Magsaysay Maritime Corp. v. Asa

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 234100. November 11, 2021.]

MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION, C.S.C.S. INTERNATIONAL NV AND NORIELA M. LEONIDAS, petitioners, vs. HERMAN JOHN HERNANDO ASA, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedNovember 11, 2021which reads as follows: HTcADC

"G.R. No. 234100 (Magsaysay Maritime Corporation, C.S.C.S. International NV and Noriela M. Leonidas v. Herman John Hernando Asa). — This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and/or set aside the Decision 2 dated March 9, 2017 and the Resolution 3 dated August 17, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 139050.

Briefly, the assailed Decision dated March 9, 2017 reversed and set aside the Decision 4 dated July 31, 2014 and the Resolution 5 dated November 3, 2014 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC LAC No. OFW (M) 06-000479-14 and reinstated the Decision 6 dated May 7, 2014 of the Labor Arbiter (LA), granting respondent's claim for total and permanent disability benefits.

On the other hand, the impugned Resolution dated August 17, 2017 denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.

The Antecedents

The first overseas employment contract of respondent Herman John H. Asa (Asa) was in July 2012, when he was hired as assistant waiter by petitioner Magsaysay Maritime Corporation (Magsaysay) for and on behalf of its foreign principal, petitioner C.S.C.S. International NV (C.S.C.S.). Two weeks into his employment, he experienced mood disturbances accompanied by auditory hallucinations and inability to control the urge to shake hands with everyone that he met. As a result, he was sent to a medical facility in Greece for treatment until he was medically repatriated on August 16, 2012. 7

Upon arrival in Manila, he was confined at the Metropolitan Medical Center (MMC) for two weeks. After several psychological examinations and treatment, the company-designated physician, Dr. Domingo Rayco, Jr. issued a Psychological Report 8 declaring him "FIT FOR EMPLOYMENT."

Thus, on April 5, 2013, Asa was able to secure another overseas employment contract with Magsaysay as assistant waiter for a period of eight months on board the vessel, Costa Deliziosa. 9

Prior to deployment, he underwent the required Pre-Employment Medical Examination (PEME), where he was declared "FIT FOR SEA DUTY." 10

During the term of his employment, he was serving 300 passengers per meal and worked for 11 hours for three consecutive days without full rest. On the fourth day, due to strenuous physical activities or hard manual labor, he experienced sleeplessness, restlessness, hallucination, poor communication, confusion and fear of being killed by a fellow crew of a different nationality. Consequently, he was confined in the ship's clinic guarded by a security personnel to prevent danger. 11

Upon reaching a port, he was sent to a foreign medical facility in Greece and was confined for three weeks for treatment and he was later repatriated due to schizophrenia. Upon arrival in Manila on May 30, 2013, he went to the company-designated physician for post-employment medical examination and treatment. 12

In a Medical Report 13 dated May 30, 2013, the company-designated physicians Dr. Robert Lim (Dr. Lim) and Dr. Esther Go (Dr. Go) noted that respondent was previously diagnosed and treated at MMC for Brief Psychotic Disorder in 2012, but was assessed fit to resume sea duties on February 5, 2013. On even date, a "Private and Confidential" 14 correspondence was issued stating that respondent's mental condition was already pre-existing and thus, not work-related. Thus, respondent was discharged from the hospital on July 12, 2013.

On November 11, 2013, Dr. Go issued a Brief Clinical History 15 stating, among others, that on September 26, 2013, there was a final diagnosis declaring Asa to be suffering from bipolar disorder.

On December 5, 2013, Asa was confined at Sunshine.Com for psychiatric treatment. Subsequently, on December 9, 2013, Asa's chosen doctor, Dr. Edison C. Galindez (Dr. Galindez) issued a Psychiatric Report, 16 declaring that he is suffering from Bipolar Affective Disorder and that he is "UNFIT for sea duty in any capacity." Dr. Galindez also recommended that he "continue his intake of maintenance medication and regular follow-ups."

On the strength of the foregoing, Asa filed a complaint before the LA, docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. OFW (M) 11-14834-13 17 for total and permanent disability benefits, damages and attorney's fees against Magsaysay.

Asa alleged, among others, that prior to his deployment on board the vessel, Costa Deliziosa, he was declared fit to work by the company-designated physician. However, during the course of his employment, he suffered a debilitating psychological illness and was repatriated for further treatment. Despite the medical treatments of the company-designated physicians, he was not restored to his pre-injury health status and was not able to work for more than 120 days, thereby entitling him to total permanent disability benefits including moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees.

On the other hand, Magsaysay contended, among others, that Asa was barred from claiming compensation benefits in view of his material concealment of his past mental disorder during his PEME. They also claimed that bipolar disorder is hereditary in origin and thus, not work-related. Asa was also not entitled to moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees because they have not acted in bad faith when they denied his claims.

On May 7, 2014, the LA rendered a Decision in favor of Asa. The dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents Magsaysay Maritime Corporation and C.S.C.S. International NV to jointly and severally pay complainant:

1. US$60,000.00 as total permanent disability benefits; and

2. US$6,000.00 as attorney's fees.

All other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED. 18

In siding with Asa, the LA ratiocinated that Magsaysay was already estopped from claiming that Asa's illness is pre-existing or that he maliciously concealed his medical condition. The LA pointed out that Magsaysay have knowledge of Asa's medical history having previously hired him in 2012, when he suffered his first episode of mental disorder. Despite such knowledge, Magsaysay gave him another chance when they rehired him and extended him with another employment contract.

The LA further opined that Asa's bipolar disorder, albeit genetic in origin, could be caused by outside factors such as stress or a major life event. Here, the fact that Asa was required to work for 11 hours straight for three consecutive days must have contributed or aggravated his illness, warranting the award of total and permanent disability benefits.

As to Asa's claim for moral and exemplary damages, the LA denied the same, there being no bad faith on the part of Magsaysay. However, since Asa was forced to litigate to protect his interest, he was awarded attorney's fees.

Dismayed by the unfavorable ruling, Magsaysay elevated the matter to the NLRC, insisting that Asa was not entitled to total and permanent disability benefits because his bipolar disorder is not work-related, and that he knowingly concealed his mental condition during his PEME. Asa was also not entitled to damages and attorney's fees because there was no evidence that they acted in bad faith in denying his monetary claims.

On July 31, 2014, the NLRC rendered a Decision 19 which reversed and set aside the LA's Decision. The NLRC held that bipolar disorder is not among the work-related illness listed under Section 32-A of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC). Thus, the burden to prove the same rests on the seafarer. However, Asa failed to discharge the same. Asa did not allege much less prove how his working conditions caused or increased his risk of developing bipolar disorder. Further, the NLRC opined that bipolar disorder is linked to one's genetic disposition, while environmental factors serve as mere triggers for those with existing genetic predisposition to the disease. Asa's own doctor also made no declaration that bipolar disease is a work-related condition. Hence, Asa's mental illness was not compensable and he was not entitled to attorney's fees.

At odds with the ruling, Asa filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the NLRC denied the same in its Resolution 20 dated November 3, 2014.

Unperturbed, Magsaysay filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, claiming that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in finding that bipolar disorder is not work-related and in ultimately, denying his claim for total and permanent disability benefits.

On March 9, 2017, the CA rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed 31 July 2014 Decision and 3 November 2014 Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The 7 May 2014 Decision of the Labor Arbiter is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED. 21

Similar to the LA, the CA held that Asa was entitled to total and permanent disability benefits because bipolar disorder is not confined to being hereditary but could be caused by stressful life events like respondent's strenuous physical labor in catering to a large number of passengers on board the vessel. Since seafaring is already a stressful occupation per se, the same had also triggered his mental condition. Further, despite respondent's brief stint on board the vessel, his 3-day continuous work for 11 hours have triggered his mental disorder.

In addition, the CA stressed that there was no concealment because Magsaysay was well aware of Asa's mental condition when he was first hired in 2012, and was in fact repatriated due to his brief psychotic disorder. The company-designated physicians who previously diagnosed him in 2012 were also the same company-designated physicians who assessed him in this case. Hence, they could have easily pulled out his medical records when he was being assessed for re-employment.

Unconvinced by the ruling, Magsaysay moved for reconsideration, but to no avail, as the CA denied the same in its impugned Resolution dated August 17, 2017.

Hence, this petition.

Issues

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING THE SEAFARER DISABILITY BENEFITS AS HIS BIPOLAR DISORDER IS NOT WORK-RELATED.

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING THE SEAFARER DISABILITY BENEFITS AS THE SEAFARER IS GUILTY OF WILLFUL CONCEALMENT.

III. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REINSTATING THE LABOR ARBITER'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES, AS THE PETITIONER'S DENIAL OF THE SEAFARER'S CLAIMS ARE PREMISED ON THE FACTS AND SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AS WELL AS THE GOVERNING POEA CONTRACT. 22

In the main, Magsaysay maintained that Asa was not entitled to his claim for total and permanent disability benefits because he was on board the vessel for a mere two to three days and thus, there was no evidence that could possibly support his allegation that his bipolar disorder is work-related. Neither did Asa's personal doctor state how he acquired his mental illness, much less that his condition was caused by his brief period of employment on board the vessel. Absent any evidence of work-relation, they insist that the NLRC was correct in denying respondent's claim for disability benefits. 23

In addition, Magsaysay continue to capitalize on the alleged failure of Asa to disclose his past mental condition during his PEME. For Magsaysay, the non-disclosure of his past medical condition constitutes willful concealment, disqualifying him from claiming total and permanent disability benefits. 24

Lastly, Magsaysay propound that there is no basis for the award of attorney's fees because they have not acted in bad faith in denying Asa's monetary claims. 25

On the other hand, Asa counters that his bipolar disorder is work-related and compensable falling among the occupational diseases listed under Section 32, paragraph 6 of the POEA-SEC or "severe mental disorder." He claims that as assistant waiter, he was exposed to strenuous physical activities or hard manual labor especially for three consecutive days working for 11 hours in serving 300 passengers per meal, which could have caused and/or triggered his mental disorder. 26 Due to his mental condition, he could no longer resume his duties as a seafarer without risk to himself and to others. Further, given his present condition, he posits that no profit-oriented employer would hire him for the same position since he would be exposed again to strenuous physical activities or hard manual labor on board the ocean-going vessel especially in lifting heavy loads. 27 Since the company-designated physicians have also not issued a fit to work assessment within 120/240 days from his repatriation, he claims that he is deemed to have been totally and permanent disabled. 28

Asa also recapitulates that he did not commit misrepresentation or concealment as Magsaysay apprised of his past and present medical condition. He reiterated that Magsaysay previously hired him in 2012, when he suffered his first episode of mental disorder. After treatment by the company-designated physicians, he was declared fit to work, so much so, that Magsaysay re-employed him despite his past mental condition. 29

Finally, Asa submits that he was correctly awarded attorney's fees as he was compelled to litigate and incurred expenses in hiring a lawyer to protect his sacred rights under the POEA-SEC. 30

Our Ruling

Prefatorily, it is a general rule that only questions of law raised via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are reviewable by this Court. 31 Factual findings of administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, including labor tribunals, are accorded much respect by this Court as they are specialized to rule on matters falling within their jurisdiction especially when these are supported by substantial evidence. 32 In exceptional cases, however, this Court may be urged to probe and resolve factual issues where there is insufficient or insubstantial evidence to support the findings of the tribunal or this court below, or when too much is concluded, inferred or deduced from the bare or incomplete facts submitted by the parties or, where the LA and the NLRC came up with conflicting positions. 33

This case falls squarely within the aforesaid exceptions considering the conflicting findings of the LA and the CA on one hand, and the NLRC, on the other. Thus, while the issues presented by petitioners were essentially factual in nature, this Court will delve and resolve the present controversy.

Settled is the rule that entitlement of seafarers to disability benefits is governed not only by medical findings but also by contract and by law. 34 The relevant contracts are: (a) the POEA-SEC, which is a standard set of provisions deemed incorporated in every seafarer's contract of employment; (b) the CBA, if any and; (c) the employment agreement between the seafarer and his employer. 35 By law, the Labor Code provisions on disability apply with equal force to seafarers. 36

In this case, respondent was employed by petitioners Magsaysay for and on behalf of its foreign principal, C.S.C.S. on April 5, 2013, thus the 2010 POEA-SEC contract governs their relations and correlatively, respondent's claims for disability benefits.

Pursuant to Section 20 (A) of the 2010 POEA-SEC, two elements must concur in order for a disability to be compensable: (1) the injury or illness must be work-related; and (2) the work-related injury or illness must have existed during the term of the seafarer's employment. There is no question that the second element is present, since respondent's bipolar disorder manifested itself while he was under the employ of petitioners. The sole question to be resolved is, whether such illness is work-related.

As a general rule, the principle of work-relation requires that the disease or illness in question must be one of those listed as an occupational disease under Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC. 37 At any rate, the law acknowledges that there are certain diseases not otherwise considered as an occupational disease under the POEA-SEC may nevertheless have been caused or aggravated by the seafarer's working conditions. 38 In these situations, the law recognizes the inherent paucity of the list and the difficulty, if not the outright improbability, of accounting for all the known and unknown diseases that may be associated with, caused or aggravated by such working conditions. 39 To address this issue, Section 20 (A) (4) of the POEA-SEC has created a disputable presumption in favor of compensability by mandating that those illnesses not listed in Section 32 are disputably presumed as work-related. 40 Notwithstanding this presumption, We have held that on due process grounds, the claimant-seafarer must still prove by substantial evidence that his/her work conditions caused or at least increased the risk of contracting the disease. 41 This is because awards of compensation cannot rest entirely on bare assertions and presumptions. In order to establish compensability of a non-occupational disease, reasonable proof of work-connection is sufficient — direct causal relation is not required. 42 Thus, probability, not the ultimate degree of certainty, is the test of proof in compensation proceedings. 43

In this case, this Court affirms the uniform findings of the LA and CA that respondent was able to prove by substantial evidence that his illness is work-related and thus, compensable.

Based on medical studies, bipolar disorder, originally called manic depressive illness, is one of the most challenging psychiatric disorders to manage. 44 It is a brain disorder that causes severe and unusual fluctuations in an individual's mood, energy and ability to function. 45 Adults with bipolar disorder typically experience a pattern of mood swings ranging from hypomania or mania, 46 (which includes increased rates of thinking and activity, and less need for sleep) to depression, which includes difficulty in making decisions, sleep disturbances, low energy levels, lack of interest in sex, appetite disturbances, and difficulties with concentration and attention. 47 While it is widely acknowledged that bipolar disorder is strongly heritable, genetics alone is not the sole cause of bipolar disorder. Research suggests that bipolar disorder is caused by a combination of factors including genetic transmission and vulnerability, neurotransmitter abnormalities, and environmental factors, such as stressful life events. 48

Notably, even the medical literature cited by petitioners in their petition mentions that the onset and progression of bipolar disorder involve the interaction of genetics, neurochemical and environmental factors. Some of the notable environmental factors that can trigger an episode of bipolar disorder includes a stressful life event, frequent use of stimulants or alcohol and lack of sleep. 49

Similarly, the NLRC while declaring that respondent's bipolar disorder is not work-related has acknowledged that bipolar disorder may be triggered by environmental factors such as extreme stress, sleep disruption, drugs and alcohol, to wit:

In any event, medical research recognizes that the development of bipolar disorder is linked to one's genetic disposition, while environmental factors serve as mere triggers to those with existing genetic disposition to the disease:

What Causes the Illness?

Scientists are learning about the possible causes of bipolar disorder through several kinds of studies. Most now agree that there is no single cause for bipolar disorder-rather, many factors act together to produce the illness. Bipolar disorder can run in families, so there is a high likelihood that genes contribute to the illness. However, environmental factors are also important in bipolar disorder-extreme stress, sleep disruption, and drugs and alcohol may trigger episodes in vulnerable patients.50 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, to encapsulate bipolar disorder is not solely attributable to genetics. External or environmental factors are also believed to be involved in the development of bipolar disorder or can set off an episode of mania or depression or make an existing symptom of bipolar disorder worse. Some of these known triggers include stress, major life events, substance abuse, and sleep deprivation. aScITE

In this case, it remains undisputed that as assistant waiter, respondent was exposed to constant strenuous physical activities or hard manual labor in catering to the dining needs of large number of passengers on board petitioners' vessel. To meet the demands of his work and keep up with the constant meal periods, he was also required to work for 11 hours for three consecutive days without full rest. Aside from his dining duties, he was also tasked to perform safety, service and social duties, including those instructed by his supervisor, the Master and other superiors. 51 Due to his working condition, he suffered sleepless nights, restlessness, hallucination, poor communication, confusion and fear of being killed by a fellow crew, all of which, have led to his eventual repatriation until he was finally diagnosed to be suffering from bipolar disorder. Given these circumstances and in conjunction with medical studies, a reasonable link between respondent's employment and his mental illness exists. It is highly probable that his constant exposure to physical stress, coupled with his harsh working condition at sea and his sleep deprivation for three consecutive days have triggered if not increased the risk of his bipolar disorder.

The foregoing finds further support from the case of Career Philippines Shipmanagement, Inc. v. Godinez, 52 where this Court allowed the disability claims of a seafarer for bipolar disorder after it has been established that his/her mental illness was directly caused by the unprofessional and inhumane treatment of his/her superiors, as well as his/her exposure to harsh working environment and conditions while at sea.

In other cases, this Court has similarly declared that a seafarer's mental illness is work-related having been caused and/or triggered by his/her working environment.

In Cabuyoc v. Inter-Orient Navigation Shipmanagement, Inc., 53 this Court has granted the payment of disability compensation for schizophrenia after finding that the seafarer's mental illness and disability were the direct results of the demands of his/her shipboard employment contract and the harsh and inhumane treatment of the officers on board the vessel.

The same ruling was reached in NFD International Manning Agents, Inc. v. NLRC, 54 where this Court has declared that schizophrenia is work-related after the employer has failed to negate the causal confluence between the epilepsy suffered by the seafarer after a mauling incident while on board the vessel and his subsequent affliction of schizophrenia.

The work-relatedness of the seafarer's schizophrenia was likewise upheld in Leonis Navigation Co., Inc. v. Obrero, 55 where this Court has considered the seafarer's prolonged stint at sea, demotion and work-related stress as contributing factors in the aggravation of his/her mental illness.

In all these cases, the common denominator, as here, is that stress and working environment play a major role in the causation, development of, and even exacerbation of the seafarer's mental illness. Thus, while it may be true that respondent was on board petitioners' vessel for a brief period of time, the same was already sufficient to have set off or contributed even to a small degree to the cause of his bipolar disorder.

Case law instructs that in determining the compensability of an illness, it is not required that the employment be the sole factor in the growth, development, or acceleration of a claimants' illness to entitle him/her to the benefits provided for. It is enough that his/her employment contributed, even if only in a small degree, to the development of the disease. 56 To stress anew, probability, not the ultimate degree of certainty, is the test of proof in compensation proceedings. 57

Having established a reasonable link between the work and mental illness of respondent, it becomes imperative on the part of the company-designated physician to arrive at a definite assessment of the seafarer's fitness to resume sea duties or to determine the degree of his/her disability within a period of 120 or 240 days from repatriation, as the case may be. In Elburg Shipmanagement Philippines, Inc. v. Quiogue, 58 this Court laid down the following guidelines that should govern the total and permanent disability claims by a seafarer: viz.:

1. The company-designated physician must issue a final medical assessment on the seafarer's disability grading within a period of 120 days from the time the seafarer reported to him;

2. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days, without any justifiable reason, then the seafarer's disability becomes permanent and total;

3. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days with a sufficient justification (e.g., seafarer required further medical treatment or seafarer was uncooperative), then the period of diagnosis and treatment shall be extended to 240 days. The employer has the burden to prove that the company-designated physician has sufficient justification to extend the period; and

4. If the company-designated physician still fails to give his assessment within the extended period of 240 days, then the seafarer's disability becomes permanent and total, regardless of any justification. 59

From the foregoing, it is easily discernible that a seafarer's inability to work and the failure of the company-designated physician to issue a declaration as to his/her fitness or disability after the lapse of the initial 120 days will not automatically bring about a shift in the seafarer's state from total temporary disability to total permanent disability. 60 The company-designated physician is given an additional 120 days, or a total of 240 days from repatriation, to give the seafarer further treatment and, thereafter, make a declaration as to the nature of the latter's disability. Thus, it is only upon the lapse of 240 days, or when so declared by the company-designated physician, that a seafarer may be deemed totally and permanently disabled. 61

Here, the company-designated physicians failed to issue a definite assessment of respondent's fitness for sea duties even after the lapse of 120 days from the time of his repatriation on May 30, 2013. Even assuming that respondent's illness required further treatment, hence justifying an extension of the period to 240 days, still no evidence was adduced to prove that a certification of fitness or disability was issued by the company-designated physicians. Verily, by operation of law, respondent's mental condition has already lapsed into total and permanent disability. On this score, the CA did not err in awarding him total and permanent disability benefits.

In the same manner, the CA did not err in finding that respondent did not commit willful concealment of his past mental condition that would preclude him from claiming his compensation benefits.

The pertinent rule on the matter is Section 20 (E) of the 2010 POEA-SEC, which speaks of an instance where an employer is absolved from liability when a seafarer suffers a work-related injury or illness on account of the latter's willful concealment or misrepresentation of a pre-existing condition or illness:

E. A seafarer who knowingly conceals a pre-existing illness or condition in the Pre-Employment Medical Examination (PEME) shall be liable for misrepresentation and shall be disqualified from any compensation and benefits. This is likewise a just cause for termination of employment and imposition of appropriate administrative sanctions. 62 (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, it remains uncontroverted that respondent was previously hired by petitioners for the same position in 2012, when he suffered his first episode of mental disorder. After medical repatriation, he underwent a series of medical examinations and treatments until he was declared "FIT for EMPLOYMENT" 63 by the company-designated physicians. Thereafter, on April 5, 2013, petitioners hired him again and he was deployed for sea service after he was declared "FIT FOR SEA DUTY" in a Medical Certificate 64 dated March 5, 2013.

Significantly, Dr. Go and Dr. Lim, the company-designated physicians, confirmed their knowledge of the past medical history of respondent when they noted in their Medical Report 65 dated May 30, 2013 that respondent had a brief psychotic disorder in 2012 while under the employ of petitioners.

Under these circumstances, the CA and LA were correct in concluding that petitioners were already estopped from claiming that respondent committed willful concealment of his past mental illness. As the facts and the records indicate, petitioners were well aware of his past mental condition even before he was re-hired and re-deployed for sea service.

In any case, even assuming that respondent was suffering from a previous mental condition, still, this would not deprive him of compensation benefits. Compensability of an ailment does not depend on whether the injury or disease was pre-existing at the time of the employment, but rather if the disease or injury is work-related or aggravated his/her condition. 66 To reiterate, respondent's constant exposure to strenuous physical activities as a seaman, combined with harsh conditions of the sea and his sleep deprivation on board the vessel have likely triggered, contributed to the development of, or aggravated his mental condition.

It is worthy to stress that in order for an employee to recover compensation, it is not necessary that he/she must have been in perfect condition or health at the time he/she received the injury, or that he/she be free from disease. 67 Every workman brings with him to his employment certain infirmities, and while the employer is not the insurer of the health of his employees, he takes them as he finds them, 68 and assumes the risk of having the weakened condition aggravated by some injury which might not hurt or bother a perfectly normal, healthy person. 69 The degree of contribution of the employment to the worsening of the seafarer's condition is not significant to the compensability of the illness. 70 Probability, not certainty, is the touchstone 71 in disability compensation proceedings.

In the ultimate analysis, respondent was entitled to total and permanent disability benefits having established by substantial evidence and the work-relatedness of his illness.

On the matter of attorney's fees, Article 2208 of the New Civil Code provides that, attorney's fees can be recovered in actions for the recovery of wages of laborers and actions for indemnity under employer's liability laws. Attorney's fees are also recoverable when the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to incur expenses to protect his/her interest. 72 Such conditions being present in this case, this Court sustains the award of attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total monetary awards in favor of respondent.

Lastly, this Court deems it proper to impose a legal interest rate of six percent (6%) per annum on the monetary awards from the date of finality of this Resolution until full payment pursuant to Nacar v. Gallery Frames. 73

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated March 9, 2017 and the Resolution dated August 17, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 139050 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioners Magsaysay Maritime Corporation and C.S.C.S. International NV are ORDERED to jointly and severally pay respondent Herman John Hernando Asa US$60,000.00 as total permanent disability benefits and US$6,000.00 as attorney's fees.

In addition, all monetary awards shall earn an interest rate of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of this Resolution until fully paid.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

By:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 3-22.

2. Penned by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan (now a member of this Court), with Associate Justices Normandie B. Pizarro and Ma. Luisa Quijano-Padilla, concurring; id. at 32-40.

3.Id. at 42-43.

4. Penned by Presiding Commissioner Gerardo C. Nograles, with Commissioners Perlita B. Velasco and Romeo L. Go, concurring; CA rollo, pp. 164-175.

5.Id. at 195-196.

6. Penned by Labor Arbiter Adolfo C. Babiano; id. at 112-120.

7.Id. at 244.

8.Id. at 85-86.

9.Id. at 80.

10.Id. at 54.

11.Id. at 246.

12.Id. at 87-88.

13.Id. at 89.

14.Id. at 59.

15.Id. at 58.

16.Id. at 60-61.

17.Id. at 44.

18.Id. at 119-120.

19.Id. at 164-175.

20.Id. at 195-196.

21.Rollo, p. 39.

22.Rollo, p. 8.

23.Id. at 10.

24.Id. at 16.

25.Id. at 20-21.

26.Id. at 65-69.

27.Id. at 77.

28.Id. at 74-75.

29.Id. at 69-71.

30.Id. at 79-80.

31.Dohle Philman Manning Agency, Inc. v. Doble, 819 Phil. 500, 508-509 (2017).

32.Reyes v. Global Beer Below Zero, Inc., 819 Phil. 483, 493 (2017).

33.Andrada v. Agemar Manning Agency, Inc., 698 Phil. 170, 180 (2012).

34.Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc., 588 Phil. 895, 908 (2008).

35.Gargallo v. Dohle Seafront Crewing (Manila), Inc., 769 Phil. 915, 926-927 (2015).

36.Philasia Shipping Agency Corp. v. Tomacruz, 692 Phil. 632, 646 (2012).

37.Jebsens Maritime, Inc. v. Babol, 722 Phil. 828, 838 (2013).

38.Jebsen Maritime, Inc. v. Raven, 743 Phil. 371, 387 (2014).

39.Aldaba v. Career Philippines Shipmanagement, Inc., 811 Phil. 486, 498 (2017).

40.Magsaysay Maritime Corporation v. Heirs of Fritz D. Buenaflor, G.R. No. 227447, June 23, 2020.

41.De Leon v. Maunlad Trans, Inc., 805 Phil. 531, 540 (2017).

42.Skippers United Pacific, Inc. v. Lagne, G.R. No. 217036, August 20, 2018.

43.Magat v. Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc., 829 Phil. 570, 580 (2018).

44. Anderson, 1. M., Haddad, P. M., & Scott, J. (2013). Bipolar disorder. BMJ: British Medical Journal, 346 (7889), 27-32. Accessed through http://www.jstor.org/stable/23493486 on September 27, 2021.

45. Sutton, K. K. (2013). Childhood Bipolar Disorder: A Difficult Diagnosis. Beyond Behavior, 23 (1), 30-37. Accessed through http://www.jstor.org/stable/24011912 on September 27, 2021.

46. Bardick, A. D., & Bernes, K. B. (2005). A Closer Examination of Bipolar Disorder in School-Age Children. Professional School Counseling, 9 (1), 72-77. Accessed through http://www.jstor.org/stable/42732646 on September 27, 2021.

47.Id.

48.Supra note 44.

49.Rollo, pp. 13-16.

50. CA rollo, pp. 171-172.

51.Id. at 243-244.

52. 819 Phil. 86 (2017).

53. 537 Phil. 897 (2006).

54. 336 Phil. 466 (1997).

55. 794 Phil. 481 (2016).

56.Supra note 42.

57.Supra note 43, at 581.

58. 765 Phil. 341 (2015).

59.Elburg Shipmanagement Philippines, Inc. v. Quiogue,id. at 362-363.

60. See Kestrel Shipping Co., Inc. vs. Munar, 702 Phil. 717, 738 (2013).

61.Supra note 35, at 928.

62.Deocariza v. Fleet Management Services Philippines, Inc., 836 Phil. 1087, 1100 (2018).

63. CA rollo, pp. 85-86.

64.Id. at 54.

65.Id. at 87.

66.Austria v. Crystal Shipping, Inc., 781 Phil. 674, 685 (2016).

67.Id.

68.Canuel v. Magsaysay Maritime Corporation, 745 Phil. 252, 273 (2014), citing More Maritime Agencies, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 366 Phil. 646, 654-655 (1999).

69.Sestoso v. United Philippine Lines, Inc., G.R. No. 237063, July 24, 2019 citing More Maritime Agencies, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 366 Phil. 646, 655 (1999).

70.Supra note 66, at 685.

71.Supra note 43, at 583.

72.Atienza v. Orophil Shipping International Co., Inc., 815 Phil. 480, 508 (2017).

73. 716 Phil. 267, 283 (2013).