationship between the employer and the employee is indeed strained as a necessary consequence of the judicial controversy. 16 This is absent in this case.

Nevertheless, it is settled that when reinstatement of the employee is rendered impossible, as when the employee had been out for a long period of time, the award of separation pay is proper in an amount equivalent to one (1) month pay for every year of service, computed up to the time the employee stopped working. 17

Here, considering that more than four years (4) years has already passed from the time Malicdem stopped reporting for work on 13 August 2016, it is no longer possible and reasonable for Autoallee to reinstate Malicdem in its service. Hence, although premised on a different ground cited by the CA, the Court sustains the award of separation pay. Considering further that Malicdem has only worked with Autoallee for less than one (1) year, or from 5 November 2015 to 12 August 2016, the Court finds a separation pay equivalent to his one (1) month pay is just and appropriate under the circumstances, which Autoallee must solely pay there being no bad faith on the part of private respondent Justin Marcus Koa so as to hold him personally and solidarily liable. Likewise, the award shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid. 18 As a consequence of these pronouncements, the CA Decision and Resolution should be modified.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Decision dated 17 September 2019 and the Resolution dated 10 March 2020 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 153127 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that respondent Autoallee Group, Inc. is ORDERED to pay petitioner Crescencio D. Malicdem, Jr. separation pay equivalent to his one (1) month pay, in lieu of reinstatement. The same shall earn 6% interest per annum from finality of this Resolution until fully paid.

SO ORDERED." (Baltazar-Padilla, J., on leave.)

By Authority of the Court:

(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDivision Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1. Also referred to as "Cresenciano" in other parts of the rollo.

2. Also referred to as " Justin Markus Koa" in other parts of the rollo.

3. Penned by Associate Justice Edwin D. Sorongon, with Associate Justices Japar B. Dimaampao and Geraldine C. Fiel-Macaraig, concurring; id. at 33-43.

4.Id. at 45-48.

5. 627 Phil. 341, 347-348 (2010).

6.Rollo, p. 46.

7.Id. at 52.

8. See 667 Phil. 808, 817 (2011).

9. 579 Phil. 486, 496-497 (2008).

10. See Lambert Pawnbrokers and Jewelry Corporation v. Binamira, 639 Phil. 1, 10-11 (2010).

11.Protector's Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 386 Phil. 611, 623 (2000).

12.Id.

13.Mehitabel, Inc. v. Alcuizar, 822 Phil. 863, 873 (2017).

14.Radar Security & Watchman Agency, Inc. v. Castro, G.R. No. 211210, 2 December 2015, 776 SCRA 71, 83-84.

15.Nightowl Watchman & Security Agency, Inc. v. Lumahan, 771 Phil. 391, 408-409 (2015).

16.Fernandez, Jr. v. Manila Electric Co., G.R. No. 226002, 25 June 2018.

17.Nightowl Watchman & Security Agency, Inc. v. Lumahan, supra note 15, at 409.

18. Pursuant to the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Circular No. 799, Series of 2013; see Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 716 Phil. 267, 280-281 (2013).