FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 244121. September 14, 2021.]
MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION AND WILHELMSEN SHIPMANAGEMENT (NORWA) AS, petitioners, vs.NEIL M. MANA, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedSeptember 14, 2021which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 244121 (Magsaysay Maritime Corporation and Wilhelmsen Shipmanagement (Norwa) AS v. Neil M. Mana). — Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court filed by petitioners Magsaysay Maritime Corporation, Wilhelmsen Shipmanagement (Norwa) AS (petitioners), assailing the Decision 2 dated July 16, 2018 and the Resolution 3 dated January 14, 2019 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 151625.
We deny the petition.
Respondent Neil Mana's (respondent) entitlement to disability benefits is governed by Articles 197 to 199, Chapter VI of the Labor Code in relation to Section 2, Rule X of the Rules and Regulations Implementing Book IV of the Labor Code. The parties are also bound by the provisions of the POEA's "Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels" (POEA-SEC), which incorporated Department Order No. 4, series of 2000 of the Department of Labor and Employment. In the case of Elburg Shipmanagement Philippines, Inc., et al. v. Quiogue, Jr., 4 this Court summarized and reconciled the pertinent rules governing a seafarer's claim for total and permanent disability benefits as follows:
In summary, if there is a claim for total and permanent disability benefits by a seafarer, the following rules (rules) shall govern:
1. The company-designated physician must issue a final medical assessment on the seafarer's disability grading within a period of 120 days from the time the seafarer reported to him;
2. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days, without any justifiable reason, then the seafarer's disability becomes permanent and total; IDSEAH
3. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days with a sufficient justification (e.g., seafarer required further medical treatment or seafarer was uncooperative), then the period of diagnosis and treatment shall be extended to 240 days. The employer has the burden to prove that the company-designated physician has sufficient justification to extend the period; and
4. If the company-designated physician still fails to give his assessment within the extended period of 240 days, then the seafarer's disability becomes permanent and total, regardless of any justification. (Emphases supplied)
It was undisputed that respondent was medically repatriated on November 10, 2015. On April 8, 2016, Carepoint, petitioners' clinic, issued its final medical assessment on respondent's fitness to return to work. Evidently, the final medical assessment was given beyond the 120-day period prescribed under the law. All the same, it can be gleaned from the facts of the case that the company doctors had sufficient justification for the belated issuance of the medical assessment. Notably, the 120th day fell on March 9, 2016. It would appear that respondent still underwent a repeat magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scan on March 21, 2016. Then on March 23, 2016, petitioners' designated physician examined him again. Evidently, petitioners were justified in issuing its medical certificate beyond the 120-day period.
Nevertheless, the Court finds the final medical assessment issued by Carepoint to be unreliable as it was biased in favor of the petitioners. This is evidenced from the fact that petitioners' final medical assessment was not supported by the medical records and the opinion of Dr. Jose Manuel Ignacio (Dr. Ignacio).
Notably, it was found in respondent's MRI scan result on March 21, 2016 that he still has "multi-level disc desiccation from L3-4 to L5-S1. The results also showed that [r]espondent still has injury in several parts of his spine — disc bulges and annular tears in L3-4, L4-L5, L5-S1." 5 Furthermore, one of the physicians assigned by Carepoint to attend to respondent's medical condition, Dr. Ignacio, found him to be suffering from limited mobility. Respondent narrated this fact as follows:
Surprisingly, despite the results showed by Respondent's latest MRI, on April 8, 2016, or mere 2 weeks after the latest MRI was done, Carepoint told Respondent that he is allegedly fit to return to work as of April 8, 2016.
Respondent was able to get a copy of the actual medical assessment given by the specialist handling him, Dr. Ignacio. Apparently, Carepoint used the medical assessment of Dr. Ignacio in issuing their fit-to-work certification to Respondent.
Noteworthy, in Dr. Ignacio's medical assessment, he stated that Respondent is "minimally symptomatic except when he does overhead work, which, if possible, I would request if he can be spared from this in the meantime." Dr. Ignacio's medical assessment proves that Respondent was not really fit to return to work yet as there are still limitations on the kind of work he could do, contrary to the fit-to-work certification issued by Petitioner's clinic, Carepoint. 6 (Underscoring ours)
As it would appear from the uncontroverted allegations of respondent, Dr. Ignacio's findings were made before the final medical assessment was issued on April 8, 2016. However, these were not considered by Carepoint in issuing its medical assessment. While respondent is minimally symptomatic, he was asked to be spared from overhead work, thereby suggesting that he still suffers from a disability, and cannot be said to be totally fit to work. Despite such results and medical findings, Carepoint certified respondent to be fit to return to work. Clearly, the final medical assessment issued by the company-designated physician is biased in favor of the petitioners. 7 Thus, the Labor Arbiter and the CA did not err in not giving weight to the findings of the company-designated physician. aCIHcD
Under Section 20 (A) (3) of the POEA-SEC, respondent is granted the option to consult his physician of choice. Thus, after Carepoint's issuance of the April 8, 2016 medical assessment of respondent, the latter consulted Dr. Venancio Garduce, Jr. (Dr. Garduce, Jr.) on May 8, 2016, who found him to be suffering from back pain secondary to spinal stenosis despite the months' long treatment that he received from the company-designated physician. Hence, Dr. Garduce, Jr. recommended that he be subjected to physical therapy, take medications, and constant check-ups. Almost a month later, Dr. Garduce, Jr. again examined respondent and found him to be totally disabled as his condition did not improve despite the additional treatment that he received. Plainly, the findings of Dr. Garduce, Jr. contravenes the final medical certificate that was issued by petitioners' company-designated physician on April 8, 2016.
Section 20 (A) (3) of the POEA-SEC further provides that in case of disagreement between the final medical assessment of the company-designated physician and the findings of the respondent's physician, a third doctor may be jointly appointed by the parties, whose findings shall be final and binding on both. As the CA found, respondent actively sought the employment of a third doctor, as mandated by law, but the petitioners were not amenable to the same. 8 It was not refuted by petitioners that respondent even sent a letter suggesting a third doctor, Dr. Teopisto Rigonan (Dr. Rigonan), and requested petitioners to signify their conformity to Dr. Rigonan's designation or for them to designate or suggest another doctor of their choice. 9 As petitioners never responded to the letter, respondent took it upon himself to consult Dr. Rigonan, who concurred with the findings of Dr. Garduce, Jr. that he is totally disabled. Certainly, it would be unfair to place respondent's situation within petitioners' discretion and keep him waiting on the designation of a third doctor.
It has been consistently held that a seafarer need not be completely disabled or totally paralyzed for him/her to be considered as totally disabled. A seafarer can be declared to be totally disabled if his/her injury or condition prevents him/her from earning wages in his/her usual work. Regardless of whether the seafarer lost any part of his/her body, his/her total disability will be considered permanent if his/her inability to work lasts continuously for more than one hundred twenty (120) days, or two hundred forty (240) days, if the extension was justified. 10
In this case, respondent's physicians were one in saying that he is totally and permanently disabled as he is still unable to work again as a fitter on board a vessel without suffering from serious pain and discomfort. Thus, this Court finds that the CA did not err in reinstating the ruling of the Labor Arbiter, which awarded respondent permanent disability benefits.
This Court likewise sees no reason to disturb the CA's award of ten percent (10%) attorney's fees. Attorney's fees may only be awarded upon substantial proof that the petitioners acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy respondent's plainly valid, just and demandable claim. 11 Here, petitioners declared respondent that he is fit to return to work despite the contrary findings of its specialist, Dr. Ignacio. Consequently, respondent was constrained to engage the services of counsel in pursuing his claims against petitioners for his total and permanent disability benefits. He is, thus, awarded an equivalent of ten percent (10%) of his total claims as and by way of attorney's fees.
Further, pursuant to the ruling of this Court in the case of Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 12 all the monetary awards should be subjected to a six percent (6%) interest per annum from the finality of this Resolution until full payment. cHaCAS
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July 16, 2018 and the Resolution dated January 14, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 151625 are AFFIRMED. Magsaysay Maritime Corporation and Wilhelmsen Shipmanagement (Norwa) AS are jointly and severally liable to pay Neil M. Mana the amount of US$60,000.00, or its equivalent to Philippine Currency prevailing at the exchange rate at the time of payment, representing his permanent disability benefits, P25,000.00 representing his sickness allowance, the sum of P18,000.00 as reimbursement of medical expenses, and an amount equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total judgment award as attorney's fees. The monetary awards are further subject to six percent (6%) interest per annum from the finality of this Resolution until full payment.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 28-84.
2. Penned by Associate Justice Stephen C. Cruz (retired), with Presiding Justice Romeo F. Barza (retired) and Associate Justice Carmelita Salandanan Manahan (retired) concurring, rollo, pp. 87-96.
3.Id. at 124-125.
4. 765 Phil. 341, 362-363 (2015) (emphases supplied), as cited in Marlow Navigation Philippines, Inc., et al. v. Reyes, G.R. No. 250369, June 30, 2020; Pastrana v. Bahia Shipping Services, et al., G.R. No. 227419, June 10, 2020; and Chan v. Magsaysay Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 239055, March 11, 2020.
5.Rollo, p. 138.
6.Id. (Citations omitted)
7.Multinational Ship Management, Inc., et al. v. Briones, G.R. No. 239793, January 27, 2020, citing C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc., et al. v. Castillo, 809 Phil. 180, 194 (2017); Nonay v. Bahia Shipping Services, Inc., et al., 781 Phil. 197, 228 (2016).
8.Rollo, pp. 18, 139.
9.Id. at 139.
10.Multinational Ship Management, Inc., et al. v. Briones, supra note 7, citing Talaroc v. Arpaphil Shipping Corporation, et al., 817 Phil. 598, 615 (2017); Elburg Shipmanagement Philippines, Inc., et al. v. Quiogue, Jr., supra note 4, at 365, citing Maersk Filipinas Crewing, Inc. v. Mesina, 710 Phil. 531, 548 (2013); Chan v. Magsaysay Corporation, et al., supra note 4, citing Orient Hope Agencies, Inc. and/or Zeo Marine Corporation v. Jara, 832 Phil. 380, 405 (2018).
11.Carcedo v. Maine Marine Philippines, Inc., 758 Phil. 166, 188 (2015).
12. 716 Phil. 267 (2013), as cited in Monsanto Philippines, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. Nos. 230609-10, August 27, 2020.